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Abstract
When announced, the Australian government was confident that Centrelink and the 
Job Network would lead to improved efficiency and effectiveness. These outcomes 
are commonly associated with the application of new public management reform 
where service provision is separated from policy departments. However, in the public 
management literature there is widespread debate about the merits of whether this 
purchaser-provider form of new public management is successful. This thesis 
employs a case study approach in evaluating Centrelink and the Job Network as 
examples of new public management reform in which delivery is externalised from 
the policy departments. Both longitudinal and cross-sectional analysis seeks to 
determine whether efficiency and effectiveness have improved over a period that 
includes from when these services were delivered by departments of the state through 
to delivery by Centrelink and the Job Network.
A central theme in new public management reform is that cost savings are delivered if 
the public sector separates its services delivery components or delivery is undertaken 
in competitive markets. To assess whether cost savings have been achieved, this 
thesis takes account of the costs involved in providing income support and 
employment services and links these to the programs delivered over a period of time 
before, during and after the introduction of Centrelink and the Job Network. The data 
sources for the efficiency evaluation are the annual reports and financial statements of 
the relevant organisations.
Supporters of new public management reform claim that separating service delivery 
leads to an improved quality of delivery for the end-users of services. In examining 
this claim, the thesis measures service effectiveness according to the results of 
customer satisfaction surveys. The satisfaction survey instruments examined for this 
purpose were obtained through Freedom of Information requests to the Department of 
Employment and Workplace Relations and Centrelink.
The longitudinal analysis demonstrates that the delivery of income support and 
employment services by Centrelink and the Job Network are no more efficient than 
the prior delivery arrangements. Similarly, in terms of customer satisfaction, the
analysis indicates that job seekers maintain a general range of satisfaction and that 
improvements have not taken place since the establishment of Centrelink and the Job 
Network.
The cross-sectional analysis compares the efficiency and effectiveness of Centrelink 
to the services delivered by the Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) -  a 
department that delivers similar programs to Centrelink, but has not undergone a split 
in its policy and service delivery functions. This analysis shows that DVA is able to 
deliver income support payments at a similar cost per customer as Centrelink’s 
delivery of the age pension and disability support pension. Also, DVA is able to 
achieve very high levels of customer satisfaction in the delivery of its services.
This thesis adds to the body of evidence providing support for public sector delivery 
that takes place within departments being no less efficient or effective in the delivery 
of services than reformed delivery systems that separate and externalise these 
services. It is suggested governments should turn greater attention towards 
understanding how organisations achieve success in their efficiency and effectiveness, 
rather than emphasising the form such delivery should take.
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Chapter One
Chapter 1: Introduction
In the late 1990s the regional office network of the Department of Social Security 
(DSS) and, within the employment department, the Commonwealth Employment 
Service (CES) were replaced by alternative service delivery mechanisms. A 
specialised government service delivery agency, called Centrelink, was established to 
deliver all of the network services of DSS, including functions of the CES relating to 
the registration and assessment of unemployed people. The employment assistance 
functions of the CES became outsourced to private and non-profit firms, collectively 
called the Job Network, that compete in a tender and performance-based process to 
deliver the government’s employment services. These changes were introduced as 
part of an international trend in reform called ‘new public management’1. These 
reforms recommend the introduction of changes to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of publicly-funded services.
The Australian government believed Centrelink and the Job Network would introduce 
substantial and long-term benefits. The then employment Minister (Vanstone 1996) 
considered Centrelink would offer “significant potential for service improvement and 
efficiency savings’’ (p.51) and the Job Network would “achieve better value for 
money” (p. vii) and “significantly enhance the quality of services to job seekers”
1 Examined in greater detail in Chapter 2, ‘new public management’ is the term commonly 
applied to a range of public sector reforms applied from the 1980s that sought to introduce 
private sector management techniques and competitive markets in the delivery of publicly- 
funded services.
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(p. 13). Furthermore, the employment department has noted that “[t]he Minister also 
explained that rather than simply cutting spending within the existing policy 
framework, the Government sought improvements in efficiency and effectiveness 
through structural reform.” (DEWRSB 2000c, p. 12)2.
This thesis examines Centrelink and the Job Network as examples of organisations 
reflecting the new public management approach to service delivery in the public 
sector where service provision is separated from the policy department. Aspects 
related to the efficiency and effectiveness of these organisations is considered. The 
question asked is whether there is firm evidence that efficiency and effectiveness have 
improved since that time when these services were delivered by DSS and the CES.
Traditionally, the approach to organising public bureaucracies involves the provision 
of state services being undertaken by large departments that combine policy 
development and service delivery within a hierarchical structure. However, this 
traditional bureaucratic model is considered rule-bound, fostering inflexible decision­
making and promoting a risk adverse culture that reduces the effectiveness of 
programs. In addition, the theories behind new public management suggest that 
bureaucrats under the traditional model are driven by personal preferences that results 
in budgets being maximised, producing wastage and inefficiencies.
Alternative methods of service delivery, such as Centrelink and the Job Network, are 
based on the belief that purchaser-provider models and competitive markets are more 
efficient and effective than the traditional bureaucratic approach. However, achieving 
the expected efficiency and effectiveness outcomes by reforming bureaucratic 
structures is far more uncertain than it is guaranteed and many writers caution against 
the use of structural solutions in the search for performance and service improvements 
(Boyne 2003a; Hood 2000; Kettl 1997; Peters and Savoie 1994; Pollitt 1995; Rhodes 
1994).
2 Referring to the then education Minister, Dr David Kemp, in a speech to the Meeting of 
OECD Labour Ministers, 1997, titled Enhancing the Effectiveness of Active Labour Market 
Policies, Australia.
2
Chapter One
Aim and scope
The aim of this thesis is to explore public sector reform of the late-twentieth century 
through the examples of Centrelink and the Job Network. To understand why these 
arrangements have come about, what it was hoped would be achieved, whether or not 
it appears reform has been successful and what the results imply for the theories that 
support new public management. The thesis is particularly concerned with the 
relationship between reform and its intended effects, comprising the commonly stated 
objectives of public sector reform -  improving efficiency and effectiveness. Whilst 
many other impacts, both positive and negative, are also associated with public sector 
reform, they are not the central concern of this thesis. This is not to suggest other 
impacts are less important for the purpose of research. All impacts of reform, major 
and minor, stated and unintended, should be understood and carefully weighed in 
decisions that adjust and restructure the ways that government programs are delivered.
Centrelink and the Job Network provide high-profile and large-scale examples of 
organisations that contribute to the debate about the impacts of public sector reform 
where service delivery is separated from policy departments. They were chosen for 
this study for a number of reasons. Both are closely connected and deal with a 
common customer base -  job seekers. Part of the reasons put forward for establishing 
Centrelink was to absorb some of the functions previously provided by the CES, 
thereby facilitating the introduction of the Job Network. An advantage in examining 
Centrelink and the Job Network is the organisations offer for analysis two different 
types of new public management reform that exemplify purchaser-provider 
arrangements -  agencification and outsourcing. In addition, an important 
consideration is being able to track over a lengthy period the criteria chosen for 
measuring the performance of the organisations before, during and after reform. 
Lastly, the reform is able to be linked with the objectives of new public management 
-  efficiency and effectiveness.
Centrelink and the Job Network have been subject to a great deal of research, 
particularly about the impact of the reform on disadvantaged unemployed people. 
However, little independent research has sought to examine the efficiency of the
3
Chapter One
arrangements, in terms of the costs and the services provided, or the impact on service 
effectiveness, as defined by end-user satisfaction. This thesis seeks to close this gap.
The evaluation does not examine the extent that structural reform is responsible for 
achieving greater cost efficiencies or improved customer satisfaction. The reasons for 
improvements in efficiency and effectiveness are many and the extent that any single 
variable is responsible is a complex issue that requires sophisticated analysis. But, the 
first step in this process is to establish whether the desired objectives of efficiency and 
effectiveness have been achieved. If it is the case that efficiency and effectiveness are 
improved, then further research may proceed to examine whether or not, or to what 
extent, the structural reforms that resulted in the establishment of Centrelink and the 
Job Network are responsible.
The thesis also makes no claim of being able to generalise the findings to the wider 
sphere of public sector reform. The circumstances surrounding reform are highly 
variable and the results contingent on numerous factors. However, the thesis does 
provide a distinctive method of examining the outcomes of public sector reform that 
may have application to other case studies. In addition, key findings may be linked 
with other research, providing a broader platform to develop generalisations about the 
success or failure of public sector reform.
Defining the terms
Foremost in conducting an evaluation of efficiency and effectiveness in public sector 
reform is to be clear about the way these terms are defined. The means by which 
efficiency and effectiveness will be measured in this thesis is cost efficiencies and 
customer satisfaction respectively. This section provides a brief explanation for 
adopting these definitions.
Efficiency
The idea that delivery of a publicly-funded service will become more efficient if its 
provision is undertaken by the private sector, or the public sector provider adopts 
private sector management practices, is a central theme in new public management.
4
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While efficiency in the context of public sector reform is commonly undefined, the 
generally accepted use of the term is connected with the relationship between inputs 
and outputs and achieving value for money (Pollitt 1998).
Centrelink and the Job Network are not exceptions in being associated with reform 
that is generally concerned with cost savings. One of the key considerations that 
guided the reform was “in a tight budgetary environment, to achieve better value for 
money in the expenditure of taxpayers’ funds” (Vanstone 1996, p. 2). This key 
objective most likely relates to the more familiar input-focused definition of 
efficiency, in which a decrease in inputs is sought while the same amount of outputs is 
maintained. However, an output-focused efficiency meaning, in which an increase in 
outputs is sought, for the same level of inputs, is also possible. Using this common 
public sector approach to efficiency, this thesis will adopt a definition that is inputs- 
outputs focused and seeks to understand the costs of the arrangement, while taking 
account of the services provided.
Effectiveness
Generally, evaluations of effectiveness consider whether program goals are reached. 
For instance, in the case of the Job Network, effectiveness evaluations commonly 
judge the impact of this reform on achieving sustained employment outcomes for job 
seekers. These evaluations are important in determining the impact of reform on 
disadvantaged groups and contribute to debates about the role of government and how 
publicly-funded services should be delivered.
However, for the purpose of this thesis, the evaluation will consider performance in 
the area of service effectiveness. Improvements in service delivery are often linked 
with new public management reforms and Centrelink and the Job Network as 
primarily service delivery agencies provide suitable examples. Because job seekers 
are the end-users of the services, their thoughts and opinions are a significant factor in 
determining service effectiveness and a strong indicator of service quality. 
Accordingly, the thesis will measure service effectiveness according to the results of 
job seeker satisfaction surveys.
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A consideration of the level of service quality is commonly linked with efficiency 
reforms to ensure that lowering inputs, while maintaining outputs, is not achieved at 
the expense of quality (Boyne, Farrell, Law, Powell and Walker 2003). When 
combined with the results of the efficiency analysis, the definition of effectiveness 
chosen for this thesis provides a more complete picture of the overall outcomes of the 
reform, as account is taken of measures that consider inputs, outputs and quality.
Method of inquiry
In the context of evaluating public sector reform it has been noted that “evaluation 
requires not only precise measurement and methodological rigour, but also theoretical 
depth” (Boyne, Farrell, Law, Powell and Walker 2003, p. 5). When these authors 
emphasise the role of theory in the evaluation design process, they are placing value 
on the importance of developing questions that enable conclusions or judgements to 
be formed that connect with the objectives of the program being evaluated. In this 
way, an evaluation is able to provide information that assists in theory development 
and has practical implications for program design. This evaluative approach, as 
acknowledged by Boyne and his colleagues, is most commonly associated with Chen 
(1990) who emphasises the importance of examining the theory that drives a program 
and conducting evaluations with the program theory in mind. Using a theory-driven 
evaluation approach, this thesis seeks to understand the program theories relevant to 
the application of new public management. These theories are outlined in Chapter 2 
of this thesis. In addition, the choice of efficiency and effectiveness, as the evaluative 
criteria, enables an analysis that takes account of the principal outcomes supported by 
the theories underlying new public management.
The central method of analysis comprises a longitudinal study that commences in 
1993-94 and ends with the 2003-04 financial year. This period of time captures a 
number of years before Centrelink and the Job Network commenced, and includes the 
first seven years of the operation of Centrelink and the first six years for the Job 
Network. The evaluation period ends in 2003-04 as this is the last financial year
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before extensive changes were announced that altered the administrative 
arrangements.3
Data for the efficiency analysis was sourced from the publicly available annual 
reports and financial statements of the relevant departments. These documents 
provide comprehensive descriptions of the programs delivered and the costs involved 
in their delivery. The reports are also prepared in accordance with requirements 
applying throughout the Australian Public Service and this ensures consistency and 
comparability in the information provided by the different organisations over time.
Throughout the analysis all costs are converted to 2004 dollar values and these are 
calculated according to increases in the Consumer Price Index. This approach enables 
changes in the value of the dollar to be taken into account and ensures the comparison 
of costs over different periods is not rendered meaningless. All amounts are provided 
in Australian dollar values.
For the effectiveness criteria, the data was sourced from numerous job seeker 
satisfaction surveys. Most of these surveys are undertaken by specialised consumer 
research companies and the data contained in these surveys is extensive. However, as 
these surveys are not publicly available, a Freedom of Information request was 
required to gain access. Appendix 1 lists the surveys provided as part of this request. 
The methodologies used in these surveys are of a high standard and the results 
provide the opportunity to make reasonable general observations about the trends in 
job seekers’ satisfaction.
In addition to the longitudinal assessment, a cross-sectional analysis is also 
undertaken comparing Centrelink to the services delivered by the Department of 
Veterans’ Affairs (DVA). This department is an example of an organisation that
3 In October 2004, at the beginning of the fourth Howard Ministry, administrative 
rearrangements removed Centrelink from the social security portfolio. A new Department of 
Human Services was established that incorporated a number of delivery agencies, such as 
Centrelink, the Health Insurance Commission and the Child Support Agency. This restructure 
established a distinct split between the policy and delivery functions that previously involved 
the delivery agencies remaining within the same policy portfolios. The administrative 
rearrangements also removed from the social security portfolio the policy responsibility for 
working-age income support payments and placed these with the employment department.
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delivers similar programs to Centrelink, within a comparable environment, but DVA 
has not undergone a split in its policy and service delivery functions.
Thesis structure
This thesis comprises 14 chapters with the first three chapters establishing the scene. 
The next ten chapters are concerned with the central question of the thesis -  whether 
there are indications that improvements in efficiency and effectiveness have taken 
place since Centrelink and the Job Network replaced the previous delivery 
arrangements. The final chapter concludes the thesis.
This introductory chapter establishes the framework for the research, briefly setting 
the scene and explaining the methods by which the inquiry of efficiency and 
effectiveness is undertaken. Chapter 2 places the research into the overall context of 
public sector reform and describes the theories that support new public management 
reform. Other drivers of reform, in addition to the theoretical drivers, are discussed 
and this leads to a description of the circumstances surrounding the establishment of 
Centrelink and the Job Network. Chapter 2 then proceeds to consider the reforms in 
practice and, recognising that new public management reforms are not always 
successful, examines theories contrary to those that support the reforms and discusses 
potential problems with the implementation of public sector reform. Chapter 3 
establishes how the evaluation will be conducted. An account of evaluation theory 
and practice assists in this process. Three central elements of a sound evaluation 
approach are identified -  the purpose, parameters and methods of evaluation. The 
requirements for meeting these three elements are discussed in the explanation of the 
evaluation methodology adopted for this thesis.
Chapter 4 commences the evaluation task by exploring the idea of efficiency and how 
the measurement of efficiency is applied in assessments of public sector reform. 
While the term ‘efficiency’ is shown to incorporate various meanings, its usage in 
public sector reform is commonly associated with reducing the level of inputs while 
emphasising an outputs focus for the services produced. This chapter also explores 
the measurement of efficiency in public sector reform by examining previous 
efficiency assessments of Centrelink and the Job Network. In Chapters 5 through to
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8, the evaluation is undertaken of whether improvements in efficiency have taken 
place since Centrelink and the Job Network were introduced. Data is examined to 
determine the costs of the arrangements and take into account the services provided. 
The assessment includes an analysis of the issues that relate to staffing, given the 
substantial resources that are invested in the number of staff for service delivery 
organisations. On the basis of the findings it is concluded that Centrelink and the Job 
Network are not more efficient than the previous structures of delivery and, therefore, 
that one should be guarded about claims suggesting Centrelink and the Job Network 
are more efficient in their delivery than DSS or the CES.
In using the attribute of end-user satisfaction as an indicator of service effectiveness, 
Chapter 9 explores the meaning of satisfaction, including the theories relating to its 
formation and measurement. The main problem identified with customer satisfaction 
involves the subjective nature of its measurement and how this produces wide 
variations for customer satisfaction results when, objectively, the same quality of 
service is delivered. Chapter 10 provides detailed descriptions and an assessment of 
the job seeker satisfaction survey instruments used in this thesis. Chapters 11,12 and 
13 examine the findings of the satisfaction surveys to determine whether improved 
levels of satisfaction are evident in the period since Centrelink and the Job Network 
replaced DSS and the CES. For Centrelink, surveys from the employment department 
suggest improvements in customer satisfaction have occurred since 2003. However, 
contrary findings from Centrelink surveys, and other factors, suggest improvements in 
customer satisfaction levels may not have taken place. For the Job Network, the 
analysis indicates no increases in the satisfaction of job seekers have occurred.
Chapters 8 and 13 undertake the cross-sectional comparisons of efficiency and 
effectiveness with the services delivered by DVA. The results suggest a combined 
approach to policy development and service delivery can be as cost effective and 
deliver as high a quality customer service as externalised delivery arrangements.
Chapter 14 concludes the thesis and contains three parts. The first part provides a 
summary of the main findings. The second part discusses the implications of the 
findings for the theories behind new public management reform and the third part 
considers future research prospects.
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Conclusion
This investigation into whether the claims of greater efficiency and effectiveness of 
Centrelink and the Job Network are reliable provides an opportunity to explore a 
tangible application of new public management reform in which service provision is 
separated from policy departments. The findings add to the body of evidence that 
demonstrates the combined approach of developing policy and delivering services 
within a single department can be as efficient and effective as externalised delivery 
structures. Therefore, the findings cast doubt on claims that reforming public sector 
delivery systems to establish purchaser-provider arrangements that separate service 
delivery or outsource its provision, will provide improved efficiency and 
effectiveness.
Over time, the ways that Centrelink and the Job Network have developed indicates the 
government is unwilling to relinquish control of the delivery aspects of its services. 
Administrative rearrangements in 2004 reduced Centrelink’s autonomy and brought 
the organisation under greater government control. For the Job Network, highly 
prescriptive contracts have evolved over time ensuring that job seekers are provided 
with minimum service standards. Perhaps these changes indicate the pace of reform 
is slowing and the Australian government is reflecting on directions for the delivery 
of its welfare services. Results, such as those arising from this study, suggest that 
governments should turn their attention towards understanding how organisations, 
both private and public, excel in delivering efficient and effective services, instead of 
emphasising the structure through which such delivery takes place.
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Chapter 2: The context -  Public sector reform
The purpose of this chapter is to position Centrelink and the Job Network into the 
wider context of public sector reform. The chapter begins by undertaking a brief 
historical account of the development of the modern public sector. Against this 
background, attention is turned towards the reasons why new public management 
reforms came about. Three main drivers of reform — ideological, theoretical and 
environmental — are discussed. The chapter is then able to situate and explain the 
people and events that led to the establishment of Centrelink and the Job Network and 
considers the types of new public management reform these agencies represent.
Finally, in recognising the desired outcomes of public sector reform do not 
necessarily eventuate, the chapter also explores reasons why new public management 
reforms may not be successful. First, contrary theoretical positions to the ideas of 
new institutional economics are examined and an alternative theory, stewardship 
theory, is described that offers a different explanation for the motivations of 
bureaucrats. Second, operational aspects that may be compromised by public sector 
reforms are discussed.
Historical background
The key ideas about the role of the modern public sector can be traced back to the 
late-eighteenth century and the writings of Adam Smith (Emy and Hughes 1991). 
The three key duties for government identified by Smith were protecting national
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defence, administering internal systems of justice to ensure citizens behave according 
to society’s laws and providing public goods that would otherwise not be available 
(Emy and Hughes 1991, p. 382). These ideas suggested a minimal role for 
government in regulating the economy and reversed the system of mercantilism that 
had previously operated. It was believed that minimal state intervention and 
unfettered market processes would provide incentives for self-betterment and lay the 
foundations for increased standards of living.
However, industrialisation, combined with a laissez-faire approach by government, 
provided wealth for some, but great hardship for many others. On this point, in 
writing about the origins of the modern state, Woodrow Wilson considered that in the 
United States “[t]he government had, in fact, been originated and organized upon the 
initiative and primarily in the interest of the mercantile and wealthy classes.” (quoted 
in Raadschelders 2000, p. 509). During this early period, populations grew, cities 
expanded and problems, such as inadequate housing and poor health, became 
widespread. In addition, the exploitation of workers, particularly the working 
conditions of children, became a concern and the role of government in an economic 
system that resulted in such hardships was subject to much debate.
Furthermore, the structure of public bureaucracies in Anglo-American countries that 
were based on systems of patronage where public officials were commonly politically 
prejudiced and highly corrupt was questioned.4 By the mid-nineteenth century there 
was strong pressure for governments to intervene in economic systems to alleviate the 
socially undesirable impacts of unbridled capitalism and to respond to the highly 
inefficient public sector bureaucracies that had developed as a result of employment 
based on obligations, rather than abilities.
State involvement in the economy led to the development of the welfare state that 
promoted an interventionist role for governments in relation to the wellbeing of its 
citizens. Changes to remove the patronage elements of public sectors were also 
progressed. For example, in the United Kingdom, the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of
4 One of the more dramatic examples of public sector fraud dates back to the 1830s when the 
Collector of the Port of New York absconded to Europe with over $1,250,000 of public monies 
(United States Office of Personnel Management 2003, p. 185).
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1853 transformed the British civil service and introduced examinations for entry and 
merit-based promotions to establish a qualified civil service that would serve the 
government of the day and be unaffected by the political system (Duggett 1997).
In Australia, the colonial powers also sought to combat corruption as a major priority 
and took their cues from the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms. Each of the six governing 
colonies established legislative frameworks embodying principles similar to those 
introduced into the United Kingdom and that, in time, would be adopted by the 
Australian government for the federal public service (Australian Public Service 
Commission 2003).
Of particular concern in the United States was solving the administrative chaos that 
would occur upon each change in elected government as a multitude of persistent 
office seekers petitioned the President and Congress for employment under the ‘spoils 
system’ (United States Office of Personnel Management 2003). The administrative 
reforms embodied in the Civil Service Act of 1883 replaced the spoils system with a 
merit-based system of public service recruitment and promotion, except for the most 
senior levels that remained political appointments.
The rise of industrialisation had also led to the development of ideas about the ways 
that large-scale, mass production could be organised. A number of writers from this 
period, such as Charles Babbage, Henri Fayol, Federick Taylor and Max Weber, 
sought to identify universal principles of design and management that would result in 
the one best way to organize and accomplish activities. With the role of the public 
sector expanding, the principles developed by such writers were incorporated into 
public bureaucracies as governments searched for structures that were believed to 
provide honest, efficient and effective means for developing and delivering public 
programs.
These pressures and the solutions offered led to the development of the classical or 
traditional model of public administration. The early reformers sought public sectors 
that would be trusted, respected and comprise suitably qualified workers committed to 
serving the cause of good government. This involved establishing permanent, merit- 
based, public services that were responsive to elected governments. Operationally,
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formal organisational structures developed that were based upon a division of labour 
and hierarchical authority.
Public sector reform in the late 20th century
During the twentieth century, governments at all levels expanded in their size, scope 
and degree of control in society. Factors such as the Great Depression and two world 
wars have been put forward to help explain the high levels of government intervention 
that developed. During the 1950s and 1960s the adoption of Keynesian economics 
supported interventionist government policies and consequently expansive social 
programs were pursued by Anglo-American governments. Whilst the traditional 
model of public administration operated virtually unquestioned during this time, in the 
latter half of the twentieth century many countries began to question whether their 
public services could be made more efficient and effective. Such questioning resulted 
in the planned restructure of public bureaucracies that involved a deliberate change to 
the structures and processes of public sector organisations with the objective of 
getting them to run better (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000, p. 8).
The ideas underlying the reforms and the approaches adopted are commonly referred 
to as ‘new public management’, although understanding exactly what this means is 
not straightforward (Hood 1991). Thomas writes that:
New Public Management is clearly a many-splendoured thing. As critics have 
noted, it is not a unified and consistent set of principles, but rather an 
agglomeration of ideas about how governments should redefine their roles and 
change how they deliver services. (Thomas 1998, p. 369)
Similarly, Rhodes (1994, p. 140) explains that new public management does not refer 
to any one idea, but to the current fashionable set of ideas that is driving public sector 
reform. Barzelay (2000) comments on how the new public management literature 
presents as a disorderly field that makes the subject difficult to teach. To Barzelay 
(2000), new public management comprises an abstract field of professional and policy 
discussions, conducted on an international level and describing recent changes in 
public sector management. Such confusion may relate to the inconsistent and at times 
disorganised, piecemeal ways that countries have approached the reform of their
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public sectors. However, the solutions adopted in new public management are 
derived from a shared belief and there is a common set of interventions that are 
chosen from, providing a framework enabling new public management to be 
discussed. This shared belief is that private sector management techniques and 
competitive markets are more efficient and effective than traditional public 
bureaucracies. For example, it is argued that hierarchical control results in delayed 
decision-making, while adhering to rules and regulations leads to inflexibility, 
unnecessary formalities and reduces the capacity of bureaucrats to take risks. The 
common set of interventions put forward by new public management include:
• a change in focus from inputs and processes to outputs and outcomes;
• the use of private sector management practices;
• an increase in program measurement such as performance indicators and 
standards;
• the growth of smaller, specific and autonomous organisations that replace 
large, multi-function, hierarchical departments;
• the use of contractual or contract-like arrangements in place of authority 
relationships;
• the development of market or market-like devices for the delivery of public 
services;
• an intermingling of the boundaries between the public and private sectors; and
• an emphasis on cost-cutting.
(Hood 1991; Pollitt 2002)
These commonalities in beliefs and interventions are sufficient for new public 
management to be “counted as a single movement” (Mulgan 2003, p. 151).
The drivers of reform
When the Australian Coalition government was voted into office in 1996, the Minister 
responsible for the public service stated that, “the challenge of public service reform 
is substantial and urgent” (Reith 1996, p. 6). The idea that the Australian public 
sector required reform was not unique and the new government acknowledged “the 
Australian Public Service has made some progress over the last decade” (Reith 1996,
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p. 10). However, the Minister also thought “the pace of change has been neither as 
fast, nor as far reaching, as required” and “the Government intends to accelerate the 
process of public service reform as an integral element of the broader reform agenda” 
(Reith 1996, p. 10).
This section of the chapter examines the drivers of public sector reform in the second 
half of the twentieth century, examining the reforms that had taken place prior to 
Centrelink and the Job Network and seeking to understand why the Minister for the 
public service considered substantial public sector reform remained an urgent 
requirement.
Ideological drivers
An ideology is a set of beliefs and values that influence behaviours and act as 
justifications for action. The ideological drivers of public sector reform often link to 
deeply held and generally unquestioned beliefs about the nature of people in society, 
the role of institutions and how governments play into this. Therefore, operating as 
powerful drivers of reform, ideological value patterns enable specific political 
interests and agendas to develop that facilitate the introduction of reform.
The ideological frameworks most commonly associated with public sector reform are 
neo-liberalism and individualism (Bevir and Rhodes 2003; Pollitt 1990). 
Neo-liberalist ideology advocates free trade and deregulation and a key influence is 
the philosophy of Adam Smith who, in the eighteenth century, promoted free 
enterprise and a reduced role for the state in the economy (Emy and Hughes 1991, p. 
383). Individualism promotes the merits of individual rights, including the role of the 
state in supporting an individual’s right to act in self-interest, provided the liberties of 
others are not infringed. The ideology of individualism is concerned that a powerful 
bureaucracy may expand to the point that individual liberties are undermined.
In his account of public sector reform in New Zealand, Scott (2001) recognises the 
influence of ideological positions in the adoption of reform. However, Scott (2001, 
p. 30) also considers the ideological arguments are “peripheral to important issues 
about the effectiveness of various management methods”. Similarly, whilst Schick
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(1996) acknowledges the power of ideas in giving leaders the confidence to introduce 
specific policies, he considers contemporary reform is related to ideas and practices 
that promise improvement in government services, with ideology not figuring 
prominently.
However, the views of Scott and Schick about the role of ideology in the development 
of public sector reform are not necessarily shared and may be self-serving. Other 
writers consider the role of ideology to be very powerful in providing the platform 
that public sector reform is built upon and an important part of the explanation for the 
introduction of reforms (Argy 2001; Bevir and Rhodes 2003; Peters and Savoie 1998; 
Pollitt 1990; Tupper 2001).
The ideological framework of new public management is commonly found in the 
statements of political leaders. For example, Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime 
Minister credited with leading the way in public sector reform, commented that 
government had, “to put its faith in freedom and free markets, limited government and 
strong nation defence” (quoted in Rhodes 1994, p. 140).
However, the ideological support for new public management is not driven solely 
from neo-liberalist thought. Others note that socialist governments also initiated the 
processes of public sector reform in Europe (Toonen and Raadschelders 1997). 
Explaining the broad ideological appeal of new public management, Tupper (2001, 
p. 152) comments on its “ideological flexibility”. This occurs because both social 
democrats and centrists are supportive of the ways that new public management 
claims effective delivery of public services at less cost and with an extension of 
democratic principles. For example, the role of government is not necessarily 
reduced, but becomes more restrained in the expenditure of public monies. At the 
same time, the decentralised decision-making promoted by new public management 
minimises the power some perceive to be residing in large bureaucracies and opens 
the way for greater community participation in the decision-making processes of 
government.
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Theoretical drivers
Closely linked to ideological drivers are the theories that support the general 
directions that have been progressed in public sector reform since the late 1970s. It is 
often the case that the role of theory is ambiguous, as reformers do not necessarily 
account for the theoretical underpinnings of their reforms. Perhaps one of the few 
exceptions is the country of New Zealand in which the direction of reform was highly 
structured and strongly influenced by the application of economic and administrative 
theories (Boston, Martin, Pallot and Walsh 1996, p. 16).
In analysing the literature, two major schools of thought are identified as important 
influences for the design of public sector reforms in the late-twentieth century. These 
schools are the highly analytical propositions put forward by the ‘new institutional 
economics’ and the more pragmatic suggestions contained in ‘managerialism’.
New Institutional Economics
New institutional economics describes a field of study that combines a number of 
disciplines within an economic framework (Scott 2001). These disciplines include 
organisational theory, political science, sociology and law. New institutional 
economics is differentiated from the ‘old’ institutional economics that took a more 
traditional microeconomic view and treated transactions either as market exchanges or 
deviations from these (Coase 1998). New institutional economics takes a broad focus 
and considers that institutions governing the performance of an economy have a 
particular influence. Accordingly, the discipline uses the tools of economic theory to 
study the institutional environment, including the interrelated structure of firms and 
the institutes of governance, incorporating the legal, political and cultural systems 
(Coase 1998; Williamson 2000).
The central focus of new institutional economics is to frame relationships in terms of 
contracts, either implied or explicit, where the parties have different interests, but 
cooperate for their own purposes (Schick 1996). Therefore, much of the literature on 
the theory deals with the design of contracts and how incentive alignments operate 
within these (Eisenhardt 1989; Nilakant and Rao 1994). The ideas behind incentive
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alignments encompass public choice theory and agency theory.5
Public choice theory
Public choice theory was developed during the 1960s and brings an economic 
approach to the study of bureaucracies that is based on the purposive behaviour of 
bureaucrats. The theory places central importance on the behaviour of bureaucrats 
who are believed to choose among a set of possible actions that will maximise their 
personal utility (Niskanen 1971). This contrasts with the sociological perspective that 
underlies traditional accounts of bureaucracies and places the behaviour of individuals 
as subordinate to the study of organisations themselves.
In the economists’ theory of the firm, the central motivation of a business person is to 
maximise the profits of the firm as this ensures organisational survival and is a 
rational means to provide individual utility maximisation. Similarly, Niskanen 
postulates that for bureaucrats the central motivational preferences are commonly 
linked to actions that maximises returns. For example, salary, public reputation, 
power, patronage and output of the bureau, constitute variables that are involved in 
the rational choice of bureaucrats and are associated with budget maximisation 
(Niskanen 1971, p. 38). Public choice theory also explains how bureaucrats maximise 
their budgets by accumulating tasks within their policy areas, taking advantage of 
their monopoly environments and hiding the actual costs of producing services 
(Pollitt, Birchall and Putman 1998).
Niskanen’s public choice theory does not necessarily infer that public bureaucracies 
are inefficient, although this link is often made. Rather, public bureaucracies are 
considered wasteful in producing more services than required or in offering a superior 
service when a mediocre service would suffice. Alternatively, the utility maximising
5 Attention is also directed towards transaction cost economics. Although not a theory as 
such, transaction costs play an important role in economic models. Transaction cost 
economics considers the internal governance structures of organisations as having an 
economic purpose and effect and therefore moves beyond the classical economic 
approaches that viewed the firm as a black box. As such, in transaction cost economics, the 
costs of internal organisation can be compared with the cost of alternative arrangements, 
such as contracts, to suggest when tasks should be undertaken within firms as compared to 
using markets (Jensen and Meckling 1976).
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behaviour of public servants provides the incentive to produce as little services as 
possible and thereby retain funds for other purposes or assist in the bid for additional 
funds (Peters and Savoie 1998).
A modification to public choice theory explains the acceptance by senior bureaucrats 
of the downsizing that often takes place in public sector reform. The ‘bureau-shaping 
model’ proposes that budget maximisation is only one of a wide range of options that 
bureaucrats adopt in pursuing self-interested goals (Dunleavy 1985). An alternative 
strategy is for bureaucrats to reshape their organisations to retain high profile and high 
status tasks. In this way, the model accounts for bureaucratic acceptance of the 
common public sector reform strategy of separating service delivery components from 
departments. This disaggregation creates smaller departments that concentrate on 
high status policy development tasks. The bureau-shaping model also adds more 
scope for non-pecuniary elements to influence the motivations of bureaucrats without 
sacrificing the core of public choice theory’s assumption of utility maximising 
behaviour.
Agency theory
The focus of agency theory is the design of rules in exchange relationships between a 
person delegating a task, the principal, and a person to whom the authority to carry 
out the task is delegated, the agent (Eisenhardt 1989). Similar to public choice theory, 
agency theory is built upon the assumption that agents are utility maximisers who will 
act in their own interest. The theory considers ways to resolve the agency problems 
that takes place when agents’ interests diverge from the interests of principals. These 
divergent interests result in agency costs for both principals and agents. Principals 
incur costs in monitoring the activities of agents and taking losses when the decisions 
of agents do not maximise returns to the principals. Agents may also incur costs in 
providing guarantees to principals that activities undertaken will be in the principals’ 
best interests (Jensen and Meckling 1976). In agency theory the operation of 
incentive systems is central as these act as the mechanisms to ensure the appropriate 
behaviours of agents.
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A large part of the literature dealing with agency theory examines the problems of 
information asymmetries and the risk of principals being captured by agents acting 
opportunistically (Arrow 1964; Eisenhardt 1989; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Nilakant 
and Rao 1994; Schick 1996). Information asymmetries occur because agents, 
compared to principals, are likely to know more about their own performance. As a 
result, principals may incur high costs in retrieving the appropriate information to 
ensure that agents are honouring the terms of contracts. The capture of principals 
takes place because agents may provide information that influences principals to take 
action that is more beneficial for the agents than it is for the principals.
In the public sector a number of principal-agent relationships operate, for example: 
purchasing departments-service delivery agencies; mangers-subordinates; politicians- 
bureaucrats; and, consumers-service providers (Ferris and Graddy 1998). In the 
context of public sector reform, the principal-agent relationship that receives most 
attention is between elected politicians and bureaucrats. This is because bureaucrats 
have greater access to information about government programs than politicians and in 
agency theory this information asymmetry suggests there is a risk of politicians 
becoming captured by the bureaucracy.
Concerns about the capture of elected representatives by the bureaucracy played a 
significant role in the public sector reforms introduced in New Zealand (Schick 1996). 
The Treasury briefing to the incoming Labour government in 1987 highlighted the 
risk of such capture:
It can be suggested however that the relationship favours the bureaucracy, that 
elected representatives are at a disadvantage in relation to their own bureaucracy 
simply because of an information asymmetry. The problem that the bureaucracy 
may hold better information about how government services actually operate 
creates the potential for opportunism or subgoal pursuit by the bureaucracy 
including shirking, budget maximisation and generally inefficient policies for 
society as a whole. (New Zealand Treasury 1987, p. 44)
Agency theory provides the means for elected representatives to overcome the agency 
problem. The means includes having clear agreements that inform bureaucrats of 
their roles and responsibilities, establishing performance requirements that are
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measurable, providing incentives to ensure the appropriate use of information and 
implementing monitoring systems.
Managerialism
The less analytical school of thought that is applied to the changes introduced with 
new public management is managerialism. Managerialism is associated with a variety 
of meanings (Lynn 1998), although it is widespread for the term to be used 
synonymously for new public management. This arises because managerialism is 
commonly used to describe the adoption within the public sector of private sector 
management practices. In this way, managerialism refers to the earlier phase of new 
public management in which the public sector introduced managerial devices such as 
corporate objectives, performance monitoring, program budgeting and a generalist 
senior executive.
Aucoin (1990a, p. 117) links managerial reforms to the influential work by Peters and 
Waterman, In Search of Excellence (1982). From their management consultant 
perspective, Peters and Waterman identify a number of practices applied by 
apparently successful corporations and put these forward as a guide for other private 
sector businesses to adopt.6 The 1992 book by Osborne and Gaebler, Reinventing 
Government, is also considered influential in the adoption of private sector practices 
in the public sector (Barzelay 2000). The similarities between these two books have 
been noted and it is suggested that Osborne’s and Gaebler’s book is an adaptation for 
governments of the earlier work by Peters and Waterman (Pollitt 2001).
Osborne and Gaebler (1992) criticise hierarchical, centralised bureaucracies and argue 
the public sector needs to become more flexible, innovative and entrepreneurial to suit 
the rapidly changing modem environment. According to Osborne and Gaebler 
(1992), entrepreneurial governments focus on results, empower citizens, are driven by 
organisational missions, redefine clients as consumers, prevent problems before they 
emerge and decentralise authority.
6 Some twenty years after In Search of Excellence, M. Chapman wrote In Search of Stupidity 
(2003), examining the reasons why companies are not successful including some of the 
companies that had provided the basis for Peters’s and Waterman’s earlier work.
22
Chapter Two
Managerialist ideas and the blurring of private sector and public sector practices were 
part of the scenery from the late 1960s. This period can be linked to the establishment 
of generic business schools that placed emphasis on concepts such as output 
budgeting and performance measurement, regardless of whether these concepts were 
original or reinvented. These business schools sought to distance their teachings from 
the traditional field of public administration that during the 1950s had become 
fractured with disagreements between the classical and neo-classical streams of 
thought (Kettl 2000a). In addition, public administration was confronting alternative 
approaches that were developing, such as the new institutional economics. Many 
commentators consider the discipline of public administration lacked any firm 
theoretical guidance at this time and the structure and role of the public sector was 
open to question (Greuning 2001; Kettl 2000a; Perrow 2000).
Evidence that governments were examining the operation of public administration 
during this period is found in the civil service enquiries established in a number of 
countries. For example, in the United Kingdom a Commission on the Civil Service 
chaired by Lord Fulton, reported in 1968 (Duggett 1997). One of the concerns of the 
Fulton Commission was the lack of interest in management shown by the 
Administrative Class.7 The Fulton Commission’s report likened the civil service to 
amateurs and used the Administrative Class as an example of this. The report defined 
amateur as meaning generalist or all-rounder, rather than suggesting that an 
administrator lacked abilities. However, it was envisaged that future appointees 
would have a greater technical expertise in economics, planning, research, accounting 
and law (Duggett 1997).
Similar to the United Kingdom, in the early 1970s the new Labor government in 
Australia established a Royal Commission to consider federal government 
administration. The Commission was headed by Herbert Coombs, a highly regarded 
senior public official from previous Australian governments and a former Governor of
7 The Administrative Class held the most senior positions in the British civil service and 
comprised a meritocratic elite with backgrounds from higher income families and educations 
at private schools followed by degrees from Oxford and Cambridge Universities. This 
education was predominantly in the humanities or classics, so the Administration Class 
lacked the more technical background of law or economics (Wilson and Barker 2003).
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the Commonwealth Bank. When the report of the Commission was presented some 
two years later it argued that a more efficient public service was possible with a 
decentralised structure that emphasised managerialist features (Guthrie and Parker 
1998).
In 2005, the newly appointed Public Service Commissioner, Lynelle Briggs, 
acknowledged the significance of the Coombs Report noting that:
The Coombs report marked a watershed in administrative thinking and reform — 
recommending far-reaching changes to the structures and direction of public 
administration. The report’s key themes; its imagined future:
• increased responsiveness to the elected government
• improved efficiency and effectiveness, with devolution and a 
stronger emphasis on results, and
• greater community participation in government
have been a catalyst for, and have strongly influenced public sector reform for the 
past 30 years. (Briggs, Great Expectations: The Public Service of the Future, 
Speech to NSW Forum of Commonwealth Agencies, 17 March 2005)
E nvironm ental drivers
The literature on late-twentieth century public sector reform makes numerous 
references to events and people that figure prominently in the reform process. Gill 
(2000, p. 57) refers to these as “practical triggers” of reform because they explain how 
ideas based on ideology and theory can emerge into action given the appropriate 
situation. Such practical triggers are discussed in this chapter under the heading of 
‘environmental drivers’. While ideologies and theories set the direction for change, 
the environmental drivers provide the imperative or opportunity for change. 
Environmental drivers are distilled into three main categories -  the economic 
environment, influential people and opportunity events.
Economic environment
The economic circumstances that link to late-twentieth century public sector reform 
are well documented (Borins 1998; Gill 2000; Guthrie and Parker 1998; Pollitt and
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Bouckaert 2000; Schick 1996; Scott 2001). In these writings, the common theme is 
the serious international fiscal crisis that occurred in the early 1970s. Governments 
across the globe experienced large external account deficits and began to question the 
expansive interventionist approaches suggested in the Keynesian economic model that 
had been followed by most Western countries throughout the 1950s and 1960s.
Toonen and Raadschelders (1997) note that by the late 1970s, governments 
recognised that economic stagflation could not be dealt with by Keynesian policies 
and budget deficits to stimulate demand. Alternative strategies were put forward and 
the opportunity to investigate and implement administrative reform was presented. 
Toonen and Raadschelders (1997) also observe that since the 1980s, international 
economic developments and shifts in the international economic order have resulted 
in a constant pressure on states and societies to reform their bureaucracies. Such 
pressure is reflected in the OECD publication, Governance in Transition (1995, p. 3), 
that suggests the requirement for reform is “driven by the need for fiscal 
consolidation, by the globalisation of the economy, and by the impossibility of 
meeting an apparently infinite set of demands on public resources”.
Economic influences have been recognised as one of the major reasons for public 
sector reform in the Australian context. Emy and Hughes (1991, p. 405) acknowledge 
the “severe resource constraints” that governments experienced in the late 1970s, but 
also comment on the ever increasing demands on government service delivery and the 
inability of governments to reduce expenditure on these services. Under these 
circumstances, Emy and Hughes (1991) consider that one of the more vulnerable 
areas in which governments may seek to save costs is in the administrative realm. 
While direct links are clear between the provision of social welfare programs and 
taxation revenue, the popularity of elected governments is more likely to be supported 
by promises that involve public sector downsizing rather than reductions to 
government services.
Influential people
While the economic conditions of the early 1970s had a global influence, the lack of 
concurrent changes to public bureaucracies throughout the world indicates other
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factors at play in a country’s adoption of new public management reform. Another 
element often raised is the role of specific actors in embracing public sector reform 
and key players, of both political and bureaucratic backgrounds, are often mentioned 
(Barzelay 2000; Hood 2000; Scott 2001; Toonen and Raadschelders 1997).
Political players
In the case of the United Kingdom and the United States, Margaret Thatcher and 
Ronald Reagan are commonly mentioned as major reformers of their public sectors 
(Duggett 1997; Halligan 2003; Issac-Henry, Painter and Barnes 1993; Peters and 
Savoie 1998; Pollitt 1990; Wilson and Barker 2003). These two leaders were 
particularly supportive of smaller government through privatisation and were 
considered so influential that systems of political and economic thought are named 
after them -  Thatcherism and Reaganomics.
Of Margaret Thatcher, Duggett writes:
Margaret Thatcher, who became (Conservative) Prime Minister on 
4 May 1979 placed her stamp upon the Civil Service. She did so in a way that no 
other Prime Minster so far, even possibly Gladstone, has done. (Duggett 1997,
P 11)
With regards to Reagan, it has been written:
President Reagan took an ideological cue from Britain’s Prime Minister Thatcher 
and made the discussion of privatisation a legitimate part of public policy 
decision making. Although few actual public-private partnership initiatives took 
hold during his administration, the stage was set by his vision of down-sized 
government, the dedication of the managers he brought into government service, 
and his economic policies that effectively starved governments of the funds they 
would need to maintain or expand programs. (Seader 2002, p. 1)
In the case of Australia, as previously mentioned with the Coombs Royal Commission 
of the early 1970s, the reform process was well underway prior to the Howard 
government coming to office in 1996. Substantial reform along new public 
management directions had also taken place under the Hawke-Keating Labor
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governments in the 1980s and early 1990s. For example, in 1987, Hawke announced 
extensive changes to the machinery of government. These changes, marketed as 
providing general administrative efficiencies by bringing together related functions 
and facilitating policy coherence, resulted in 11 departments and 3000 public service 
positions being abolished (Keating 1993). Higgott and Nossal (1993, p. 155) 
comment that this administrative restructure “represented the most extensive 
reorganisation of the public sector in Australian history”.
However, the focus of change under the Hawke-Keating governments was generally 
tied into adopting managerial techniques within the public sector and budgetary and 
financial management reforms were common. These reforms were directed at two 
broad elements (Keating and Holmes 1990). The first element was tightening 
expenditure restraint while introducing management flexibility and incentives to 
improve efficiency. The second element involved improving the performance of 
managers and providing the basis for a “new accountability” (Keating and Holmes 
1990, p. 169). The new accountability was achieved by developing government 
objectives and ensuring the reporting arrangements, which included expenditure 
information and performance measurement, were linked to these objectives.
Although the Labor Party was generally opposed to privatisation, during the Hawke- 
Keating governments the selective privatisation of public enterprises, such as the 
airline and banking industries, took place (Emy and Hughes 1991). However, the 
debates within the Labor Party that enabled privatisation to occur were decided on 
efficiency grounds, rather than a neo-liberalist ideology. This provides an example of 
the “ideological flexibility” of new public management (Tupper 2001, p. 152) and 
reflects the diverse circumstances that enable public sector reforms to take place.
When the conservative Howard government gained office in 1996, the path of reform 
not only continued down the new public management route established by Hawke and 
Keating, but actively increased in pace with policies seeking to reduce the size and 
scope of government through privatisation, outsourcing and deregulation (Aulich 
2000, p. 163). The accompanying emphasis on the separation of policy from service 
delivery represents a further phase of new public management involving the removal 
of functions from the public sector. Unlike the earlier reforms of the Labor
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government, the Coalition government’s agenda for reform contained strong 
ideological elements about the limited role for government in society. For example, 
in a speech explaining his Liberal Party traditions, Howard (1997b) remarks, “[i]n the 
economy, we aim to liberate the full potential of private enterprise within the context 
of a strategic but appropriately limited role for government”.
This ideological stance taken by the Howard government is recognised by other 
researchers. For example, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000, pp. 93-94) identify four types 
of government to indicate the extent that private sector methods are embraced. 
‘Maintainers’ adopt a modest approach, concentrating on streamlining and budgetary 
restraint. ‘Modernisers’ retain a large role for the state, but introduce many practices 
common to the private sector such as strategic planning, decentralisation and 
evaluation. The third type is ‘marketeers’, with these governments introducing 
market-type mechanisms within the public sector or contracting out services to the 
private sector. Lastly, ‘minimalist’ governments seek to privatise as much as possible 
and leave only a core of the bureaucracy remaining. Using this framework, Pollitt and 
Bouckaert (2000) describe the Howard government as a marketiser, although they 
also regard this government as having flirted with the idea of a minimalist approach.
Bureaucratic players
In addition to political leaders, senior public servants are often mentioned in the 
literature as playing active roles in the adoption of new public management reforms.
Graham Scott, a former senior bureaucrat in New Zealand, highlights the role of 
public servants in the development of an analytical framework that facilitated the 
systemic reform of New Zealand’s public sector (Scott 2001, p. 26). In the late 
1970s, the Secretary to the Treasury, Noel Lough, established a group of economists 
in the Treasury department to consider the problems of structural adjustment in the 
economy. These economists considered the application of new institutional 
economics to the form and function of public and private institutions. When the 
Labour government was elected in 1984, public sector reform proceeded with support 
from the Treasury officials who positioned their advice within the framework of 
institutional economics and management theory (Scott 2001, p. 35).
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In Australia, during the Hawke-Keating governments, senior bureaucrats, such as 
Michael Keating, the Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
were actively working alongside politicians in developing and driving new public 
management reforms. The support garnered from senior bureaucrats has increased 
under the Howard government, but this feature may also relate to the increased 
politicisation that has taken place among senior executives in the bureaucracy.8
However, support from senior bureaucrats is not necessarily a required element in 
public sector reform. For example, Marsh, Smith and Richards (2000) consider the 
extent that bureaucrats were overtaken by the political drivers of reform with the 
introduction of the Next Steps program in Britain.9 The authors conclude the stimulus 
for these changes were predominantly driven by politicians with senior bureaucrats 
lacking information and underestimating the political will for the Next Steps reform. 
Although many senior bureaucrats opposed the changes, they did not develop an 
organised opposition (Marsh, Smith and Richards 2000, p. 469).
Opportunity events
In addition to the role of influential people in the process of public sector reform, 
there is also recognition that institutional environments, or the circumstances that 
arise at particular points in time, provide the opportunities for reform to be discussed 
and enable changes to proceed. For example, it is suggested the nature of political 
systems within which politicians and bureaucrats operate are a central determining 
factor for the ways that public sector reforms are progressed. In a centralised political 
system where a unitary state centralises power among the Ministry or Cabinet of the 
ruling national party, such as those political systems operating in Britain and New 
Zealand, leaders have greater opportunity to become the initiators of reform (Toonen
8 Whether or not politicisation of senior public servant positions is detrimental, because, for 
example, it may impede ‘frank and fearless’ advice to ministers, is greatly debated. Other 
concerns relate to the strategic capacity of bureaucracies to implement programs within the 
policy frameworks of elected governments.
0 The Next Steps program commenced in 1988 and entailed the biggest civil service reforms 
during the Thatcher government. The reforms required agencies to be established to carry 
out the executive functions of government according to the policies and within budgets set by 
departments (Duggett 1997). By 1997, around 130 agencies were operating and these 
employed 74 per cent of the Home Civil Service (Duggett 1997, p. 16).
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and Raadschelders 1997). Others question whether specific individuals are catalysts 
for change or are prescribed responsibility for events that would have occurred in 
their absence (Wallis and Dollery 1997).
A common opportunity event is a change in government, particularly when the 
incoming government is elected on a platform of reform to the public sector (Gill 
2000, p. 57). Emy and Hughes (1991, p. 405) include this type of opportunity event 
as one of the major reasons for the 1980s being a significant decade of change in the 
Australian public sector. Published in the early 1990s, Emy’s and Hughes’s book 
pre-dates when the Howard government came to office in 1996. However, under 
Howard’s leadership, the process of public sector reform in Australia has been 
maintained and its direction altered as external methods of service provision were 
sought. Whilst Halligan (2003) considers financial management reforms have 
remained a top priority since the 1980s, he acknowledges that reform under the 
Howard government has involved the re-working of organisational forms 
concentrating on the relationships that cross public and private boundaries.
Whether or not any future change of government in Australia will result in a different 
direction for public sector reform remains to be seen. However, such a change will 
provide the opportunity for a different direction to be adopted. For example, the 
Australian Labor Party’s National Platform and Constitution (2007) states that Labor 
“will revive the concept of a career in the public service’’ (Chapter 11, No. 67) and 
that “Labor supports the maintenance of a strong, unified, apolitical public service as 
a repository of knowledge and expertise in the development of government policy and 
the delivery of essential services” (Chapter 11, No. 71). This Platform suggests a 
future Labor government may examine the increased politicisation of senior 
bureaucrats and revisit the Westminster model that supports career public servants 
without partisanship influences.
Summary
The drivers contributing towards public sector reform are many and they interweave 
in complex ways to bring about the changes that have taken place in public sectors 
over the past 30 years. For the purpose of this thesis, the major drivers of reform have
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been identified and grouped into three broad categories -  ideological, theoretical and 
environmental. Although broad, these categories are unlikely to incorporate all of the 
drivers that motivate public sector reform and aspects such as a country’s political 
history and bureaucratic traditions also play a role. Perhaps more certain than any 
particular influence were the international developments taking place during the 
second half of the twentieth century. These influences combined and placed pressure 
on governments for the need to investigate and implement reform agendas. Against 
this background, the chapter will proceed to examine the events that led to the 
establishment of Centrelink and the Job Network.
Establishing Centrelink and the Job Network
Background
For decades, the provision of social welfare and employment services in Australia 
was dominated respectively by the Department of Social Security (DSS) and, within 
the employment department, the Commonwealth Employment Service (CES). Given 
the size and traditional bureaucratic structures of these organisations it is not 
surprising they were the subject of discussion that was linked to the ideas of new 
public management reform that recommends the separation of policy from service 
provision. For example, one of the more senior Australian bureaucrats, Michael 
Codd, head of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in the early 1990s, 
wrote about changing the boundaries between functions carried on within 
governments (Codd 1996).
In his paper, Codd presented models that were very similar to that now applying in the 
case of Centrelink and the Job Network. Although expressing some cautions, Codd 
used the administrative function of providing income support payments as an example 
of where a service delivery task could be given to an agency (Codd 1996, p. 179). In 
the case of employment services, Codd mentioned recent reforms by the Labor 
government that had given job seekers greater choice in employment assistance by 
contracting out some services to community and private sector agencies (Codd 1996, 
p. 182). These contracted case management arrangements had evolved by the early 
1990s to provide assistance for the long-term unemployed and those at risk of
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becoming so. However, it is noted that during much of this period contracting out 
was undertaken because non-govemment providers were considered effective in 
helping unemployed people with special needs and in coordinating services at a local 
level (Eardley 2003a). Distinct differences in the payment structures are also raised, 
with the Job Network initially designed on a competitive price basis whereas previous 
arrangements under the Labor government provided payments for services (Webster 
and Harding 2000).
An additional reason for restructuring these organisations was that both DSS and the 
CES dealt with unemployed people -  DSS for the payment of unemployment benefits 
and the CES for the registration and delivery of employment services. Accordingly, 
suggestions were put forward that service delivery for the unemployed would improve 
and become more efficient if these services could be provided jointly in some way. 
Both organisations recognised this and in the 1993-94 DSS annual report (DSS 1994, 
p. 20) certain activities were identified for the possibility of joint delivery in an 
“Agreement for Cooperation”. These activities included the co-location of property 
and shared facilities, system management and support, public communication, staff 
training, research and evaluation and closer cooperation in servicing specific client 
groups such as people from non-English speaking backgrounds.
Given this background, by the time the Howard government came to power in 
March 1996, the stage was set for a significant reform of income support and 
employment services that would result in service delivery being separated from the 
departments. Within a short period of time, the government convened a National 
Commission of Audit (NCA) to advise on public sector finances. The Commission 
reported to government in June 1996 and suggested instances that would enable 
significant savings to be delivered through rationalising and restructuring operations. 
For example, the Commission recommended “amalgamating the payments structure 
and systems of the departments of Social Security and Employment, Education, 
Training and Youth Affairs” (NCA 1996, p. 115).
Within two months, the government released a lengthy statement by the employment 
Minister, Senator Vanstone, outlining reform proposals that would establish 
Centrelink and the Job Network. However, the speed of the government’s response
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reflects the bureaucratic involvement that had been contributing to the process since 
the election victory of the Coalition government. Recognising the climate of change 
that was associated with the incoming government, the Secretaries of DSS and the 
Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs (DEETYA) were 
concerned the service delivery components of their portfolios would most likely be 
targeted for restructure (Rowlands 2003).
To avoid the imposition of an undesirable model, the Secretaries presented the idea of 
a social welfare service delivery agency to the new government. The agency, that 
would become Centrelink, would deliver all income support and related services 
previously handled by DSS and would undertake the registration and assessment of 
unemployed people that had previously been a task of the CES. Importantly, the 
establishment of the delivery agency would facilitate the development of a fully 
competitive employment services market (Briggs and Fisher 1996). The privatised 
employment services market would comprise a range of private and non-profit service 
providers and a corporatised public provider10, collectively called the Job Network.
Centrelink and the Job Network are examples of the later phase of new public 
management reform, but the organisations are structured quite differently from each 
other. When established in September 1997, Centrelink was located in the DSS 
portfolio, within a framework that provided a chief executive officer accountable to a 
management board for the agency’s performance. In addition, service agreements 
between Centrelink and its purchasing departments specify the services that 
Centrelink deliver. The Job Network comprises a collection of private sector 
businesses, incorporating profit and non-profit organisations, operating on the basis of 
formal contracts with the government to deliver job brokerage services, training in job 
search techniques and intensive assistance to disadvantaged unemployed people. As 
examples of new public management reform, Centrelink and the Job Network are co-
10 A corporatised public provider of employment services, Employment National, was 
established out of the remnants of the CES to ensure an adequate coverage of employment 
services. Employment National was not a success and was abolished in 2003. The reasons 
for Employment National not succeeding are varied and much wider than issues associated 
with any mismanagement. For example, it has been noted that the second Employment 
Services Contract did not fairly weight the performance results from large providers resulting 
in Employment National losing a significant share of the more profitable intensive assistance 
services (Ramia and Carney 2001). In this same contract process the largest private 
provider, Drake, lost all its government employment services business.
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located within the broader framework of contractualism, however Centrelink provides 
an example of agencification and the Job Network operates as an example of 
outsourcing.
Agencification
Agencification is the creation of an autonomous body within the public sector and 
these arrangements are associated with two core ideas (Talbot, Pollitt, Bathgate, 
Caufield, Reilly and Smullen 2000). First, the creation of autonomous agencies 
involves disaggregating large-scale departments into a single agency, or a number of 
smaller agencies. Disaggregation is believed to increase efficiency by facilitating 
improved management performance because objectives are clarified and the specific 
tasks associated with these are prioritised. The second core idea of agencification is 
performance contracting, either on a formal or informal basis. The performance 
agreements that arise in the contracting environment help define what agencies do in 
return for stated resources. With clearly established goals and resources, it is believed 
that agencies are able to focus on becoming results-orientated organisations and move 
away from the traditional bureaucratic emphasis on input controls. Centrelink 
satisfies these two core agency concepts — it was formerly the delivery component of 
a large bureaucratic department and its relationships with purchasing departments are 
governed through service delivery agreements.
With the formation of Centrelink, the idea that competition from alternative service 
delivery agencies would ultimately be introduced was commonly accepted and in 
March 1997, during the agency’s implementation phase, the then chief executive 
officer, Sue Vardon, said:
We are actually preparing for the Agency so it will be flexible in a competitive 
environment ...(Vardon 1997)
Similarly, Dr Rosalky, then the Secretary of DSS, stated that:
If I now ask how far we have come towards setting price by reference to alternative 
possible suppliers through a competitive process, I find no comforting answers. We 
are only beginning to do the work required to move in that direction. The 
responsibility for pursuing this lies mainly with DSS, although Centrelink does need
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to be ready when such action is taken. (Rosalky, Centrelink National Strategic 
Development Conference, 1998)
Nevertheless, despite the high expectations that Centrelink would be operating in a 
competitive environment and the value that some suggest is gained from competition, 
a decade has passed since Centrelink’s establishment and the agency has remained a 
monopoly provider within the auspices of the Australian Public Service.
Outsourcing
While establishing a separate government agency to undertake service delivery 
functions may have many perceived benefits, a strong element within new public 
management involves a mistrust of bureaucratic power and a questioning of the 
incentive systems and motivational responses of bureaucrats. On this basis, decisions 
to separate policy from delivery may extend to outsourcing delivery activities to the 
private sector, as in the case of the Job Network.
Outsourcing reflects the trend in public sector reform that involves the use of 
contracts by governments to regulate various kinds of relationships (Ramia and 
Carney 2001). In theory, outsourcing introduces contestability into the delivery of 
services and, when supported by highly specific outcome-focused contracts that 
provide appropriate incentive payments for the delivery of successful outcomes, it is 
believed to foster efficient and effective delivery systems. Additional benefits flow to 
governments because departments are able to focus on core policy activities and 
elements of service delivery risk are transferred outside of government (Quiggin 
1996).
Outsourcing may be associated with privatisation in the public management literature 
and the two forms of restructure share similarities. For example, outsourcing and 
privatisation involves reassigning public sector service delivery to the private sector 
where it is assumed differences in the operation of incentives provide for greater 
efficiency and effectiveness. However, outsourcing enables governments to retain a 
high degree of control in the services provided because ownership of the services is 
not transferred. Instead, contracts specify the outputs expected and provide for end-
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dates, enabling badly performing providers to be replaced or government delivery to 
be resumed. With privatisation, governments discontinue public ownership of the 
assets, although a high degree of government control can be maintained through 
regulation.
A common concern with outsourcing is the resources required to manage the contract 
process. For the Job Network, a number of contract periods have been completed to 
date and the employment department recognises the method of procurement as “an 
extremely large and complex process” (DEWR 2006, p. 61). Concerns have also been 
raised about the disruption to services and the transaction costs involved in the 
contract renewal process (Abbott 2003; ACOSS 2000; Eardley 2003a; OECD 2001; 
Productivity Commission 2002; Struyven and Steurs 2005).
A large part of the appeal of outsourcing is the development of competitive 
environments that are considered a central feature in fostering incentives for 
businesses to perform efficiently and effectively. The presence of multiple suppliers 
also enables governments to choose the ‘best value for money’ providers. However, 
in the case of the Job Network, concerns are expressed about the extent that the 
employment services market is competitive. For example, in the third employment 
services contract that commenced in July 2003, Eardley (2003a, p. 320) comments on 
how the key employment services were becoming concentrated among a few service 
providers with the “top 12 agencies will hold just under 60 percent of business 
overall, leaving an average of 0.6 per cent for each of the rest”.
Summary
In the establishment of Centrelink and the Job Network many of the drivers for public 
sector reform previously mentioned in this chapter are observed. The neo-liberal 
ideologies of the Howard government, that support a limited role for public 
bureaucracies in the provision of services, are evident. It does not appear that 
theoretical considerations played a significant role in the structural redesign of the 
organisations, although overseas models may have provided some direction for the 
design of Centrelink. For example, the Next Steps program in Great Britain, an
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example of agencification involving the establishment of the Benefits Delivery 
Agency for the delivery of income support, may have provided an example of reform 
that would be suitable for Centrelink. For the design adopted for the Job Network, 
contracted case management services were already operating and the extension of this 
arrangement to other employment services was straightforward. Environmental 
drivers figure prominently in the development of Centrelink and the Job Network, as 
the change of government offered the political opportunity and key players from both 
the political and bureaucratic spheres progressed the ideas.
Public sector reform in practice
The overarching justification for reforming public sectors is that improved efficiency 
and effectiveness will be achieved. However, the current period of public sector 
reform has been around for some time. For example, Hood and Peters (2004) 
consider new public management has reached its middle age as evidenced by the 
comprehensive textbook treatment that exists. It is also suggested the word ‘new’ 
should be removed from the term (Wise 2002, p. 564). But, despite the more than 
three decades that new public management has been practiced, there is still 
widespread uncertainty as to whether the goals of efficiency and effectiveness are 
always achieved.
In explaining these uncertainties, this part of the chapter explores public sector reform 
in practice and discusses reasons why efficiency and effectiveness may not take place 
at the level many would promote. The first part of this section considers theoretical 
opposition to the ideas of new institutional economics. For example, stewardship 
theory is discussed as an alternative explanation for the behaviour of bureaucrats. 
Also, conceptual issues are raised about the assumptions that support new institutional 
economics. In the second part of this section operational concerns relating to the 
ways that new public management impacts on areas such as accountability, policy 
capacity, performance management and citizen responsiveness, are discussed. 
Writers caution that these aspects, and there are numerous other operational concerns 
not discussed such as the impact on public service values and the consequences of 
reduced levels of trust, may not only be negatively impacted by public sector reform, 
but may also impede the achievement of improved efficiency and effectiveness.
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Theoretical concerns 
Stewardship theory
With its origins in psychology and sociology, stewardship theory has emerged over 
the previous two decades to provide an alternative view to that of new institutional 
economics for the exchange relationships taking place in and between organisations. 
In contrast to new institutional economics, stewardship theory assumes agents’ 
objectives are in harmony with those of principals (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson 
1997a, Kulik 2005). As a result, in stewardship theory there ceases to be an agency 
problem because there is no divergence of interests between agents and principals 
(Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson 1997a). This means no costs are required to 
negotiate, monitor and enforce agreements to solve the agency problem. In addition, 
stewardship theory proposes that agents are capable of being motivated by self- 
actualising behaviours involving intrinsic rewards such as group affdiation and 
self-growth. Therefore, supporters of stewardship theory question the assumptions of 
new institutional economics that agents are self-interested with a general aversion to 
work and that alignment with the principals’ goals can only be achieved if tangible 
and extrinsic rewards are offered that satisfies the agents’ self-interests, such as 
performance-based pay.
A further variation between economic-based organisational theories, such as new 
institutional economics, and stewardship theory is the central role of individuals 
compared to collectives. The field of economics has its origins in the study of events 
arising out of the actions of individuals and “develops hypotheses about social 
behaviour from models of purposive behaviour by individuals” (Niskanen 1971, p. 5). 
In comparison, stewardship theory derives from a sociological perspective and is 
collectivist in orientation, employing a systems-level of analysis (Davis, Schoorman 
and Donaldson 1997a; Donaldson 1990). This difference between the two theories is 
also used as an explanation of the popularity of new institutional economics. That is, 
the foundations of new institutional economics align comfortably with the 
individualist framework and ideology prevalent in modem Anglo-American cultures 
(Hirsch, Michaels and Friedman 1987).
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The approach towards management solutions also differs between agency theory and 
stewardship theory (Donaldson 1990). Agency theory concentrates on the 
development of appropriate governance structures to control the agency problem, 
such as establishing a board of directors with no relationship to management, or 
ensuring the interests of the chief executive officer are aligned to those of the 
shareholders. Stewardship theory searches for organisational structures that empower 
stewards (agents) to act because such action will be in the best interests of the 
principals. For example, stewardship theory argues for combining the role of 
chairperson and chief executive officer to enable decisions to be unified and remove 
conflict and role ambiguity.
Conceptual issues with new institutional economics
A fundamental premise of new institutional economics is that bureaucratic operations 
are less efficient and effective than markets because bureaucrats seek to maximise 
their own utilities in preference to achieving the goals of the organisation. New 
institutional economics seeks to remedy this situation by developing mechanisms that 
limit an agent’s self-serving behaviour. However, as Emy and Hughes (1991, p. 413) 
comment, the notion that bureaucrats are utility maximisers “suffers from a marked 
lack of evidence”. The reason why bureaucrats may not operate to satisfy their own 
interests is that the conceptual foundations of new institutional economics may be 
incorrect or incomplete.
In analysing agency theory as a theory of performance outcomes, rather than as a 
theory of human behaviour, Nilakant and Rao (1994) acknowledge the contribution of 
agency theory in reducing uncertainties about agents’ behaviours. However, this 
highlights one of the more common concerns with agency theory -  that problems are 
the fault of agents who shirk, misrepresent their abilities and generally behave to 
maximise their own utility. Nilakant and Rao (1994) believe that agency theory does 
not provide a complete explanation of the relationship between effort and outcome 
and nor does it acknowledge other ways that uncertainty arises.
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In terms of the relationship between effort and outcome, agency theory proposes that 
appropriately designed contract-based mechanisms will resolve the problem of agents 
shirking. However, agency theory may be inadequate when there is a tenuous 
connection between the effort outlaid and the outcome sought, or when there are 
multiple principals and agents causing goal conflicts that result in outcome 
uncertainty. Nilakant and Rao (1994) suggest structural and cultural mechanisms may 
operate to solve such effort/outcome dilemmas, rather than ineffective contractual 
devices. These structural and cultural mechanisms reduce uncertainty in performance 
by concentrating on organisational design structures, such as implementing boundary 
spanning roles and teams, and devising cultural methods to support environments of 
trust and collaboration.
One of the more common concerns with new institutional economics is the emphasis 
placed upon the self-centered behaviours of agents and the risk of these leading to a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. That is, if agents are presumed to be untrustworthy and 
require close monitoring, then agents will act according to this belief. Many writers 
caution that adherence to the ideas of new institutional economics fosters 
environments of mistrust and that bureaucrats will adopt opportunistic behaviours that 
are harmful to the positive values of the public service such as integrity, honesty and 
fairness (Boyne 2003b; Goshal and Moran 1996; Gregory 2000; LeGrand 2001; Lynn 
1998; Pollitt, Birchall and Putman 1998; Schick 1998).
On a macro level, new institutional economics and contractualism are criticised 
because of the undesirable shift in policy goals the ideologies behind these theories 
implicitly support. These policy shifts place emphasis on self-provision rather than 
universality, call for a reduced role in government regulation and promote 
market-based solutions (Argy 2001). Argy (2001) considers these shifts lead to 
policies that downgrade the objective of full employment, reduce commitment to 
unconditional needs-based welfare, neglect environmental issues in favour of 
economic performance and increase disparities in access to social programs such as 
health and education.
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Operational concerns
In revisiting the comprehensive reforms that were implemented in New Zealand, 
Schick (2001, p. 1) states that he has become “more critical and less ambivalent, more 
admiring of the remarkable managerial edifice erected in this country, but less 
convinced that it is the right way to go”. These statements by Schick are based on the 
all-encompassing nature of the New Zealand reforms that have made it difficult to 
single out and apply a specific reform element that may suit a particular context, but 
not others. In the case of developing nations, Schick (1998) further warns that 
important preconditions such as formal control systems and robust central agencies 
are required before new public management practices can be implemented 
successfully. This is despite the push by international financial institutions, such as 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, encouraging developing 
countries to adopt new public management practices (Hughes 1998).
Schick’s comments also relate to concerns about how new public management reform 
operates in practice and the possible unintended outcomes of reforms. The concern 
that new public management may not successfully operate in all developing countries 
supports a conclusion of Peters and Savoie (1994) who consider the reforms have 
done little to rectify badly managed departments, whilst well-managed departments 
remain well-managed. The introduction of new public management practices to 
bureaucracies that are efficient and well-managed is considered by Hood (2000) as 
one of the paradoxes of public sector reform. This is because the reforms are either 
applied late, or not at all, in the case of dishonest and inefficient bureaucracies when 
logic would dictate reform is needed most.
If new public management has the potential to impact negatively, not only may the 
efficiency and effectiveness gains claimed by reformers not take place, but the way 
other aspects of public administration operate could be at risk. This section considers 
four major areas of public sector operations commonly discussed in the literature — 
accountability, policy capacity, performance management and citizen responsiveness. 
The thesis does not examine further the impact of Centrelink and the Job Network on 
these operational aspects. This brief exploration is provided to indicate that possible 
unintended negative impacts of reform have been raised in the public management
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literature and that such aspects may explain why efficiency and effectiveness do not 
improve or may be compromised with the introduction of reform.
Accountability
The issue of accountability attracts repeated attention in the new public management 
literature (Dobel 2001). In the public sector, accountability operates to prevent the 
abuse of power and as Thomas (1998, p. 348) writes, “is the heart of governance” . 
Traditionally, accountability in the Westminster tradition has centered on the idea of 
ministerial responsibility whereby conventions operate that hold Ministers responsible 
to parliament for the conduct of bureaucrats who work in their departments. This 
traditional accountability model was based upon centralised authority relationships 
prevalent in the classical style of public sector administration (Glynn and Murphy 
1996). In addition, other avenues of accountability have developed that supplement 
the traditional ministerial accountability, such as parliamentary committees, 
government audit authorities, Ombudsman investigations and access to documents 
through Freedom of Information legislation. These additional avenues of 
accountability have become problematic for new public management because private 
firms are generally not subject to such instruments of scrutiny.
Under new public management, with the separation of purchaser from provider and 
devolved lines of responsibility, relationships have changed and impacted on the 
traditional notion of accountability. Thomas (1998, p. 358) argues that recent 
developments have resulted in a shift to ‘political answerability’ where Ministers are 
answerable to parliament when errors can be traced back to their instructions or 
inactions. Without this link, Ministers may seek to avoid accountability.
The supporters of new public management argue that accountability should be 
strengthened under the new structures (Domberg 1998; Scott 2001). This enhanced 
accountability is a feature of the relationship exchanges in new public management 
that are designed around greater clarity in roles and responsibilities and require 
performances to be monitored and assessed against specified outputs.
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Both Centrelink and the Job Network are based on designs that seek to enhance 
accountability by clearly specifying the desired results and outcomes. In the case of 
Centrelink a purchaser-provider model was adopted and the legislation that 
establishes the framework of the delivery agency enables Centrelink’s chief executive 
officer to enter into arrangements that specify the services to be provided. As such, 
Centrelink has established agreements with its purchasing departments that set out:
• the roles and responsibilities of each organisation, incorporating, the principles 
and values governing the relationship;
• a description of the services that Centrelink will deliver;
• the performance measures and standards against which Centrelink is to 
deliver; and
• standards to be followed by the departments in providing Centrelink with 
appropriate policy advice, guidance and support.
For the Job Network, commercial contract arrangements apply where profit and 
non-profit employment service organisations compete in a tender process to provide 
specified services. The contracts contain fee structures where payments are provided 
based on meeting specific performance outcomes. The purchasing department closely 
oversees the operation of the Job Network and monitors compliance with obligations, 
scrutinises progress against contracted placement targets and makes outcome 
payments.
However, critics argue that accountability under arrangements such as Centrelink and 
the Job Network is not enhanced and, worse still, may have been weakened. For 
example, Thomas (1998) is concerned that accountability becomes narrowly defined 
under formalised performance mechanisms that place reliance on imperfect 
agreements. These agreements are imperfect because public sector program
objectives are commonly imprecise and unarticulated (Mulgan 2003). The new public 
management reformers would argue that accountability is enhanced because 
governments are required to clearly articulate program objectives. However, 
government program objectives may inherently be imprecise because the influences 
on achieving a particular goal are often multiple and commonly beyond the control of 
the public sector. In addition, social objectives may be difficult to measure and
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unstated policy goals may reflect political dimensions that are responding to 
competing interest groups. Such concerns do not necessarily impact on the 
performance agreements typical of private sector businesses that enjoy relatively 
straightforward goals that involve quantifiable measurements based on items such as 
profit and market share.
Other writers suggest new public management obscures accountability through the 
complex institutional networks that create a labyrinth of multiple contracting agencies 
engaged in the delivery of services (Chalmers and Davis 2001; Rhodes 1994). The 
use of private sector companies distances government from operational aspects and 
may blur the lines of accountability (Glynn and Murphy 1996). Furthermore, 
arrangements with the private sector may become subject to commercial-in- 
confidence provisions and the nature of accountability becomes hidden (Dobel 2001; 
Glynn and Murphy 1996; McNally 2003). Accountability also becomes confusing 
with the mixed messages from new public management about freedom to manage on 
the one hand and explicit requirements aimed at greater control on the other (Thomas 
1998).
The traditional accountability mechanisms were fundamental to avoiding the 
corruption that operated under the patronage and spoils systems, ensuring that proper 
regard would be given to the use of public resources. The possibility that 
accountability may be diminished under new public management raises direct 
concerns for the effectiveness and efficiency of government programs. In 
commenting on the need to ensure proper accountability is maintained, a former 
Auditor-General of Australia has noted that “the introduction of a new player in the 
accountability chain — the private sector service provider” has “strengthened” the 
need for accountability (Barrett 2000a, p. 61). Furthermore, Barrett (2000a, p. 61) 
comments that, “[t]he experience of my office has been that a poorly managed 
outsourcing approach can result in higher costs, wasted resources, impaired 
performance and considerable public concern”.
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Policy capacity
One of the key features of later new public management reforms is separating the 
policy advising functions from service delivery to ensure service delivery issues do 
not receive priority at the expense of policy issues. This concern reflects a central 
component of agency theory -  that purchasers are at risk of capture by producers or 
providers that can dominate purchasing organisations because the information 
asymmetries enable delivery agencies to act in ways that are not in the best interests 
of the purchasers’ objectives. Approaches to recent public sector reform place 
emphasis on the specification of service delivery activities through agreements, 
leading to a clear focus on outputs and, through performance measurement, enhanced 
results. Appropriately designed agreements are believed to reduce the risk of agents 
acting in their own best interests at the expense of principals.
However, in contrast to the theory, the separation of policy from operations may lead 
to a decline in policy capacity and this raises more general concerns about the 
strategic capacity of government and the overall efficiency and effectiveness of 
government business. As policy becomes increasingly removed from operations it 
becomes more difficult for the policy-making departments to take account of 
operational issues in the review cycle of policy development. The policy departments 
are also at risk of being captured by service delivery agencies in different ways 
because the existence of these agencies becomes inextricably linked to maintaining 
the existing policies, causing bias in the information provided to policy areas (Schick 
1996).
Also, the proliferation of service delivery agencies is seen as fragmenting the 
traditional bureaucratic structure resulting in the likelihood of incoherent policy. Gill 
(2000), commenting on the New Zealand reforms, notes the plethora of 
single-purpose agencies that have little incentive to work together. These structures 
create barriers for communication across organisations and the strategic capacity of 
government to develop and coordinate plans across society as a whole may be 
diminished (Rhodes 1994).
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Writers caution that the managerial focus of new public management results in a 
lowered emphasis in the policy-making expertise of bureaucrats (Ingraham 1998, p. 
165; Tupper 2001, p. 154). With management issues dominating the policy 
environment and with continual downsizing, many long-term bureaucrats depart the 
public sector resulting in a loss of institutional memory and the creation of a policy 
vacuum (Savoie 1998). Policy expertise is further diminished with the appointment 
of senior bureaucrats emphasising managerial qualities over policy backgrounds. As 
a result, the extent that governments hear expert policy advice from within the 
bureaucracy may decline. Concerns about policy capacity are also linked to the 
increased politicisation of senior bureaucrats and the impact this may have on the 
delivery of objective policy advice. If Ministers are only told what senior bureaucrats 
perceive they want to hear the quality of policy advice may be compromised 
(Scott, G. 1999).
Moreover, the idea of contestable markets within the new public management 
framework suggests that external policy advice may be sought by governments in 
much the same way as external service delivery. This may increase the policy 
involvement of those ideologically aligned with governments, such as think tanks, 
ministerial staffers and government established taskforces. Such groups may come to 
dominate the policy arena and, as the policy role of bureaucrats diminishes, policy 
biases develop. This process has been identified by Pierre (1998) as the 
‘deinstitutionalisation of policy advice’, a process that can threaten the legitimacy of 
the bureaucracy that Pierre believes has evolved in Anglo-American countries to 
support and facilitate democratic systems of representative government.
Overall, with new public management reforms resulting in a possible decline of the 
policy competence of the bureaucracy, the strategic capacity of government is 
threatened and short-term political motives can dominate long-term policy setting, 
having a significant impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of government 
programs.
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Performance management
One of the central ideas of new public management is a greater focus on results 
achieved by contracts, or contract-like arrangements, where outputs are specified and 
performance is measured. For both Centrelink and the Job Network, such 
arrangements operate -  service agreements with purchasing departments in the case of 
Centrelink and formal contracts in the case of the Job Network. However, a number 
of writers express caution about the application of a performance framework in the 
public sector context (Boston 2000; de Laine 1997; Ferris and Graddy 1998; Flynn 
1996; Gill 2000; Paquin 1998; Pollitt 1998).
In the delivery of public services the outputs requiring specification may be highly 
intricate and not easily reduced to a few, clear measures (Boyne 2003a, Chalmers and 
Davis 2001, Paquin 1998). As a result, long and complex service agreements develop 
with unmanageable, vague or conflicting specifications that frustrate rather than 
enhance service delivery. Also, during periods of early public sector reform 
implementation, bureaucracies are likely to have limited experience in dealing with 
performance measures or adequately identifying the costs and levels of service 
required, thereby limiting the effectiveness of the performance framework (Thomas
1998) . This raises another paradox of new public management reform -  that public 
sectors are inefficient and ineffective in the delivery of services, yet are able to 
transform into the expert managers of complicated contracts (Rainey and Steinbauer
1999) .
In many cases the links between outputs and outcomes are tenuous (Coggburn and 
Schneider 2001; de Laine 1997). Achieving social outcomes is often the result of 
multiple influences that are beyond the control of a single service delivery agency. In 
these situations, requiring an agency to improve outcomes as part of an agreement is 
unfair and such agreements are unlikely to be entered into (Ferris and Graddy 1998; 
Gill 2000).
Even if the measures are appropriate for the outputs sought, detrimental program 
impacts may result because the efforts of organisations are directed towards meeting 
the requirements of what is measured, rather than the programs’ outcomes. This
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issue, known as ‘goal displacement’, is considered by Davies (1999, p. 155) to be the 
“Achilles heel” of performance management. Closely related is the ‘checklist 
mentality’ where tasks are completed only if stated in agreements. In his review of 
the New Zealand public sector reforms, Schick (1996, p. 81) raises concerns that 
checklist managing “unduly narrows managerial perspective and responsibility”. 
Rather than merely complying with agreements, Schick (1996) considers the more 
valuable contribution of chief executives, their judgement and leadership, may be 
lessened by the emphasis on checklist compliance.
Likewise, Lane (2001) warns that if both agents and principals concentrate on the 
terms of a contract, contractualism becomes an end in itself, consuming large amounts 
of time and effort and creating perverse incentives that do little to guarantee 
competent management.
Commentators consider the future of the reform process is moving to an 
outcomes-based approach where results are given priority and not the items being 
produced. However, given the multiple influences that may be impacting on 
outcomes, policy effectiveness may require holistic approaches that cross 
organisational boundaries. In commenting on the comprehensive New Zealand 
reforms, Graham Scott (1999, p. 7) indicates that outcomes-based management 
remains the “elusive Holy Grail”. This view explains the recent trend in developing 
mechanisms aimed at establishing collaborative forms of organizing the shape and 
delivery of public services. These mechanisms operate either through ‘joined-up’ 
arrangements within government organisations or ‘networks’ of government, private 
and volunteer organizations (Bevir and Rhodes 2003; Bovaird 2006; Mingus 2005; 
Skelcher, Mathur and Smith, 2005).
Citizen responsiveness
Another common concern in the literature is the focus of new public management on 
members of the public as consumers of goods and services, compared to their role as 
citizens in the process of collective decision-making (Box 1999; Box, Marshall, Reed 
and Reed 2001; Pollitt 1990; Rhodes 1994; Rockman 1998; Thomas 1998). Taking 
its cues from the private sector, where the viability of a firm partly relies upon
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maintaining a satisfied customer base to avoid consumers choosing to purchase goods 
and services elsewhere, new public management has shifted the emphasis of the users 
of government services from clients to consumers. This emphasis on consumers 
shifts the focus within the public sector to customer satisfaction with service delivery.
However, for the outcomes of efficiency and program effectiveness, the emphasis on 
customer satisfaction may be a distraction. For example, it is argued that in treating 
people as consumers, attention is directed towards the delivery aspects of a program 
as measured by the program’s satisfaction ratings. This attention can focus on the 
tasks that are involved in shopfront activities such as waiting times and staff 
politeness, but neglect the more important aspects such as staff knowledge and correct 
decision-making (Pollitt 1998).
Another concern is the emphasis on customer satisfaction distancing people from the 
process of collective action and becoming involved in policy debates. This is because 
attention is diverted into completing customer satisfaction surveys or participating in 
focus groups. In this way, the attention of new public management on consumerist 
outcomes operates to disempower citizens and has implications for participative 
democracy and the overall policy responsiveness of governments to the people. 
Writing on the United States experience with the National Performance Review, 
Carroll (1995) cautions that the managerialist economics upon which the National 
Performance Review is based causes government to become an instrument of service 
consumption and ignores the role a government plays in setting agendas, resolving 
conflicts and pursuing values that have little to do with satisfying customers.
Conclusion
This chapter provided an explanation of why public sector reform in the late-twentieth 
century has taken place. The chapter began with a description of earlier reforms to 
Anglo-American bureaucracies and how these have shaped the modern public sector. 
The earlier reformers were concerned that bureaucracies were inefficient, wasteful 
and did not necessarily achieve desired results. Changes sought to establish public 
sectors that would provide stability, competence and support for successive 
governments within a democratic framework. In the current reform process, the claim
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that public bureaucracies are inefficient and ineffective is also emphasised, but the 
reasons for this and the solutions offered are very different from their earlier 
counterparts in that these recent reforms question the overall structure and 
fundamental role of the public sector.
The chapter listed the main drivers of modern reform as ideological, theoretical and 
environmental and explored the common political responses. These responses have 
involved adopting private sector management practices into the public sector or 
replacing the public provision of services with competitive environments. The 
specific types of reforms adopted for the designs of Centrelink and the Job Network 
were described.
Another feature of modern public sector reform is that the ideas and solutions are 
progressed despite a lack of evidence the claimed efficiency gains and effectiveness 
outcomes are always delivered. The chapter proceeded to explore reasons that have 
been put forward for why efficiency and effectiveness are not forthcoming in adopting 
new public management reform. For example, concerns about the theoretical 
underpinnings of new public management reform were explored and the chapter 
considered the impact of reform on a number of operational aspects of the public 
sector. Although this thesis does not seek to explain the reasons why Centrelink or 
the Job Network has either succeeded or failed in improving efficiency and 
effectiveness, this section examined explanations for why the reforms are not always 
successful.
Having considered the current reform environment that public bureaucracies are 
exposed to, the value of paying attention to the results of reform is apparent. The 
process of reform is costly, in ways that are more than financial, and the impacts may 
not be entirely beneficial. Open and independent evaluations, such as undertaken in 
this thesis, are necessary to ensure the performance of publicly-funded services are 
maintained and the implications of changes to these services are understood.
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Chapter 3: Designing an evaluation for measuring  
efficiency and effectiveness
This chapter describes the methodology that is employed to answer the thesis question 
of whether efficiency and effectiveness have improved since Centrelink and the Job 
Network were established. Initially, the chapter explores the evaluation literature to 
develop an appreciation of the foundations of evaluation and how evaluation theory 
links to the practice of evaluation. In doing so, elements common to the design of 
evaluations are identified as the purpose, parameters and methods of evaluation. 
These three elements are explored in the context of evaluations of public sector 
reform and the way these are applied in this thesis is explained.
The foundations and theory of evaluation
An analysis of the evaluation literature reveals that a single descriptive theory of 
evaluation that provides for the approach to adopt for a specific evaluative situation 
does not exist. In contrast, the literature describes numerous prescriptive theories that 
differ in how an evaluation should be structured and undertaken. These theories 
outline different methods for determining the criteria for judgement, collecting and 
interpreting data, and diverge on the use that evaluation findings are put. To some 
extent the proliferation of approaches to evaluation can be explained by looking at the 
historical developments within the field. Each development has added to or enriched
51
Chapter Three
the approaches available without necessarily replacing previous ways of undertaking 
evaluations.
Generally the foundations of evaluation research for social programs commence 
around the mid to late 1800s when a body of knowledge concerning evaluation 
research first became recognised and a number of associations were established to 
foster developments in social inquiry. This period coincides with an increased level 
of government intervention in the lives of ordinary people. With the increasing 
investment of public monies in social programs, questions were asked about whether 
or not the desired outcomes were being achieved and formal evaluation research 
developed to provide these answers. The early evaluators sought to apply a logical 
analysis to measuring the effects of a program against the goals it set out to 
accomplish. In this manner, evaluation would provide meaningful information from 
which policy decisions could be made.
The orthodox approach that developed during this early period for designing an 
evaluation was based upon the scientific, or positivist, paradigm. This paradigm is 
characterised by researchers using rigorous scientific approaches and empirical 
methods to arrive at objective, evidence-based knowledge that is able to provide clear 
solutions about what does or does not work. The theoretical emphasis is aimed at 
determining causality and the language used is that of variables and validity. The 
experimental design approach, involving treatment and control groups, was developed 
and refined during these early periods of evaluation when, through to the 1950s, 
evaluators strived to ensure that internal validity (ascertaining the relationship 
between cause and effect) and external validity (being able to generalise from the 
results) were accomplished in an evaluation.
During the 1960s a significant growth in the number of social and educational 
programs dramatically increased the need for large numbers of program evaluators. 
However, many evaluators found it difficult to meet the requirements of the scientific 
paradigm. It was not always straightforward to apply methods that required the 
uncontaminated existence of control groups, or the random assignment of subjects to 
treatment groups. During this period many evaluators and sponsers of evaluation 
research recognised that evaluations often failed to produce useful knowledge or clear
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answers, particularly for improving the outcomes of social programs. Also, different 
social science research methods began to emerge, with many evaluators not formally 
trained in the techniques of evaluation, adapting and modifying the approaches to 
research learnt in their formative disciplines. As a result, approaches on how to 
conduct evaluations expanded with research methods adopted from disciplines such as 
education, psychology, sociology, anthropology and history.
By the 1970s new approaches to evaluation emerged that seriously questioned 
experimental methods and objectives-based inquiry. For example, the constructivist 
paradigm developed that considered evaluation to be highly subjective, with the 
findings reflecting the unquestioned value framework of the inquirer. In practice, the 
constructivist approach to evaluation design resulted in a greater diversification of 
evaluation methods, including more reliance on the use of qualitative data. When 
applying the constructivist approach evaluators reflect on the diverse perspectives of 
stakeholders and make sense of the various constructions that emerge from among 
them. Today the constructivist approach to evaluation has its supporters as well as its 
detractors. For example, Scriven (2001), a recognised evaluation theorist whose work 
supports goal-free evaluations, cautions that the denial of objectivity is “inescapably 
self-refuting” (2001, p. 28), particularly when a constructivist evaluation is seeking to 
determine the “real truth”. Scriven's evaluative approach is to recognise the
possibility for values-based bias to enter an evaluation and for this to be documented 
and accounted for in the evaluation design.
The diversity of approaches to evaluation forming throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
resulted in an expansion of the issues that a well-constructed evaluation ought to 
consider. For example, evaluation design became increasingly aware of the 
conflicting purposes for conducting an evaluation and how this impacts on the criteria 
chosen to form judgements about the success or failure of programs. As a result, 
approaches developed that took account of various stakeholder perspectives.
Alkin (2003, p. 86) suggests that differences in approaches to evaluation arise because 
the designs emanate from the particular points of view or purposes for conducting 
evaluations that are held by evaluation theorists. For example, Chen (1990) considers 
that an understanding of the program theory is central to designing an evaluation.
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Evaluation that is designed with the program theory in mind enables the collection 
and analysis of information that will assist in the development of the theory and 
provides practical information for the program design. Alternatively, House (2001) 
considers the purpose of evaluation is to achieve social justice and that this is done by 
representing the perspectives of diverse groups of stakeholders, particularly those 
with a weak power base, and conducting evaluations committed to and able to exert 
influence in the process of social engineering.
Recently, evaluation theorists have sought to classify different approaches to 
evaluation according to their main evaluative emphasis (Alkin and Christie 2004; 
Stufflebeam 2001). This might suggest a movement within the field of evaluation to 
consolidate and refine the multitude of evaluation approaches. This may be the 
direction required if the field of evaluation is to develop an encompassing descriptive 
theory of evaluation. However, in commenting upon Stufflebeam’s (2001) conclusion 
that a general approach to evaluation is warranted, Henry (2001) suggests that 
evaluation is heavily dependent upon context, with the choice of an approach guided 
by the environment in which the evaluation is conducted.
If context is so critical in establishing the evaluation questions, the scope of the 
research and how the findings are utilised, then the possibility of devising an 
encompassing theory of evaluation is unlikely. King (2003), in her article about the 
challenge of studying evaluation theory, also agrees that evaluation is largely context- 
driven. Accordingly, King proposes that, unlike the formulation of other theories, the 
theory of evaluation may need to be derived from and based upon the practice of 
evaluation.
Today, the practice of evaluation comprises many different approaches, with the 
choice of any given approach not necessarily superior to that of another. Rather, each 
evaluation is a reflection of many aspects coming together and providing a unique 
assessment of the object being evaluated. Nevertheless, in exploring the different 
ways that evaluations are conducted, common elements emerge enabling the different 
approaches to evaluation to be linked because they provide a common framework 
involving a similar language and overlapping methodologies. These common 
elements are broadly grouped for the purpose of this thesis as the purpose, parameters
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and methods of evaluation. As each of these elements is discussed, examples of the 
way they have been applied in evaluations of public sector reform is explored and 
how these elements relate to the methodology applied in this thesis is described.
The elements of evaluation
Purpose
An evaluation can serve many purposes and being clear about this is important in 
developing appropriate evaluative questions and ensuring the overall approach to the 
evaluation will provide meaningful results. This section explores the primary reasons 
for undertaking an evaluation and describes the common approaches that are applied 
in evaluations of public sector reform. These approaches include whether an 
evaluation is undertaken as a case study or a meta-analysis, and in the form of a 
cross-sectional study or a longitudinal investigation.
Formative and summative evaluations
Evaluations generally seek to provide feedback on the operation of a program and are 
either formative or summative in purpose (Human Resources Development Canada 
1998, pp. 8-9). Formative evaluations, also known as process evaluations, are 
concerned with providing feedback on how programs are operating or the outcomes 
achieved, but do not investigate events that would occur without the program. In 
contrast, summative evaluations, also called impact evaluations, are conducted to 
determine the success of programs in reaching stated policy objectives, with a key 
concern being to credit the outcome to the program rather than another event. 
Because the design of summative evaluations involves treatment and comparison 
groups, where the outcome for the comparison group is not observed, a key concern is 
devising a methodology that provides a useful comparison or counterfactual 
(Cobb-Clark and Crossley 2003). Both formative and summative evaluations are 
useful to a range of stakeholders and may impact on the overall direction and future of 
a program, therefore being highly pragmatic in orientation. A great deal of the 
evaluation literature on public sector reform is summative in its purpose, seeking to 
determine whether the reforms to public sectors are responsible for introducing
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improved efficiency and effectiveness compared to the traditional approach to public 
sector organisations.
Knowledge-based evaluations
Another purpose for evaluations is gathering information and forming conclusions 
that are directed towards developing knowledge rather than directly impacting on the 
design of a program. These evaluations may seek to discover and test general theories 
and propositions about social processes and mechanisms as they occur in the context 
of social policies and programs (Mark, Henry and Julnes 2000, p. 58). For example, 
in Greene’s (2005, p. 43) evaluation proposal for a school’s learning program, the 
purpose of her evaluation is directed towards the knowledge end of the evaluation 
purpose spectrum. This is indicated in the description of her approach which is 
“fundamentally educative, aspiring to provide spaces and places for thoughtful, 
data-informed reflections on practice”.
Knowledge-based evaluations are recognised in the public sector reform evaluation 
literature. For example, Boston (2000), in his analysis of evaluations into public 
sector reform in New Zealand, indicates that few studies have provided 
comprehensive assessments of the reforms. However, many comprise “careful, 
patient, perceptive analyses, and furnish important insights into the strengths and 
weaknesses of the new model of public administration” (2000, p. 131). Both 
knowledge-based and formative or summative assessments are undertaken either as 
case studies or meta-analysis.
Case study analysis
A case study is a comprehensive examination of a situation and is generally 
descriptive or exploratory in character, often aimed at establishing hypotheses for 
subsequent investigations, rather than providing an account of a situation that is 
universal in application. The use of the case study approach to investigate the impacts 
of public sector reform is common. Many variables are recognised as influencing the 
outcomes of organisational reform and the case study approach enables the 
relationships between variables to be fully explored and situational findings revealed.
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For example, a case study approach is used by Worthington and Dollery (2001) to 
examine the technical and scale efficiency of domestic waste management in a 
cross-sectional analysis across New South Wales local governments. The study takes 
into account a large number of factors that are assumed to have an impact on 
efficiency and seeks to determine areas where inefficiencies could be reduced based 
upon observations of best practice. Such an analysis of the efficiency outputs of firms 
compared to best practice is recognised as a basic research strategy for governance 
and public management studies (Hill and Lynn 2004, p. 175). However, this type of 
research is considered more useful to practitioners of management, it being more 
challenging to apply the results across various contexts as expected in the application 
of formal theory. In this vein, Worthington’s and Dollery’s research identifies 
components that would enable local governments to engage in waste management 
with increased efficiency.
Meta-analysis
General conclusions about public sector reform and its impact on performance are 
more likely in research that examines a multitude of case studies across a wide range 
of organisational structures, industries, time periods and countries. A synthesis of 
such studies is useful for drawing together the evidence and providing an overall 
picture that no single case study on its own could accomplish.
Strictly speaking a meta-analysis attempts to statistically aggregate the results of 
individual studies and is applied in a stringent manner to enable meaningful 
information to be extracted from existing evidence. However, Boyne (2003a, p. 374) 
notes that formal meta-analytical techniques are inappropriate in the analysis of 
research on public management reform because of the wide variation in the 
definitions of variables that impact on public sector improvement and the operational 
status of dependent and independent variables. Accordingly, Boyne’s review of 65 
empirical studies adopts a modified statistical test to assist in the analysis of the 
results of the studies. Boyne comments that one of the major features arising from his 
analysis is the paucity of evidence on the determinants of public sector performance
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with minimal knowledge about the influences of public sector reform on efficiency, 
value for money and customer satisfaction.
A similar theme is noticed in the book co-authored by Boyne, Farrell, Law, Powell 
and Walker (2003) that seeks to provide a thorough investigation of the impact of 
public management reform in the case of health care, housing and education in the 
United Kingdom. This research takes a longitudinal approach as the authors consider 
it necessary to track performance over time and examine the evidence that exists for 
differences in the periods before and after reforms and in concluding whether or not 
these differences are attributable to the reforms. Overall, Boyne and his co-authors 
are limited by the technical barriers and methodological hurdles faced in the gathering 
of case study evidence on the impact of reform and the researchers are unable to 
pronounce with confidence the reforms are either a success or failure.
Making certain that case study evidence meets robust design criteria appears a highly 
limiting feature of meta-analysis research on public sector reform and, without 
assurances from researchers that rigorous processes have been applied, the results 
may be uncertain. Overall, examining the results of meta-analysis approaches that 
consider the impact of public sector reform highlights the multitude of variables that 
are investigated by individual studies and brought together in a broad analysis. 
Establishing the influence of these variables on performance remains a difficult task 
and ascertaining that variations are due to factors related to public sector reforms are a 
further challenge.
The purpose of this evaluation is situated firmly on the side of knowledge-based 
inquiry and the case study approach is used to investigate the circumstances that 
surround new public management reform. The evaluation is not intended to provide 
definitive conclusions about the success of Centrelink and the Job Network in 
improving efficiency and effectiveness. Rather, the evaluation seeks to determine if 
improvements in efficiency and effectiveness have taken place since the 
commencement of Centrelink and the Job Network. If it is the case that 
improvements are apparent, then further research would be required to determine the 
cause of such improvements. Whilst the evaluation provides useful descriptive and
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empirical material, the results are specific to the selected subject matter and therefore 
unrepresentative of other situations.
Applied to the case study or the meta-analysis, are either cross-sectional or 
longitudinal designs. Cross-sectional evaluations compare the performance of 
organisations within particular industries or services at a point in time. This contrasts 
to longitudinal designs that consider performance over the periods before, during and 
after reforms to public sector organisations.
Cross-sectional approaches
A number of authors comment that cross-sectional, or comparative, designs are the 
most common type of approach to assessments of performance in the case of public 
sector reform (Boyne 2003a, p. 388; Hill and Lynn 2004, p. 174; Jensen and 
Stonecash 2005, p. 771; Villalonga 2000, p. 46). Cross-sectional designs enable 
direct and immediate comparisons between public sector performance and the results 
achieved by private sector companies.
Whilst cross-sectional studies are popular, they are limited by the degree that outputs 
are comparable. Studies may be upfront about the number of differences and 
acknowledge the limitations that arise or seek to control for such variables, but many 
differences may be too obscure and easily overlooked. For instance, Jensen and 
Stonecash (2005) comment that although comparing the cost of refuse collection 
between public providers and private firms may appear straightforward, not all 
differences are easy to recognise such as “the fact that one collection area is much 
hillier than the other” (p. 771). This topographical difference is subtle, but the 
impacts on performance may be significant.
While this evaluation is not seeking to explain the impacts of Centrelink and the Job 
Network on the criteria of efficiency and effectiveness some insights may be possible 
if a department is examined that has not undergone a split in its policy and service 
delivery roles. Such an analysis may indicate similar or different trends in the 
performance of these criteria and aid in making loose comparative comments. In this 
way, the thesis is not completely overlooking the impact of structural reform.
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The Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) provides a reasonable comparison, 
particularly in the case of Centrelink. The veterans’ affairs department carries out 
similar functions to Centrelink, being involved in delivering services to veterans, 
including the provision of income support payments. However, unlike Centrelink and 
its purchasing departments, DVA has not undergone a split in its policy and service 
delivery functions. Both Centrelink and DVA are part of the Australian Public 
Service and have a monopoly on the provision of their services and so remain 
unaffected by a competitive environment. This common location within the 
Commonwealth public sector also means that DVA and Centrelink are regulated by 
the same Commonwealth legislative framework and have been affected by other 
overarching reforms to the public sector such as changes to industrial relations, 
human resource management, financial processes, planning and reporting 
requirements. More compelling, both Centrelink and DVA deliver income support 
payments and have parallel requirements for their information technology network 
and a similarity in the nature of their service delivery network and purpose. Also, 
both organisations produce similar data enabling a comparison on the basis of similar 
information.
A major weakness in using DVA as a point of comparison is that its operations are on 
a much smaller scale than Centrelink’s. In addition, DVA has come to use the 
delivery network of Centrelink, although the use of Centrelink services is very limited 
and tends to involve servicing rural and remote communities. For example, in 
2003-04, DVA paid Centrelink $438,000, representing around 0.15 per cent of DVA’s 
total operational expenses for the year (DVA 2004).
While cross-sectional research is a useful tool for enquiries that question one form of 
service provision over another, a strong weakness is that this form of research is 
unable to gauge the level of improvement or decline that may occur over time. This 
timing aspect is particularly relevant to research on public management reform and 
Boyne (2003a, p. 388) comments that the cross-sectional nature of much of the 
statistical analysis of public sector reform is a “central weakness” that undermines the 
establishment of cause and effect relationships.
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Longitudinal approaches
Public sector reform involves the transformation of large, hierarchical organisations 
involved in both the policy development and delivery of government programs, to 
structures that comprise discrete delivery agencies or introduce competition and 
private sector firms into the realm of service delivery. As such, a longitudinal 
analysis that spans a period of time before, during and after reform is useful in 
assessing the impacts of reform. A longitudinal approach is also able to take account 
of changes in the wider environment over time and the impacts these may have on 
performance.
Martin and Parker (1995) undertake a longitudinal study of the impact on 
performance of the privatisation of state-owned industries in the United Kingdom. 
Eleven firms privatised during the 1980s are tracked over different periods of time so 
that Martin and Parker are able to take account of numerous influences such as the 
boom conditions of the 1980s compared to the recessionary conditions of the early 
1990s. In this way, the study may help to determine if performance has more to do 
with the business cycle rather than the change of ownership that public sector reform 
often entails. The data collected by Martin and Parker enable five distinct periods to 
be analysed, comprising a timeframe of four years for each period. The periods 
include three prior to privatisation (firstly during the period of nationalisation, then 
two periods pre-privatisation -  one before and the other after the announcement to 
privatise) and two periods after privatisation (a post-privatisation and an economic 
recession phase). The periods covered in Martin’s and Parker’s study are 
comprehensive and are a strong component of the authors’ methodology.
Villalonga (2000) examines a number of privatised Spanish industries and takes a 
longitudinal approach to assessing the impact of reform, stating that “privatization is 
by definition a change, and needs to be addressed dynamically by looking at a given 
firm’s evolution and transition between its private and public stages” (p. 51). For this 
study Villalonga selected firms that would enable data to be available on profits 
before taxes, assets, financial expenses, sales and staff numbers for minimum periods 
of three years prior to privatisation and three years after privatisation. Although 
comprehensive, the approach limits consideration to firms able to comply with the 
study’s data requirements and this would introduce certain biases.
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One of the strengths of Villalonga’s research is that major factors that intervene in the 
timing of privatisation effects on performance are considered. The factors identified 
are political, organisational and dynamic. Political factors deal with the decisions 
made by governments to adopt public sector reform. For example, the decision to 
privatise during a period of recession might increase government revenue, but may 
impact on the ability of an organisation to improve performance compared to being 
privatised during a period of economic boom. Organisational factors relate to the 
decisions made by organisations that are not predicted by governments at the time of 
reform, but that impact either positively or negatively on performance. The dynamic 
factors recognise the passage of time itself brings changes, including in the political 
and organisational arenas. The time periods considered by Villalonga (2000) are 
different to the more extensive periods used by Martin and Parker (1995) and this 
aspect can have implications for the observed effect of privatisation on performance.
The bulk of analysis for this thesis comprises a longitudinal approach in providing an 
answer on whether efficiency and effectiveness have improved since the introduction 
of Centrelink and the Job Network. The approach involves tracking changes in 
relevant data sources over time and across organisations. The timeframe over when 
the organisations are assessed commences in 1993-94 and ends with the 2003-04 
financial year. This period covers a number of years prior to the reform, when the 
services were delivered by DSS and, within the employment department, the CES, 
and captures the first seven years of the operation of Centrelink and the first six years 
for the Job Network. The timeframe for the evaluation ends in 2003-04 as this is the 
last financial year before changes were announced that altered the governance 
arrangements of Centrelink and substantially shifted among departments the 
responsibilities for the services examined in this study.
It should also be noted that during the evaluation period administrative 
rearrangements took place that altered the programs for which departments were 
responsible. The longitudinal analysis tracks specific programs regardless of the 
department or organisation that managed or delivered these. These rearrangements 
are displayed in diagram 3.1.
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Diagram 3.1 shows the Coalition government established Centrelink in July 1997, with 
the Job Network following shortly afterwards in May 1998. The Administrative 
Arrangements Order of 21 October 1998 resulted in the Department of Social Security 
becoming the Department of Family and Community Services (FaCS). At the same time, 
the Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs (DEETYA) was 
split into the Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business 
(DEWRSB) and the Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs (DETYA). 
On 26 November 2001, following another election victory, the Coalition government 
transferred the youth functions from DETYA to FaCS and renamed DETYA as the 
Department of Education, Science and Training (DEST). At the same time, DEWRSB 
was reorganised, losing the small business functions, and becoming the Department of 
Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR). The final rearrangement took place on 
26 October 2004. The income support payments provided to people who are of 
workforce age was transferred from FaCS to either DEWR or DEST. At the same time, 
Centrelink became an agency within a new portfolio, the Department of Fluman Services.
Parameters
The parameters of an evaluation are those aspects that determine the boundaries and 
include factors related to the resources available and the time constraints imposed. 
Central to influencing the parameters of an evaluation are the criteria decided upon for 
making judgements about the success or failure of the object being evaluated. The 
number and nature of the criteria often reflects the breadth of stakeholders that are 
consulted in their development. A singular approach, engaging few stakeholders, results 
in the development of criteria that are specific and usually found in the stated objectives 
of a program. For example, a government commissioned evaluation (Human Resources 
Development Canada 1995) into a Canadian employment program, Novia Scotia 
Compass, involved a singular approach to the development of evaluative criteria with the 
stated objectives of the program forming the basis of the assessment.
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A pluralist approach to the development of evaluation criteria accommodates the 
perspectives of a broad range of stakeholders and the evaluator generally engages in a 
process that seeks consensus from these stakeholders on the criteria to be used for 
judging the object being evaluated. The collaboration of stakeholders is generally 
involved throughout the whole of a pluralist evaluation process and the design of the 
evaluation endeavours to ensure an equal power balance between stakeholders is 
maintained. For example, the evaluation proposal presented by Greene (2005) for how 
she would proceed to evaluate a school’s learning program takes a pluralist approach to 
the development of the evaluation criteria. Greene’s style places importance on obtaining 
the perspectives and values of all those affected by a program, particularly those who 
may be alienated from the evaluation process.
For this thesis a singular approach to the development of the criteria is applied, rather 
than develop criteria that consider numerous perspectives and examine unstated outcomes 
or unintended impacts. Accordingly, major areas of performance improvement that 
Centrelink and the Job Network were expected to deliver on, and that are commonly 
mentioned as the gains flowing from adopting contractualist methods of new public 
management, are examined - the criteria of efficiency and effectiveness. While the 
definitions of these terms and matters related to their measurements are fully explored in 
the following chapters, a brief description follows.
Efficiency
In his speech at the launch of Centrelink, the Prime Minister, John Howard (1997), stated, 
“[t]he consolidation in Centrelink of so many of the services of the Government that 
interact with people will provide, of course, a more human face. It will provide a more 
efficient service”. Likewise, Amanda Vanstone, then the government’s employment 
services Minister, in a statement announcing the government’s reforms to employment 
assistance, claimed the reorganised arrangements would “ensure the most cost effective 
and efficient use of available resources” (Vanstone 1996, p. 30). In these statements, as 
with others that accompany public sector reform, efficiency refers to the relationship of
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inputs to outputs that, at its most simplistic level, seeks to achieve the greatest output for 
the least input. Within this framework, efficiency may also mean expanded outputs for 
the same level of inputs or maintaining outputs while minimising inputs. This evaluation 
explores efficiency by taking account of changes in the level of inputs and the associated 
outputs over the period before, during and after Centrelink and the Job Network were 
established. This is done by systematically examining data related to the costs of the 
arrangements, whilst taking account of the services provided.
Effectiveness
Effectiveness evaluations generally approach this criterion in terms of whether or not a 
program’s stated goals have been accomplished. In the case of Centrelink and the Job 
Network the role of income support and labour market services in improving the 
employment prospects of disadvantaged job seekers is highlighted. Numerous studies, 
particularly those examining the Job Network, assess the labour market outcomes of the 
reformed employment assistance arrangements (see for example, Australian Council of 
Social Services 2000; Borland and Tseng 2004; Bruttel 2004; Considine 2000; Cowling 
and Mitchell 2003; Davidson 2002; Dockery and Stromback 2001; Eardley 2002a, 
2002b; Eardley, Abello and MacDonald 2001; Nevile and Nevile 2003b; Quiggin 2002; 
Ziguras, Considine, Hancock and Howe 2004).
This thesis adopts an alternative, and rarely examined, measurement of effectiveness that 
is explicitly linked to the reform’s employment outcomes and emphasised by the 
government -  service effectiveness as measured by improvements in the quality of 
services provided to customers. In the employment Minister’s announcement of the 
reforms it was stated that “[clients will benefit from higher standards of service, more 
flexible and customised assistance, and ultimately better and more lasting employment 
outcomes” (Vanstone 1996, p. 15). The association between employment outcomes and 
improvements in the quality of services is not surprising. The current approach to labour 
market program outcomes has shifted the focus away from broad economic responses to
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the actions and behaviours of unemployed people and assistance that is flexible in 
customising support that takes account of the individual’s needs and circumstances.
A limitation in adopting a measurement of effectiveness that considers the satisfaction of 
end-users is that account is not taken of the wider population and the extent to which 
publicly-funded organisations support democratic outcomes. Critics of new public 
management express concern about the emphasis of reform on customers as the end-users 
of government services, suggesting this emphasis reduces the collective power of 
citizens. This is because the focus on individual users and their satisfaction with direct 
service encounters diverts the attention of citizens from contributing to the ways in which 
government policy responses are shaped or in holding government to account for the 
outcomes of policies (Box 1999; Box, Marshall, Reed and Reed 2001; Pollitt 1990; 
Rhodes 1994; Rockman 1998; Thomas 1998).
The focus in this thesis on the service effectiveness of Centrelink and the Job Network, as 
measured by the satisfaction of end-users, is not intended to detract from the insights that 
may be gained from measuring the effectiveness of these arrangements according to the 
wider views of citizens. Instead, the approach is to consider explicitly stated objectives 
of the reform and explore the extent to which these objectives are achieved. In the case 
of Centrelink and the Job Network achieving improvements in the quality of services was 
emphasised. For example, in Centrelink’s inaugural annual report of 1997-98, both the 
chairperson of the Board, Robin Marrett, and the chief executive officer, Sue Vardon, 
explained that one of the priorities of the organisation was to provide excellence in 
service. The Board’s chair recognised that “the key cultural driver for the organisation is 
a focus on customer service” (Centrelink 1998, p. 3). Similarly, the chief executive 
officer acknowledged the Government had introduced the agency to be “focused on, and 
specialising in, customer service” (Centrelink 1998, p. 17). Likewise, the Job Network 
was established on the assumption that high quality services would result. The 
Ministerial Statement that announced the new employment services market stated that, 
“[tjhe introduction of a competitive market for employment services could be expected to 
significantly enhance the quality of services to job seekers” (Vanstone 1996, p. 13).
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Methods
The methods element of evaluation concentrates on the techniques used to collect and 
analyse evaluation data. Two distinct streams within the evaluation literature are 
identified, dealing with either quantitative or qualitative methods. Quantitative methods 
of analysis are commonly found in summative evaluations where both experimental and 
nonexperimental methods are used to solve the problems in identifying suitable 
counterfactuals (Cobb-Clark and Crossley 2003). Qualitative data is based on an 
interpretative approach to the subject matter and produces data with multiple 
interpretations and rich descriptions of the areas studied, rather than seeking to determine 
causal relationships between variables.
Quantitative methods
In studies that consider the performance of public sector management, a large proportion 
of the research adopts a quantitative approach, with econometric methods of analysis 
applied for conducting efficiency and effectiveness investigations. For example, an 
article by Hill and Lynn (2004), that examines the evidence for whether hierarchical 
governance is in decline, identifies 16 studies that consider the incentives and effects of 
contracting out, with all but two of the 16 studies using econometric methods.
Some suggest the preference for quantifiable data comes from the influence of the 
scientific paradigm and a reliance on the use of mathematical procedures to arrive at 
conclusions that are considered irrefutable (Guba and Lincoln 1989, p. 37). However, the 
complexity of the interrelationships across multiple variables and the difficulties in 
determining causal linkages remains a difficulty. LaLonde’s (1986) influential paper, 
that yielded contrary results when different statistical approaches were used with the 
same data, served to caution evaluators when using quantitative methods of analysis. 
Econometric techniques have progressed since LaLonde’s research and nowadays a 
greater degree of confidence in the application of econometric methods is provided 
(Cobb-Clarke and Crossley 2003).
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The value in studies that adopt quantitative methods is in deteremining the statistical 
significance of variables that may be associated with achieving greater levels of 
efficiency and effectiveness. However, proceeding with such associations to the point 
where causality can be shown is another matter. Causal associations require the cause 
(independent variable) to precede the effect (dependent variable) in time, resulting in a 
relationship between the variables that is asymmetric. In addition, establishing a causal 
connection requires the impact of other influencing variables to be ascertained and this 
may involve analysing a whole network of associations and understanding multiple 
causal links. Determining causal relationships is also difficult because changes in the 
setting may alter the effects. Furthermore, evaluators need to be aware that evidence to 
show the effect of increasing a variable cannot be used to support a claim about the 
effects of decreasing the variable. An added difficulty for research into the efficiency 
and effectiveness of public sector management is that variables may be interacting in 
nonlinear ways, which means that changes in the unit of input may be associated with 
different changes in output, including an increase in the output, but possibly decreasing 
the output or having no discernible impact on it.
A common econometric approach employed for measuring the performance of 
government service production is data envelopment analysis. This type of analysis 
provides the advantage of managing multiple inputs and outputs, particularly where it is 
difficult to assign values to these factors (Heshmati 2003; Pina and Torres 2001; 
Worthington and Dollery 2001). But, the approach fails to take random factors into 
account and treats all deviations from the frontier as inefficiencies (Heshmati 2003). 
Some writers modify data envelopment analysis techniques to overcome the 
shortcomings. For example, Ruggiero, Duncombe and Miner (1995) are concerned that a 
great deal of the data envelopment analysis that is used in assessments of public sector 
efficiency does not distinguish discretionary from fixed inputs. The authors modify data 
envelopment analysis to control for environmental factors and apply their modified 
version to determine possible causes of technical inefficiency in the provision of public
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education in New York State. The modified approach enables results to be presented that 
disaggregate efficiency according to specific inputs and environmental factors.
Many authors highlight the difficulties of dealing with matters that concern public 
management efficiency through quantitative analysis. Hanushek (1986) examines 
research on the economics of education and explains why an economic tool such as the 
production function performs inadequately when applied to a social program. Hanushek 
(1986, p. 1148) notes the standard textbook treatment of production functions draws upon 
simplified examples in which knowledge of the inputs required to produce specific 
outputs are known. As such, straightforward calculations develop the appropriate 
combination of inputs to construct the production of required outputs at least cost. 
However, in the case of education, and other similar social programs, the production 
function is characterised by unknown inputs, that are estimated by using imperfect data 
and for which the capacity to alter aspects of the input mix is not always possible. 
Combined with inadequate measurements of the outputs, the result is a production 
function that is “subject to considerable uncertainty” (Hanushek 1986, p. 1149). 
Furthermore, Hanushek suggests that educational decision makers may be unaware of 
production processes and theories related to the profit optimisation of firms. Instead, 
other factors, unrelated to profits or the minimisation of costs, guide the processes and 
incentives in delivering public education.
Other authors express concerns that quantitative techniques applied in research on public 
sector reform may provide misleading conclusions (Boyne, Meier, O’Toole and Walker 
2005; Gill and Meier 2000). For example, Gill and Meier (2000) consider the null 
hypothesis significance test, that has dominated quantitative analysis in the social 
sciences and public administration for decades, is “logically and interpretively flawed in 
the deepest possible sense” (p. 166). This standard statistical approach to hypothesis 
testing envisages two hypotheses -  a null hypothesis and an alternative hypothesis. The 
null hypothesis is initially accepted as true until statistical evidence is able to nullify the 
hypothesis thereby supporting the alternative hypothesis. The null hypothesis 
significance test is most suited to research that is favourable to a single hypothesis.
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However, in disciplines where there is a wide range of control variables, such as public 
management, use of this statistical test is inappropriate because data that supports a null 
hypothesis does not necessarily mean it is true, given the number of competing 
hypotheses. Moreover, acceptance of the null hypothesis, or the alternative, is limiting as 
it may inhibit the exploration of competing research hypotheses.
Alternative approaches to quantitative research, or a greater investment in developing 
more appropriate methodologies, are suggested (Gill and Meier 2000). One such 
alternative is adopting a Bayesian approach, which incorporates a subjective probability 
into testing the relationships between variables by accounting for prior knowledge and 
having regard to both the internal consistency among such knowledge and for the data 
presented (Raftery 1995). Some authors regard the public management environment as 
particularly Bayesian in nature because management decisions are not made in isolation, 
but incorporate prior experience and judgement (Boyne, Meier, O’Toole and Walker 
2005, p.638). Such authors consider the public sector environment is unsuited to analysis 
using classical statistical methods. Similarly, Gill and Meier (2000) are concerned with 
the application of econometrics to the field of public administration because economic 
analysis is driven predominantly by economic problems and has become focused on 
theory rather than empirical analysis.
The multitude of factors and the numerous quantitative methods used to examine the 
efficiency of public sector reform may account for the wide variations in the findings on 
the success or failure of reform.
Qualitative methods
Another avenue for investigating the performance of public sector reform resides in 
qualitative research. Qualitative research into public service improvement does not 
necessarily seek to establish relationships between dependent and independent variables, 
but is directed towards providing useful insights into the changes in public sector 
management and the impact of these changes on programs and their administration. The
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most common forms of qualitative research include observations, document analysis, 
interviews, surveys and individual or multiple case studies. Using these forms of 
research, qualitative analysis tends to be illustrative in nature and focuses on providing 
extensive descriptions of events and happenings.
An example of research that examines public sector policy from a qualitative perspective 
is the study by Ziguras, Dufty and Considine (2003) on the experience of disadvantaged 
job seekers with the mutual obligation regime in Australia. Using interviews to gather 
information, the study seeks to understand the impact of the active society approach to 
welfare and the associated compliance demands placed upon unemployed people. One of 
the findings is that people with severe barriers to employment are so preoccupied with 
meeting their obligation requirements, that fulfilling these requirements replaces the 
activity of searching for a job. These job seekers develop resentment towards Centrelink 
and are highly discouraged in searching for employment. Such a finding has application 
for further studies that may seek to explore the relationship between the performance of 
Centrelink and the welfare policies of government.
Using a meta-analysis approach, Forbes and Lynn (2005) examine published research to 
evaluate and provide insights into public management and government performance. 
These authors employ the same framework developed by Hill and Lynn (2005) who also 
adopt a meta-analysis approach to examining whether hierarchical governance is in 
decline based on a ‘logic of governance’ to frame the research. This approach 
acknowledges the multitude of social, political and fiscal influences that operate in the 
public sector and seeks to place research within a common logical framework. However, 
Hill’s and Lynn’s (2005) research, that concentrates on American data, is highly biased 
towards quantitative material. In contrast, Forbes and Lynn (2005) seek only non- 
American studies for their meta-analysis and find the international literature incorporates 
a great deal more qualitative material. This qualitative material is valued by Forbes and 
Lynn for the theoretical viewpoints offered and the interpretive or speculative 
conclusions provided. The authors conclude that meta-analysis which considers only 
statistically significant results “fail to capture the full range of theories and variables
72
Chapter Three
under study” and the “inclusion of reasonably well conceived qualitative studies affords a 
more complete picture of the international public management research enterprise” 
(Forbes and Lynn 2005, p. 565).
The strength of qualitative research is that it adds to the knowledge about reform and may 
identify possible influencing variables and suggest relationships for further investigation 
that have avoided observation using the more prescriptive methodologies of quantitative 
research.
The approach of this thesis is qualitative in orientation, although it adopts highly 
empirical methods. The evaluation does not seek to determine the possible variables 
involved in the efficiency and effectiveness of the arrangements and the extent that such 
variables are responsible for the success or failure of the reform. Rather, the approach 
adopts a systematic appraisal of the data related to the costs of the arrangement and the 
levels of customer satisfaction to the programs delivered. The analysis is directed 
towards understanding whether efficiency or effectiveness have improved since the 
alternative arrangements for the delivery of income support and employment services 
were introduced and seeks to obtain this by a thorough examination of relevant data 
sources. If the findings reveal that, since the introduction of Centrelink and the Job 
Network, cost efficiencies are indicated or customer satisfaction has risen, then further 
research may proceed to establish if the reasons for such efficiencies or service 
effectiveness derive from the reformed delivery structures or result from other variables. 
In the first instance, this evaluation will provide useful insights about the directions taken 
with efficiency and effectiveness in a specific example of public sector reform.
Efficiency data
For detailed information on the costs and programs delivered, comprehensive 
descriptions are provided in the organisations’ annual reports and financial statements. 
The benefit of using these documents is they are prepared in accordance with specific 
requirements, including that the financial statements give a true and fair view of matters
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as required by orders of the Finance Minister. The veterans’ affairs portfolio also 
prepares annual reports in accordance with the Finance Minister’s orders and this enables 
cross-sectional judgements to be made for the period that aligns with Centrelink’s 
delivery of income support payments.
The annual reports include both departmental and administered funding for each major 
program, which is important in drawing conclusions about the operational efficiencies 
associated with the different programs. The capacity of organisations to alter the 
administered costs of programs is highly limited as these costs relate directly to the goods 
or services received, but they do provide an indication of the amount of program dollars 
an organisation manages. On the other hand, departmental costs are within the control of 
organisations and serve as an indication of operational efficiency, particularly when the 
type of services delivered and the number of clients are also taken into account.
Access to the publicly available annual reports and financial statements over the 
evaluation period provides continuity in the type and format of data available and assists 
in a process that requires comparative analysis. However, in some instances, particularly 
in the more recent annual reports, the level of detail provided is lacking. For example, 
during the period 1993-94 to 1997-98, DSS provides departmental costs, administered 
costs and the average staffing levels for each payment type that comprises the entire 
social welfare system. However, as the Centrelink arrangement emerges this detail is not 
provided. In the 1998-99 and subsequent annual reports, the departmental costs relate to 
outputs rather than payment types, such as output group 3.1 that comprises nine payment 
types. For output 3.1 departmental costs are indicated in only two broad figures, one 
amount for the costs of the department and another amount for the costs of Centrelink. 
Also, from 1999-00 onwards, the Centrelink annual reports provide no information on the 
average staffing levels for any outcome, output or payment type. Given the large 
workforce employed by Centrelink and the costs or saving that relate to staffing numbers, 
providing only an aggregate staffing level for the entire agency limits the depth of 
analysis that can be undertaken.
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Similar concerns about the lack of data is raised in the case of the Job Network, 
particularly in the case of individual Job Network members for which no specific costs, 
types of services provided or staff employed are outlined.
A further limitation in using the annual reports is the change from a cash basis to an 
accrual accounting framework from 1999-00. Accrual budgeting shifts the emphasis 
away from cash inputs, towards outputs and outcomes, with organisations funded at an 
agreed price for their outputs. As such, accrual accounting supports the output-outcomes 
framework that is a common feature of public sector management reform.
Despite a language that would suggest significant changes, accrual-based reporting does 
not substantially alter the expenditure reporting patterns to the extent that a longitudinal 
analysis is not possible. Carlin and Guthrie (2000), reporting on a study they completed 
of output-based budgeting (OBB) in Australia and New Zealand, observe:
Indeed, what was most striking about many OBB systems reviewed for the purposes of 
our study, was how fundamentally similar in form the resulting budget paper 
documentation was to the documentation prepared along traditional “input” lines. This 
observation caused us to question the extent to which internal management processes had 
fundamentally changed as a result of the adoption of “new” systems in the guise o f OBB  
budgeting. (T. Carlin and J. Guthrie, Third Bi-annual Conference of the International 
Public Management Network, Sydney, 4-6 March 2000)
From a practical perspective, adopting the accrual accounting approach means that from 
1999-00 the annual reports provide financial information in relation to specific outputs 
and outcomes. As such, the corporate services previously undertaken across programs 
and reported separately, such as personnel services, property services or computing 
infrastructure services, become integrated into the outputs-outcomes structure and are 
reported as part of the funding for specific outputs or outcomes. For those periods of this 
evaluation prior to 1999-00, when corporate costs are separately identified, these costs 
are apportioned according to the percentage that each program represents of the total 
expenses of the department. The resulting proportion of corporate expenses are then 
included in each programs’ departmental expenses. For example, in 1995-96 the total
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cost for DEETYA of the employment program comprised 19.5 percent of the 
department’s total expenses. As such, 19.5 percent of the corporate costs are attributed 
to the employment program for the 1995-96 financial year.
It should be noted that costs provided in the annual reports are converted for the analysis 
into real terms, using 2004 dollar values and calculated according to increases in the 
consumer price index. This approach ensures that changes in the value of the dollar are 
taken into account.
Effectiveness
A standard measuring tool for determining the quality of customer service levels is 
customer satisfaction surveys. Customer satisfaction became an emerging issue in the 
1980s as service industries expanded and firms turned their attention towards achieving 
greater competitive advantages in this area (Iacobucci, Grayson & Ostrom 1994, p. 93). 
The expanded role of customer satisfaction is reflected in Kaplan’s and Norton’s 
balanced scorecard, a device for measuring an organisation’s overall performance, which 
includes customer satisfaction as one of its four performance measurements (Wisniewski 
and Dickson 2001, p 1058). The balanced scorecard became a feature of Centrelink’s 
approach to performance measurement, highlighting the importance Centrelink’s 
management placed upon providing quality customer service.
While the evaluation of efficiency takes a wide view of the reform and comprehensively 
investigates most aspects of income support and employment services, the effectiveness 
evaluation concentrates on the impact of the reform on job seekers. This is because the 
government’s announcement of the reform emphasised the service improvements that 
would flow through to unemployed people by establishing Centrelink and removing the 
dual registration and payment processes. The registration process required unemployed 
people to register with the CES before claiming an unemployment payment from DSS. 
Under the reformed arrangements, Centrelink has become responsible for registering
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unemployed people, determining entitlement for income support and assessing 
employment capacity for referral to the appropriate employment service.
As the publicly reported findings of customer satisfaction surveys relating to Centrelink 
and the Job Network are ad hoc and do not consistently report on the same component of 
customer service over time, the author contacted Centrelink and DEWR to obtain 
longitudinal customer satisfaction survey data. In both cases, information was unable to 
be obtained and Freedom of Information requests were lodged. Centrelink provided data 
on the satisfaction of employment customers and youth job seekers with the overall 
quality of Centrelink services for the period 1997 to 2004. However, Centrelink’s survey 
questions focus on broad aspects that are applicable to all customers regardless of the 
payment they are on and the type of service they are receiving. Specific questions related 
to employment services are not included in Centrelink’s surveys and it was suggested 
survey data from the employment department would be of greater assistance. The 
surveys conducted by the employment department collect information on job seekers’ 
satisfaction with the services provided by Job Network members and Centrelink. 
Concerns related to the privacy of customers’ information is avoided as no data was 
requested that would indicate the identity of job seekers. The documents provided under 
the Freedom of Information request are listed in Appendix 1. For the cross-sectional 
analysis, survey data was also obtained from DVA. The veterans’ affairs department 
began conducting regular veterans’ satisfaction surveys in 1995. From 1998, DVA 
changed its approach from a general snap shot of services to specific cyclical surveys of 
the different areas of service delivery. The department provided copies of their survey 
results from 1995 to 2004. The survey instruments used in this thesis are described in 
detail in Chapter 10.
The use of customer satisfaction surveys is not without its limitations. Using the findings 
of customer satisfaction surveys is laden with difficulties and the subjective nature of 
these instruments is highly problematic, commonly placing the results in dispute. The 
issues relating to the measurement of customer satisfaction are examined in greater detail 
in Chapter 9. For the purpose of this study, it is recognised that precise comparisons
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between the organisations and across time may not be possible. However, the body of 
data contained in the customer satisfaction surveys is extensive, high quality 
methodologies are used and substantial financial outlays by government are involved. As 
such, the results provide the opportunity to confidently form reasonable general 
observations about the trends taking place in customer satisfaction.
Conclusion
Judging the appropriateness of the methodology outlined in this chapter is somewhat 
arbitrary as many variations are possible in the application of the elements of evaluation. 
Different evaluators might choose alternative criteria, define the criteria of efficiency and 
effectiveness in other ways, examine other data sources or employ different techniques to 
interpret the data. Each evaluation design will be unique and contain its own set of 
strengths and weaknesses.
However, important aspects of evaluation design need to be fulfilled to ensure the 
conclusions reached are justified and provide credible answers to the evaluation 
questions. These aspects include a systematic approach that considers the purpose of the 
evaluation, matches the evaluation questions to the available resources and background of 
the evaluator, collects relevant and robust data, analyses the information in an objective 
fashion and reports the results with an appreciation of the limits of the study. The 
approach outlined for this evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of Centrelink and 
the Job Network incorporates these elements of a sound quality evaluation.
Systematic consideration has been given to the evaluation design with the purpose clearly 
outlined and placed at the centre of the evaluation. The approach adopts a case study of 
Centrelink and Job Network in a design that incorporates both longitudinal and 
cross-sectional analysis. The criteria for assessing Centrelink and the Job Network are 
identified and defined. The methods chosen are within resource capacity and seek to 
provide an objective account of efficiency and effectiveness. High quality government
78
Chapter Three
data sources form the basis of the material examined and, as will be shown in the 
following chapters, a thorough and careful analysis is undertaken.
The evaluation is not designed to enable the findings to be generalised to other public 
sector reforms. Rather the value of this investigation is the logical, systematic approach 
that is given to understanding whether efficiency and effectiveness have improved since 
the introduction of Centrelink and the Job Network, or when compared to the veterans’ 
affairs portfolio, an organisation which is similar to Centrelink in providing income 
support payments, but has not undergone a split in its policy and delivery functions.
To this point, the thesis has concentrated on setting the scene for public sector reform in 
the late-twentieth century and constructing an evaluation design for assessing whether 
efficiency and effectiveness have improved in a specific application of these reforms. 
The examples of Centrelink and the Job Network have been chosen to provide an 
illustrative case study of public sector reform, with two of the most commonly associated 
outcomes -  efficiency and effectiveness -  selected as the criteria for assessing the reform. 
In the current chapter, the elements that comprise a sound evaluation design have been 
explored and applied to devise a practical evaluation methodology. In the following 
chapters of this thesis the main analytical task of assessing in detail the trends in 
efficiency and effectiveness is undertaken.
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Chapter 4: Efficiency in public sector reform
In this chapter, the meaning of efficiency is examined and its application in public sector 
reform is considered. A central theme of recent reforms to the public sector is the claim 
that separating policy from delivery, either through agencification, outsourcing or 
privatisation, is more efficient than bureaucratic structures designed around large-scale 
hierarchical organisations that undertake all aspects of developing, implementing and 
delivering public services.
The idea that a specific way of doing something is more efficient than another has broad 
appeal. Afterall, the funds of governments are limited and it is prudent to ensure no more 
of taxpayers’ money is spent than necessary. But, claims of efficiency should be closely 
scrutinised as it is by no means certain that new public management arrangements are 
more efficient than previous structures. If the methods of delivery suggested by new 
public management resulted in universal and noticeable efficiencies, then adoption of 
these methods would be universal, or at least widespread. However, many consider the 
new public management claim of greater efficiency to be more rhetorical than substantive 
and there is considerable empirical evidence that indicates government organisations are 
as equally efficient as private businesses. Indeed, it has been suggested the most 
prevalent form of international convergence with new public management is discursive or
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decisional in nature, but that taking action and producing results is far less common 
(Pollitt 2002).
Before an assessment of the efficiency of Centrelink and the Job Network is undertaken it 
is worthwhile examining the meaning of efficiency and how this is applied in public 
sector reform. This chapter demonstrates the meaning of efficiency is not necessarily 
straightforward and emphasises the importance of context in applying the term. The 
chapter then explores ways that efficiency has previously been considered in assessments 
of Centrelink and the Job Network. This enables the insights of other evaluations to be 
considered and alternative evaluation methodologies to be reviewed.
The meaning of efficiency
The term ‘efficiency’ has been used in the public administration literature for decades 
and most likely linked to public sector reform throughout the history of public 
bureaucracies. However, the emphasis placed upon efficiency in the current framework 
of new public management reform constitutes a direct challenge to the processes 
developed within the public sector and even large segments of the bureaucracy itself. 
Established bureaucratic procedures are replaced by methods common to private 
enterprise and substantial components of the public sector are reduced with the view that 
better value for money will be delivered by multiple agencies operating in competitive 
environments.
In many of the writings on new public management the idea of efficiency is used with no 
direct linkages between inputs and outputs (Pollitt 1998, p. 53). The introduction of 
Centrelink is one such example, with the Prime Minister’s speech at the official launch 
providing numerous references to the “efficient” services Centrelink would deliver, 
without elaborating on the specific meaning of efficiency (Howard 1997a). While the 
Prime Minister was most likely linking the idea of efficiency to cost savings, this is not 
made explicit, with the term being used more generally to impress upon his listeners that 
efficiency benefits from the reformed delivery arrangements would be forthcoming.
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Referring to efficiency on a broad level, Hawkins (1950, p. 31) notes the term has an 
abstract quality involving “an impression of competence or capability, readily recognised 
when a person, or a piece of plant, or an organization, does its work particularly well”. 
The view expressed by Hawkins incorporates a generalised concept of efficiency that 
relates to how well the work on a task is carried out. This idea of efficiency is closely 
associated with the concept of effectiveness, but effectiveness has more to do with the 
extent that a task achieves the purpose for which it was designed, as compared to 
efficiency dealing with the way that a task is carried out, regardless of whether the end 
objective is met.
Hawkins (1950) proceeds further and explores the concept of economic efficiency -  a 
term that commonly appears in management texts. Economic efficiency involves the 
avoidance of waste in the production of goods and services that meet consumer demands 
at prices the consumers are prepared to pay and that provide a profit for the producer 
(Hawkins 1950, p. 31). Further reading of economic texts reveals that ‘efficiency’ has a 
multi-definitional quality and exploring the various uses and dimensions enables a greater 
understanding of studies that seek to determine the efficiency of organisations.
Accepted as an influential article, Farrell (1957) describes a method for measuring the 
overall efficiency of a firm that separates the idea of efficiency into technical and price 
efficiency. Technical efficiency relates to the success of a firm in producing the greatest 
output from a given set of inputs or a specific output from a minimal level of inputs. 
Price efficiency takes into account the costs of various inputs and measures the extent 
that inputs are used in optimal proportions given their prices. The overall efficiency of a 
firm is a combination of technical efficiency and price efficiency and is determined 
according to an assumed standard of perfect efficiency.
Most current day economic texts refer to price efficiency as allocative efficiency because 
this measurement of efficiency involves the appropriate allocation of inputs to achieve 
maximum profitability or cost minimisation. For example, Kalirajan (1990) separates the
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idea of economic efficiency into technical and allocative efficiency. Similar to Farrell 
(1957), the technical efficiency of a firm is described as the “ability to obtain the 
maximum possible output from a given set of resources” (Kalirajan 1990, p. 75). 
Allocative efficiency relates to the ability of a firm to maximise profits by making 
adjustments to the “manner of application of inputs on outputs” (Kalirajan 1990, p. 75). 
Allocative efficiency also takes into consideration the market price of products and 
accordingly deals with the distribution of goods and services and seeks to allot these so 
there is a match between production and the preferences of consumers (Boyne, Farrell, 
Law, Powell and Walker 2003, p.16). Defined in this way, allocative efficiency ensures 
that maximum net benefit is obtained in the use of outputs.
However, the economic literature is not always straightforward and consistent with the 
usage of terms. Other words replace or overlap with the ideas of technical and allocative 
efficiency and some authors utilise the term productive efficiency to equate with 
technical efficiency. For example, Kay and Thompson (1986) examine the sale of 
government industrial assets in the United Kingdom and define productive efficiency to 
mean “that whatever is done should be achieved at minimum cost” (p. 20). However, Ng 
and Li (2003, p. 608), in their analysis of the effect of training on enterprise efficiency, 
consider productive efficiency on an industry level to represent a wider concept that 
incorporates technical efficiency, as well as the efficient allocation of inputs and the total 
output of the industry group.
Hall (1959) also identifies technical efficiency, but contrast this with target efficiency, a 
concept that is concerned with “how much a particular firm has to increase its output to 
reach the best in its particular environment” (p. 74). Hall (1959, p.74) sees target 
efficiency and technical efficiency as “lying between” or ‘overlapping” with the concepts 
of managerial efficiency and efficiency in use. Managerial efficiency, as with target 
efficiency, involves the management performance of a firm and considers variables that 
are under the control of managers. Efficiency in use, closely relates to technical 
efficiency as it concerns the efficiency of the productive unit in terms of the output 
achievable by the plant. However, Tomkins (1987) describes managerial efficiency,
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which he also refers to as internal efficiency, as “given that we want cakes, what is the 
cheapest way of producing them?” (p. 16). In this way, Tomkins is using managerial 
efficiency in a similar way that many authors use the term technical efficiency. That is, 
Tomkins’s description concerns the combination of inputs and outputs where the greatest 
output is achieved with minimal input.
Allocative efficiency is closely related to the idea of distributive efficiency as used in the 
study of welfare economics. Distributive efficiency concerns the way that goods and 
services are redistributed among income groups in society (Hölsch and Kraus 2006, p. 
51). However, Hölsch and Kraus (2006) distinguish distributive efficiency from 
allocative efficiency, emphasising that allocative efficiency is concerned with how 
society’s resources are allocated whereas distributive efficiency deals with the share of 
wealth in society. Allocative efficiency is often used in an assessment of the impact of 
social assistance schemes on labour supply and suggests the guaranteed minimum income 
offered by social assistance schemes may operate as a disincentive to either join the 
workforce or increase the hours of workforce attachment and thereby results in an 
inefficient allocation of labour.
Given the range of economic uses applying to the term ‘efficiency’, and the extent that 
the term is used without definition in public sector reform, it is prudent to consider the 
meaning embedded within the context that it is used. Generally, from a public 
management perspective, efficiency refers to technical efficiency, with the focus of 
current public sector practices directed towards cost minimisation (Boyne, Farrell, Law, 
Powell and Walker 2003, p. 16). Technical efficiency is most commonly measured by 
the unit costs required to produce a unit of output and this can be reasonably 
straightforward in a commercial product environment where profits are the bottom-line 
and suppliers are able to accurately determine the inputs required to produce goods and 
services at prices consumers are willing to pay. However, determining technical 
efficiency in relation to the services provided by government may not be as clear-cut. 
For example, Boyne et al. (2003, p. 17) comments on the indirect costs involved in 
outsourcing and how these may be excluded from assessments of efficiency. These costs
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include obscure items such as the payment of social security and welfare services in 
supporting workers whose jobs have become surplus through public sector reform.
The cross-sectional study by Byrnes, Grosskopf and Hayes (1986) highlights the 
importance of being clear about the type of efficiency that is evaluated. The authors 
examine data from 1976 on the water utilities industry in the United States. The study 
adopts a production function approach to measuring technical and scale efficiency, as 
compared to a cost or profit function approach. The econometric analysis of 68 
government-owned and 59 privately-owned water utility companies concludes that the 
type of ownership does not impact on the level of productivity and, therefore, that public 
water utility companies are no more wasteful or slack than their private sector 
counterparts. The authors are linking the notion of efficiency to productivity that, as the 
previous section on the definition of efficiency has shown, relates to the idea of technical 
efficiency. This is different to studies that might investigate the cost efficiency of firms 
and therefore comment on price-related efficiencies. As such, Byrnes, Grosskopf and 
Hayes view their results as consistent with other studies that, using the same data, have 
found public utilities to have higher costs. These other studies are based on a definition 
of efficiency that considers the costs of private and public water utilities, rather than 
measurements of their productivity. This study raises issues about variations in findings 
related to use of the same data and the need to acknowledge the type of efficiency that is 
being studied and the methods used to capture this.
An important consideration in reforms that seek to improve efficiency by measuring the 
inputs and quantity of outputs, is to include a measure of the quality of the product 
(Boyne, Farrell, Law, Powell and Walker 2003). Within this framework a number of 
combinations of the three variables (cost, quantity and quality) are possible in forming 
judgements on the success or failure of the efficiency of public sector reform. However, 
the measurement of quality in services funded by the government is often elusive, with 
no clear agreeable measures available. For example, in the provision of welfare services, 
one of the many standards of quality relies upon the actions of individual service 
operators in their dealings with clients, but measuring and ensuring quality standards
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across numerous different operators is problematic. Nonetheless, the inclusion of a 
quality component in the measurement of efficiency recognises that public sector reforms 
involving the level of inputs and how this translates into the quantity of outputs are likely 
to impact on the quality of these outputs. It is important to acknowledge the quality 
component in an efficiency evaluation and ensure quality measures are maintained or not 
diminished in reforms that seek to reduce costs while delivering similar levels of output.
A common forecast is that private, profit-seeking firms are likely to compromise on 
quality in order to reduce their costs -  the ‘quality shading hypothesis’. An alternative 
view is that quality will improve under new public management because competition 
between providers fosters quality service provision and the contractual arrangements 
specify the quality of services required and monitor the results. Perhaps, in the first 
instance, it is helpful to consider quality as separate from a determination of cost 
efficiency and then make an overall assessment of reform based on both the cost 
efficiency of production and measures of the quality of outputs.
Summary
In translating the concept of efficiency from an abstract notion into a tangible assessment 
of the Centrelink and Job Network arrangement, this exploration of the term highlights 
the relationship between inputs and outputs. Governments may have an input-focus and 
choose reform for the possibility of achieving cost-savings or possess an output-focus and 
seek to achieve more with the same level of input. With a deep show of faith in new 
public management reform, governments may believe they will be able to deliver more 
outputs with less inputs.
Prior to examining the indicators of efficiency this thesis is using to evaluate whether 
improvements have taken place since the commencement of Centrelink and the Job 
Network, this chapter explores the ways that efficiency has previously been assessed in 
the case of Centrelink and the Job Network.
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For Centrelink, the emphasis on cost-savings involving a reduction in inputs is apparent. 
Centrelink was established to return to government substantial savings and efficiency 
dividends indicating the level of return to government were made explicit. For the Job 
Network, the government was guided by reform principles they believed would produce 
both cost-savings combined with better and more sustainable employment outcomes. 
These reform principles for the Job Network typify the new public management approach 
involving the development of a competitive market, devising an outcomes framework and 
introducing incentives-based contracts.
Assessments of Centrelink and the Job Network
This section examines the ways that efficiency has previously been assessed in the case 
of Centrelink and the Job Network. The methods used and the strengths and weaknesses 
of these methods are emphasised in this analysis. This section also provides a useful 
background ahead of the efficiency evaluation of Centrelink and the Job Network 
conducted in the following four chapters of this thesis.
Common and often highly publicised evaluations are conducted by the departments or 
agencies that are involved in the reform. Such evaluations may be undertaken by 
consultants, as in the case of Centrelink’s efficiency evaluation by the Boston Consulting 
Group (2002). A caution against possible biases in these types of evaluations is 
encountered. For example, meta-analysis studies by academics (Boyne 2003a; Forbes 
and Lynn 2005; Hill and Lynn 2005) have limited the use of material to those articles 
presented in leading public administration journals in the belief that such articles provide 
a greater degree of independence and peer review than the “overtly promotional and 
normative literature by governments and consultants” (Forbes and Lynn 2005, 561).
Review from independent government authorities that operate at arm’s length and are 
tasked with oversight, such as the Australian National Audit Office or the Productivity 
Commission, claim a high degree of transparency and independence in their investigative
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processes. Another source is independent assessments based on sound methods and with 
a degree of objectivity in the findings, such as those conducted by academics.
Centrelink
Boston Consulting Group
In the case of Centrelink, one of the major efficiency studies undertaken was 
commissioned by the Centrelink Board of Management and conducted in 2002 by the 
Boston Consulting Group. The Boston Consulting Group devised a cross-sectional study 
and used a method that involved interviewing key external stakeholders and visiting 
Centrelink service centres, area offices and call centres. Centrelink’s costs in specific 
areas were compared with selected financial institutions, comprising mostly financial 
services such as banks and insurers.
As with all studies that are cross-sectional in design, the results of the Centrelink 
efficiency review was limited by the extent to which Centrelink’s operations were able to 
be likened, then compared, to the costs of other organisations. In this regard, the 
efficiency report recognised that Centrelink’s workload significantly exceeded in volume 
and complexity the workload dealt with by other organisations in the study. Another 
limitation for the study was accepting cost data provided by Centrelink for specific areas 
of its operation. The report itself questions the integrity of the data noting that 
“Centrelink’s understanding of its costs and its access to good cost information are 
inferior to those found in other network organisations” (Boston Consulting Group 2002, 
p. 7).
The five major cost areas examined by the Boston Consulting Group consisted of service 
delivery, call centres, management and support, information technology and property. In 
all of these operational areas, the Boston Consulting Group found the cost efficiency of 
Centrelink was comparable to that of other businesses, taking into account the 
organisational complexity of Centrelink’s operations.
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Subsequently given some prominence was the finding by the Boston Consulting Group 
that Centrelink had achieved efficiency gains of around 21 percent since its 
establishment. For example, both the chairman of Centrelink’s Board and the chief 
executive officer highlighted this efficiency finding in their reports for the 2002-03 
Centrelink annual report (Centrelink 2003a, pp. 2 and 3). While the measurement of 
efficiency derived by the Boston Consulting Group is favourable for Centrelink, the 
reasons for this should be closely considered, as the efficiencies are not necessarily 
related to Centrelink’s establishment and methods of operation.
The Boston Consulting Group calculated Centrelink’s efficiency by examining expenses 
and linking these to workloads, thereby determining the cost per unit workload. The 
expenses component utilised Centrelink’s annual operating costs, adjusted for inflation, 
over the five financial years comprising 1997-98 to 2001-02. The workload was 
measured by the minutes of work required to undertake Centrelink’s core activities. The 
core activities examined included the area network and call centre workloads that were 
associated with general enquiries, assessing new claims, activities involved in processing 
recipients’ changed circumstances, raising debts, undertaking payment reviews and 
dealing with the participation requirements of those in receipt of unemployment 
payments. The 21 percent efficiency measurement was derived from the net effect of a 
two per cent increase in real operating expenses and an estimated increase in workload of 
29 per cent.
A number of concerns are raised with the methodology that determined Centrelink’s 
efficiency level. For example, it is unclear how the estimated 29 per cent increase in 
workload is calculated. The report of the Boston Consulting Group indicates the growth 
in Centrelink’s workload had been driven by an increase in call centre volumes and the 
additional participation requirements placed upon recipients of unemployment payments. 
However, over the same period, 1997-98 to 2001-02, the Centrelink annual reports 
indicate a growth in telephone calls of 17.5 percent. Also, over this period, while the 
overall percentage of customers increases by 12.5 percent, the number of customers in 
receipt of an unemployment payment, and involving the additional particpation
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requirements, reflects the strong economic conditions and decreases by 25 per cent. 
These figures from the annual reports do not provide strong support for a 29 per cent 
estimated increase in Centrelink’s workload.
The calculations of the Boston Consulting Group’s efficiency measurement also appear 
to neglect the activities involved at the national office level that, ultimately, support and 
therefore should be linked to Centrelink undertaking its core activities. While figures in 
the Centrelink annual reports for the period 1997-98 to 2001-02 indicate that staffing 
levels in the Centrelink area offices and call centres reduced from 23,174 to 21,595, staff 
in the national office increased from 2162 to 3048. These staffing figures represent a loss 
of staff in the Centrelink network of almost seven per cent compared to a gain at the 
national office level of 41 percent. In absolute terms, the decline in the Centrelink 
network and the growth in national office, results in an overall loss of 693 staff, but if the 
workload associated with Centrelink’s core activities excludes the national office 
involvement, a distorted picture of inputs, effort and outputs may emerge.
On the topic of staffing at the network and national office level, it is interesting to note 
that it is staffing at the senior levels that have increased by a greater proportion than other 
levels. For example, the Senior Executive Service (SES), the highest level of public 
sector employment, increased in the Centrelink national office by 70 per cent over the 
period 1997-98 to 2001-02. Over this same timeframe, staff at the executive level, the 
feeder level for the SES, increased in national office by 65 per cent. This compares to 
increases in the Centrelink network of 12 per cent for SES officers and 10 per cent for 
executive level officers. By way of comparison, staff at the lower levels, the 
Administrative Services Officer classes 1 to 6, increased by 32 percent in national office 
and decreased by eight per cent in the network. The increase in the number of senior 
staff and less staff in the regional network is in contrast to the new public management 
principle involving devolved decision-making and flatter organisational structures, but is 
consistent with the managerialist emphasis and the finding by Pollitt that “among the 
most common practical effects on the New Public Management are increased authority 
(and often salary) for top managers and the shedding of staff at lower and middle levels”
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(1998, p. 51). A detailed account of issues related to staffing is provided in the next 
chapter.
Another factor that influences the findings of the Boston Consulting Group’s efficiency 
analysis is the period of time taken into account for the study. Using a different time 
period to track changes in Centrelink’s operating costs reveals a different picture. 
Centrelink was able to contain operating costs during the period 1997-98 to 2001-02, 
largely as a result of substantial retrenchments during this early period of its operations. 
However, in later periods such costs are not controlled to the same extent. For example, 
in 2002-03, when staffing levels increased by seven per cent, costs rose in real terms 
from the previous financial year by around eight percent. Accordingly, the cost 
efficiency model as developed by the Boston Consulting Group would not indicate the 
same level of efficiency gains for the period 1997-98 to 2002-03 as the 21 percent 
reported for the period 1997-98 to 2001-02.
If the findings of the Boston Consulting Group’s evaluation are accepted as indicative of 
improved efficiency, it does not necessarily follow that such efficiencies are a result of 
the changed structural arrangements. Other factors, such as technological advances, may 
be responsible for improved efficiency and would have taken place had the previous 
delivery structures been retained. In the case of Centrelink, improvements in the 
processing of activities are partly explained by the introduction of changes to the 
information technology systems. In May 1998, building upon work largely completed 
within the previous DSS, Centrelink introduced significant changes to the computing 
infrastructure for allowances. Called the ‘Newstart Common Platform’, the introduction 
of these changes reduced the workload in some areas and, as acknowledged by the 
Boston Consulting Group, “explain, in part, Centrelink’s overall efficiency improvement” 
(Boston Consulting Group 2002, p. 20).
While the government was confident that integrating the functions of DSS and some of 
the tasks of the CES into Centrelink would provide a “more coherent and more efficient 
delivery” (Vanstone 1996, p. 16), the Boston Consulting Group concludes that only a
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small proportion of Centrelink’ s efficiency gains derive from the merger o f the two 
organisations. The efficiency report indicates that while major gains from business 
mergers often arise from the rationalisation of computing systems and branch networks, 
in the case of Centrelink, opportunities to reduce these costs were minimal. The report 
identifies the main drivers of the efficiency gains as the staff reductions o f around 5000 
employees and technology advancements provided by the introduction o f the Newstart 
Common Platform. Whether the efficiency report also accounts for the costs of staff 
retrenchments, amounting to over $129 m illion11 in the three financial years 1997-98 to 
1999-00, is not clear.
Australian National Audit Office
The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) is a specialist public sector audit office 
that provides support to the Auditor-General in conducting independent assessments o f 
specific areas of public administration. The Office has extensive powers o f access to 
Commonwealth documents and the work is governed by auditing standards applied by 
the auditing profession in Australia. As such, the performance and financial statement 
audit reports produced by the ANAO are designed to provide a reasonable level of 
assurance that its audits present an accurate portrayal of the efficiency and effectiveness 
of public sector bodies.
Since 1997, the ANAO has conducted numerous performance reports on the efficiency 
and effectiveness of various aspects of Centrelink’s operations. In its investigations, the 
Audit Office considers specific payment types, such as Parenting Payment (ANAO 
2003b) or Age Pension (ANAO 2001a), the operation of systems that support the 
payment of income support, such as the debt management system (ANAO 2004) or the 
review and appeal system (ANAO 2005c) and broad administrative mechanisms that 
support the management of the organisation, such as the planning and monitoring
11 The costs of retrenchments are provided in the Financial Statements of Centrelink in the 
1997-98 to 1999-00 Centrelink annual reports.
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mechanisms that support cost effective service delivery (ANAO 2000b) or the operation 
of the Value Creation Program (ANAO 2005d).
A common theme throughout the ANAO audits of Centrelink is the inability to assess the 
cost efficiency of the programs or systems under investigation because of a lack of cost- 
related performance information. Such concerns were raised during early audit reports of 
Centrelink. For example, in the 2000 audit of Centrelink’s planning, monitoring and 
costing arrangements, the audit office noted that:
Centrelink will require ready access to more robust management information, particularly 
on cost, to support its managers to implement and evaluate major business initiatives and 
to use to set prices with its purchasers. In an environment of continuing funding 
constraints, Centrelink will also need reliable management information to provide an 
assurance to Government and client departments that it has the capacity to maintain 
timely, quality and cost effective service delivery. (ANAO 2000b, p. 13)
In later reports the information gathering mechanisms of Centrelink do not appear to have 
progressed. In commenting on the costs involved in the value creation workshops, the 
audit report notes that most area and service centre managers were unable to provide 
figures, or even a “guesstimate”, for the expenses involved in the program (ANAO 
2005d, p. 18). Similarly, the 2005 audit of Centrelink’s complaints handling system 
notes the absence “of performance information prevents Centrelink from providing a 
more robust assessment of its complaints handling system, such as its effectiveness, value 
for money and the impact it has had in improving Centrelink service delivery” (ANAO 
2005a, p. 73).
The ANAO also undertakes follow-up audit activity to determine whether the 
recommendations in previous audit reports have been actioned. In the case of Centrelink, 
follow-up audit activity has found the issues related to identifying Centrelink’s costing of 
activities, and therefore assessments of efficiency, remain unresolved. For example, in 
2002 the audit office undertook a follow-up audit of Centrelink’s costing arrangements 
(ANAO 2002a) and concluded that Centrelink’s activity based costing model did not 
incorporate the key features of an effective costing system and the implementation of the
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system was lacking key components such as an effective change management plan and a 
structured project management approach.
The AN AO recognises that significant government funding is provided for Centrelink’s 
operations and proposes an audit into the costing of Centrelink’s operational activities 
and services (ANAO 2006b, p. 75). Whilst the proposed audit is not a follow-up of the 
2002 Centrelink costings investigation, the audit would consider whether Centrelink has 
implemented an effective approach to the costings of its operations, enabling efficiency 
audits to be undertaken.
The audit activity of the ANAO has been unable to determine the efficiency of 
Centrelink’s operations and, as such, the ANAO is unable to contribute useful comments 
on Centrelink’s efficiency. Despite continued pressure from the ANAO, Centrelink’s 
progress in providing greater clarity for the costs of delivering their products and services 
remains obscure. Given this, it is difficult to see how the government is able to conclude 
that Centrelink has improved efficiency. Moreover, the lack of Centrelink’s costing 
information questions the operation of the purchaser-provider relationships that the 
Centrelink design was based upon and that presupposes the purchase of services at 
known levels of expenditure. The consequence of the costing uncertainty for a monopoly 
provider engaged in delivering services to a single purchaser is the difficulty in knowing 
if value for money is being delivered. As the former head of DSS has stated:
DSS and Centrelink are effectively captives of each other. We (DSS) have little choice 
but to buy from you (Centrelink) at whatever is the lowest cost you can achieve, and you 
have little choice but to deliver something to us at the highest price we are able to pay. 
An implication of this mutual dependency is that DSS, as your main purchaser, is the 
main beneficiary or loser from better or worse cost control by Centrelink. 
(Rosalky 1998, p. 3)
Independent assessments
Independent commentaries on the efficiency of the Centrelink arrangements have either 
not been undertaken or the results of such analysis are not published. It is more common
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for studies of Centrelink to examine the accountability relationships that operate at the 
political and managerial levels (Mulgan 2002), the ambiguous aspects of the purchaser- 
provider model through which Centrelink is designed to operate (Halligan 2004) or 
Centrelink’s role in supporting active social welfare policies (McDonald and Marston 
2006; McDonald, Marston and Buckley 2003; Raper 1999, Schooneveldt 2004; Ziguras, 
Dufty and Considine 2003).
Articles about the establishment of Centrelink generally comment on the efficiencies the 
government expected to obtain (Briggs and Fisher 1996; Scott, E. 1999; Rowlands 1999), 
but as these articles were written close to, or before, the commencement of the agency, no 
assessments of efficiency are undertaken. In keeping with the emphasis placed upon the 
objective of efficiency, Rowlands (2000), in an article that explores the issues involved in 
evaluating the Centrelink arrangements, comments that “any serious evaluation of the 
Centrelink arrangements will take efficiency and effectiveness as its point of origin” (p. 
79). As such, it is surprising the efficiency outcomes of Centrelink have not been subject 
to greater independent scrutiny.
Independent assessments that comment on Centrelink’s efficiency generally do so within 
a broader framework of investigation. For example, McDonald’s and Marston’s (2006) 
study of the changing role of social workers in Centrelink and their capacity to exercise 
discretion in the implementation of welfare-to-work policies, briefly comments that the 
“real efficiencies made by Centrelink have been through the extensive deployment of 
information and communication technologies” (p. 174). McDonald and Marston consider 
Centrelink’s efficiencies are related to new work processes, which constrain the 
discretion of front-line staff, and the use of computer-driven procedures, that limits the 
involvement of recipients to obtain the optimum levels of throughput. However, the 
study does not offer quantification of any such efficiencies and the authors do not define 
whether their use of efficiency is related to the overall operations of Centrelink or is 
confined to the productive efficiency of front-line staff.
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In contrast, another study by a former Centrelink employee, Rod Whyte (2005), in a 
position of “authority” (p. 5) and with access to “some of the most sensitive and detailed 
information one could ever have on Centrelines performance” (p. 5) argues that 
Centrelink’s front-line performance is declining rapidly and that “considerable amounts 
of money are being lost from Commonwealth revenue through mismanagement” (p. 19). 
As an example, Whyte (2005, p. 66) examines Centrelink’s ability to recover debts from 
beneficiaries and pensioners and calculates that over the six year period 1998-99 to 
2003-04, debts totalling $2.28 billion remained outstanding and that performance for the 
recovery of payment debts were falling each year.
Combined, the independent studies by McDonald and Marston (2006) and Whyte (2005), 
provide an example of how efficiency measurements can differ depending on the 
viewpoints of the researchers. McDonald’s and Marston’s study relates efficiency gains 
to the number of customers that staff are able to process, whereas Whyte’s analysis 
suggests that efficiency in performance is declining as indicated by the reduced capacity 
to recover debts.
The absence of in-depth assessments into the efficiency of Centrelink may reflect the 
methodological difficulties that are encountered in undertaking efficiency evaluations, 
such as the lack of access to administrative data. Alternatively, the lack of efficiency 
assessments may indicate that for the majority of researchers Centrelink remains an 
integral part of the public sector and there is little to substantively distinguish the 
organisation from the extensive bureaucratic network that operated previously.
Job Network 
Internal Assessments
For the Job Network, three major internal assessments were conducted by the 
employment department in the years 2000, 2001 and 2002. These three internal 
assessments published by the employment department focus on the four criteria of equity, 
quality, efficiency and effectiveness, although each evaluation considers specific aspects
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of the Job Network. Each internal assessment examines areas o f cost efficiency, 
generally calculated as cost-per-participant (unit cost) or incorporates a component o f 
effectiveness into the measure by indicating the cost-per-outcome or cost-per-net impact 
of assistance. However, the analysis often relies upon data that is not available for 
replication o f the results and other published data produces contrary findings. For 
example, the first report concludes that job search training delivers assistance at about 
two-thirds the cost of job clubs12. The first evaluation report (DEWRSB 2000c, p. 67) 
indicates the unit cost for job search training amounted to $418 compared to $625 for the 
job clubs program. However, the first report also indicates that an estimated $60 m illion 
was allocated to job search training and that the program involved a total contracted 
capacity o f 128,300 places (DEWRSB 2000c, p. 59). Using these figures, the unit cost o f 
job search training amounts to $467, not the $418 mentioned in the report. Furthermore, 
the first report also indicates that job search training providers were operating at 
74 per cent o f their contracted number and that the introduction of an accelerated referral 
system from March 1999 had resulted in only a negligible effect on the level o f 
commencements (DEWRSB 2000c, p. 59). Recalculating the unit cost o f job search 
training, based on 74 per cent o f the 128,300 total contracted capacity, results in a unit 
cost of $632. The lack of clarity relating to how figures were calculated, such as the 
$418 per job search training participant, limits independent assessments o f the internal 
reviews.
In addition to cost efficiency, inconsistencies are also found in comments about the 
effectiveness of job search training compared to job clubs. The first evaluation report 
notes that job search training participants “ had an overall positive outcome level o f 
46 per cent compared to 30 per cent for job clubs in 1995-96”  (DEWRSB 2000c, p. 66). 
However, the 30 per cent quoted for job clubs compares with data in the employment 
department’s 1995-96 annual report that indicates the percentage o f participants who had 
found unsubsidised employment or commenced education or training three months after 
participating in the job clubs program was 43.8 percent (DEETYA 1996a, p. 124).
12 Job clubs were managed by the CES and provided similar assistance to the job search training 
program the Job Network delivers.
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In the first and second internal assessments of the Job Network, the employment 
department acknowledges that development of the Job Network market was in its early 
stages and assessments of the efficiency of the arrangements had received limited 
coverage. In contrast, the third evaluation of the Job Network sought to undertake an 
analysis that combined the costs of assistance with employment outcomes to assess the 
cost-effectiveness of the Job Network. While evaluations of the program outcomes for 
the Job Network are outside the scope of this thesis, the third report notes that substantial 
efficiency gains took place by combining the staff resources and office networks within 
Centrelink. However, the report neglects to mention if the costs involved in creating the 
competitive market that is the Job Network, or the costs of the contractual processes that 
maintain the outsourcing arrangements, have been taken into account. In addition, in 
contrast to the department’s conclusion, the previously mentioned evaluation of 
Centrelink by the Boston Consulting Group noted the efficiencies resulting from “merger 
synergies” were not significant (2002, p. 19).
While assessments of the Job Network in the first and second departmental reports 
concentrate on the outcomes for individual participants in programs, the third report 
discusses the macroeconomic impacts of the Job Network on the economy and labour 
market as a whole. This aspect of the Job Network concerns the role of employment 
services in improving labour market efficiencies, which deals with issues such as the 
impact of long-term unemployment, the speed that vacancies are filled and the allocation 
of employment opportunities. The third report recognises that a multitude of factors can 
influence change in the wider environment and this makes it difficult to isolate the 
performance of the Job Network. For example, the report acknowledges the reform was 
introduced during a period of “relatively robust economic and employment growth” 
(DEWR 2002b, p. 134). This compares to the economic environment of the early 1990s 
when an economic recession and a rise in unemployment, particularly long-term 
unemployment, set the scene for the employment programs introduced under the Labor
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government’s Working Nation'3 initiative. Accounting for the impacts of these wider 
environmental influences on the operation of the Job Network compared to the previous 
programs remains a concern for most researchers.
Australian National Audit Office
In the case of the Job Network, investigation by the ANAO is limited to the operations of 
the employment department in its role as the purchaser of employment services. In 
relation to Job Network providers, their operations as private agencies are beyond the 
scope of the audit office. In recognising the accountability risks of outsourcing, a former 
Australian Auditor-General has commented that the introduction of the commercial 
sector into the arena of government service delivery should not provide the avenue for 
non-disclosure of publicly-funded services (Barrett 1999). However, the non-disclosure 
of costing data and the degree of protection that Job Network members have from 
independent scrutiny are features of the Job Network. For instance, in the course of 
Senate Committee proceedings, the then Secretary of the employment department, Dr 
Shergold, commented that the price for which Job Network services are tendered is 
commercial-in-confidence (Senate Employment, Workplace Relations, Small Business 
and Education Committee 2001, p. 99). Such a lack of transparency in the arrangements 
that operate under new public management are raised by those who comment generally 
on matters of public administration (Barton 2003; Dobel 2001; Mulgan 2001; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2000) and are discussed specifically in the case of the Job Network (Chalmers 
and Davis 2001; Eardley 2002a; Finn 2001; Struyven and Steurs 2005). The implications 
of a lack of transparency for matters involving public accountability are disturbing and 
range from mismanagement through to dishonest behaviours.
Access to specific cost data at the level of individual providers would facilitate an 
analysis of efficiency at the micro-level, rather than the more limited analysis afforded by 
aggregate figures that combine providers operating efficiently with those operating
13 Announced in May 1994, the Working Nation measure was a major initiative of the Keating 
government. Responding to the high levels of unemployment in the early 1990s, the Working 
Nation measure significantly boosted the funding for labour market programs.
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inefficiently. In part, the need for such data is lessened by changes introduced as part of 
the evolution of the Job Network where, in the third employment services contract, 
competitive price tendering for Job Network services was replaced by set administrative 
prices. This feature improves the financial transparency of the arrangements, but 
acknowledges the problems arising in a competitive price tendering approach, such as 
agencies bidding too low in order to gain a contract, then not being able to deliver the 
services. It also questions a fundamental design feature of the Job Network that 
promoted competitive price tendering as a means to provide an incentive for efficient 
operations.
The audit office report of the implementation of the third employment services contract 
notes the department had re-established an indicator to enable it to assess the efficiency 
of the Job Network (ANAO 2005f, p. 130). This indicator is an aggregate measure that 
provides the current average cost per employment outcome, defined as job seekers 
employed or studying three months after leaving Job Network assistance. The ANAO 
notes that this efficiency measure includes outcomes that are attributable to external 
factors, such as economic trends, or are due to the sole efforts of job seekers, and that 
performance reporting would be more transparent if the inclusion of these externalities 
were made explicit.
Productivity Commission
A detailed review of the Job Network arrangements was undertaken by the Productivity 
Commission during 2001 and 2002. The Productivity Commission was established in 
1998 and replaced three separate bodies that had been responsible for providing 
independent research, advice and policy review on the industry and economic sectors. 
Today, the Productivity Commission provides the Australian Government with key 
review and advisory functions on microeconomic policy and regulation. Although the 
Commission offers independent assessments, the enquiries it conducts are in accordance 
with terms of reference provided by the government and, accordingly, controversial areas 
of public policy may be excluded from the Commission’s consideration. The
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independence of inquiries undertaken by the Productivity Commission has also been 
questioned (Brown and Uhr 2004; Freedman and Stonecash 1997, Rowland 2003).
In the case of the Commission’s review of the Job Network, the terms of reference were 
broad. However, the approach of the Commission presents a distinctly neo-liberalist 
view of public sector management. For instance, whilst recognising the advantages of 
traditional forms of bureaucracy, such as economies of scale and strong accountability, 
the report also mentions the obstacles government monopolies may face in improving 
cost efficiency, including the lack of pressure from competitors, the inflexibilities of 
public service-wide practices, access to capital, risk aversion and capture by interest 
groups. In commenting directly on the evolution of industry policy and the views of the 
Productivity Commission, Freedman and Stonecash (1997, p. 180) note;
The philosophy behind the agenda is that efficiency in allocation and gains in 
productivity can only be obtained if government lessens its role in the allocation 
process. The Productivity Commission makes its view clear:
Australia’s productivity performance has been handicapped by government 
policies and practices over many years that have weakened or distorted 
incentives to be cost-conscious, innovative and productive ...
It is predictable, therefore, that the Productivity Commission concluded the Job 
Network’s purchaser-provider model constituted an appropriate policy framework for the 
delivery of employment services. As noted by Eardley (2002a), “the Productivity 
Commission has, perhaps not surprisingly, opted in favour of greater competition and a 
purer market-base solution” (p. 5).
The government was generally pleased with the outcome of the review and in response 
announced:
The report has found the Job Network’s purchaser-provider model, with its focus on 
outcomes, competition and choice “is a suitable policy framework for the delivery of 
active labour market programs” and notes that “competition between providers and 
the use of outcome payments have created incentives for improved efficiency and
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better outcomes”. (Joint Media Release of Mai Brough and Senator Ian Campbell,
20 September 2002)
However, Burgess observes the conditions outlined by the Productivity Commission, as 
suitable for the application of a purchaser-provider model, are equally suitable for the 
model of monopoly provision by government (Burgess 2003, p. 233). Moreover, the 
Productivity Commission also qualified the operation of the purchaser-provider model by 
indicating that it was only as effective as the regulatory framework in which it operated 
and that a number of aspects of the system, such as job seekers’ choice of provider, the 
targeting of assistance and the structure of financial incentives, required reform.
The support by the Productivity Commission of the efficiency, flexibility and innovation 
of the market system, as compared to their concerns about budget maximisation, rigidities 
and dysfunctional incentives within the public sector, also highlights one of the 
perplexing contradictions of new public management -  the belief that public 
bureaucracies can transform from inefficient, outmoded deliverers of government 
services into successful developers, implementers and managers of complex contractual 
arrangements (Rainey and Steinbauer 1999).
Although concentrating on the employment outcomes, the Productivity Commission 
comment on the efficiency of the Job Network using data produced by the employment 
department. The departmental submission to the Commission provided data on the unit 
costs of providing assistance, costs per outcome and costs per program net impact. 
However, the Productivity Commission express caution about the data provided by the 
department, noting that:
there is much uncertainty surrounding the measurement of outcomes because of the 
methodology used, including the problems of constructing a meaningful control group. 
The main implication to be drawn from this is that DEWR’s measures of outcomes are 
best seen as estimates with a wide margin of error, (p. 5.23)
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Although the Commission’s report acknowledges the aggregate cost of labour market 
programs fell by around half in the initial few years of the Job Network’s operations, and 
with little change in the unemployment levels, this suggests a high degree of cost 
effectiveness, “it could also be the result of the imprecision with which the small impacts 
of labour market programs are measured’’ (Productivity Commission 2002, p. 5.24). 
Overall the report by the Productivity Commission is a strong reflection of research 
conclusions that support the political and ideological positions of the researchers.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
A major assessment of the Job Network has also been undertaken by the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2001). This assessment covers the 
design and operation of the Job Network, including arrangements involving payments to 
unemployed people and the industrial relations setting. Overall the OECD was 
supportive of the Job Network design, but this finding is not surprising given the support 
by the OECD of countries experimenting with contestability in the delivery of their 
public employment programs (Dawkins 2002, p. 86). Quiggin (2002) is also cautious 
about the findings of the OECD’s assessment, indicating the study “effectively 
reproduced” (p.98) the third major evaluation undertaken by the department, recognising 
that assessments of the OECD are heavily reliant on information supplied by 
governments. In a similar vein, Boyne (2003a, p. 372) excludes studies published by the 
OECD from his review of empirical studies into the service performance of public 
service providers. Boyne’s preference is to confine his examination to journal articles on 
the basis that such publications undergo review by colleagues.
Independent assessments
An extensive collection of publications and conference papers are available that assess 
the Job Network. As with the independent assessments of Centrelink, these articles often 
examine a particular issue, although many issues intersect and are combined in the 
research undertaken.
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The efficiency or otherwise of the Job Network is secondary to the more common 
concern of the impact of the Job Network on disadvantaged groups, comprising the long 
term unemployed, youth, mature aged, Indigenous, disabled and those with specific 
problems such as drug dependency and homelessness (Bruttel 2004, Eardley, Abellö and 
McDonald 2001; Kerr, Carson and Goddard 2002). Articles assessing the impact of the 
Job Network on disadvantaged groups closely overlap with discussions about the equity 
of the Job Network and explore aspects such as the operation of the incentive system 
(Dockery and Stromback 2001; Quiggin 2002), the job seeker classification instrument 
(McDonald, Marston and Buckley 2003) and specific labour market programs (Borland 
and Tseng 2004; Nevile and Nevile 2003b; Ziguras, Dufty and Considine 2003).
Other researchers consider the market structure of the Job Network and explore the extent 
that a genuine market framework is achieved, or possible, (Burgess 2003; Eardley 2003b; 
Quiggin 2002; Struyven and Steurs 2005), the impacts on specific providers such as the 
non-profit sector (Abellö and MacDonald 2002; Considine 2003; Eardley 2002b; Ramia 
and Carney 2003) or more generally whether the Job Network is achieving its objectives 
(Cowling and Mitchell 2003; Dockery 1999; Kelly, Lewis, Mulvey, Norris, Dockery 
1999). An additional area of investigation explores the operation of the Job Network 
within an economic framework and its role in the operation of the labour market (Burtless 
2002b). A further area of examination is concerned with the operation of micro­
relationships that develop between providers and the unemployed (Bigby and Files 2003) 
or between the unemployed and the members of society at large (Marston and McDonald 
2003).
Of interest in the context of this paper are independent assessments that consider the 
performance of the Job Network. The majority of such assessments examine the 
employment outcomes of the Job Network and often compare these outcomes to those 
achieved by the Working Nation programs that preceded the Job Network. Different 
methodologies and data sources often lead to diverse results, although general agreement 
may be found in the suggestion that, consistent with overseas experience, “only relatively
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small net employment gains are to be had from labour market programs” (Eardley 2003b, 
p. 9).
In determining the impact of the Job Network on employment outcomes a discussion of 
costs is often included and overall conclusions related to the cost effectiveness of the Job 
Network are provided. The general finding is that because significant cost savings have 
been made and the employment outcomes from labour market programs are substantially 
the same as those obtained through the Working Nation initiative, the Job Network has 
provided a cost-effective solution. However, the decline in labour market program 
expenses resulted from substantial cuts made prior to the introduction of the Job 
Network. As Dockery (1999) indicates in his early analysis of the Job Network, “nearly 
all this decline in the level of spending had been set in place through the reduction and 
streamlining of labour market programs before the Job Network came into effect” (p. 20). 
It is also difficult to credit the Job Network with responsibility for improved labour 
market outcomes given the substantial growth in the economy and the availability of jobs 
since the establishment of the Job Network. This broader aspect of the Job Network’s 
operating environment has been recognised by those who comment that a full economic 
cycle needs to be completed before conclusions about the success of the Job Network can 
be ascertained (Dockery 1999; Junankar and Kapuscinski 1997; Kelly, Lewis, Mulvey, 
Norris and Dockery 1999; Productivity Commission 2002).
The main Working Nation programs affected by cost reductions were those dealing with 
subsidised employment and training for the long term unemployed or those at risk of 
becoming so. This explains the preoccupation of many researchers about the equity 
outcomes of the Job Network. For example, in an early analysis of the Job Network, 
Webster and Harding (2000, p. 31) forecast that intensive assistance, the support 
available under the Job Network for disadvantaged job seekers, would be less successful 
than comparable Working Nation programs given the reduced Job Network expenditure. 
However, research contributing to the second departmental evaluation (DEWRSB 200le) 
concluded assistance to disadvantaged job seekers cost less than the previous 
arrangements, reflecting the greater efficiency of the Job Network. In this regard, the
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second departmental evaluation notes that “cost-per-job of intensive assistance is lower 
than the equivalent costs of most of the major labour market programs operating in 
1995-96 that it replaced—more than $5000 less” indicating that “the available data on 
unit costs and net impact indicate that Job Network appears to be delivering better value 
for money than the previous labour market assistance arrangements” (DEWRSB 200le, 
pp. 65 -  66). Subsequent assessments have queried the department’s findings and 
suggest the intensive assistance program for disadvantaged job seekers appears 
“substantially more expensive per net employment gain” (Eardley 2003b, p. 9).
Independent assessors may also emphasise the importance of factoring into evaluations of 
the Job Network the indirect, less obvious or misplaced expenses. Some of these indirect 
costs include:
• increased expenses for State governments as costs are shifted as a result of the 
reduced Commonwealth expenditure available for labour market programs 
(Eardley, Abellö and MacDonald 2001, Kelly, Lewis, Mulvey, Norris, Dockery 
1999);
• a change in the operation of community and non-profit organisations, such as the 
loss of their advocacy role, as these groups become entwined in the competitive 
environment of the Job Network (Considine 2003, Ramia and Carney 2003); and
• the impact of expenditure cuts on wages and the lowering of working conditions 
for those who are employed in the Job Network system (Abellö and MacDonald 
2002; Australian Council of Social Services 2001; Jobs Australia and 
Brotherhood of St Laurence 2005; Patton and Goddard 2003).
The design of the Job Network may also impact negatively from a ‘market efficiency’ 
perspective (Considine and Finn 2004). For example, the incentives operating under the 
contract approach of the Job Network may lead to ‘creaming’, where investments are 
directed towards job seekers who would succeed in obtaining employment without Job 
Network intervention, or ‘parking’, in which disadvantaged job seekers are not given 
assistance because it is believed their chances of employment are slim. Researchers have 
also raised the issue of cross-subsidisation, where funds for disadvantaged job seekers are
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redirected towards the underfunded job matching services, again providing assistance for 
job seekers most likely to obtain their own employment and further reducing the funding 
available for disadvantaged job seekers (Dawkins 2002, McNally 2003, OECD 2001).
An area likely to produce greater efficiencies, but more removed from public enquiry and 
less common to the main concerns of independent assessors is the internal working 
practices of Job Network members. Consideration of internal organisational processes is 
supported by Boyne’s (2003a) study on the determinants of public service improvement. 
In this research, Boyne (2003a) concludes that a consistent influence on performance is 
the impact of management variables and that other aspects, such as organisational 
structure, size, market arrangements and the regulatory environment, are not significant. 
However, in the case of the Job Network, investigating the internal operations of 
providers is limited by the competitive market structure that gives providers 
commercial-in-confidence protection and negates the sharing of best practice information 
given the competitive advantage that providers would lose in doing so. The second 
evaluation report of the department (DEWRSB 200 le) provided discussion on an internal 
study that compared the service strategies of top-performing providers with bottom­
performing providers. In relation to this study, the OECD (2001) felt that “more detailed 
research and more precise documentation of the services provided by the top-performing 
providers would be helpful” (p. 223). Similarly, the Productivity Commission (2002) 
suggests greater information should be available on the “black box” of providers’ 
processes to determine the most successful approaches (p. 3.16).
Overall, independent assessments of the Job Network are closely linked to employment 
outcomes, particularly in the case of disadvantaged job seekers. However, the absence of 
administrative data is a key weakness that makes in-depth assessments into the efficiency 
of the Job Network difficult, particularly as it relates to the internal management 
processes of providers.
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Summary
With a view to exploring efficiency evaluations of the Centrelink and the Job Network, 
this section examined a wide cross-section of the literature that comments on the 
arrangements. Except for the Centrelink efficiency evaluation by the Boston Consulting 
Group, little in the way of dedicated efficiency research appears to have been undertaken, 
although the ANAO discuss this aspect in the context of insufficient data.
In line with Pollitt’s (1998, p. 53) observation, much of the literature applies the term 
efficiency without a meaning attached to its use and robust methods are not applied in 
determining the efficiency outcomes of an arrangement. The absence of meaning or 
methodology is particularly prevalent in political statements or material provided by 
Centrelink and the employment department, where the efficiency of the new arrangement 
is presented as a statement of fact to be accepted on faith by the readers. Furthermore, 
little raw data is provided by the organisations to enable broad claims of efficiency to be 
confirmed by independent research. This echoes the common concerns of evaluators that 
includes the inability to obtain data and a lack of confidence in the data presented 
(ANAO 2000b, 2002a, 2003b, 2004 and 2005a; Bruttel 2004, Dockery and Stromback 
2001; Eardley 2002b and 2003b; Nevile and Nevile 2003b; Productivity Commission 
2002; Webster and Harding 2000). At the same time, access to reliable data does not 
overcome the impact of other variables such as economic cycles, political imperatives or 
technological changes that have implications for research into efficiency and would 
strongly impact on the efficiency outcomes of Centrelink and the Job Network.
It is common for assessments, particularly of the Job Network, to consider the cost- 
effectiveness of the arrangements and conclude that value for money has been obtained 
through the reduction of expenditure on employment programs combined with little 
change in the employment outcomes achieved. However, the reduction in program 
expenditure took place prior to the introduction of the Job Network, indicating the 
reformed arrangement was not a factor in reducing expenditure. Little analysis is 
available related to efficiency assessments of Job Network members or the department’s 
contract management role in this. Likewise, studies of the administrative efficiencies of
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Centrelink, or the oversight of Centrelink by the social security department and how the 
purchaser-provider relationship operates in this context, are lacking. The absence of such 
studies is a reflection of the lack of meaningful data and perhaps a strong interest among 
researchers of the equity implications of the new arrangements.
In terms of analysing the findings of evaluations of Centrelink and the Job Network, it is 
important to take into account the origin of any research and consequently the vested 
interests that may be involved with the outcomes. As with any evaluation, the findings 
should be supported by reliable data, incorporating sound methodologies and the capacity 
to replicate the research and therefore verify any conclusions. It would appear that not all 
efficiency evaluations of Centrelink and the Job Network provide such assurances and, in 
these cases, the findings need to be treated cautiously.
Conclusion
Initially, this chapter explored the meaning of efficiency, which was shown to be highly 
specific in an economic context. From a public management perspective the term is often 
not explicitly defined, but given the environment of fiscal restraint, efficiency in public 
sector reform is strongly associated with the relationship between inputs and outputs. 
This relationship generally means minimising costs while achieving the same output, but 
can also include producing a greater output with the same level of inputs.
The chapter proceeded to explore the ways that other studies have assessed the efficiency 
of Centrelink and the Job Network. Except for an efficiency assessment of Centrelink 
undertaken by consultants in 2002, it does not appear the arrangements have been closely 
scrutinised for their cost efficiency impacts. In the case of Centrelink, the ANAO has 
commented on the inability to assess cost efficiency because of the lack of cost-related 
performance information. In relation to the Job Network, efficiency analysis has been 
closely linked to effectiveness, as measured by employment outcomes, reflecting the 
concerns of researchers for disadvantaged job seekers and the role of employment 
services in addressing labour market inequities. A common difficulty, as identified with
110
Chapter Four
other studies into public sector reform, is the access to suitable data. For the Job 
Network, obtaining data on costs is made difficult by the private sector status of 
employment service providers and the protection afforded them under commercial-in­
confidence provisions.
The data used in this efficiency evaluation is derived from the organisations’ annual 
reports and financial statements. These documents provide a picture of the departmental 
and administered costs pertaining to the programs delivered over the evaluation period 
and offer a high level of reliability. The evaluation does not seek to ascertain the 
variables that are responsible for any efficiency outcomes that are observed in the 
Centrelink and Job Network arrangement. Rather, the results of this evaluation are more 
modest, but perhaps more achievable. This thesis seeks to determine whether there are 
indications that cost efficiency has improved since Centrelink and the Job Network 
replaced the previous delivery structure and the following four chapters analyse the data 
provided in the annual reports and financial statements to establish this.
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Chapter 5: Efficiency -  the overall costs
The purpose of this chapter and the following three chapters is to evaluate whether the 
broad claims about the improved efficiency of Centrelink and the Job Network are 
supported or not. Initially, this chapter presents a broad picture of the total costs that 
relate to the provision of income support and employment services. These programs, 
provided by DSS and the Department of Employment, Education and Training (DEET) in 
1993-94, are tracked through to 2003-04, regardless of the department or agency that 
manages or delivers them. In this way, a broad picture is developed that provides the 
costs of programs related to the services delivered by Centrelink and the Job Network.
Following the presentation of the broad picture, the chapter then proceeds to limit the 
analysis to those services provided specifically to job seekers. That is, for the payment of 
income support, the costs are restricted to unemployment payments. This isolates the 
investigation to those services related directly to the employment service reforms to 
determine if cost efficiencies are apparent at this specific level of service delivery. The 
analysis in this chapter also scrutinises the staffing levels involved in the delivery of 
services given the substantial component of operational expenditure involved in staffing.
The figures provided display both the administered and departmental costs. The 
administered costs are useful in providing an indication of the amount of program dollars
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the organisations manage, while the departmental costs comprise the operational 
expenses. In two of the chapters that follow, the efficiency evaluation will focus on 
Centrelink and the Job Network separately, with the analysis delving into the program 
level and taking the number of customers into account. Then, a chapter examining the 
cross-sectional efficiency assessment of Centrelink and DVA will conclude the efficiency 
evaluation.
The overall picture
The following chart tracks the total costs related to the provision of income support 
payments and employment services over the period 1993-94 to 2003-04. Payments 
related to Abstudy are excluded from the figures because this payment was removed from 
the employment portfolio when a restructure formed a separate education department. In 
the case of income support programs, the costs related to housing, child care assistance, 
child support and family relationships are excluded from the analysis because the location 
of these programs over the evaluation period have not consistently been located in the 
social security portfolio. The expenses related to Centrelink and the Job Network are 
included as costs incurred by the purchasing departments.
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Chart 5.1: Overall costs of income support and employment programs, 
1993-94 to 2003-04
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Chart 5.1 indicates the overall costs of the income support and employment programs 
have risen substantially in real terms by $15 billion dollars -  from $49.3 billion to 
$64.3 billion. Chart 5.1 also reveals that responsibility for the overall increase in real 
costs is due to social security programs, with a decline in the costs associated with 
employment programs. The total expenses related to income support programs have 
risen in real terms from $44.8 billion to $62.7 billion. In contrast, total expenditure 
related to employment services programs has declined from $4.4 billion to $1.6 billion. 
A partial explanation for the increase in the cost of income support programs and the 
decline for employment programs is that responsibility for support programs for youth 
were transferred from the DEETYA portfolio to DSS in July 1998. This transfer of 
functions between the two portfolios involved costs in excess of $2 billion. However, 
this transfer is the only major program shift and does not provide a complete explanation 
of the increase in costs for income support programs. Further insights may be gained by
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separating the programs into their administered and departmental costs, as this w ill 
indicate whether the increases have taken place in the costs of the programs or with the 
management surrounding the programs.
Chart 5.2 provides a picture of the administered costs and indicates an almost continual 
increase in the real costs o f social security programs. The sharper increases for income 
support programs in 2000-01 and 2003-04 reflects the more generous income tests 
introduced with the tax reform measures in July 2000 and an expansion in pensioner 
customers in 2003-04. For employment programs, the chart shows a decline after 
1995-96 that continues until the commencement o f the Job Network in 1998-99, followed 
by a flattening out of program expenses.
Chart 5.2: Administered costs of income support and employment programs, 
excluding education funding, 1993-94 to 2003-04
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The following chart plots the departmental expenses for income support and employment 
programs. The chart reflects the establishment of Centrelink in 1997-98 and shows a
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shift in this financial year of departmental expenses from income support programs to 
Centrelink. Chart 5.3 shows the total costs o f managing income support and employment 
programs rose in real terms over the entire period only slightly, by around $86 million. 
This amount comprises around $542 million of increases in the income support programs, 
that combines the costs related to the social security department and Centrelink, and a 
decline of around $456 million in departmental costs for employment programs. In the 
case o f employment programs, this decline in departmental expenses took place over the 
period 1995-96 to 1998-99, with costs remaining stable since the establishment o f the Job 
Network.
Chart 5.3: Departmental costs of income support and employment programs, 
1993-94 to 2003-04
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A  further refinement of the analysis that limits costs to those programs providing 
assistance to job seekers may be helpful. A t the broader level o f inquiry, as reflected in 
charts 5.2 and 5.3, the administered and departmental costs involved in providing
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assistance to unemployed people are hidden by the high levels of expenditure that relate 
to providing and managing the multitude of social security programs. While Chapter 6 
will examine the efficiency of delivering social security programs, the following analysis 
considers the costs related to services for unemployed people. This analysis may shed 
light on whether improvements in efficiency are evident since the establishment of 
Centrelink and the Job Network in the areas of delivery related specifically to 
employment services.
Income support for job seekers and employment programs
This refinement of the costs associated with social security and employment programs is 
aimed at reducing the components of the organisations to those activities dealing 
specifically with job seekers. In the case of employment services, the DEET employment 
program from 1993-94 is straightforward to identify despite the department’s numerous 
transformations up to 2003-04. In the case of services to the unemployed by the social 
security department, costs are isolated for only those income support payments that 
required beneficiaries to actively seek employment during the period 1993-94 to 2003-04. 
This involves identifying costs at the payment level because payments forming part of the 
labour market assistance program during this time included passive income support that 
required no active job search, such as parenting payment and partner allowance. As 
departmental costs according to payment type are not stated in later annual reports, an 
assumption is made these costs are in a similar proportion to the administered costs, that 
are broken down to the payment level in the annual reports. For example, in the 2003-04 
annual report for the social security portfolio, Newstart allowance comprises 
administered funds amounting to 37.8 per cent of the total administered costs of the 
labour market assistance program. By applying the same proportion to departmental 
costs, it is calculated the costs of managing and delivering the Newstart allowance is 
$19.48 million for the department (37.8 per cent of the $51.52 million identified as 
departmental costs for the labour market assistance program) and $262.75 million for 
Centrelink (37.8 per cent of the $695.1 million that comprises Centrelink’s costs for 
delivering labour market assistance).
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In recognition that costs are strongly linked to outputs, chart 5.4 includes the number of 
people in receipt of an unemployment payment at 30 June each year. The number of 
unemployment payment recipients provides only a crude measure of the total number of 
people assisted by employment services or receiving an unemployment payment during 
the course of a financial year. That is, the number of allowees plotted in chart 5.4 
represents a static measurement of the stock of unemployment payment recipients at a 
particular point in time, rather than the flow of people who, over time, move from being 
employed, unemployed or not in the labour force during the course of a year.
In addition, while the Job Network was initially established to provide services only to 
income support recipients, Job Network providers encountered early problems with 
inadequate numbers of clients. In response the government introduced a substantial 
reform package eight months after the Job Network commenced to enable providers to 
receive outcome payments for assistance to job seekers not receiving an income support 
payment. Accordingly, the number of people seeking employment assistance, would be 
greater than the number of unemployment beneficiaries shown in chart 5.4. However, the 
trend in declining numbers of unemployment payment recipients is likely to apply to the 
overall flow of people through the system. Chart 5.4 combines the departmental costs of 
income support and employment programs because the scale used in the chart would 
make such a distinction difficult to observe. Administered costs are shown separately for 
employment programs and income support for the unemployed.
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Chart 5.4: Cost of income support for job seekers, employment programs and 
number of unemployment payment recipients, 1993-94 to 2003-04
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Chart 5.4 shows the administered cost of providing employment services and income 
support to unemployed people peaked in 1995-96 and this is mostly due to the increased 
expenditure surrounding the Working Nation employment programs. Following 1995-96, 
a decline in administered costs commences. However, in 1996-97, the decline in 
administered expenses results from a reduction in expenditure for employment programs, 
whereas the income support component is greater in 1996-97 than in the previous 
financial year. Following 1997-98, much of the decline in administered costs occurs 
within the income support component, reflecting improved employment levels over this 
period flowing through to lower the expenditure on income support for the unemployed. 
A t its highest level in 1996-97, income support for the unemployed amounted to 
$7.5 billion, compared to the lowest amount in 2003-04 o f $5.5 billion. This represents a 
decline in administered costs o f 36.4 per cent, compared to a 27.3 per cent reduction in 
the number o f people receiving an unemployment payment over the same period. The
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higher percentage decline in costs compared to recipients reflects the increase of 
unemployment payment recipients with access to casual employment and therefore 
earnings that reduce the level of income support received. The lack of a reduction in 
administered expenses for employment programs, whilst the number of unemployment 
beneficiaries has been reducing, suggests the new arrangements that comprise the Job 
Network are not operating efficiently. Such a conclusion is not straightforward and 
caution is required when linking the number of unemployed with the costs of delivering 
employment programs. For instance, as employment conditions improve, those 
remaining jobless may have greater levels of disadvantage that require higher levels of 
costly interventions. A more detailed examination of the efficiency of the Job Network is 
provided in Chapter 7.
In relation to departmental costs, chart 5.4 indicates these expenses have remained stable 
since 1998-99 despite the fall in the number of unemployed people. As with the costs 
associated with programs for the unemployed, a direct relationship between the number 
of unemployed and departmental expenses is not clearcut because numerous fixed costs 
remain, such as leasing and maintaining buildings. However, a stable level of 
departmental costs, while the level of people in receipt of an unemployment payment has 
reduced substantially, doesn’t provide strong support for the achievement of cost 
efficiencies under the reformed arrangments.
Staffing
An aspect of expenditure that is variable because it is easily altered is the costs relating to 
staffing. Moreover, the costs of employing staff in service delivery organisations are a 
significant component of operational expenditures, so staffing levels warrant close 
attention. As an example of the costs related to staff, table 5.1 shows the total average 
staffing level in Centrelink, the costs in real terms and the percentage that employee 
expenses comprise of the total costs of Centrelink. The table also includes the total 
number of Centrelink customers at June each year. This table shows that changes in the
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number of staff do not necessarily vary in the same proportion as changes in the number 
of customers.
Table 5.1: Centrelink staffing, 1997-98 to 2003-04
Total staffing  
levels
Expenses for 
em ployees, 
2004 dollars
(0 0 0 )
Em ployee  
expenses as 
percentage of 
total costs
N um ber of 
custom ers
(June)
1997-98 23,745 $1,341,416 63.94% 5,893,744
1998-99 22,329 $1,260,932 63.53% 6,178,111
1999-00 20,416 $1,136,626 58.88% 6,333,450
2000-01 21,086 $1,196,341 60.74% 6,549,914
2001-02 22,488 $1,251,882 62.82% 6,611,480
2002-03 24,115 $1,400,430 67.70% 6,631,695
2003-04 24,153 $1,408,542 65.33% 6,644,236
Table 5.1 converts the employee expenses into 2004 dollar values using the Wage Cost 
Index, rather than the Consumer Price Index. The Wage Cost Index is a measure o f 
changes in wage and salary costs in the Australian labour market and it provides the most 
suitable basis for converting employee costs into comparable figures. Given the large 
component o f operating costs that relate to employee expenses in Centrelink, and 
presumably the Job Network also, there is a strong argument for using the Wage Cost 
Index throughout this evaluation. However, the Wage Cost Index was compiled for the 
first time in 1997 and is unhelpful for an analysis that examines data back to 1993-94.
Table 5.1 confirms the substantial amounts involved in employee expenses. Except for 
the 1999-00 financial year, the expenses of Centrelink’ s employees are above 60 percent 
of the total operating costs and in 2002-03 the employee expenses total 67.7 percent o f 
the total costs o f Centrelink.
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Tracking the staffing levels of the organisations involved in the reform may reveal 
whether efficiencies related to staff processes have taken place. However, determining 
the staff numbers involved is not straightforward and only a cautious estimate can be 
determined. The following provides a description of the process leading to the staffing 
figures that are estimated in tables 5.2 and 5.3.
For the staffing involved with the payment of income support, the annual reports of the 
social security department generally provide specific staffing information for each 
payment type until the 1998-99 annual report. Accordingly, the data in early annual 
reports enables accurate staff numbers to be collected, although an assumed proportion of 
corporate staff is required to be allocated to the unemployment payments for the purpose 
of determining staffing levels for this evaluation. Throughout the period 1998-99 to 
2003-04, the annual reports for social security provide aggregated staffing levels that 
combine a range of payment types. To determine an estimate of staff involved only in 
the delivery of the unemployment payments, the proportion of staff engaged in providing 
these payments as indicated in the 1997-98 annual report is applied to the subsequent 
years.
In relation to the employment department, each annual report provides staffing levels for 
the entire employment program. During the years 1993-94 to 1997-98, when corporate 
services are separately identified within the employment portfolio, a proportion of the 
corporate staffing figure is allocated to the employment program for the purpose of this 
evaluation.
In the case of Centrelink, except for the 1998-99 financial year, the average staffing 
levels are provided as a single figure that applies to the entire organisation. Over the 
period 1996-97 to 1997-98 staff numbers for Centrelink indicate an increase of over 
3000. This figure coincides with the 3167 staff mentioned in the DEETYA 1997-98 
annual report as transferring to Centrelink following the reassignment of functions from 
the CES. When 3167 is combined with the number of staff involved in the delivery of 
unemployment payments in the 1995-96 financial year, the staffing level for delivering
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unemployment payments and services would number around 10,000 -  equivalent to 
42 per cent of Centrelink’s total staffing. This figure is similar to the number of 
Centrelink staff undertaking unemployment related activities as determined by the OECD 
in their research of Australia’s labour market reforms (OECD 2001, p. 112). The 
OECD’s figure was based on a careful assessment o f the share of employees undertaking 
unemployment related activities in visits to several Centrelink customer service centres. 
As such, for Centrelink, this evaluation calculates the number o f staff involved in 
unemployment payments and services as, conservatively, 40 per cent o f Centrelink’s total 
staff level.
Table 5.2 presents the estimated number o f government staff involved in the provision of 
employment services and the delivery of unemployment payments to job seekers during 
the period 1993-94 to 2003-04.
Table 5.2: Government staffing numbers for services to the unemployed 
(excludes Job Network staff), 1993-94 to 2003-04
Social security 
department
Employment
department Centrelink Total
1993-94 9198 10,612 19,810
1994-95 7578 10,163 17,741
1995-96 7244 9555 16,799
1996-97 6856 7165 14,021
1997-98 164 5429 9 498 15,091
1998-99 88 792 8 932 9812
1999-00 93 1626 8 166 9885
2000-01 90 1647 8 434 10,171
2001-02 136 1359 8 995 10,490
2002-03 206 1494 9 646 11,346
2003-04 214 1555 9 661 11,430
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Of greater difficulty than determining the staff employed directly by the government is 
the task of calculating the employees engaged in the outsourced Job Network. At 
June 2004, the Job Network comprised 109 Job Network members and hundreds of 
licensed Job Placement Organisations operating from more than 2700 sites across 
Australia. The extent of these operations suggest a large number of staff are engaged in 
the government-funded employment services market. However, no registration is 
required of staff so the exact number employed is unknown. Some assistance is provided 
by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), with their publications that examine 
employment in the employment services market (ABS 2000a and 2003). However, the 
ABS reports do not provide a straightforward figure for the number of people employed 
in the Job Network and the data only relates to the periods 1998-99 and 2001-02, rather 
than each year of the evaluation period.
In the 1999 survey (ABS 2000a), the ABS categorise employment services into the 
employment placement industry and the contract staff industry. Of interest for a 
consideration of the Job Network is the employment placement industry as these 
businesses engage in job search, employee selection and referral services, but are not 
responsible for the payment of wages of the person placed in employment. In contrast, 
the contract staff industry engage in job placement, but do so on the basis that the wages 
associated with the persons placed are paid by the business performing the placement. 
For the employment placement industry around 11,300 persons are employed and 
58 per cent of the industry income is derived from the Job Network contracts. As such, it 
is assumed around 6500 employees (58 per cent of 11,300) are involved with Job 
Network activities. However, total Job Network contract income amounts to 
$636 million, yet employment placement firms collect only $581 million in Job Network 
contracts. The remaining $55 million of Job Network funds would account for around 
650 additional staff. Therefore, it may be assumed that around 7200 Job Network staff 
are employed at June 1999.
Using the same ABS publication (ABS 2000a), the OECD (2001) hypothesises about 
two-thirds of the 11,300 employment placement staff (that is, 7500) are funded by the Job
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Network. This assumption is based on 28 percent of businesses deriving their income 
from employers (rather than the government) and because private placement agencies 
account for 36 per cent of all permanent placements. In relation to the latter figure of 
36 per cent, it is uncertain the type of ‘private’ agency the OECD is discussing. The ABS 
publication divides placements into those provided by the ‘for profit’ and ‘not for profit’ 
industry. However, both sectors provide Job Network services, with the ‘for profit’ 
sector responsible for 64 per cent of all Job Network placement activity.
An alternative approach to determining the number of people employed in the Job 
Network is to take account of placement activity. In relation to the total number of 
placements for the year ending 30 June 1999, those firms providing Job Network 
placement activity accounted for 75 per cent of all placements (252,201 of a total of 
332,472 placements). If using placement numbers, then the number of employment 
placement industry staff engaged in Job Network functions could number about 8500 
(75 per cent of 11,300).
The preceding three paragraphs have determined that for the year ending June 1999, Job 
Network staff numbered as low as 7200, using a proportion based on the amount of Job 
Network funding, or 8500, based on the proportion engaged in Job Network placement 
activity. With an absence of appropriate data the actual number of Job Network 
employees for 1999-98 remains unknown.
In the subsequent survey of the employment service industry (ABS 2003), the ABS 
combine their analysis of the employment placement industry and the contract staff 
industry and concentrate on specific activities and the nature of ‘for profit’ and ‘not for 
profit’ organisations involved in these activities for 2001-02.
The ABS survey notes that ‘not for profit’ organisations accounted for around 28,440 of 
total employment in the employment service industry and that around 51 per cent of their 
income was generated from government, although the extent that this government income 
comprises Job Network funding is not provided. If the government income for non-
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profits is all Job Network related, then up to half of the 28,440 ‘not for profit’ employees 
are involved in the Job Network, that is 14,220 people. In addition, because the market 
share of Job Network employment services held by non-profit organisations is around 
50 percent (Eardley 2003a), the remaining half of Job Network services undertaken by 
the ‘for profit’ sector adds another 14,000 or so staff into the Job Network staffing 
numbers, producing a total around 28,000.
Although the ABS conclude that employment service organisations experienced a 
“significant growth between 1998-99 and 2001-02” (ABS 2003, p. 7) an increase of 
around 300 per cent for the staff of the Job Network appears unlikely and is not supported 
by substantial increases in the level of expenditure for the Job Network by the 
employment department. Accordingly, with no accurate method for determining the staff 
engaged in the Job Network, and with such a high number calculated for 2001-02 
compared to the number of 7200 to 8500 determined in 1998-99, hypothesising about the 
number of Job Network staff is unlikely to yield firm figures.
If, as a conservative figure, an additional 7500 staff is added to the total government staff 
numbers from the 1998-99 year onwards to represent Job Network staff, then total staff 
figures for the reformed employment services is estimated to be greater than the three 
years preceding the introduction of the Job Network. These estimated figures are shown 
in table 5.3.
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Table 5.3: Estimated total staff numbers for services to the unemployed 
(government employees and Job Network staff),
1993-94 to 2003-04
Total column 
from table 5.2
Job Network 
(estimate) Total
1993-94 19,810 19,810
1994-95 17,741 17,741
1995-96 16,799 16,799
1996-97 14,021 14,021
1997-98 15,091 15,091
1998-99 9812 7500 17,312
1999-00 9885 7500 17,385
2000-01 10,171 7500 17,671
2001-02 10,490 7500 17,990
2002-03 11,346 7500 18,846
2003-04 11,430 7500 18,930
With fewer unemployed people and less administered costs involved in funding 
employment programs in the later years, the higher levels of staff numbers would suggest 
the reform is not as efficient as expected. However, without accurate staffing figures for 
the Job Network, it is difficult to be confident of any conclusions. Nevertheless, the 
findings question unqualified support for the idea that the competitive Job Network 
market has provided significant efficiencies in the area of staffing. It may be the case 
that given the possibility of poorer working conditions for Job Network employees, the 
costs related to staffing may not be as significant for the Job Network as it is for 
government. This view is supported by a common concern associated with the adoption 
of new public management reforms -  that inadequate funding, or the drive for profits, is 
responsible for the exploitation of outsourced workers who experience poor working 
conditions, low wage rates and increased levels of stress due to inadequate staffing 
(Chalmers and Davis 2001; Lundsgaard 2002; Quiggin 2002; Schick 1996). Such 
concerns have been raised in the case of the Job Network (Abellö and MacDonald 2002;
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Australian Council of Social Services 2001; Jobs Australia and Brotherhood of St 
Laurence 2005).
Conclusion
The analysis in this chapter shows that during the period 1993-94 to 2003-04, real costs 
for income support and employment programs have increased by almost $15 billion. 
Closer examination indicates the largest proportion of this increase in costs involves the 
payment of income support.
In the case of income support for the unemployed and employment services programs, 
administered expenses for income support has decreased by around $2 billion while 
employment services programs have reduced by over half from the highest level of 
$2.6 billion in 1995-96 to $1.3 billion in 2003-04. Combined, the administered expenses 
for job seekers have reduced in real terms over the period 1993-94 to 2003-04 by around 
$2.4 billion. In terms of the overall operational costs of programs for the unemployed, 
costs were reduced by half prior to the introduction of Centrelink and the Job Network 
and have since remained stable. Over the same period, the number of people receiving an 
unemployment payment has reduced by almost a third.
This chapter has also examined in detail the issue of staffing the new arrangements for 
programs to assist the unemployed. Reductions in staff can lead to significant savings 
and are commonly associated with new public management reform. For example, as 
mentioned in Chapter 4, the efficiency report of the Boston Consulting Group concludes 
that one of the main drivers of Centrelink’s early efficiency gains was a reduction in staff 
of around 5000. However, determining staffing levels, particularly for the Job Network 
is shown to be difficult. The inability to form a judgement on the number of Job Network 
employees also reflects a lack of transparency and a gap in the data that limits the 
completion of a comprehensive efficiency evaluation.
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Chapter Six
Chapter 6: Efficiency and social security programs
This chapter examines income support programs to consider program shifts that have 
occurred over the evaluation period and the number of people receiving social security 
assistance. Taking into account these factors may assist in explaining shifts that have 
taken place in administered and departmental costs over the course of the evaluation 
period.
In 1993-94, the year when the evaluation period commences, the management and 
delivery of income support payments was the central work of the social security 
department. Aside from the establishment of Centrelink in 1997, the other major change 
to the department’s structure that takes place over the evaluation period is in 
October 1998, when the department was renamed the Department of Family and 
Community Services (FaCS). At this time, numerous community programs and services 
transferred into the department from other portfolios. However, the broadening of the 
department’s functions is not unique to this time. When DSS had initially formed in 
December 1972 it amalgamated income support payments with activities related to a 
range of community services such as aged persons welfare, handicapped persons welfare, 
homeless persons assistance and rehabilitation services. By 1993-94, these broader 
services had been placed into other departments and the provision of income support 
comprised the central focus of DSS. This chapter concentrates on the costs associated
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with the provision of income support payments as this was the main task of the 
department in 1993-94 and has comprised the bulk of Centrelink’s work since its 
establishment.
Examining the expenses associated with Australia’s major income support payments 
during the evaluation period, including any significant shifts in policies and the number 
of income support recipients may reveal trends in the direction of cost efficiency. The 
analysis begins by considering costs on a macro level and examines the administered and 
departmental expenses associated with the major programs within the social security 
portfolio. These programs reflect the organisational structure upon which the portfolio is 
arranged. Each program contains a number of income support payments. For example, 
the ‘retired’ program generally comprises age pension, wife pension (age) and widows B 
pension. As the type of payments within each program varies over the course of the 
evaluation period, the chapter proceeds to undertake an analysis that is separated on the 
basis of payment types. For this purpose, payments are examined as either pensions or 
allowances and the number of customers for each payment type are taken into account.
For an alternative view to the cost per customer analysis that is undertaken for the major 
payment types, the chapter proceeds to examine the proportional changes that have taken 
place to the expenses and customer numbers associated with social security payments 
over the course of the evaluation period. These aggregate figures enable the variations in 
administered expenses, departmental expenses and customer numbers to be compared 
alongside each other to provide a different picture of the overall changes compared to the 
cost per customer basis of analysis.
Finally, the chapter assesses Centrelink’s efficiency performance as indicated by the 
delivery of efficiency dividends. Centrelink has often commented on its success in 
returning efficiency dividends to government. For example, in its 2002-03 annual report, 
Centrelink remark on their achievement in delivering a total of $1081.6 billion in 
efficiency dividends since its inception. However, the operation of Centrelink’s 
efficiency dividend does not appear to have been closely scrutinised. Given the emphasis
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placed on this aspect of Centrelink’s performance, a closer examination of the operation 
of the dividend is undertaken.
Social security programs
The following two charts display the administered and departmental costs o f social 
security programs for the period 1993-94 to 2003-04.
Chart 6.1: Administered costs of social security programs, 1993-94 to 2003-04
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Chart 6.1 shows that increases have occurred in real terms for the administered costs of 
all of the major income support programs. Assistance to the retired has increased from 
around $15 billion to just under $20 billion and payments for families with children have 
increased from $10.4 billion to $18 billion. Payments involving the unemployment 
program and the disability and sickness program have also increased, but not to the same
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degree as for the retired or assistance for children programs. Payments related to the 
unemployment program increased in real terms from around $10 billion to $12.6 billion 
over the period 1993-94 to 2003-04. The sudden increase in administered expenses for 
the unemployment program in 1998-99 relates to the transfer from the assistance for 
children program of income support payments provided to parents. A t the same time, a 
decrease in the assistance for children program can be observed. The special 
circumstances program, consisting in 1993-94 of payments to widows and special benefit 
payments, ceases after 1997-98 when these payments were moved to other programs.
Chart 6.2: Departmental costs of social security programs, 1993-94 to 2003-04
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In chart 6.2, the funding for Centrelink, that is always departmental in nature, is 
combined with the departmental expenses for DSS or FaCS. Combining the 
departmental expenses in this way captures the entire costs o f running a program, 
including the direct service delivery costs o f Centrelink and the department’ s costs in 
developing and administering the programs’ policies and managing the purchase o f
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services from Centrelink. This approach ensures all the costs related to the reformed 
arrangement are included in the analysis.
As with chart 6.1, chart 6.2 indicates real increases for the departmental expenses of all 
programs, with the assistance for children program showing the highest increase of 
around 125 per cent in real terms.
The progression of costs in charts 6.1 and 6.2, between administered expenses and 
departmental expenses, do not necessarily display a direct relationship where the 
departmental costs increase or decrease in the same proportion as administered costs. 
Seeking to understand the reasons for the ups and downs in administered and 
departmental costs from an analysis of the programs is not straightforward. As 
previously mentioned, this is largely because the types of payments that comprise each 
program have altered over the course of the evaluation period. For example, in 1993-94, 
the ‘income security for the unemployed’ program involved three payment types, but by 
2003-04 comprises nine payments, reflecting the greater emphasis over this period of 
time being placed upon the workforce participation of a greater number and variety of 
income support recipients. A more useful way of tracking the administered and 
departmental costs is to consider the major types of payments provided in the income 
support system and analyse these payments as separate items. The following sections 
explore these different payment types as either pensions, allowances, parenting payment 
or family payment.
The only payment excluded from the analysis is the widow allowance. Payments to 
widows were introduced in the 1940s, when women were not expected to engage in 
employment because of age or duties caring for children. In the late 1980s, as 
perceptions about the role of women in the workforce were changing, the government 
commenced the phasing out of payments to widows. However, with the worsening 
workforce attachment of older women in the early 1990s, and to lessen the impact of the 
phasing out of the widows payments, the government introduced the widow allowance in 
1995 for older women with little or no recent workforce experience. The payment was a
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short-term response and from July 2005 no new claims for widow allowance are possible, 
unless the claimant was bom on or before 1 July 1955.
Historically, income support has comprised two broad categories of payments - pensions 
and allowances. Generally, pension payments have been provided to ensure adequate 
levels of income to people who are expected to remain out of the workforce for long 
periods of time. Accordingly, the main types of pensions are age pension and disability 
support pension. In contrast, allowance payments, also referred to as benefits, are 
provided to those who it is assumed require only short-term assistance. As such, the rate 
of allowance payments is not as great as for pension payments and the means test 
applying to allowances -  comprising an amount of income that can be received before the 
rate of payment begins to reduce (the free area) and the rate of the reduction once income 
exceeds the free area (the withdrawal rate) -  is not as generous as the means test applying 
to pensions. The allowance means test is intended to ensure that recipients make every 
effort to return to paid employment as soon as possible. Payments that do not easily suit 
the pension/allowance distinction, such as parenting payment and family payment, are 
considered separately in this efficiency evaluation.
Table 6.1 indicates the values, at June 2004, of a pension payment compared to an 
allowance payment, including the free areas and withdrawal rates, and the levels of 
fortnightly income where the payments are reduced to nil.
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Table 6.1: Comparison of pensions and allowances -  rates and income tests, 
June 2004
P aym en t S in g le  rate  
p/f
F ree  a rea  
p/f
W ith d ra w a l rate In c o m e  level 
th a t red u ces  
p a y m e n t to  nil 
p/f
P ensio n $470 $120
40 cents for each 
dollar of income 
over $120 p/f $1,295.00
A llo w a n c e $389.20 $62
50 cents for each 
dollar of income 
betw een $62 p/f 
and $142 p/f
70 cents for each 
dollar on incom e 
over $142 p/f
$640.86
Pension payments
The pension payments tracked in this analysis are age pension, disability support pension, 
carer payment (known as carer pension prior to July 1997) and wife pension. Age 
pension provides support for the retired and is paid to men from the age o f 65. While 
women were able to claim the age pension from age 60, this age is gradually being 
increased (by six months every two years) so that in 2013, the elig ibility for women to 
age pension w ill occur at age 65 also. The disability support pension is provided to 
ensure that people of workforce age, who are unable to work full-time because of a 
substantial impairment, receive adequate income. The wife pension is provided to female 
partners of men receiving age pension or disability support pension. However, since 
July 1995 there have been no new grants o f wife pension in recognition o f the increased 
workforce participation of women, resulting in a substantial drop in the number of 
women receiving this payment over the period 1993-94 to 2003-04. The final pension 
included in this analysis is carer payment, a payment providing support for people who 
are unable to participate substantially in the workforce because of their caring role for 
people with disabilities. Table 6.2 shows the pension populations for these pensions at 
30 June each year.
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Table 6.2: Customer numbers for the major pension payments, 
June 1994 to June 2004
At June 
each year
Age
pension
Disability
support
pension
Wife
pension
Carer
payment
Total
1994 1,581,874 436,234 152,575 17,699 2,188,382
1995 1,578,698 464,430 161,540 20,098 2,224,766
1996 1,602,834 499,235 148,928 25,037 2,276,034
1997 1,680,214 527,514 127,884 29,558 2,365,170
1998 1,682,618 553,336 116,125 33,979 2,386,058
1999 1,718,792 577,682 100,728 40,070 2,437,272
2000 1,738,215 602,280 91,341 47,550 2,479,386
2001 1,793,426 623,926 77,701 57,190 2,552,243
2002 1,818,205 658,915 67,968 67,260 2,612,348
2003 1,861,055 673,334 58,110 75,937 2,668,436
2004 1,876,250 696,742 52,829 84,082 2,709,903
Source: DSS/FaCS annual reports, 1993-94 to 2003-04
Table 6.2 indicates substantial increases in the number of age, disability and carer 
pensioners. Age pension recipients have increased in number as life expectancies have 
risen. For disability support pension, the increase in numbers has been pronounced 
among older males and may reflect the general trend in the Australian population that 
shows the incidence of disabilities increasing with age. However, concerns have been 
expressed about the maturing baby boomer generation using the disability support 
pension to support early retirement (Ingles 2000). The increase for carer payment 
recipients most likely parallels the increase in disability support pensioners and because 
no new grants of wife pension are made. The decrease in wife pensioners is expected 
with no new grants of this payment.
In determining the administered and departmental costs of pension payments, the 
expenses relating specifically to each of the four pension payments are divided by the
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number of pensioners as outlined in table 6.2. This provides a measure of the costs on a 
per customer basis. This method does not provide an accurate portrayal o f costs per 
service unit because the number of pensioners at June each year does not equate with the 
number of people receiving payment throughout the year. However, the method w ill 
provide an indication of the trends in costs on a per pensioner basis over the evaluation 
period, enabling broad conclusions to be drawn. For the period 1993-94 to 1997-98, 
before the introduction of accrual accounting when corporate costs were identified 
separately, these corporate costs are attributed to each type of pension payment based 
upon the percentage that each payment comprises of the total costs of the portfolio.
Chart 6.3: Pension payments - administered costs per customer,
1993-94 to 2003-04
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Chart 6.3 indicates that for most pension payments gradual increases in the administered 
costs per customer in real terms has taken place. The most notable features o f the chart 
are the decrease for wife pension from 1993-94 to 1995-96 and the increase affecting age 
pension in 2000-01. In the case o f wife pension, the DSS annual report for 1994-95 notes 
an increase in the number o f wife pensioners receiving part-pension. The growth in part-
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rate wife pensioners may reflect the increased participation of these women in the 
workforce, particularly with the policy change that restricts the payment to older women. 
These women may have been transitioning themselves for the cancellation o f payment by 
joining the workforce.
For age pension, the increase shown in 2000-01 relates to the one-off ‘savings bonus’ 
offered to age pensioners to counter the impact o f an increase in general prices expected 
with the introduction of the goods and services tax in July 2000. The overall increases in 
administered costs per customer that becomes more noticeable after 1999-00 may be 
explained by the more generous pension income test structure that was also introduced 
with the tax reform measures.
Chart 6.4: Pension payments - departmental costs per customer,
1993-94 to 2003-04
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Overall, as chart 6.4 shows, the departmental costs per customer have either remained 
stable or tended to increase slightly in real terms during the period 1993-94 to 2003-04. 
A decline for most pension payments occurred in 1997-98 as Centrelink was introduced
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and the restructure resulted in numerous retrenchments and a decline in running costs. 
However, over the following two-year period, increases in departmental expenses take 
place that result in costs greater than those for the period prior to Centrelink. From 
1999-00 onwards only minimal changes in departmental expenses are observed.
In chart 6.4, the most obvious anomaly is the sharp increase, then decline for the 
departmental costs of carer payment in the period 1997-98 to 1999-00. This period 
coincides with the change from carer pension to carer payment in July 1997 and reforms 
to carer income support that involved the development and implementation of strategies 
aimed at providing more opportunities for carers to access voluntary and paid work, 
education and training. Despite the carer payment reforms, the administered costs per 
customer in chart 6.3 shows the carer payment program costs have been increasing on a 
per customer basis. Since 1999-00, chart 6.3 shows the administered costs for carer 
payment have risen each year and in 2003-04 were the highest of all pension payments at 
just under $ 11,000 per customer.
Allowances
The main types of allowance payments are unemployment payments, partner allowance, 
mature age allowance, sickness allowance and special benefit. Unemployment payments 
are provided for people taking steps to gain employment. A major change to payments 
for job seekers over the 1993-94 to 2003-04 period is the increased level of participation 
required in specific activities. This change is associated with both the previous Labor 
government and the Howard government adopting an ‘active society’ approach to 
welfare. This approach involves a shift from passive receipt of welfare to active 
participation of the unemployed in structured activities. Some commentators consider the 
Social Security Review, a major appraisal of the welfare system undertaken in the 
mid-1980s, as introducing the active society approach (Harris 2001; Ramia and Carney 
2003; Ziguras, Dufty and Considine 2003). The emphasis on conditionality has become 
more prominent under the Howard government with the introduction of measures such as 
ther Job Seeker Diary, the Mutual Obligation Initiative and the Work for the Dole
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scheme. In addition, non-compliance with required activities is closely monitored and 
the number of income support recipients incurring a financial sanction has increased 
substantially under the Howard government.
Another major change for unemployment payments was the move to individualising 
income support. Prior to September 1994, a partnered male who was unemployed was 
paid a married rate of allowance. In recognition of the increased participation o f women 
in the workforce, after September 1994 women were paid an income support payment 
based upon their own circumstances. Partner allowance was introduced as a non-activity 
tested payment to the female partners of unemployed men. To be eligible for partner 
allowance a women must be born before 1 July 1955 and have no recent workforce 
experience. Mature age allowance, introduced in March 1994, is another non-activity 
tested payment paid to some unemployed people aged over 60, but not yet old enough for 
the age pension. Both the partner allowance and the mature age allowance were closed to 
new applicants in September 2003. This change reflects the increased policy emphasis 
on lim iting the number o f payment types that are not linked to undertaking steps towards 
gaining employment.
Sickness allowance is paid to people temporarily incapacitated for work. The number o f 
sickness allowance recipients has been steadily decreasing since the introduction of 
changed rules in March 1996 that restricted e lig ib ility to people who have a job to return 
to or students who intend to resume their studies. Those who do not meet the changed 
elig ibility requirements for sickness allowance are paid an unemployment payment, but 
are exempted from meeting any activity requirements. Special benefit provides income 
support to needy people who are unable to access any other pension or allowance, for 
example, a woman in the later stages o f pregnancy who is unable to satisfy the activities 
associated with unemployment payments.
Table 6.3 provides the allowance customer numbers. For unemployment payments the 
numbers include recipients o f the youth allowance payment who are unemployed.
142
Chapter Six
Table 6.3: Customer numbers for the major allowance payments, 
June 1993 to June 2004
A t J u n e  
e a c h  y e a r
U n e m p lo y m e n t
p a y m e n ts
P a rtn e r
a llo w a n c e
M a tu re  a g e  
a llo w a n c e
S ic k n e s s
a llo w a n c e
S p e c ia l
b e n e fit
Total
1994 878,278 45,848 25,542 1,187,168
1995 822,571 216,739 38,866 46,050 20,440 1,144,666
1996 846,556 69,840 45,931 34,578 18,885 1,015,790
1997 829,903 72,117 53,386 15,633 14,700 985,739
1998 902,215 75,021 50,771 16,285 10,236 1,054,528
1999 773,797 81,359 45,253 11,181 11,808 923,398
2000 699,369 89,684 41,840 10,773 10,971 852,637
2001 703,406 92,492 39,149 10,942 12,712 858,701
2002 674,829 103,892 40,498 9522 13,315 842,056
2003 633,259 102,811 41,078 8755 12,228 798,131
2004 602,736 90,936 32,912 8478 11,216 746,278
Source: DSS/FaCS annual reports, 1993-94 to 2003-04
Unlike the overall number of pensioners, the number of allowees has declined by almost 
40 percent over the evaluation period, from 1,187,168 to 746,278. Much o f this decline 
relates to the improved conditions of the labour market. The more unusual figure in the 
table is the 216,739 recipients of partner allowance in 1995, which drops to 69,840 in the 
next year. The drop in partner allowees is due to the introduction o f parenting allowance 
in July 1995, a payment introduced for the primary carers o f children in couple-headed 
families where the other partner was an income support recipient or a low income 
worker. Those partner allowees with children would have transferred to parenting 
allowance in July 1995. Payments to parents are considered in the next section of this 
chapter.
Similar to the analysis undertaken for pension payments, the following charts display the 
administered and departmental costs of allowances on a per customer basis. Once again,
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for the years 1993-94 to 1997-98, corporate costs are identified separately in the annual 
reports. As such, these costs are attributed to each allowance payment based upon the 
percentage that each payment comprises of the total expenses of the portfolio.
Chart 6.5: Allowance payments - administered costs per customer, 
1993-94 to 2003-04
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Chart 6.5 shows that for most payments the administered costs per customer have 
declined. This result is because of the increased proportion of allowees with earnings. 
Against this trend involving some labour force attachment, the proportion of partner 
allowance recipients with earnings has dropped. This decline in earnings is reflected in 
the higher administered costs per partner allowee as compared to the other allowance 
recipients and is explained by the non-activity tested nature of partner allowance and the 
limit of eligibility to women bom on or before 1 July 1955 who have little or no 
workforce experience. Since 2000-01, the administered costs per customer have been 
stable for most payments. Increases for partner allowance and mature age allowance take
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place in the final year o f the evaluation period — from $8578 in 2002-03 to $9462 in 
2003-04 for partner allowance and from $9507 to $11,319 for mature age allowance. 
With no new grants available for partner allowance and mature age allowance after 
September 2003, the number of recipients for these payments fell by a greater proportion 
than did the administered expenses, raising the costs per customers in 2003-04 compared 
to 2002-03.
Chart 6.6: Allowance payments - departmental costs per customer, 
1993-94 to 2003-04
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In chart 6.6 the departmental costs per customer for special benefit and sickness 
allowance show a sharp drop coinciding with the period when Centrelink was introduced. 
This may suggest operational efficiencies o f Centrelink are responsible. However, 
policies changes also coinciding with Centrelink’s introduction impacted greatly on each 
of these two payments. For special benefit, the composition o f the payment generally 
comprises a large number of migrants who do not meet the residential criteria for other 
payment types. However, in 1996-97 a two-year waiting period for newly arrived
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residents was introduced and the number of beneficiaries and running costs reduced 
substantially. In the case of sickness allowance, 1996-97 is the period when new rules 
restricting eligibility to people who have a job or are studying were introduced and this 
resulted in a 55 per cent decrease in the number of recipients and a corresponding 
substantial reduction in running costs as claims became more straightforward and 
involved less complex assessments. Unlike the previous transfer to sickness allowance, 
unemployed people who become ill are termed ‘incapacitated’ and remain on the 
unemployment payment while given a temporary exemption from the activity 
requirements.
Generally, in chart 6.6, departmental costs per customer for allowance payments decline 
following the introduction of Centrelink, but following several financial years of little 
movement, the chart indicates a slight upward trend since 2000-01.
Parenting Payment
Parenting payment is another major payment provided by the income support safety net. 
However, in this analysis it is considered separately from pensions and allowances, given 
the combined pension and allowance background of the payment. The parenting 
payment was introduced in March 1998 and combined the two payments of sole parent 
pension, paid under pension conditions, and parenting allowance, paid under allowance 
conditions. The payments were combined in recognition that recipients were the main 
carers of their children, albeit as lone parents in the case of sole parent pension and 
partnered parents in the case of parenting allowance.
Table 6.4 provides the customer numbers for parenting payment over the period 1994 to 
2004.
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Table 6.4: Customer numbers for parenting payment, June 1993 to June 2004
At June each 
year
Sole parent
pension/ Parenting 
payment (single)
Parenting 
allowance/ 
Parenting payment 
(partnered)
Total
1994 313,437
1995 324,941
1996 342,290 237,321 579,611
1997 358,893 239,317 598,210
1998 372,286 236,550 608,836
1999 384,821 227,677 612,498
2000 397,278 218,013 615,291
2001 424,614 214,721 639,335
2002 427,846 191,576 619,422
2003 436,958 181,405 618,363
2004 449,312 177,157 626,469
Source: DSS/FaCS annual reports, 1993-94 to 2003-04
Table 6.4 shows that depending on whether the recipient o f parenting payment is single 
or partnered, the numbers in receipt of payment move in the opposite direction. In the 
case o f single recipients, the numbers have been increasing, but partnered recipients are 
declining in number. This feature of the payment is due to a number of factors. In the 
case o f single parenting payment, the proportion of sole parent families in the Australian 
population has been rising slowly, but steadily, throughout the period. For partnered 
parenting payment, the decline in recipients mirrors the overall decline in the allowance 
population, where the partners of what would otherwise be parenting payment recipients 
are no longer in receipt of income support.
Also, the opposite trend in numbers may reflect the separate income tests applying to the 
different parenting payments. Single parenting payment retained the more generous 
pension income test resulting in far greater earnings than the partnered payment to obtain
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the same level of income support or before the payment is reduced to nil. That is, the 
more generous pension income test enables a single parenting payment recipient to retain 
access to payment, when, at the same level of income, a partnered person would have 
ceased receiving income support.
To reinforce the idea that parents with school age children are in receipt of a workforce 
age payment, changes announced in the 2005-06 Budget greatly reduced the eligibility to 
parenting payment under the pension income test. Whilst the separate income tests 
remain, new claimants for the partnered parenting payment require their youngest child to 
be aged under six, or in the case of single parenting payment, under eight. Existing 
recipients retained eligibility under the previous rules that allowed dependent children to 
be aged up to 16 years. For new recipients, the changed rules impact the most on single 
recipients, who need to apply for an unemployment payment when their youngest child 
turns eight years old, and therefore are subject to the much harsher allowance income test 
and more intensive activity requirements.
Although the number of sole and partnered recipients of parenting payment is available, 
the expenditure data in the annual reports combines the costs of parenting payment into 
single figures, so separate analysis of the costs of partnered parenting payment compared 
to single parenting payment is not possible. As such, for the first three years before 
parenting payment commences, the following two charts combine the expenses related to 
parenting allowance and sole parent pension.
148
Chapter Six
Chart 6.7: Parenting payments - administered costs per customer, 
1996-97 to 2003-04
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Chart 6.7 shows the administered costs of paying parenting payment per customer has 
decreased on a per customer basis, but only slightly over the 1996-97 to 2UÜ3-Ü4 period. 
The rise, then dip, over the period 1998-99 to 2000-01 takes place during a time when 
customer numbers are continuing to rise. Therefore, as these costs relate directly to the 
payment of income support, the variation indicates a change in the average rate of 
payment. The lowering o f administered costs in 2000-01 may relate to the more 
generous pension income test introduced as part o f the July 2000 tax reform changes, 
resulting in a higher level of earnings for pensioners before their payment reduces to nil. 
This change would have introduced to parenting payment an increase in the number of 
single recipients with high earning and a low rate o f payment, thereby reducing the 
average amount of administered expenses per customer.
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Chart 6.8: Parenting payments - departmental costs per customer, 
1996-97 to 2003-04
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The departmental costs per customer of parenting payment, as indicated in chart 6.8, 
shows a distinct upward trend during the evaluation period, from $426 per customer in 
1996-97 to almost $ 1100 per customer in 2003-04. Furthermore, the chart shows a sharp 
increase, then decrease during the period 1996-97 to 1999-00. This period coincides with 
the introduction of Centrelink, but this feature of the chart is more likely explained by the 
increased activity that would have been taking place when sole parent pension and 
parenting allowance were amalgamated to become parenting payment in March 1998. 
Following the period of implementation, a decline in departmental costs takes place, but 
chart 6.8 then shows a steady increase in departmental costs per customer over the period 
2000-01 to 2003-04, from $736 to $1088.
Family Payments
Payments made in recognition of the costs of raising children are not considered income 
support payments. Historically, family payments operated as a means of providing
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horizontal equity and compensated people for the costs of children, regardless of family 
income level. However, vertical equity concerns, that involve providing low income 
families with greater levels of financial assistance, have come to dominate the structure 
of the payment. Particularly in recent times, the value of family payments has increased 
and the means test ensures greatest assistance at lower levels of family income, resulting 
in a payment that conforms closely to the notion of vertical equity. Given the high costs 
involved with family payments they were included in this analysis.
Over the period under study many changes to payments for families take place. The 
major change occurred in July 2000 as a result o f the tax reform measures. In this change 
over 12 different payments to families were consolidated and the new family tax benefit 
introduced. In this analysis the costs associated with the numerous payments provided to 
families prior to July 2000 are combined.
In July 2000, the government also established the Family Assistance Office in 500 
locations around Australia to manage the front-end delivery of family tax benefit. The 
Family Assistance Office operates as a virtual office and is actually staffed by Centrelink, 
Medicare and the Australian Taxation Office. Unlike the previous forms of direct 
assistance, family tax benefit is able to be accessed through the tax system as a lump sum 
on lodgement of a tax return or as a reduction in the amount of periodic tax deductions 
across the year. However, the FaCS annual reports note that in excess of 95 per cent of 
recipients receive their family payments by direct fortnightly payments or as lump sums 
from Centrelink.
Despite the changes to family assistance, the number of recipients of family payments has 
remained fairly stable as shown in table 6.5.14
14 The analysis is based on the number of persons in receipt of family payments. This is different 
to the number of children in respect of which a person is paid family payment.
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Table 6.5: Customer numbers for family payments, June 1993 to June 2004
At June each 
year
Family payment
recipients
1994 1 ,825,248
1995 1 ,804,118
1996 1 ,812,457
1997 1 ,811,745
1998 1 ,775,663
1999 1 ,773,185
2000 1 ,749,479
2001 1 ,827,865
2002 1 ,823,371
2003 1 ,813,235
2004 1 ,840,004
Source: DSS/FaCS annual reports, 1993-94 to 2003-04
Chart 6.9 shows the administered costs per customer of family payments from 1993-94 to 
2003-04. Throughout this period, substantial increases in the real value of family 
payments have occurred.
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Chart 6.9: Family payments - administered costs per customer, 
1993-94 to 2003-04
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In 1993-94, the administered costs per customer was around $1500 compared to over 
$8000 in 2003-04. The increase in the value of the payment and the liberalisation of the 
income tests for family payments have become an important means for maintaining the 
real incomes of families with children, particularly in the bottom quintile o f the income 
distribution (McNamara, Lloyd, Toohey and Harding 2004).
However, as chart 6.10 indicates, significant increases in the departmental costs per 
customer have also taken place, especially leading up to and the year following the 
introduction of the family tax benefit in 2000-01. These high levels of departmental costs 
per customer have not shown any lowering since 2000-01.
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Chart 6.10: Family payments - departmental costs per customer, 
1993-94 to 2003-04
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Overall, since 1993-94, the departmental costs per customer have risen in real terms from 
about $40 to almost $250 per customer in 2003-04. While providing assistance to low 
income working families with children has become an important aspect of the modern 
welfare state, the costs in managing and delivering the family assistance system is 
considerable.
Summary
At the beginning of this section, the picture of administered expenses displayed in chart 
6.1 showed increases in costs among all programs. Similarly, in chart 6.2, the 
departmental expenses for each program indicated real increases have occurred over the 
evaluation period. In total, administered expenses have increased in real terms by 
40 per cent, while departmental costs have climbed by 34 per cent during the period 
1993-94 to 2003-04. At the same time, the total number of customers has increased by 
17 percent from June 1994 to June 2004. These figures suggest the social security 
system has become more generous over the course of the evaluation period. Of particular
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concern in an evaluation of cost efficiency is the increase in departmental expenses of 
34 per cent during the evaluation period. These figures do not support the claim that the 
reformed delivery of income support, involving the social security department purchasing 
services from Centrelink, operates with greater cost efficiency than when policy and 
delivery were combined within the same department. Although, proportionally, 
administered costs have increased more than departmental costs, the proportional 
increase in the number of customers is half that of departmental expenses. It would be 
expected that the greatest amount of departmental expenses are involved in the 
processing activities associated with customers. In contrast, providing higher levels of 
payment assistance, as indicated by the growth in administered expenses, would not be 
expected to involve substantial operational costs as this could be simply achieved by 
relevant changes to the computing systems by which the level of payments are calculated.
Because income support comprises many different payment types, determining whether 
the increases in administered and departmental expenses have occurred uniformly 
throughout all payments, or relate specifically to certain payment types, required further 
analysis. Accordingly, for each major payment type within the pension and allowance 
categories, and for parenting payment and family payment, this section undertook a 
separate analysis of expenses, linked to the number of recipients. The results indicated 
that increases in the administered and departmental costs for all payments are not 
universal or consistent. For example, while administered expenses for most pension 
payments on a per customer basis have risen, in the case of allowances the administered 
costs tend to decline. In terms of departmental expenses per customer, a measure that 
should take into account the level of processing required for each payment, pension 
payments have risen only slightly as with most allowance payments, although special 
benefit and sickness allowance show substantial declines in departmental costs per 
customer. While the administered costs per customer for parenting payment have 
declined slightly, the departmental costs for this payment type have increased 
significantly. This section also showed that on a per customer basis, family payments 
have increased considerably in both administered and departmental expenses.
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The overall increases in administered and departmental expenses that take place over the 
evaluation period occur because those payments where costs have risen tend to comprise 
large customer numbers. For example, at June 2004, of the payments in the analysis that 
indicate an increase in departmental costs per customer, around 88 percent of customers 
receive these payments. On the other hand, the three payments that indicate a decrease in 
the expenses related to departmental costs per customer (unemployment payments, 
sickness allowance and special benefit), do not comprise a large number of customers. 
Of these three payment types, unemployment payment comprises the largest number of 
customers, but declines only slightly in departmental costs per customer over the 
evaluation period. In comparison, sickness allowance and special benefit are payment 
types that show significant reductions in departmental costs per customer, but comprise 
only 0.3 per cent of customer numbers. The analysis was also able to show that one-off 
variations in the administered and departmental expenses of different payment types is 
generally related to policy changes taking place at the same time.
Proportional changes to income support payments
To provide a further indication of the changes that have taken place to costs and customer 
numbers over the evaluation period, an analysis based upon proportional changes is also 
undertaken. The following table indicates the proportional changes in administered and 
departmental costs, as well as the proportional change in customer numbers, from the 
start to the end of the evaluation period.
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Table 6.6: Percentage change in number of customers, administered and 
departmental costs during 1993-94 to 2003-04
Percentage 
change in 
recipient 
numbers
Percentage 
change in 
administered 
costs
Percentage 
change in 
departmental 
costs
A g e  p e n s io n 19 31 3 3
D is a b ility  s u p p o rt p e n s io n 60 83 162
W ife  p e n s io n - 6 5 - 7 1 - 4 7
C a re r p a ym e n t 375 4 8 3 3 6 3
U n e m p lo y m e n t p a y m e n t - 3 1 - 5 2 - 5 6
P a rtn e r a llo w a n c e  (a) 21 35 4 7
M a tu re  a g e  a llo w a n c e  (b) -  15 -  17 3 2 2
S ic k n e s s  a llo w a n c e - 8 2 - 8 5 - 9 6
S p e c ia l b e n e fit - 5 6 - 6 5 - 8 8
P a re n tin g  p a y m e n t (c) 5 4 16 7
F a m ily  p a y m e n t 1 4 6 4 5 2 5
(a) Percentage change since 1997-98
(b) Percentage change since 1994-95
(c) Percentage change since 1996-97
Table 6.6 shows that a general pattern emerges in the direction of change between 
customer numbers and the administered and departmental costs. That is, in cases where 
customer numbers have increased, the administered and departmental costs have 
increased also and where customer numbers have decreased, the administered and 
departmental costs have also decreased. Mature age allowance is the only payment type 
where the direction of change is inconsistent. For this payment, the number of recipients 
has declined by 15 percent and administered costs reduced by 17 percent, but 
departmental costs have increased by 322 per cent.
In the case of some payments, there are wide variations between the amounts of 
proportional changes. For example, the number of parenting payment recipients has 
increased by only five per cent during the period 1996-97 to 2003-04 and four per cent in
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relation to administered costs, but the operational expenses as indicated by the 
departmental costs have increased by 167 per cent.
To shed more light on the changes to payments over the periods before and after the 
establishment of Centrelink, the proportional changes in customer numbers, administered 
and departmental costs are calculated for the four-year period prior to Centrelink’s 
establishment and the four-year period after Centrelink commenced. Those payments 
unable to provide data for these four-year periods (partner allowance, mature age 
allowance and parenting payment) are not included in the anlaysis.
Table 6.7: Percentage change in number of customers - administered and 
departmental costs in the four years PRIOR to Centrelink, 
1993-94 to 1996-97
Percentage Percentage Percentage
change in change in change in
recipient administered departmental
numbers costs costs
Age pension 6 4 19
Disability support pension 21 30 43
Wife pension -  16 - 3 7 - 7
Carer payment 67 72 40
Unemployment payment - 6 - 2 4 -  1
Sickness allowance - 6 6 - 6 9 - 6 2
Special benefit - 4 2 - 5 0 - 3 9
Family payment -  1 183 72
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Table 6.8: Percentage change in number of customers, administered and
departmental costs in the four years AFTER Centrelink, 1997-98 to 
2000-01
Percentage 
change in 
recipient 
numbers
Percentage 
change in 
administered 
costs
Percentage 
change in 
departmental 
costs
A g e  p e n s io n 7 26 122
D is a b ility  s u p p o r t p e n s io n 13 15 62
W ife  p e n s io n - 3 3 - 2 8 - 5 8
C a re r p a y m e n t 68 68 - 6 0
U n e m p lo y m e n t p a y m e n t - 2 2 - 2 5 - 5 3
S ic k n e s s  a llo w a n c e - 3 3 - 7 - 8 9
S p e c ia l b e n e fit 24 8 - 6 8
F a m ily  p a y m e n t 3 32 129
Considered together, tables 6.7 and 6.8 reveal a mixed picture about changes in the 
number of recipients for a given payment and the associated costs in the periods before 
and after Centrelink’s establishment.
Table 6.7 shows that in the period prior to Centrelink all, but one (carer payment), of the 
eight payments lists a percentage change in departmental costs that is unfavourable 
compared to the changes shown for administered costs and customer numbers. For 
example, in the case of age pension, the number of recipients increased by 6 per cent in 
the four-year period prior to Centrelink. During the same period, administered costs for 
age pension increased by 4 percent, but departmental costs rose by a greater proportion, 
at 19 percent. Similarly, for disability support pension, the customer numbers increased 
by 21 per cent, while administered costs increased by 30 percent, but departmental costs 
increased by 43 percent.
In the four-year period following Centrelink’s establishment, the results in table 6.8 
indicate that Centrelink was able to contain the departmental costs, relative to changes in
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customer numbers and administered costs, for five of the eight payments. These 
payments are wife pension, carer payment, unemployment payment, sickness allowance 
and special benefit. For example, with carer payment, administered costs and customer 
numbers continued to rise, by 68 per cent each, but departmental costs have decreased by 
60 per cent over the same period. However, those payments for which Centrelink has 
been unable to limit the increase in departmental expenses (age pension, disability 
support pension and family payment) involve payments with more customers and higher 
levels of administered and departmental costs. By way of comparison, the combined 
populations of wife pension, carer payment, sickness allowance and special benefit, 
comprised around eight per cent of the age pension population at June 2004. In relation 
to the growth in departmental expenses for payments with large customer numbers, the 
number of age pensioners increased by seven per cent and administered costs rose by 
26 per cent, yet operational expenses increased by 122 per cent. For family payment, 
customer numbers increase by three per cent and administered costs rise by 32 per cent, 
whereas operational expenses increase by 129 per cent. Overall, during Centrelink’s 
period of delivery departmental costs rise to a greater extent compared to the four-year 
period prior to Centrelink, despite Centrelink being able to contain the growth of 
departmental expenses for many payments.
Summary
On the basis of the analysis completed in this section it is difficult to conclude that 
efficiency is improved when delivery is undertaken by Centrelink compared to the 
previous delivery structure. Departmental costs have increased since Centrelink was 
established, but this increase does not necessarily mean the purchaser-provider 
arrangement under which Centrelink and the purchasing department operate are 
inefficient, as similar results may have taken place had delivery within DSS/FaCS been 
maintained. However, the results would recommend a hesitant approach to claiming that 
Centrelink is more efficient in its delivery than DSS.
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The picture is not straightforward and many factors are involved in the reasons why 
payments vary in the costs of their delivery. In charts 6.7 and 6.8, the results indicate that 
for some payments the delivery by DSS appears to have constrained the departmental 
increases compared to Centrelink. Yet, with other payments, Centrelink is more 
successful than the department in reducing the operational costs. In accounting for the 
growth in departmental costs during Centrelink’ s period, those payment types that have 
the higher customer numbers are payments that Centrelink has been unable to constrain 
in terms of increases in departmental expenditure.
Centrelink's efficiency indicators
Efficiency dividend
In Centrelink’ s first annual report, delivering a required efficiency dividend is described 
as a “ milestone” (Centrelink 1998, p. 4) and during the early years of the organisation’s 
existence, the efficiency dividend is commonly mentioned by the chief executive officer 
as an indication of Centrelink’s operational success (Vardon 1999c, 2000b and 2001b).
The application of efficiency dividends is not unique to the Howard government, with the 
previous Hawke-Keating governments also applying measures entailing a clawback to 
government from the running costs of public sector bodies. Generally, government 
funding is indexed according to a specific rate, allowing base funding to be increased 
annually at a pre-determined rate. An efficiency dividend reduces the base rate of 
indexation, eroding the real value of funding. The efficiency dividend of one per cent, 
per annum, introduced service-wide on 1 July 1996 shortly after the Howard government 
attained Office in March 1996, resulted from recommendations o f the National 
Commission of Audit (1996)15. The Commission considered that outlays on the 
operational aspects of all Commonwealth programs could be subject to on-going
15 The National Commission of Audit was established in April 1996 by the Howard government to 
advise on public sector finances. The report of the Commission has been criticised for adopting a 
neo-classical economic approach and some have suggested the report was not impartial, 
analytical or objective (Argy 1996, Hamilton 1996, Mitchell 1996, Walker 1996).
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efficiency gains and that setting minimum and challenging savings targets would drive 
the cultural change that was needed in the public sector to increase efficiency. For 
example, the Commission suggested savings in the order of at least 20 per cent over three 
years could be delivered by rationalising and restructuring the payments structure and 
systems of DSS and DEETYA. However, efficiency dividends that encompass a 
continuing effort to limit the operational costs of organisations are problematic for their 
cumulative impact on funding and the Commission was criticised for not providing the 
necessary evidence on the capacity of organisations to deliver the required efficiencies 
(Hamilton 1996).
Given the statement by the Commission about the efficiencies to be gained from 
restructuring DSS and DEETYA, the introduction of Centrelink was linked to achieving 
high levels of operational efficiencies. Following negotiations with the Department of 
Finance, it was agreed that efficiency dividends totaling 16.5 percent over three years 
would be delivered, in addition to the on-going service-wide efficiency dividend of 
one per cent. In the case of Centrelink, the reductions in the funding base were not 
cumulative over this three years and the overall result would equate to a ten per cent 
reduction in Centrelink’s funding base for what would otherwise have been available in 
1999-00.
Close examination of Centrelink’s operating performance over the period that spans its 
first seven financial years reveals a less than positive outcome. Data from Centrelink’s 
annual reports shows that revenue less expenses, including the amount of the efficiency 
dividend, generally results in negative operating performance. Table 6.9 displays 
Centrelink’s net operating performance, including the amounts of the efficiency dividend.
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The figures in table 6.9 indicate that in four of the seven periods, Centrelink’s net 
operating performances return negative figures. In addition, when the operating expenses 
over the period are combined to derive a cumulative total, the operating results indicate 
total losses of almost $89.5 million over the first seven years of Centrelink’s operations. 
If the amounts in table 6.9 were adjusted for inflation, the operational losses over the 
period would be greater, at about $103.3 million in 2004 dollar values.
Even if the results for Centrelink’s operating expenses were more positive, the ANAO 
notes the savings options identified to enable the efficiency dividends to be delivered 
were developed prior to Centrelink “and would have been available to DSS without the 
establishment of Centrelink” (ANAO 1997, p.57). In addition, the ANAO also finds that 
given the preparations required to produce the savings, “it would be unlikely that 
Centrelink would be in a position to make substantial savings had it not been able to build 
on work already initiated by DSS” (ANAO 1997, p. 58). Such conclusions, although 
attributing some of the efficiency outcomes to the previous delivery structure, do not take 
account of the net operating losses incurred by Centrelink in meeting the efficiency 
dividends. That is, the publicity given to the return by Centrelink of the government’s 
yearly efficiency dividend is rarely linked to the outcome that, on complying with the 
efficiency obligation, Centrelink was commonly incurring negative net operating results.
Efficiency key performance indicator
Another efficiency measure identified as a key performance indicator for Centrelink is 
the price per customer (Vardon 1999a, p i90). Although this indicator is a useful basic 
measurement that takes account of inputs in relation to the units of service, Centrelink 
documents provide no indication of the on-going results for this indicator. The following 
chart shows the total operating revenue of Centrelink divided by the number of customers 
at June each year.
164
Chapter Six
Chart 6.11: Centrelink’s key performance indicator - price per customer, 
June 98 to June 04
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The number o f customers at June each year is a static measurement that does not take 
account o f the flow of customers on and o ff payment throughout the year. W ith a higher 
number of customers, a measurement taking account of the flow would show a lowering 
of the cost per customer. However, the trend in cost per customer would most likely be 
similar, that is, a decline in the costs until 2001 followed by increases in each o f the 
following years. After a period of seven years, Centrelink’ s cost per customer is the 
same as when the organisation was first established. The initial declines are most likely a 
result o f the reductions in staff that occurred in Centrelink’s first three years.16
Summary
The net operating results for Centrelink incorporating the efficiency dividend and the key 
performance indicator of cost per customer indicate that improvements in efficiency have 
not taken place. Over the period of analysis, the net operating expenses indicate losses
16 Refer to table 5.1 for the total number of Centrelink staff and the overall number of customers.
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and the costs per unit of service have not decreased. This does not suggest the efficiency 
outcomes are any worse than those that may have been delivered under the previous 
delivery structures, as there is no way to know of the previous department’s responses 
under the same circumstances. But, it does appear the social security department was 
setting in place operational directions that it hoped would lead to greater efficiencies, 
such as computing system upgrades and the identification of a number of joint activities 
with the employment department to improve efficiencies and benefit customer service 
(DSS 1994, p. 20). As such, many commentators consider the efficiency capabilites of 
Centrelink had been set in place by operational directions commenced by the previous 
structure of delivery.
Conclusion
Reform to the structure of government service delivery is not undertaken lightly, 
especially on the scale represented by Centrelink. The conviction that enables such 
fundamental reform to progress is the idea that changing government organisations to 
allow them to concentrate on core activities provides the opportunity to maximise 
efficiency.
While Centrelink has remained a part of the Commonwealth, all indications in the 
beginning were that the agency and purchasing department were positioning themselves 
for the introduction of competition. Even without a competitive environment for 
Centrelink’s services, efficiencies were expected to arise by removing the double 
handling of unemployed people by the CES and the social security department. Apart 
from these savings, the purchaser-provider arrangements under which Centrelink operates 
is assumed to deliver efficiencies by specifying the services to be produced and 
measuring the performance in achieving these, thereby establishing an outcomes-focus 
that redirects processes away from the emphasis on input controls and curbs the wastage 
believed to be inherent within the combined policy/delivery structure. However, the 
efficiencies presumed to flow from these arrangements are not certain and the purpose of
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this chapter was to explore whether there are indications that improvements in efficiency 
have taken place since the establishment of Centrelink.
This analysis did not seek to determine the factors that might be responsible for 
efficiency and whether these related to elements of the reform. On a more preliminary 
level, the study was aimed at determining whether or not improved efficiency has taken 
place, as measured by changes in expenditure, taking into account the programs delivered 
and the number of customers.
For the major payment types, the results show that increases or decreases in administered 
and departmental costs vary. For most pension payments, administered expenses on a per 
customer basis have risen as have departmental costs. In the case of allowances, the 
administered costs per customer tend to decline, perhaps indicating higher levels of part- 
time employment among workforce age recipients. At the same time, the departmental 
expenses for allowance payments remain generally stable, although costs have risen 
slightly in recent years.
In the case of special benefit and sickness allowance, substantial declines in departmental 
expenses occurred, but these were more likely a reflection of policy changes than the 
introduction of Centrelink. The situation for parenting payment and family payment 
showed significant increases in departmental costs per customer. While the administered 
costs per customer for family payment had also increased considerably, for parenting 
payment administered costs per customer had declined.
The assessment of Centrelink’s performance also considers the proportional changes in 
costs and customer numbers that have taken place over the evaluation period and 
compares the four-year period prior to Centrelink with the four-year period following the 
establishment of Centrelink. These calculations indicate that during Centrelink’s period 
of delivery, departmental costs increased a greater amount compared to the period prior 
to Centrelink. Overall, during the entire evaluation period, departmental costs increased 
around 34 per cent during the evaluation period, whereas the overall number of customers
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increased by 17 percent. Despite an official commentary that suggests efficiency gains 
under Centrelink are being achieved, the conclusion is reached that Centrelink does not 
appear to be more efficient in its delivery than the previous structure.
Finally, the chapter examined Centrelink’s achievement of efficiency dividends and the 
results of Centrelink’s key performance indicator for efficiency. The analysis showed 
that in operating with reduced funding, because of the application of efficiency dividends, 
Centrelink generally functions with net operating losses. In relation to Centrelink's 
efficiency performance indicator of cost per customer, the analysis shows no overall 
improvement in this indicator from the period June 1998 to June 2004.
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Chapter 7: Efficiency and employment programs
Part of the government’s intention for reforming employment assistance and establishing 
the Job Network was to “provide for greater efficiency” (Vanstone 1996, p. 12). Within a 
short period of time the government was claiming the Job Network was achieving high 
levels of efficiency. For example, the then employment Minister stated:
Inevitably, there were transitional problems but within 12 months, 1200 public 
servants and about 7000 Job Network staff were obtaining 20 per cent better 
outcomes at up to 50 per cent lower cost than 14,000 public servants operating under 
the old system. (Tony Abbott, Address to the Institute of Public Administration 
Australia, May 22, 2002)
This chapter explores whether improved costs efficiencies, such as those indicated by the 
employment Minister, have taken place since the establishment of the Job Network. In 
doing so, this chapter considers the types of employment services offered under the 
previous arrangement and compares this to those provided by the Job Network and the 
associated costs to the employment department in terms of administered and 
departmental expenses. Expenses relating to the services transferred from the CES to 
Centrelink -  the registration, assessment, referral and provision of information about 
employment services to unemployed people -  are generally accounted for in the 
employment departments’ annual reports as purchases from Centrelink and are included
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in the analysis. In the conclusion to this chapter attention returns to the statement made 
in this introduction by the employment Minister about the achievements o f the Job 
Network compared to the CES to consider whether or not such claims are substantiated.
Expenditure from annual reports
To provide an initial assessment of the costs o f employment programs, the annual reports 
of the employment department are examined to determine the administered and 
departmental costs. As with the analysis in the previous chapter o f social security 
programs, the annual reports in the period prior to accrual budgeting isolate the costs of 
corporate services. As such, a proportion of these corporate costs are attributed to the 
employment program according to the percentage the employment program represents of 
the total expenses of the department.
Chart 7.1: Employment services - administered and departmental costs,
1993-94 to 2003-04
$ ( 000)
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Chart 7.1 shows that in real terms a peak in administered expenses took place in 1995-96. 
This peak is related to the Working Nation measures announced in May 1994 that 
significantly boosted funding for labour market programs. The chart reflects these 
increased costs with a rise of around $1 billion in the two years leading up to 1995-96. 
Following the peak, the total cost of employment services declines from almost $3.5 
billion in 1995-96 to just over $1.6 billion in 2003-04. However, this decline was not 
gradual with the reduction in expenditure concentrated over the period 1996-97 to 
1998-99. This period of rapid decline in overall expenditure coincides with the early 
time of the Howard government, when the Working Nation programs were wound back 
and takes place prior to the introduction of the Job Network.
In chart 7.1 the expenditure related to departmental expenses appears higher before the 
introduction of Centrelink and the Job Network. A significant decline in the operational 
costs is noted in 1998-99, followed by an adjustment after which the departmental costs 
in the period 1999-00 to 2003-04 remain generally stable. The decline may be explained 
by the substantial change that took place in staffing. In the two years leading up to 
1998-99, the employment department underwent significant restructure and staffing 
numbers fell from a peak of more than 16,000 to less than 4000 by 30 June 1998 
(DEETYA 1998b, p. 6). However, a closer examination of the data in the employment 
department’s annual report for 1998-99 raises questions about the accuracy of the figures. 
This annual report indicates that departmental expenses for the management of the Job 
Network, the Community Support Program, preparations for the second Job Network 
tender round, the Australian Job Search service and the management of the relationship 
with Centrelink, amounts to only $59.1 million. But, in this same financial year, 
Centrelink’s annual report indicates that $100.9 million has been received from the 
employment department. It is unclear from the employment department’s annual report 
where the amount of $100.9 million is taken account of when only $59.1 million is stated 
as the departmental costs for numerous programs, including the funding for Centrelink.
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To examine the relationship between administered and departmental costs closer, chart 
7.2 indicates the percentages that departmental costs represent o f the total costs o f the 
employment program.
Chart 7.2: The percentage of the total costs of employment services that 
comprise departmental expenses, 1993-94 to 2003-04
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Chart 7.2 shows a substantial variation in percentages coinciding with the establishment 
of Centrelink and the Job Network. That is, in 1997-98 departmental costs comprise 
around 33 per cent of overall costs, but this drops suddenly the follow ing year when 
departmental costs represent around 16 percent of total costs. However, in this type o f 
analysis, departmental expenses are merely the inverse o f those percentages that apply to 
administered expenses. For example, in 1997-98 significant reductions in labour market 
programs had taken place, greatly reducing administered expenses and, as a result, a 
similar amount of departmental expenses as in previous years would comprise a greater 
proportion of overall expenses.
Another perspective from which to view the changes in departmental costs, and separate 
them from the influence of administered costs, is to calculate the percentage variation in
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departmental costs over the course of the period under study. Chart 7.3 plots the 
percentage change in departmental costs from the base year o f 1993-94. As a point of 
comparison, the percentage change in administered costs from the base year o f 1993-94 is 
also provided.
Chart 7.3: The percentage change in departmental and administered expenses, 
1993-94 to 2003-04 (calculated in real terms using 2004 dollar values)
« — Departmental costs 
■♦—Administered costs40% -
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Chart 7.3 more clearly displays the relationship between departmental costs and 
administered costs and indicates that both types o f expenses follow the same general 
trend. Overall, the departmental costs have decreased by over 50 per cent since 1993-94 
and at the same time administered costs have declined by around 25 percent, suggesting 
greater operational efficiencies have been achieved. However, both types o f expenses 
begin to decline following the 1995-96 financial year and substantial reductions in costs 
generally take place before the introduction o f the Job Network in May 1998. As 
previously discussed, the large drop in departmental expenses in 1998-99 may reflect the 
significant decline in staff numbers, but caution is also warranted in using the figures 
from the employment department’ s annual report. From 1999-00 to 2002-03, the 
administered and departmental costs remain mostly stable.
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In the last financial year, 2003-04, administered expenses increase about ten per cent 
while departmental expenses decline slightly. The 2003-04 financial year involves the 
beginning of the third employment services contract that introduces a new policy 
platform for Job Network services, the Active Participation Model (APM). The APM 
requires specific service requirements for job seekers and these have resulted in 
expenditure increases17. While the employment department highlights record levels of 
performance outcomes under the APM policy changes, there is debate concerning these 
outcomes. For example, the ANAO notes the employment department may have 
improved their capacity to capture data, leading to higher reported job placement 
outcomes and that outcomes resulting from the job seekers own efforts to find 
employment, and for which the department is not prepared to pay job placement 
agencies, are included as placement outcomes (ANAO 2006a).
Specific labour market programs
The analysis thus far is inconclusive about the government’s claim that the Job Network 
is achieving greater efficiencies than the previous arrangement under the CES. 
Departmental costs during the period of the CES are higher than those relating to the 
period that the Job Network has been operating, but the CES also experience greater costs 
for employment programs and the number of job seekers is higher than for the Job 
Network. To examine more closely the associations between labour market programs 
and the costs of their delivery, the analysis considers changes to the employment 
programs throughout the period 1993-94 to 2003-04 and the implication of these changes 
for the departmental costs associated with the programs.
The introduction of the Job Network in 1998 is variously described as a “radical 
transformation” (OECD 2001, pi 1) and that the changes to employment services are “far- 
reaching” (Productivity Commission 2002, p. 3.2). However, many employment
17 In the following financial year, 2004-05, the administered expenses for Job Network services 
increased to $1,385 billion compared to under $1 billion in 2003-04 (DEWR 2005).
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programs remain similar to when delivery was undertaken by the CES, with variations 
relating more commonly to the number of programs available and the names by which 
they are referred, than to fundamental changes in program designs. This is because, at 
their core, government funded employment programs, whether delivered by the public 
sector or private organisations, involve similar activities designed to assist those unable 
to purchase their own employment assistance. Indeed, prior to the Job Network, the 
previous government developed a competitive framework for the delivery of case 
management services to highly disadvantaged job seekers. This involved a separate 
component of the CES competing with non-government agencies and included oversight 
by a statutory authority to regulate and promote fair and open competition between the 
service deliverers.
As with the contracting out of case management services, the types of employment 
services provided by the Job Network are comparable to the programs that were 
previously delivered by the CES. The three major services provided by the Job Network 
-  job matching, job search support and intensive assistance for disadvantaged or long 
term unemployed job seekers -  comprise around 90 per cent of the total funding of the 
Job Network and are the focus of this analysis. A number of other minor programs have 
remained within the employment department for both management and delivery, but are 
not included in the analysis. These other programs include employment services to 
Indigenous people, structural and regional adjustment programs and research and 
evaluation activities.
Job matching involves gathering information about vacancies from employers and 
assisting suitable job seekers in the application process. It is the most basic form of 
employment assistance that is easily connected with the origins of the CES in the post 
Second World War period when a substantial number of demobilised ex-service people 
required assistance in being matched to jobs. Job matching is particularly important for 
certain groups of job seekers who may require early and basic job brokerage services to 
gain employment, for example, school leavers and women returning to the workforce
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following a lengthy break, but this early period of unemployment is largely self-directed 
by the job seeker.
Assistance with job search techniques recognises that following a period of unassisted job 
search of around three months, with no successful outcome, greater employment 
assistance may be required. Job Network providers offer assistance in planning for 
interviews, writing job applications and preparing resumes. The CES operated similar 
programs to provide job search support, such as job clubs.
The major service provided by the Job Network is intensive support for disadvantaged or 
long-term unemployed job seekers. This form of assistance comprises the bulk of Job 
Network funding, demonstrating the priority of publicly-funded employment programs in 
providing assistance to disadvantaged job seekers. Initially designed to replace the 
majority of active labour market programs that operated under the CES, such as wage 
subsidies, formal training assistance, vocational skills programs and case management, 
intensive support under the Job Network enables providers to be flexible in the types of 
services offered. In designing this form of assistance to be highly flexible the 
government believed that providers would be best placed to determine '‘the optimal mix 
of assistance needed to obtain an outcome that will not be limited by the constraints 
associated with current labour market programmes” (Vanstone 1996, p. 29). Although 
not directly discouraged from offering active labour market assistance, Job Network 
members face incentive issues to minimise costs and survey research has shown the more 
expensive forms of intervention, such as wage subsidies, are avoided (Dockery and 
Stromback 2001; Eardley, Abello and MacDonald 2001).
Enabling Job Network members to have a high level of discretion in the choice of 
employment services provided to job seekers raises concerns about the lack of 
information available on the more successful forms of intervention (OECD 2001; 
Productivity Commission 2002). For the purpose of this study, it also means that a 
comparison of the programs available from the CES and from the Job Network must 
involve a broad approach to classification.
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The approach to classifying employment programs for this thesis in a manner that enables 
comparison between CES employment services and Job Network/Centrelink employment 
services results in the following broad categories.
Table 7.1: Major classes of employment services, CES verus Job 
Network/Centrelink
Com m onw ealth Em ploym ent 
Service
Job N etw ork/C entrelink  services
C ategory one
em ploym ent
services
A c tiv e  L a b o u r  M a rk e t P ro g ra m s
( in c lu d e s  a ll w a g e  s u b s id ie s , tra in in g  
a n d  s k ills  d e v e lo p m e n t, s u c h  a s  
J o b s ta r t, J o b S k ills ,  J o b T ra in , 
S k il lS h a re , J o b  C lu b s , M o b ility  
A llo w a n c e , a n d  c a s e  m a n a g e m e n t 
s e rv ic e s )
In te n s iv e  A s s is ta n c e  -  J o b  N e tw o rk  
J o b  S e a rc h  T ra in in g  -  J o b  N e tw o rk
C ategory two
em ploym ent
services
J o b  s e e k e r  re g is tra tio n , a s s e s s m e n t 
a n d  re fe rra l
( in c lu d e s  jo b  m a tc h in g , s e rv ic e s  to  
e m p lo y e rs , s e lf-h e lp  fa c il it ie s )
J o b  p la c e m e n t s u p p o r t  -  J o b  N e tw o rk  
C e n tre l in k  s e rv ic e s
Table 7.1 displays two major categories o f employment services. Category one relates to 
the activities involved in job search training and intensive assistance, while category two 
encompasses the job brokerage functions of the Job Network and the tasks involved in 
registering, assessing and referring unemployed people that are provided by Centrelink.
Using the classification outlined in table 7.1, the following analysis allocates 
administered and departmental funding. Assigning these expenses is not straightforward 
using the data provided in annual reports. This is because program activity identified as 
departmental expenses for the CES are subsequently described as administered expenses 
for the Job Network. For example, in the annual reports covering the period of the CES 
(1993-94 to 1997-98), case management activities are listed as running costs. However, 
when the Job Network absorbs these services into the intensive assistance program, the 
costs become part of the administered expenses that relates to the department’ s purchase 
of services from the Job Network.
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A further d ifficulty relates to the amount o f financial information provided in annual 
reports, particularly in later periods as dedicated labour market programs cease and are 
absorbed into general funding for the Job Network. In the later periods, the annual 
reports offer a single item of administered expenses to reflect the entire funding provided 
to the Job Network. Recognising the inexact nature o f this expenditure data the ANAO 
(2005f) recommended the department provide a breakdown of actual expenditure on the 
Job Network in their annual reports. However, the department disagreed with this view 
of the ANAO on the basis that the “ Job Network is a single programme and is reported as 
a single programme in accordance with government policy”  (2005f, p. 69). The 
department’s argument is linked to the introduction o f the Active Participation Model in 
July 2003 and the combining of job matching, job search support and intensive support 
into a single continuum of Job Network services. However, the ANAO ’s request that Job 
Network payments be identified according to the outcome payment would enable 
indicative comparisons with previous services.
Alternative sources to the annual reports were used to derive the level o f funding for the 
three major services available from the Job Network (ANAO 2005e, 2005f and 2006a; 
Productivity Commission 2002). Whilst it was generally possible to derive this 
information18, a further limitation involves recognising the inaccuracy o f data given the 
discretion available in the Job Network model. For instance, during the period o f the first 
employment services contract, concerns were raised about the cross-subsidisation of 
funds from intensive support services to the underfunded job matching services (Dawkins 
2002, McNally 2003, OECD 2001).
The following two charts display the administered and departmental costs as they appear 
in the annual reports and also as modified figures where expenses are grouped according 
to the employment service categories outlined in table 7.1. For example, case
18 Financial data for the Job Network’s three major services was not available for the 2002-03 
financial year. Based on the proportions of funding indicated in other years, the total funding in 
2002-03 was assigned 75% to intensive support, 10% to job matching and 5% to job search 
support. The remaining percentage finances other Job Network services such as the New 
Enterprise Incentive Scheme.
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management is listed as a departmental expense in the annual reports during the operation 
of the CES, but becomes merged with the administered expenses of the Job Network 
when provided as part of intensive support services. In the modified figures, the costs 
relating to case management during the CES period are converted to administered 
expenses to provide continuity in the treatment o f these costs.
Chart 7.4: Category one employment services - administered and departmental 
costs, 1994-95 to 2003-04
$ ( 000)
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Charts 7.4 and 7.5 examine the period 1994-95 to 2003-04 because the 1993-94 annual 
report did not provide a sufficient breakdown of the costs to enable classification 
according to the two major classes of employment services used in this analysis.
Chart 7.4 shows that in the case of category one employment services the modified 
figures are lower for departmental costs during the period that the CES operates than the
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figures in the annual reports and higher in relation to administered costs. Given the scale 
of expenditure shown in chart 7.4, the differences in costs involve substantial amounts. 
For example, in 1995-96 at the height o f the Working Nation initiative, the figures 
indicate the difference in the administered costs for the annual report compared to the 
modified amount was over $80 million. The costs that cause the difference between the 
figures in the annual reports and those that have been modified relate to case management 
services. These services are listed as departmental costs in the annual reports during the 
period 1994-95 to 1997-98, but thereafter are transferred to administered costs under the 
Job Network. Overall, as previous noted, sharp declines in both administered and 
departmental costs take place, but these occur prior to the introduction o f the Job 
Network. Since the introduction o f the Job Network costs have remained generally 
stable, but slight increases are evident in 2003-04 in both administered and departmental 
expenses, due mainly to the introduction o f the active participation model.
Chart 7.5: Category two employment services - administered and departmental 
costs, 1994-95 to 2003-04
$ ( 000)
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□  Annual report - departmental costs 
El Modified - departmental costs
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Chart 7.5 reveals the shift that has taken place between administered and departmental 
expenses for the category two employment services — job brokerage services and the 
registration, assessment and referral processes. In the period up to 1997-98, the annual 
reports show amounts are incurred as departmental expenses for these services. 
However, with the commencement of the Job Network, the amounts related to job 
brokerage services are recorded as administered expenses in the annual reports. The 
modified figures, shown as the darker segment in chart 7.5, maintains the expenditure for 
job brokerage services as a departmental expense. Category two employment services do 
not show the sharp decline in expenditure that is evident for category one services in 
chart 7.4. This indicates that category one services, incorporating the active labour 
market programs, are more susceptible to policy changes and either large injections or 
withdrawals of funding. Category two services, involving the basic job matching 
functions and job seeker assessment processes, are more stable in their provision and 
expenditure over time.
With the introduction of the Job Network and Centrelink, official figures from the 
department’s annual reports show a decrease in departmental expenses. However, this is 
a result of costs shifting from activities that are departmental in nature during the period 
of the CES, to administered under the Job Network/Centrelink model. Accordingly, the 
official decreases in departmental expenses should not necessarily be viewed as the 
achievement of greater efficiencies by the reformed arrangements.
Costs per customer
The analysis to this point does not provide an opportunity to determine the efficiency or 
otherwise of the activities undertaken by Centrelink and the Job Network on behalf of the 
employment department because the service output is not taken into account. To 
conclude this section and delve further into the efficiency of the government’s 
expenditure on employment services, funding is tracked over time in accordance with the 
number of people in receipt of unemployment payments. Using the number of
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unemployment beneficiaries is not entirely satisfactory as a greater number of job seekers 
avail themselves o f employment services, but this was also the case for the CES. A 
limitation in using unemployment beneficiaries as an indication o f the output of 
employment services is that the general rate o f unemployment might be low, but may not 
be a sound indicator o f sections o f the workforce that are underemployed or are 
discouraged from employment.
Chart 7.6 displays the administered costs per customers, combining the expenses for the 
two major categories of employment services19. Both the data provided in the annual 
reports and the modified figures show the costs of the major employment programs on a 
per customer basis have declined. A t their highest level, in 1995-96, the cost per 
customer o f these employment services was around $2650 and this declined within two 
years to the lowest point at about $700 per customer. As previously indicated, this 
substantial decline relates to the scaling back by the newly elected Howard government 
of the Working Nation labour market program initiatives. The administered costs per 
customer have been rising steadily since 1997-98, the year when Centrelink commenced, 
and in 2003-04 are almost at $1500 per customer.
19 Refer to table 7.1.
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Chart 7.6: Administered costs per customer of employment services, 
1994-95 to 2003-04
$3,000
* — Annual reports data 
■ Modified figures$2,500
$2,000
I  $1,500
^ $1,000
$500
The departmental costs per customer provide a useful guide for the possible achievement 
of operational efficiencies. The results in chart 7.7 indicate a significant drop in expenses 
from 1997-98 to 1998-99 and this reflects the significant reductions in staffing that took 
place while the Working Nation programs were being wound back and the portfolio was 
restructuring with the introduction of Centrelink and the Job Network.
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Chart 7.7: Departmental costs per customer of employment services, 
1994-95 to 2003-04
• — Annual report data 
- Modified figures
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The most notable feature of chart 7.7 is that when the modified departmental figures are 
examined, at the end of the period in 2003-04, the Job Network is costing no less on a 
cost per customer basis than the CES in 1994-95. Chart 7.7 accounts for changes in the 
value of the dollar by using the Consumer Price Index and the modified figures show that 
departmental costs per customer were at $511 in 1994-95 compared to $519 in 2003-04. 
Moreover, chart 7.7 also shows that since the commencement of the Job Network in 
May 1998, departmental expenses have risen. Based on the figures in the annual reports 
departmental expenses per customer have risen from a low of $246 per customer in 
1998-99 to $403 in 2003-04. If the modified figures are used, this difference is from 
$325 in 1998-99 to $519 in 2003-04. These findings do not provide strong support for 
the claim that the Job Network is more efficient or provides more value for money than 
the previous structure of delivery through the CES.
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Conclusion
Judgements about the efficiency of the Job Network are not straightforward. Prior to the 
employment services reforms the government substantially reduced the funding for 
labour market programs and significantly restructured the employment portfolio resulting 
in sizeable staff reductions. Aside from questions related to the effectiveness o f 
employment services in achieving outcomes for job seekers, the modified figures indicate 
the Job Network is as costly to administer on a per customer basis with less program 
funding per customer to apply.
In 1994-95, the peak period for the Working Nation initiative, the departmental costs in 
running active labour market programs, including case management services, was around 
$107 million and expenditure on these programs was around $1.7 b illion20. This 
compares to 2003-04 where the cost of purchasing similar Job Network21 services 
amounts to $80 million with administered costs of $851 million. This means that in 
2003-04, the program expenditure on similar employment programs had decreased by 
around 50 per cent since 1994-95, yet the cost to the department o f managing these 
programs had reduced by 26 per cent. At the same time, in June 2004, the number of 
unemployment beneficiaries has declined by around 29 per cent from June 1995.
With significantly less program costs and less unemployed people in 2003-04, it is 
expected the Job Network would not require the same level o f funding as provided to the 
CES in 1994-95 to manage active labour market programs. Whether a 26 per cent 
reduction in the department’s operational costs is sufficient to constitute a more efficient 
structure o f delivery than the CES, in light of the reduced customers and program 
expense, is debatable. In addition, it must be recognised that Job Network providers 
would be using a proportion o f their administered funding to carry out their own 
operational costs, such as salaries for employees, and as profits for their businesses. It 
would therefore be expected that in 2003-04, the operational costs for active labour
20 Amounts are converted to 2004 dollars using the Consumer Price Index.
21 Job Network services similar to active labour market programs are job search training and 
intensive assistance.
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market programs is greater than just the $80 million departmental costs incurred by the 
department, with a proportion of the $851 million relating to the purchase of Job Network 
services also being spent by Job Network providers on operational requirements.
For the Job Network, claims of efficiency are often based on the reduced amount of 
program expenditure that is provided to Job Network members, combined with improved 
employment outcomes. However, the strong economic conditions, and associated 
lowering of the unemployment rate, that have prevailed since the commencement of the 
Job Network complicates conclusions about the effectiveness of the system. In dealing 
with about half of the previous expenditure for labour market programs and about a third 
less people in receipt of unemployment payments since 1994-95, the Job Network should 
cost less to operate. However, a close examination of the figures in the annual reports 
indicates costs for similar programs have shifted in being classified as administered or 
departmental since the time of the CES. When the figures are transposed to provide for 
consistency in being treated as either an administered or departmental expense for the 
entire period of the assessment, the modified figures indicate the Job Network is as costly 
to manage and deliver on a per customer basis as the CES, with about a quarter less in 
program funding to apply per customer.
Claims the Job Network is achieving greater efficiencies than what was being achieved 
by the CES should be examined closely, particularly when figures are provided. For 
example, if the employment Minister’s statement provided at the beginning of this 
chapter is scrutinised, that in 2000 “around 1200 public servants and 7000 Job Network 
staff were obtaining 20 per cent better outcomes at up to 50 per cent lower cost than the 
previous structure that employed 14,000 public servants” (Abbott 2002), a different 
picture emerges. In terms of staffing, the 1999-00 employment department’s annual 
report notes that around 1626 full-time staff equivalent were employed in the portfolio’s 
management of employment programs, added to the more than 3000 staff that had been 
transferred to Centrelink to undertake duties that would previously have been done by the 
CES, in addition to the number of Job Network staff of around 7500, as calculated in 
Chapter 5, and the figure is around 12,000, not the 8200 suggested by the Minister. In
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relation to the “better outcomes”, the employment department has acknowledged that 
early net impact studies contained methodological problems that exaggerated the 
employment outcomes of Job Network programs. Also, attributing program success to 
the Job Network is tenuous when taking account of the variety of influences that impact 
on employment outcomes, such as the positive economic conditions that have existed 
since the establishment of the Job Network. Finally, the cost mentioned by the Minister 
relates to the entire costs of employment programs and does not isolate the operational 
costs involved in delivering employment programs -  costs that provide a more 
meaningful account of organisational efficiency. It should also be noted the program 
costs of employment services had been significantly reduced prior to the commencement 
of the Job Network, so the level of funding, and therefore the appearance of savings, 
would also have been the case had the CES been maintained.
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Chapter Eight
Chapter 8: Cross-sectional analysis -  the efficiency of 
Centrelink and the Department of 
Veterans’ Affairs
In examining the delivery of social security programs, the figures relating to departmental 
costs of income support in chart 5.3 of Chapter 5 indicate that an overall increase of 
around $542 million has taken place during the period 1993-94 to 2003-04. This result 
does not necessarily mean the purchaser-provider arrangement of Centrelink and the 
social security department is less efficient in its delivery of income support programs 
than would be the case with delivery through a combined policy and service delivery 
department. Rather, these figures may indicate that government income support 
programs are becoming more complicated to deliver and the increases in costs would 
have occurred if the previous structures had been maintained. To investigate further, this 
chapter examines the delivery by the Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) of 
payments to service pensioners and compares this to comparable payments — the 
delivery of age pension and disability support pension by Centrelink.
To avoid issues involving Centrelink’s early period of substantial restructure, the period 
chosen for comparing the organisations is the five-year period commencing 1999-00 to 
2003-04. This period also begins when accrual accounting standards are adopted
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throughout the Commonwealth and the outputs/outcome framework commences. As 
such, there is no requirement to modify program costs by attributing an assumed value of 
corporate services to the programs. This period also coincides with stability in the design 
of the payments to be compared and the operational structures that manage these.
To deliver comparative findings, programs within Centrelink and DVA that have the 
greatest similarities are chosen. In the case of Centrelink’s payments, the age pension 
and disability support pension are recognised as similar to the payment of service 
pensions and disability pensions provided by the veterans’ affairs portfolio. The service 
pension is paid to veterans, including the partners or widow(er)s of service pensioners, on 
the basis of age or invalidity. The ‘age’ service pension is payable at age 60, compared 
to the Centrelink age pension at age 65 for men. If the veteran is permanently 
incapacitated (for whatever reason), the ‘invalidity’ service pension is paid at any age. In 
the case of the DVA disability pension, the incapacity of the veteran must have resulted 
from war or peacekeeping service.
Using a similar method of analysis as applied in the previous chapters, the administered 
and departmental costs associated with the payments delivered by DVA are tracked over 
the period 1999-00 to 2003-04 and the figures converted to 2004 dollar values using the 
Consumer Price Index. This provides an indication of the expenses that DVA are 
managing and trends that may be developing. Chart 8.1 displays the administered costs 
of the service pension and the disability pension.
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Chart 8.1: Administered costs of DVA service pension and DVA disability 
pension, 1999-00 to 2003-04
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In chart 8.1 the lowering of administered costs for the service pension reflects the 
declining population of DVA service pensioners. The rise in expenditure for the 2000-01 
financial year for the service pension relates to the payment of the aged persons savings 
bonus that was provided to compensate older people with savings by maintaining the 
value of these savings upon the introduction of the goods and services tax in July 2000. 
For the disability pension, the annual report notes that while the number of disability 
pensioners is decreasing, the profile of the recipients is changing and this involves greater 
degrees of service-related incapacity and higher rates of payment (DVA 2003, p. 57).
Chart 8.2 reveals that following substantial reductions in 2000-01, the operational costs 
of providing DVA service pensions and disability pensions tend to be gradually rising 
over recent years.
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Chart 8.2: Departmental costs of DVA service pension and DVA disability 
pension, 1999-00 to 2003-04
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The DVA annual report (DVA 2003, p. 46) notes that for both the service pension and the 
disability pension, the higher departmental costs in 2002-03 and 2003-04 reflect the 
implementation of new policies, such as aligning pension assessments with the trusts and 
companies legislation, and expenses related to the development and implementation of 
new information technology systems.
As an initial indication of the overall efficiency of D V A ’s delivery of income support 
compared to that o f Centrelink’s age pension and disability support pension, the 
proportion that departmental costs comprise of the total costs of the payments are 
calculated.
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Table 8.1: Payment types - percentage of total costs that consist of departmental 
costs, 2003-2004
Payment Departmental cost Total costs Percentage
$(000) $(‘000)
DVA service pension 38,611 2 , 869,129 1.3
DVA disability 44,209 2 , 787,813 1.6
pension
Centrelink age 244,025 19 ,797,345 1.2
pension
Centrelink disability 258,068 7 , 750,600 3.3
support pension
Table 8.1 shows that those payments with the higher rate of departmental costs, as a 
percentage of total expenses for the payment, are the disability payments. This is not 
surprising given the more complex levels o f assessment required for the claimants’ 
disabilities. However, the proportion that departmental costs comprise o f the total costs 
for Centrelink’ s disability support pension are much higher at 3.3 percent compared to 
the 1.6 per cent for D V A ’s disability pension. The lowest percentage applies to 
Centrelink’s age pension, although at 1.2 percent, the result is very similar to the DVA 
service pension at 1.3 percent. With D V A ’s service pensioner population at June 2004 
around 13 percent of Centrelink’ s age pensioner numbers, it is expected that Centrelink 
would be able to achieve greater economies of scale. W ith much smaller customer 
numbers it would be more difficult for DVA to maintain lower departmental costs as a 
proportion of the total costs of the payments. For example, the cost o f information 
technology development can be expensive and DVA has a much smaller customer base to 
spread these costs among. However, in comparison to the Centrelink figures in table 8.1, 
DVA achieves similar results or, in the case o f the disability pension, better results.
For a consideration of Centrelink’ s and D V A ’s management o f their pensions in relation 
to the number of recipients, a useful comparison considers the costs per customer over
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the period 1999-00 to 2003-04. Chart 8.3 displays the administered costs per customer 
for each of the four pensions, providing a picture of the level of funds the organisations 
manage for each pension type.
Chart 8.3: Administered costs per customer of Centrelink and DVA pensions, 
1999-00 to 2003-04
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In all cases, chart 8.3 shows the administered expenses on a per customer basis have been 
increasing over the period 1999-00 to 2003-04. These increases reflect the more 
generous pension income test for both Centrelink’s and DVA’s pension payments that 
came into effect with the tax reform measures on l July 2000. Both the age pension and 
service pension show an increase for the period 1999-00 to 2000-01, indicating the 
increased administered costs associated with the one-off payment of the aged persons 
savings bonus, another compensatory item of the tax reform measures.
The departmental costs per customer are a barometer of the organisations’ management 
of their payments and provide a strong indication of the operational efficiencies. For the 
age and disability support pensions delivered by Centrelink, the departmental costs
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provided in chart 8.4 include the oversight and policy development undertaken by the 
purchasing department (DSS/FaCS).
Chart 8.4: Departmental costs per customer of Centrelink and DVA pensions, 
1999-00 to 2003-04
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Overall, the departmental costs per pensioner are reasonably stable for all payments, but 
the costs relating to Centrelink’s disability support pension are significantly higher 
throughout the entire period and are in excess of double the level o f departmental 
expenses per pensioner for the other payment types. There are a number o f factors that 
explain the higher levels of departmental expenses per Centrelink disability support 
pensioner compared to the other payments. With disability support pension, the 
government has been mindful of the rapidly increasing number o f recipients that came 
onto the payment during recent years. Accordingly, the assessment process has become 
detailed and recipients are subject to continual review and reassessment procedures. 
Given the greater scrutiny of the medical condition o f disability support pension 
claimants, compared to the scrutiny that may befall disabled veterans, decisions on the
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payment are subject to a high number of both internal and external appeals, further 
increasing the operational costs associated with Centrelink’s disability support pension. 
Finally, the close association of the disability support pension and unemployment 
payments means that a greater emphasis may be placed on the rehabilitation of recipients 
and maximising opportunities to participate in social and economic activities, compared 
to veterans in receipt of a DVA disability pension.
Conclusion
In using DVA as a comparative delivery structure against the FaCS-Centrelink 
arrangement, on the balance of figures presented it is difficult to conclude the purchaser- 
provider model is more efficient than a structure that combines policy and delivery within 
the one organisation. The departmental costs per customer indicate that operational 
expenses have generally remained stable across all payment types, with Centrelink 
spending about the same amount of money to deliver the age pension as DVA does to 
deliver service pensions. The payment with the highest expenses to operate is 
Centrelink’s disability support pension, but the reasons for this may have more to do with 
the policy behind the payment and the complexities of the assessment, review and 
appeals process, than the way Centrelink manages the delivery of the payment.
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Chapter 9: Measuring customer satisfaction
In this thesis, the effectiveness of the services provided by Centrelink and the Job 
Network is defined and measured according to the levels of satisfaction that job seekers 
have with the services delivered. This approach is consistent with the view of Fornell 
(1992, p. 18) who notes that quality improvements not recognised by the customer are 
questionable and that “accordingly, the most meaningful measurement of quality is how 
it affects customer satisfaction” . But, such measurements are only meaningful if the 
nature of customer satisfaction is understood and issues related to its measurement 
appreciated.
In the first instance, this chapter explores the theoretical dimensions of customer 
satisfaction. In doing so, the determinants of customer satisfaction and how they interact 
with the closely related idea of service quality are examined. The chapter then 
investigates the ways that service quality and customer satisfaction are measured by 
outlining different models used to frame the measurement of satisfaction, identifying 
common elements of service that are taken account of by customers in their assessments 
of satisfaction and the ways in which data on customer satisfaction is obtained.
In examining the concept of customer satisfaction and its associated measurement issues, 
this knowledge is applied in Chapter 10 to a methodical study of the survey instruments
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that gather data on job seekers’ satisfaction with Centrelink and the Job Network. The 
analysis of the findings of the customer satisfaction survey instruments is undertaken in 
Chapters 11 to 13 of this thesis.
Theoretical background
Introduction
Although discussions of marketing are found in the texts of ancient Greece (Shaw and 
Tamilia 2001), the more recent academic interest in marketing thought, as the body of 
literature from which customer satisfaction and service quality research has developed, is 
traced to the late-nineteenth century. In this period, marketing theorists recognised the 
viability of firms was strongly reliant on customers as consumers of their products 
(Dixon 1999). The early marketing researchers studied the processes that took place in a 
market exchange using a common economic framework and concentrated on issues 
particular to the marketability of commodities. For example, investigations into 
consumer choice sought to identify the benefits of products and measure how important 
these features were for consumers.
Towards the mid-twentieth century, a rapid proliferation in the marketing literature took 
place. In order to more fully understand what motivates consumer decisions, analysis 
expanded to incorporate theories on human behaviour (Shaw and Tamilia 2001). This 
period also coincides with an expansion in the production of consumer goods and, in 
many cases, there was little to differentiate product brands. As such, understanding the 
reasons for the purchase decisions of consumers became an area of strong interest, 
particularly for the business community. Accordingly, the marketing literature developed 
a strong business orientation and studying the concept of consumer satisfaction and the 
significant effect this had on purchase intentions became widely researched from the 
1950s onwards. In the 1970s, such emphasis grew stronger and, with the growth of the 
service industry, analysis expanded to examine issues around service quality, as 
compared to product quality, and the linkages that service quality has with customer 
satisfaction.
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Customer satisfaction and service quality became aligned with measurements of market 
success and as important indicators of profitability (Andreassen 1994). The 1970s 
business dictum of “market share maximisation”, in which a company’s share of the 
market is measured relative to competitor companies, developed as a key strategy and the 
role of customer satisfaction and service quality in retaining customers and attracting new 
customers was a key component (Fomell 1992).
Today the field of marketing science is broad and specific areas of research have 
developed in subjects such as competitive responsiveness, strategic pricing strategies and 
the use of Internet technology in virtual shopping. Many authors comment on the 
expansive nature of the literature and the extent that there is confusion (Brady and Cronin 
2001; Cronin and Taylor 1994; Shaw and Tamilia 2001). The literature presents 
alternative views on the constructs of customer satisfaction and service quality and often 
uses multiple terms to describe the same function. For example, the components of the 
expectancy-value approach to isolating the determinants of human behaviour have been 
variously described as performance vector, force, behavioural potential, aroused 
motivation, subjective expected utility or attitude (Mazis, Ahtola and Klippel 1975, 
p. 38).
Concerns by those who study current marketing theory are expressed for the lack of 
original direction being applied or that a cohesive framework is missing. For instance, 
such concerns are reflected in Shaw’s and Tamilia’s article on the history of marketing 
thought that states “we spend too much time spinning our wheels in a semantic jungle 
that grows with each new generation” (2001, p. 162). Shaw and Tamilia are also 
concerned with the specialist sub-disciplines of marketing theory that have developed as 
isolated areas of study without attending to the need for how these fit into a unified 
theory of marketing (2001, p. 161). Whether or not such a unified theory is warranted is 
unclear. However, understanding concepts such as customer satisfaction and service 
quality, and the methods that identify and measure these concepts, is central to this thesis
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given that the customer satisfaction levels of job seekers is being used as the key criterion 
in evaluating the service effectiveness of the Centrelink and Job Network arrangements.
Customer satisfaction and service quality
The idea that improved service quality is reflected in a higher level of customer 
satisfaction is common. However, the relationship between customer satisfaction and 
service quality is complex and it may not necessarily be the case that increased customer 
satisfaction reflects higher levels of service quality. To understand why this may be the 
case, the constructs of customer satisfaction and service quality and their interrelationship 
are explored.
Customer satisfaction research is that component of marketing theory that considers the 
factors that influence customers’ subjective evaluations of the favourableness, or 
pleasure, of products and services (Babin and Griffin 1998). In this process, research on 
the determinants of customer satisfaction generally emphasise the role of expectations 
and performance. At one level, expectations operate as anticipation and are considered a 
direct influence on satisfaction (Szymanski and Henard 2001). However, a more 
commonly held view is that expectations are part of a comparative process that combines 
with the perceived performance of the product or service to form customer satisfaction 
levels. This widely accepted account of the formation of satisfaction judgements is 
variously called the gap theory, the comparison standards paradigm or the 
disconfirmation paradigm.
Several pre-consumption standards have been developed, but the most common model 
adopted uses predictive expectations. In this model, customer satisfaction is derived when 
prior expectations are compared with the perceived performance of a product or service. 
Three evaluative outcomes are possible in the model. First, the perceived performance of 
the product or service will match the prior expectations and the confirmation will result in 
a neutral impact on satisfaction. Second, the perceived performance of the product or 
service will exceed prior expectations and the resulting positive disconfirmation will
2 0 0
Chapter Nine
increase the level of satisfaction. Lastly, perceived performance will be inferior 
compared to prior expectations and the consequent negative disconfirmation will lower 
the level of satisfaction. In this way, customer satisfaction is linked to consumers’ 
perceptions of whether their experience with a product or service has no impact, or, 
positively or negatively, disconfirms their pre-experience expectations.
The less common pre-consumption standards incorporate the use of different expectations 
such as equity expectations that are based on notions of reasonableness or experience- 
based expectations that result from personal experience or the experience of others 
(Fournier and Mick 1999). In addition, researchers may consider the impact of other 
attributes in the process of satisfaction formation. For example, satisfaction judgements 
may be modified in the case of product or service failure where the consumer believes the 
provider had no control over the outcome or where the failure was an unusual event 
(Bitner 1990).
The disconfirmation paradigm identifies expectations and perceived performance as 
separate, but related constructs to customer satisfaction. In this relationship, expectations 
and perceived performance form two key antecedents of customer satisfaction. That is, 
expectations and perceived performance are important preceding events that combine in a 
post-product/service evaluation to form customer satisfaction. If perceived performance 
is high and exceeds expectations then a customer is likely to be very satisfied. However, 
when perceived performance is low and falls short of expectations, then a very 
dissatisfied customer is likely.
Whilst traditional marketing theorists argued that firms should meet or exceed customer 
expectations to achieve higher levels of customer satisfaction, the disconfirmation 
framework cautions product and service providers about raising expectations and how 
this may be detrimental to an organisation’s success. Falling short of expectations, 
regardless of the quality of the product or service, may result in lower levels of 
satisfaction and the possibility of customer exits. Given this possible outcome, Sheth and 
Mittal (1996) argue that, rather than fulfil or exceed customer expectations, firms should
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concentrate on approaches directed towards shaping customer expectations and so avoid 
false expectations that could lead to dissatisfied customers and lowered profitability.
In the same way, the disconfirmation paradigm posits that increased customer satisfaction 
does not necessarily reflect increased levels of service quality. Instead, it may be that 
expectations decline and the service experience becomes more highly rated despite no 
objective changes in quality taking place.
Similar to the caution that organisations should not necessarily meet or exceed customer 
expectations, Fornell (1992) questions the substantial literature linking customer 
satisfaction with market share, and therefore, profitability. Although profitability is not 
generally applicable to public sector activities, the value of Fornell’s work is how specific 
strategies may function to improve customer satisfaction and such strategies are 
applicable to either public or private sector services. In his analysis, Fornell (1992, p. 8) 
associates market share with measures that evaluate customer numbers in relation to 
competitors, whereas customer satisfaction is generally measured from the consumer 
perspective and involves changes in customer retention. Fornell (1992) proposes that 
loyal customers are not necessarily satisfied customers and that devising defensive 
strategies to lessen customer exits, such as functional complaints management systems, 
can lead to profitability. Furthermore, Fornell (1992) considers defensive strategies to be 
less costly than offensive strategies. For example, the offensive strategy of improving 
customer satisfaction, that ultimately aims to increase market share by taking consumers 
away from competitors, is considered expensive and not straightforward given the 
multiplicity of factors that impact on the formation of satisfaction.
The disconfirmation paradigm generally positions consumers in a cognitive evaluation 
framework that assumes the consumer responds as a ‘rational man’ in processes that 
compare pre-consumption expectations with post-consumption performances (Carroll 
2004). More recently, research has included the impact of affective components in 
satisfaction judgements. This influence is commonly linked to the experience of 
consumption and the emotions that take place are believed to have an affective impact on
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memory and become integrated into assessments of satisfaction (Szymanski and Henard 
2001).
Fournier and Mick (1999) present a contingency view on the formation of customer 
satisfaction that highlights the importance of sociocultural factors and affective 
responses. The contingency perspective enables context and meaning unique to the 
individual consumer to frame the satisfaction experience. The authors use empirical 
methods that are based on lengthy, unstructured interviews that permit meanings and 
emotions to be explored, and conclude that it is not meaning-deficient comparison 
standards that impact most on satisfaction formation, but a blend of cognitions, 
motivations, emotions and meanings, embedded in a context setting (Fournier and Mick 
1999, p. 15).
Although the consumer marketing literature can lead to confusion in the relationship 
between consumer satisfaction and service quality, distinct meanings can be found 
(Bitner 1990; Bolton and Drew 1991; Boulding, Kalra, Staelin and Zeithaml 1993; 
Brown and Swartz 1989; Cronin and Taylor 1992, 1994; Roch and Poister 2006 and Teas 
1993). The standard approach is to regard customer satisfaction as a short-term, 
transitory judgement that is made on the basis of a specific encounter. Service quality, on 
the other hand, represents a longer-term attitude that forms the basis of an overall or 
general conclusion about a service and may develop following multiple encounters. 
However, no agreement is found on whether customer satisfaction is reliant on the level 
of service quality; that service quality is a result of customer satisfaction; or, that some 
other influences are responsible (Burns, Graefe and Absher 2003).
The emerging consensus appears to be that just as expectations and perceived 
performance are antecedents in the formation of customer satisfaction, satisfaction 
becomes an antecedent to service quality. That is, satisfaction operates as a function 
from a prior period that mediates the formation of the current perception of service 
quality (Cronin and Taylor 1992). Bolton and Drew (1991) form a distinction in which 
customer satisfaction is the ‘surprise’ a customer experiences following a service
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experience and that this becomes an input into the less dynamic attitude that forms 
around service quality. However, Bolton and Drew (1991) caution that the distinction 
between customer satisfaction and service quality can become unclear in the case of 
frequent or continuously provided services.
Another view is that both customer satisfaction and service quality are linked in their 
common use of the disconfirmation paradigm, but use different expectation standards 
(Boulding, Kalra, Staelin and Zeithaml 1993). The construct of expectations in the 
satisfaction literature represents predictions about products or services that providers 
‘would’ offer and therefore deals with expectations as a prediction of future events. In 
the service quality literature normative expectations of future events dominate the field 
and manifest as ideal or desirable expectations that are represented by services that 
‘should’ be provided or services that are associated with an excellent firm. In this latter 
framework, ‘ideal disconfirmation’ drives service quality and has an impact on 
satisfaction. As such, service quality becomes an intermediary between disconfirmation 
and satisfaction (Danaher and Haddrell 1996).
M easuring custom er satisfaction
Introduction
Extending outwards from debates around the formation of customer satisfaction and its 
relationship with service quality, researchers further deliberate on how to measure these 
concepts. An explanation put forward for the lack of consensus associated with the 
measurement of satisfaction is its highly abstract and subjective nature in a service 
environment. Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry (1985) recognise that defining and 
measuring quality has come mainly from the goods sector, but that the techniques for 
measuring the quality of goods are insufficient in the case of services.
The three defining features of service provision that Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry 
(1985) put forward to explain its unique nature are that service quality is intangible, as it 
cannot be measured objectively through direct observations, is heterogeneous, because it
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comprises elements that are subject to variation, such as the behaviour of service staff 
during the consumer experience, and is inseparable, in that the process of production and 
consumption takes place at the same time. The last defining feature, inseparability, 
positions consumers in a significant role in the outcome of the service encounter and 
authors often comment on this distinctive feature. For example, Fountain (2001, p. 58) 
notes that customers in a service enterprise function as co-producers. In recognition of 
this co-production, Brady and Cronin (2001) consider the employee-customer interface a 
key factor in the formation of service quality perceptions.
Together, the unique characteristics of service delivery lead consumers to evaluate a 
service differently from the purchase of merchandise and researchers must consider the 
process of the service encounter rather than concentrate on the object of consumption as 
commonly pursued in the satisfaction of goods literature. Accordingly, it is this process 
of service delivery that customer satisfaction and service quality researchers seek to 
identify and measure. In doing so, the literature can be divided into three major areas of 
discussion that, when interlinked, provide a background from which to examine and 
conduct studies of satisfaction particular to service environments. These major areas are 
— the models constructed to frame the measurement of satisfaction and service quality, 
the service elements that are assessed by customers when providing accounts of their 
service experiences and the methods for obtaining data.
Constructing models that frame the measurement of satisfaction and service 
quality
The principal models devised to measure customer satisfaction or service quality are 
based either on the overt use of the disconfirmation paradigm and measure the gap, or 
mathematical difference, between expectations and performance, or measure perceptions 
as a direct appraisal of the service. Direct appraisals avoid difference scores and use 
either performance or satisfaction scales to directly measure service quality or 
satisfaction. Direct appraisals do not dismiss the disconfirmation paradigm, but 
incorporate immediately into the service quality or satisfaction measurement a subjective
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determination of disconfirmation where the respondent has implicitly compared 
expectations with perceived performance.
Researchers put forward pros and cons for each model and in some instances studies are 
completed that empirically compare the results of using difference scores compared to 
direct appraisal. Before discussing some of these studies that compare the different 
models of service quality and satisfaction measurement, a closer look at how these 
models have developed is provided.
Building upon earlier work on the disconfirmation paradigm within the satisfaction of 
goods literature, Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry (1985) developed a long-standing 
model to measure service quality using difference scores. Following extensive in-depth 
interviews with executives and focus groups discussions with consumers, the authors 
collected data from a variety of service industries and developed the gap or 
disconfirmation model. The gap model identifies a total of five gaps or discrepancies that 
impede the delivery of service. Four of the gaps are associated with the service 
marketers’ side of delivery and include the difference between:
• consumer expectations and management perception;
• management perceptions of consumer expectations and service quality 
specifications;
• service quality specifications and the service actually delivered; and
• service delivery and what is communicated about the service to consumers.
The fifth gap identified by Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry (1985) relates to the 
consumers’ perspective and affirmed the disconfirmation paradigm in that judgements of 
high and low service quality depend on how consumers perceive the actual service 
performance in the context of what they expected. Accordingly, gap five is, “the quality 
that a consumer perceives in a service is a function of the magnitude and direction of the 
gap between expected service and perceived service” (Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry 
1985, p. 46). The authors subsequently developed the SERVQUAL instrument that 
focused on measuring the perceived gaps between a consumer’s expectation or level of
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importance associated with a specific item and the degree of excellence, or performance 
associated with that same item.
Following the development of SERVQUAL a number of authors queried how the 
instrument operationalised the service expectation concept. Cronin and Taylor (1992, 
1994) expressed concern with the measurement of customer expectations, proposing that 
gap scores were subject to an ambiguity occurring between a ‘desired’ level and an 
‘existing’ level of service. Cronin and Taylor (1992) proceeded to develop the 
SERVPERF instrument, based on the measurement of service quality as an attitude and 
designed around the use of concise performance-only scales.
Peter, Churchill and Brown (1993) alert consumer researchers to some of the statistical 
analysis problems that may arise with the use of difference scores. The problems 
identified are reliability, discriminant validity, spurious correlation and variance 
restriction. In an analysis of several well-known consumer research studies, such as 
Parasuraman’s, Zeithaml’s and Berry’s SERVQUAL research, Peter, Churchill and 
Brown (1993) found that none of the studies computed the reliability of the difference 
scores correctly. That is, the correlations between the components of the difference score 
were not adequately considered. Furthermore, none of the studies provided the necessary 
information for a subsequent inquiry to undertake a similar analysis.
Discriminant validity, necessary for establishing construct validity, refers to the degree 
that distinct constructs, which theoretically should not be related to each other, are 
dissimilar constructs. Typically, correlation coefficients between theoretically dissimilar 
measures should be low. Peter, Churchill and Brown (1993) point out that low reliability 
magnifies the correlations between a difference score measure and other measures, 
thereby creating the appearance of meeting discriminant validity when this is not the 
case.
The third issue that Peter, Churchill and Brown (1993) identify in using difference scores 
in consumer research is that of spurious correlation. This takes place in research that
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seeks to determine the correlation between a difference score and another variable. The 
variable is just as likely to be correlated with one or both of the components from which 
the difference score is derived. In some cases, one of these components may indicate a 
closer association with the variable than the difference score.
The final problem in the use of difference scores is called variance restriction. This takes 
place when one component used in calculating a difference score is higher than the other 
— a situation common to consumer research where expectations might commonly 
outweigh perceived performance. Variance restriction can lead to erroneous conclusions 
about the statistical significance of regression coefficiencts. In conclusion, Peter, 
Churchill and Brown (1993) recommend consumer researchers design survey questions 
to avoid the use of difference scores where possible.
A favourable aspect of using the disconfirmation model is the asymmetry common in 
performance-only or satisfaction-only models can be greatly reduced. The asymmetry 
arises because, in general, responses to performance or levels of satisfaction are mostly 
favourable and this results in distributions that display negatively skewed findings. That 
is, most of the scores occur towards the upper end of the scale. Some researchers 
consider the highly skewed distribution of responses in satisfaction research a problem 
(Brown and Swartz 1989; Elam and Ritchie 1996; Fomell 1992). The problem arises 
because consumers may experience clear and serious deficiencies in service quality, but 
still specify a satisfactory rating. As a result, questions are raised about the capacity of 
satisfaction measures to reflect aspects such as customer loyalty and retention. Gap 
scales, on the other hand, indicate little skewness and are more suitable for regression 
analysis because such calculations assume symmetry in the error distribution.
The debate between using gap scales or performance-only and satisfaction-only scales is 
central to studies that test both models to determine which has the strongest link to 
aspects such as overall satisfaction or customer loyalty. Burns, Graefe and Absher 
(2003) examine water-based recreationists’ importance and satisfaction ratings,
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subjecting the results to satisfaction-only and difference scores. The authors’ analysis 
finds that satisfaction-only measures are a better predictor of overall satisfaction.
Danaher’s and Haddrell’s (1996) study, examining the satisfaction of hotel users, 
contrasts disconfirmation, performance-only and satisfaction-only scales. Their findings 
indicate that performance-only and satisfaction-only scales are able to indicate the overall 
levels of customer satisfaction, whilst the disconfirmation scale is useful for capturing the 
negative feelings of guests.
Szymanski and Henard (2001) conduct a meta-analysis of 50 empirical studies on 
customer satisfaction. The authors report the cumulative findings of the meta-analysis 
and find that performance-only measures are not a dominant predictor of satisfaction 
levels and emphasise these measures reveal only a small part of the satisfaction story. In 
contrast, the meta-analysis shows that disconfirmation measures play a dominant role in 
satisfaction assessments, but that the choice of comparison standards impacts greatly on 
results.
Researchers may seek to develop a single, superior satisfaction model. However, a 
perusal of the marketing literature suggests that disconfirmation and performance- 
only/satisfaction-only models dominate, and that situations need to be explored to 
identify when a given model would be the best indicator of customer satisfaction and 
service quality.
For the purpose of this thesis, satisfaction data has been obtained from the departments 
through a Freedom of Information request. The next chapter describes the survey 
instruments obtained in this request. The use of disconfirmation methodologies does not 
appear to be common and it is generally the case that satisfaction-only measures are 
gathered and aggregate results presented.
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The elements of customer satisfaction measurement in a service environment
In determining a level of customer service satisfaction, measurements are undertaken 
from the perspective of the consumer of the service. This section of the chapter examines 
those components of service delivery that, when combined, become the service 
experience and form the foundations of data gathered by consumer researchers. These 
components of the service delivery experience are also referred to in the literature as 
dimensions, attributes, factors or elements.
Broadly, two methods of measuring customer satisfaction are available. First, a 
single-item, or aggregate, level of measurement may be sought. This measurement seeks 
an overall or global indication of consumers’ responses to the service experience. The 
second measurement captures satisfaction through a multi-item, or multi-attribute, level 
that asks questions about the different elements of the service. These different elements 
of service are mathematically manipulated to provide a single customer satisfaction 
rating. The Centrelink customer satisfaction index, discussed in Chapter 10, is an 
example of a satisfaction rating obtained through a multi-item measurement. Generally, 
survey instruments gather customer responses to both single-item and multi-item 
measurements of satisfaction.
One of the difficulties in customer satisfaction research is that a single-item rating often 
provides a different indication of satisfaction than if the elements of service are examined 
in another way. For example, Elam’s and Ritchie’s (1996) analysis of factors that 
influence assessments of customer satisfaction among beneficiaries of the Department of 
Social Security in the United Kingdom, found that global satisfaction measures reporting 
the percentage of customers that were ‘very satisfied’ or ‘fairly satisfied’ with the 
services they received from their local office, was not supported in qualitative research. 
Participants in focus group discussions, whilst reporting they had provided satisfactory 
ratings to the global satisfaction measure in a national customer survey, spoke of service 
experiences where it was apparent that “some very clear, even serious, deficiencies” in 
service were perceived to have occurred (Elam and Ritchie 1996, p. 14).
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Accordingly, most researchers adopt the view that service quality perceptions are based 
on multiple dimensions that impact on satisfaction in a multiple level fashion where some 
dimensions are more important than others. However, there is no consensus on the 
number and type of service attributes that should be considered and whether these apply 
generically across service industries and sectors, or are specific to the service being 
measured. Two broad approaches are the Nordic perspective and the American 
perspective, the latter dominating the consumer literature (Brady and Cronin 2001). The 
Nordic perspective is reflected in the work of Grönroos (1988) and the American 
perspective is represented by the research of Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry (1985).
Grönroos’s research identifies two service quality dimensions — technical, or outcome 
focused, and functional, or process-related. The technical dimension relates to what the 
customer receives in their interaction with the service provider. This aspect of service 
quality is more than just the final outcome as it incorporates the way that the end process 
is transferred to the customer. An example of a technical dimension is the 
professionalism and skills of the employees, operational systems and physical resources 
of the service provider. Not all aspects of the technical dimension relates directly to the 
actions of the provider. For example, a customer’s perception of the technical dimension 
is influenced by the presence of other customers, such as the need to queue or the 
interactions that take place with another customer. The functional quality dimension 
refers to how customers receive the service and closely relates to the two-way interaction 
where the customer takes part in the process of production. Functional dimensions 
include the attributes and behaviours of staff, the accessibility and flexibility of the 
service provider, the reliability and trustworthiness shown and the ability of the provider 
to recover from an unexpected situation.
Grönroos (1998, p. 12) comments that firms often concentrate on issues relating to 
technical dimensions. However, success in a technical aspect of quality requires a 
competitive advantage through the development of an excellent technical solution, but 
this is rarely the case and competing firms quickly acquire the technology. Accordingly,
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a more viable strategy to improve customer satisfaction is for firms to concentrate on 
adding value through improvements in the functional quality dimensions.
Expanding upon the two basic quality dimensions, Grönroos (1988, p. 13) explores the 
factors contributing to good quality and develops a short, but comprehensive list 
outlining the six criteria necessary for firms to generate the perception of good quality 
service. These factors are:
• professionalism and skills -  customers are aware that service providers have the 
knowledge and skills to solve the customers’ problems (technical dimension);
• attitudes and behaviours -  customers sense staff are concerned and genuinely 
interested in solving their problems in a friendly manner (functional dimension);
• accessibility and flexibility -  service providers are accessible to customers with 
the opening hours, location and the operating systems enabling such access. 
Customers also know that providers can be flexible and adjust services to meet 
demands (functional dimension);
• reliability and trustworthiness -  customers can rely on service providers to keep 
promises and perform in the best interests of their customers (functional 
dimension);
• recovery -  customers know that service providers will immediately take 
corrective action when something goes wrong or an unpredictable event occurs 
(functional dimension); and
• reputation and credibility -  customers believe that service providers can be trusted 
to perform well and have values similar to customers (image related aspect that 
fulfils a filtering function).
The American perspective concentrates on dimensions that describe the characteristics of 
service encounters. Utilising a range of service industries, Parasuraman, Zeithaml and 
Berry (1985) conducted interviews with service business executives and held focus group 
sessions with service users to explore views around a number of service quality issues. 
The issues included the reasons for satisfaction and dissatisfaction, descriptions of ideal 
services, the meaning of service quality and the factors important in evaluating service
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quality. As a result of this research, Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry (1985) form a 
model describing ten determinants forming the basis o f service quality evalutions that 
apply regardless of the type of service delivered. Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry 
(1985) further categorise these ten determinants into a framework used to describe the 
quality of goods. This framework comprises:
• search qualities -  easy to evaluate attributes that relate to aspects able to be 
evaluated prior to the service experience;
• experience qualities -  these are more difficult to evaluate attributes that can only 
be decided during or after the service encounter; and
• credence qualities -  characteristics that are most d ifficu lt to evaluate or the 
customer may never be able to determine.
The ten service quality determinants, arranged within the quality o f goods framework are 
shown in the following table.
Table 9.1: The service quality determinants of Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry
Q u a lity  of g oo d s S e rv ic e  q u a lity  d e te rm in an ts
S ea rc h  q u a lit ie s tang ib les (physical evidence of the service) 
cred ib ility  (trustworth iness, believability and honesty)
E x p e rie n c e  q u a lit ie s access (approachability  and ease of contact) 
courtesy (politeness, respect, consideration and friendliness) 
reliab ility (consistency of perform ance and dependability) 
responsiveness (w illingness or readiness of em ployees) 
understanding (making the effort to understand the custom ers ’ needs) 
com m unication (keeping custom ers inform ed and listening to them )
C re d e n c e  q u a lities com petence (possession of the required sk ills  and know ledge) 
security (freedom  from danger, risk or doubt)
In progressing their research, Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry found a high degree of 
similarities among some of the ten determinants and were able to consolidate the 
determinants into five broad dimensions that became the basis for their SERVQUAL
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service quality measurement instrument. This consolidation moved away from the 
quality of goods classification, based around the degree of difficulty for customers in 
arriving at a judgement, and moved towards a classification arranged on similar types of 
service activities. Assurance incorporates aspects related to the knowledge and courtesy 
of employees. Empathy involves the care and attention given to individual customers. 
Responsiveness is a measure of the willingness of employees to provide appropriate and 
prompt services to customers. Reliability relates to being able to perform the service 
dependably and accurately. Lastly, tangibles are the physical facilities, equipment, 
personnel and communication components of service provision. The SERVQUAL 
measuring tool was designed to be applicable to any service organisation and it 
proceeded to form the basis of a great deal of consumer research into satisfaction and 
quality (Johnston 1995; Wisniewski and Donnelly 1996).
Subsequent research on the different elements that impact on customers’ assessments of 
service quality has expanded both the Nordic and American perspectives. For example, 
Brady and Cronin (2001) indicate the Nordic perspective has been expanded with the 
addition of a ‘service environment’ dimension. Given the popularity of SERVQUAL, 
this instrument has been modified on numerous occasions. For instance, Frost and 
Kumar (2001) devised INTSERVQUAL that introduced an additional gap measurement 
that involves internal support staff and front-line service staff. INTSERVQUAL 
introduced seven additional factors to measure this internal service delivery gap — 
teamwork, employee job-fit, technology job-fit, perceived control, supervisory control 
systems, role conflict and role ambiguity (Frost and Kumar 2001, p. 374).
In order to provide information on the service quality dimensions and enable the 
disconfirmation paradigm to be applied, the SERVQUAL instrument seeks customers’ 
views on 22 aspects of service delivery. These 22 aspects are repeated to the customers 
three times, once to gain the customers’ perception of the service performance, then to 
find out the customers’ understanding of what service quality the provider should give 
and, thirdly, to determine the customers’ belief about the extent to which an excellent 
company would possess the service quality aspects.
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An examination of other consumer research studies indicates survey instruments designed 
to measure customer satisfaction and service quality are based around similar aspects of 
service delivery to the 22 items listed as part of SERVQUAL. Table 9.2 compares the 
elements of service quality that a number of studies have identified as gathering the 
necessary information from customers to measure their satisfaction with services. The 
table considers survey instruments that are developed to be generic and apply across 
different service industries, such as SERVQUAL, and surveys designed to measure 
satisfaction within a particular service. Researchers who develop generic instruments 
validate these in cross-industry and cross-cultural settings (Brady and Cronin 2001; 
Callahan and Gilbert 2005; Fornell, Johnson, Anderson, Cha and Bryant 1996). In 
developing the specific survey instruments, the researchers construct their surveys based 
on literature reviews and focus group discussions that explore those elements of service 
quality commonly raised by customers within the particular service environments.
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Chapter Nine
The elements of service indicated in table 9.2 reflect common core aspects and a number 
of themes are evident. Firstly, customers are concerned about being treated with dignity 
and respect and this translates into the way staff treat customers, the appearance and feel 
of the service environment and the ethical practices adopted by service providers and 
reflected in the providers’ culture. Also, customers need to feel they are equal partners in 
the service delivery relationship and this is evidenced by the access of customers to 
information and the feedback mechanisms that enable customers to partake in the service 
development process. Importantly, service providers must understand the outcome 
sought by the customer in the service encounter and therefore staff should be 
knowledgeable and have the support necessary to fulfil the customers’ requirements.
The common service elements identified in the literature are also encountered as areas of 
service that are important to consumers of income support and employment services in 
Australia. This is indicated in research identifying those aspects of service that 
unemployment payment recipients have found important. Whilst discussed in more detail 
in the next chapter, areas of high importance for job seekers includes personable and 
individual treatment, access to appropriate and useful information, resolving problems 
quickly and being listened to and treated with respect.
This section of the chapter has explored those elements of the service delivery process 
that customers are evaluating when arriving at conclusions about their customer 
satisfaction experience. Without understanding what customers are looking for and 
evaluating in their service encounters, research into customer satisfaction would not be 
possible. The remaining component to understanding customer satisfaction measurement 
is the methods by which customer satisfaction data is gathered.
The methods for obtaining customer satisfaction data
Given the ultimate judge of quality is the customer (Fornell 1992), it is predictable that 
most measurements of customer satisfaction are derived from mechanisms that collect 
data from customers. The standard approach is a customer satisfaction survey
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(Van Ryzin 2006; Watson, Juster and Johnson 1991). However, numerous biases that 
distort customer satisfaction measurements operate and it is important these biases are 
appreciated so the results of surveys can be regarded thoughtfully and with an 
understanding of the strengths and weaknesses involved. The Institute for 
Citizen-Centred Service (ICCS) (2001, p. 33) outlines six standards necessary to ensure 
the quality of customer satisfaction findings. These standards are timeliness, accuracy, 
efficiency, usefulness, reliability and validity. The emphasis of the ICCS is on public 
sector customer surveys and accordingly the standards of efficiency and usefulness are 
important in the context of being accountable for the use of public funds. However, 
researchers commenting directly on the quality of survey information may focus attention 
on the limited criteria of reliability and validity (Danaher and Haddrell 1996). With a 
view to appreciating the difficulties of customer satisfaction data collection, this section 
of the chapter examines those aspects of gathering data that are commonly raised in the 
consumer research literature.
One of the first requirements in designing a customer satisfaction survey is deciding on 
the most appropriate method of data collection. The choice of method is most likely 
context-driven by such factors as the service provided, resources available, frequency of 
customer contacts, diversity and location of customers, language issues and the required 
complexity and length of questions. Although the most common approach is periodic 
surveys, continuous surveying may be possible in some situations, for example when 
regular customer feedback is desirable and the need to incorporate findings into a 
continuous assessment process is high.
The most common methods in collecting customer satisfaction data are focus group 
sessions, mail surveys, telephone surveys, personal interviews and Internet-based surveys 
either through electronic mail or web-based mechanisms. In the case of Centrelink and 
the Job Network, the major job seeker satisfaction surveys are undertaken using 
telephone interviews. The telephone method has a number of advantages in that it is;
• cost-effective with large numbers of respondents;
220
Chapter Nine
• results in higher response rates than mail interviews because the interviewer is 
able to encourage participation;
• enables greater guidance of the interview process as compared to personal 
interviews, particularly with the use of computer-assisted telephone interviewing 
(CATI), as is the case with recent customer satisfaction surveys of Centrelink and 
the Job Network;
• responses require minimal data clean-up; and
• the capacity to generalise from the results is considered high (ICCS 2001; Owens
2002).
As with any method of collecting data, using telephone surveys raises specific biases. 
For example, the results would be biased against households that are without telephones. 
The telephone survey may also pressure respondents into providing speedy responses and 
leave little time to process the questions and provide thoughtful answers (Crossen 1994, 
p. 22). Research has found that response rates to telephone surveys have been 
decreasing, with the suggestion by a consumer marketer that response rates in the range 
of 10 to 15 per cent are common (Miller and Kobayashi 2001). Explanations for this low 
response rate may include the increased demands on peoples’ time, the intrusion of cold- 
calls by telephone marketing firms and the access to affordable answering machines that 
are utilised for avoiding unwanted phone calls. Despite the lower response rates, Miller 
and Kobayashi (2001) consider telephone surveying a popular data collection method, but 
partly because the market research industry is heavily invested in the infrastructure 
developed for telephone interviewing.
In addition to the methods of data collection, broader issues impact on the reliability and 
validity of customer satisfaction surveys. For example, some researchers consider the 
issue of timing to be important in determining customer satisfaction. Nicholls, Gilbert 
and Roslow (1998) emphasise their customer satisfaction measuring instrument was 
given immediately following the service encounter because at this time the experience of 
the service should occupy a prominent position in the respondents’ memories.
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Many authors express concern about the biases that impact on customer satisfaction 
surveys through the structures and wording of the questions that are asked (Crossen 1994; 
DeMoranville and Bienstock 2003; ICCS 2001; Payne 1951; Trochim 2000). For 
example, questions can introduce bias because of the way they are worded. Also, the 
words used may be ambiguous and open to multiple interpretations, or simply are 
unclear. Double-barreled questions that provide for more than one attribute to be rated 
on a single scale, are also problematic. It is common for surveys to be designed around a 
series of highly structured questions, but not provide the opportunity to explore 
experiences or enable a respondent to indicate a question is not applicable or that the 
respondent can’t remember.
In addition to the wording of the questions, researchers are conscious of the impact the 
ordering of questions has on the results of customer satisfaction survey. For example, it 
is common for the rating of a general or overall satisfaction question to be higher when 
appearing after specific service satisfaction questions, than when appearing before. 
Similarly, the ratings for specific service satisfaction questions will be lower when these 
are asked after an overall satisfaction question. To explain this ordering outcome, 
DeMoranville and Bienstock (2003) make use of the Maxim of Relevance and the Maxim 
of Quantity, that both function within the theory of conversation. These Maxims operate 
to maintain conversation within the boundaries of previous discussion, but also avoid 
repetition within a conversation. When applied to surveys, the Maxims provide an 
explanation for why responses are given in consideration of previous responses and may 
provide new information. That is, the Maxim of Repetition explains how a general 
question asked after specific questions will be rated higher, than if asked before, because 
the preceding specific questions activate information about the satisfaction construct and 
perform a positive priming function. The Maxim of Quantity operates to avoid repetition 
with those responses that have been provided beforehand. As a result, ratings for specific 
questions are lower when following a general satisfaction question, because the responses 
to the specific questions are isolated and contrasted with the general response allowing 
different elements of the service experience to be rated lower than the overall experience.
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Beyond issues of question wordings or orderings, bias in data collection takes place at a 
more cryptic level in the process of interaction that occurs between the interviewer and 
the respondent. Crossen recognises these subtle forces and writes that, “[response 
effects arise from the quirkiness of language and the complexities of human emotion — 
pride, embarrassment, self-righteousness, contempt or any of hundreds of other strings 
that play when one person speaks to another” (1994, p. 22).
Accordingly, researchers need to be aware of the many forms of bias that can arise from 
the wording, ordering and way questions are asked. In response, some consumer 
researchers suggest the analysis of customer satisfaction should be based on responses to 
open-ended questions that give priority to the customers’ frame of references (Fournier 
and Mick 1999; Pothas, De Wet and De Wet 2001). These authors believe that 
unstructured formats enable insights and understandings to develop that are otherwise 
absent when survey contents are predetermined through established questions by the 
investigators.
Another area of customer satisfaction bias is the methods of data analysis that are used to 
form conclusions about the results of surveys. Numerous statistical approaches are 
adopted to analyse the data and make sense of the findings. In the first instance, 
databases may be distorted by the processes that manipulate the data in preparation for 
analysis. For example, blank answers may be deleted or open-ended responses 
categorised incorrectly. The relationships between independent variables and dependent 
variables may be configured inappropriately and unreasonable conclusions formed as a 
result of applying statistical techniques such as factor analysis, analysis of variance or 
regression analysis. These techniques are part of the realm of inferential statistics where 
researchers are seeking to reach conclusions that extend beyond the immediate data.
A common technique with descriptive data analysis is to cross-tabulate the information 
according to certain characteristics of respondents* for example calculating average levels 
of satisfaction in relation to age, sex or geographic location of the customer. Along 
similar lines, Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry (1985) explore the idea of segmenting
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consumers on the basis of their service quality expectations, suggesting research aimed at 
determining whether distinct identifiable service quality segments exist would be 
valuable. However, drawing conclusions from such analysis is not necessarily obvious. 
For example, in the context of the United States, research has suggested that race is a 
significant explanatory variable because black citizens are consistently more dissatisfied 
with municipal services than white citizens (Brown and Coulter 1983). In contrast, more 
recent studies indicate race is less significant when factors such as political affiliation or 
general attitudes towards government are also taken into consideration (Van Ryzin 2006; 
Van Slyke and Roch 2004).
Given the subjective nature of assessments of satisfaction and the influences of numerous 
other factors, some researchers have investigated the neutral-observer methodology 
(Licari, McLean and Rice 2005). This method involves the placement of a non-resident, 
non-expert into a service experience to capture an element of neutrality and introduce 
user non-bias into the satisfaction assessment process. Whilst research shows that citizen 
evaluations correspond closely to non-resident, non-expert assessments, Licari, McLean 
and Rice (2005) conclude the neutral-observer methodology should be investigated 
further as a useful instrument for testing the validity of citizen evaluations.
C onclusion
In this chapter the consumer literature was explored to enable the application of this 
knowledge to the customer satisfaction surveys of job seekers. In the first instance, the 
theoretical frameworks that support the study of customer satisfaction were explored. 
Research on the determinants of customer satisfaction generally emphasise the role of 
expectations and perceptions of performance. These two factors, that are manifestations 
of a multitude of variables, interact in complex and uncertain ways to form a level of 
pleasure or disappointment with a service encounter. Furthermore, the research is 
uncertain about the role customer satisfaction plays in the associated measurement of 
service quality. The subjective aspects that underpin the formation of satisfaction 
weakens its capacity to provide an objective indication of service quality. In practice,
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this means that similar levels of customer satisfaction are able to reflect varying degrees 
of service quality. Or, conversely, wide variations in customer satisfaction ratings can 
arise when the same quality of services are delivered.
In emphasising the subjective nature of satisfaction, the research provides a framework to 
consider the formation of satisfaction on an individual basis. Gathering customer 
feedback on a collective level remains a challenge, but the results can provide useful 
information. Aggregate customer satisfaction findings that are representative of the client 
population can indicate the range over which satisfaction occurs and ensure management 
decisions are undertaken on an understanding of their end-user impacts. For example, 
managers using similarly worded surveys are able to monitor broad changes in customer 
satisfaction over time and use this to assess service delivery changes.
Attention then turned towards the more technical aspects of measuring customer 
satisfaction and commenced with the ways that the constructs of customer satisfaction 
and service quality are operationalised. Numerous studies indicate that those elements of 
service quality that customers contemplate when evaluating a service experience can be 
generalised. That is, the service experience, whilst taking place in situation-specific 
contexts, involves an interchange between service providers and customers that contains 
common elements. For example, the ways customers are treated and the fulfilment of the 
customers’ expected outcomes are elements of the service experience that most 
customers take into account when determining their levels of satisfaction. Finally, the 
chapter considered the methods for collecting and analysing customer satisfaction data, 
along with aspects that can impact on the results of such data.
The research contained in this chapter develops an understanding of the construct and 
measurement of customer satisfaction and this can be applied to form useful commentary 
on the job seeker satisfaction surveys.
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Chapter Ten
Chapter 10: The job seeker satisfaction survey 
instruments
The betterment of services is one of the justifications for the introduction of public sector 
reform. Reforms that separate service delivery functions from departments of the state, 
such as Centrelink, or contract previously state-provided services to private sector 
providers, as with the Job Network, are claimed to offer greater service effectiveness in 
delivery operations. This assumption is based on the belief that such operations are able 
to become highly focused on customer outcomes and are unchained from the plethora of 
bureaucratic processes that bind traditional models of government service delivery.
The previous chapter examined the concepts of customer satisfaction and service quality 
and the ways these interact and are measured. This research enables the analysis in this 
chapter to place the job seeker satisfaction survey instruments into a theoretical 
framework and facilitates discussion on the soundness of the job seeker surveys.
This chapter examines the survey instruments from which the job seeker satisfaction data 
is obtained and considers aspects that deal with the reliability and validity of the surveys. 
In addition, tables are provided that list the characteristics of the surveys and those 
aspects of service delivery that are investigated. The next three chapters draw together
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the findings of the survey instruments described in this chapter to form conclusions about 
the directions that customer satisfaction has moved.
Customer satisfaction survey instruments
To obtain departmental information about the satisfaction of job seekers, the majority of 
data has been sourced from a Freedom of Information request undertaken specifically for 
this thesis. The documents provided as part of the request are listed in Appendix 1. 
However, the results of the surveys and the accompanying analysis in the Freedom of 
Information request documents commonly have missing pages and blank areas where 
information has been deleted. The schedule of documents prepared by the employment 
department that contains the reasons for deletions, comments that some material has been 
removed in accordance with section 22 of the Freedom of Information legislation. 
Section 22 concerns material that is irrelevant to the request. However, it is unclear why 
such material would have been irrelevant when the request for information was very 
broad in seeking the customer satisfaction information from job seeker surveys.
In some instances it is apparent that data is missing where satisfaction levels have 
declined. For example, in the 2005 survey report for job seekers’ satisfaction with 
Centrelink, a table indicating changes in the service aspects relating to the Preparing for 
Work Agreement (PfWA) process has one of the three service elements deleted. 
However, the text accompanying the table states, “2005 reflected slight rises in the share 
of job seekers who understood what was required under the PfWA and were satisfied 
with the process of completing and signing a PfWA, that were offset by a decline in the 
proportion of job seekers who recalled signing the agreement”. In this instance, the text 
indicates the deleted item in the table must have provided the figure showing the decline 
in job seekers who recalled signing a PfWA. However, in most cases, the text is deleted 
also and it is uncertain what data has been removed and whether this relates to positive or 
negative findings.
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Additional customer satisfaction information was obtained from documents publicly 
available in the departmental libraries. These library documents relate to satisfaction 
surveys completed for the previous delivery arrangements involving DSS and the CES.
The surveys used in this evaluation and described in this chapter are:
• five surveys relating to the satisfaction of clients to the services of DSS over the 
period 1986 to 1996;
• three surveys on job seekers’ satisfaction with the CES over the period 1993 to 
1997;
• five surveys commissioned by the employment department for job seekers’ 
satisfaction with Centrelink for the period 1998 to 2002;
• two surveys measuring customer satisfaction with the Job Network undertaken in 
1999 and 2001; and
• three surveys commissioned by the employment department, termed ‘omnibus’ 
surveys, that consolidate findings for job seekers’ satisfaction with both 
Centrelink and the Job Network during the period 2003 to 2005.
Customer satisfaction surveys for the Department of Social Security
Customer satisfaction information relating to the provision of income support delivered 
by DSS prior to Centrelink is sparse. This lack of data reflects the less important role that 
end-user satisfaction research played during the era prior to new public management. 
This is not to suggest that delivering quality services was not a consideration of DSS or 
the public sector in general. In the first annual report for the department in 1973, the 
introduction by the Director-General states, “[t]he challenge is to provide for the diverse 
needs of clients without sacrificing speed and efficiency on the one hand or humanity and 
compassion on the other.” (DSS 1973, p. 1).
Surveys relating to customer satisfaction were available from the FaCS departmental 
library. The earliest survey dates to 1986 and indicates that customer satisfaction was
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becoming an issue at this time. By way of support, in 1986 the department listed as one 
of its eight corporate goals “high quality service in a timely, fair and sensitive manner” 
(DSS 1986, p. 8). The most recent DSS customer satisfaction survey dates from late 
1996, but this survey took place during the planning stages for Centrelink and the 
implications for staff and the flow-on impacts for customers should be taken into account 
in analysing the results.
1986 Work organisation trial client satisfaction survey
The 1986 survey is a client satisfaction survey developed and conducted in-house in by 
the department. The survey was undertaken as part of the Work Organisation Trials. 
These trials arose out of arrangements in regional offices to redesign and outfit offices 
and consider the reorganisation of duties in response to automatic data processing 
technology being adopted.
The 1986 client satisfaction survey was based on over 5000 personal interviews with 
clients in regional offices following their service experience. The survey did not attempt 
to develop a single measure to reflect the overall level of client satisfaction, but sought to 
measure the level of client satisfaction in relation to specific aspects of the department’s 
service.
Of those customers approached, 70 per cent agreed to an interview. This high response 
rate may be a result of interviewers speaking to people directly and the respondents not 
wanting to appear impolite in refusing to participate. However, at the same time, the 
personal interview method may bias the sample because customers who did not 
experience a positive service experience, or outcome, may have felt disappointed and not 
motivated to discuss the service encounter. Also, despite assurances of anonymity, those 
clients that participated may have felt compelled to be positive given the link between the 
department and the interviewers. The timing of the survey, occurring in the social 
security offices after the completion of the customers’ business, enables the service
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experience to be fresh in the minds of survey respondents and this would contribute 
towards a high degree of confidence in the recollection of survey respondents.
In terms of the questionnaire, the survey instrument gave the options of ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘not 
applicable’ answers. Generally, abstract concepts such as satisfaction tend to be 
measured using an interval response scale such as a l-to-5 rating scale. Also, some of the 
questions contained emotive content or may have been suggestive of particular delivery 
problems. For example, ‘were you unhappy that ...’ or ‘did there seem to be a lack of 
communication between different areas ...’.
Concerns are also raised about the representativeness of regional offices involved in the 
survey. The objective of the survey was to measure client satisfaction before and during 
a work organisation trial period that involved the restructuring of offices to prepare for 
the introduction of computer technology into the department. Offices were chosen to 
participate in the surveys because they would be used in the work organisation trials. A 
number of offices were selected as control offices where existing procedures and 
practices were maintained to enable comparison with the trial offices. However, both the 
control offices and trial offices were given additional training to ensure that staff had the 
appropriate skills to undertake their duties to the fullest in their benefit specialisation. In 
addition, offices that commonly experienced difficult client-related problems were not 
selected to participate in the survey. These factors would result in higher levels of 
customer satisfaction than would normally be the case.
1986 Work organisation trial counter enquiry survey
To complement and provide a range of checks on the client satisfaction survey, the 
department also conducted a counter enquiry survey at the work organisation trial offices. 
Over a two-week period counter staff and enquiry officers completed a questionnaire for 
each contact with a client. The questionnaire was completed sequentially as the enquiry 
was processed, with each officer marking service in and out times. The questionnaire
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sought data on details of the client such as benefit type, the type of enquiry and the 
service time for up to five categories of officers attending to the client.
Non-response bias was not an issue for the counter enquiry survey as the survey was not 
undertaken on a volunteer basis with clients, but represented a census of all client contact 
by staff. Whist response bias is possible with staff concealing details of their client 
interactions, an analysis of the results included a comparison with the service times 
reported by clients in the client satisfaction survey. The results of this comparison 
indicate service times reported by clients were generally consistent with those recorded 
by the counter staff and enquiry officers.
1987 Work organisation trial qualitative research study
Whilst not seeking representative quantitative satisfaction data, this qualitative study was 
undertaken by a marketing firm to validate and interpret the findings of the department’s 
work organisation trial satisfaction surveys.
It is questionable how the qualitative study is able to validate the findings of the 
department’s client satisfaction surveys when it does not seek to build a sample from 
which the findings can be generalised. The study chose group discussions to explore 
satisfaction, but participation was based on a counter receptionist screening potential 
respondents for initial eligibility and willingness to participate. The write-up for the 
qualitative study acknowledges the bias that arises from this selection process. For 
example, in one office the recruiting interviewer noted that 16 young Indigenous males 
had dealings with the receptionist, but none of these clients had been referred to the 
interviewer for inclusion in the group discussions.
Eight group discussions were held and participation was reported as low in four of the 
groups. In one case, the discussion was abandoned due to low attendance. The low 
attendance occurred despite the payment of $20 as an incentive for those attending. 
Whilst no numeric data is provided, the conclusion of the qualitative survey indicate a
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highly satisfied majority with a critical minority that complained of problems in either 
obtaining a particular kind of benefit or resolving an administrative issue.
1990 client services satisfaction survey
The FaCS library also held a paper undertaken by a final year social work student from 
the University of New South Wales. The paper examined client satisfaction in a single 
office of the department that was located in a regional coastal town.
Eighty two clients were given short (22 questions) structured questionnaires based on a 
random sampling approach where every 20th client was offered participation. Questions 
sought data on basic demographics, and satisfaction relating to some aspects of the 
service. In some cases the responses to the questions provided yes/no formats, while 
other questions used interval response scales, based on a l-to-5 rating.
1996 Department of Social Security customers’ satisfaction survey 
The department engaged a consultancy firm to undertake customer satisfaction research 
in late 1996. The survey was aimed at determining satisfaction among a broad range of 
service aspects and for using the findings as a guide for improving customer service 
within the new services delivery agency. During the period when the survey was 
undertaken, the implementation of Centrelink was in the early planning stages. 
Government announcements had taken place in August 1996 and Centrelink was to 
commence operation in July 1997. As such, this was a difficult time for staff with 
uncertainty over their futures and ambiguity surrounding the directions the new 
organisation might take.
The research company conducted 1221 telephone interviews where 72 percent of those 
surveyed had contact with the department in the previous three months. As with other 
surveys conducted by telephone, some time elapsed following the service experience and 
customers’ memories and feelings may have changed since the service event. The survey
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involved over 100 questions about service aspects and 17 additional questions related to 
the respondents’ characteristics. All of the service aspect questions provided a l-to-5 
interval response scale for the answer. As with the surveys to follow, a common feature 
of the way that the survey questions are worded is to include positive descriptions of the 
service element. For example, respondents are asked if the department, ‘is a caring 
organisation, and looks after its customers’ interests’, ‘is constantly striving to improve’ 
or ‘the way they treat you, for example treating you with respect and being understanding 
and sympathetic’. It could be argued that continually forming questions around positive 
service attributes is a form of loading the question that may produce more favourable 
responses.
Summary
Most of the surveys undertaken for DSS are not representative of the general income 
support population. The 1986 surveys are undertaken because the introduction of 
computer technology would impact greatly on the way that the process of service was 
structured. The qualitative study, also completed in 1986 to complement the findings of 
the quantitative work organisation trial satisfaction surveys, notes that most clients do not 
devote intense consideration to evaluating the services provided to them by the 
department. It would appear that in the mid 1980s the links between customer 
satisfaction and the delivery of income support were not well developed. The literature 
linking the elements of satisfaction to public services was not widespread and many of 
the staff processes in the department for dealing with claims and assessing the amounts of 
payment were well established and sought to provide for consistent treatment across a 
broad network. Whilst the development of computing systems would impact greatly on 
these staff processes, 1986 was an early stage in the redesign of work processes.
The 1990 survey is a minor study undertaken by a social work student whose major 
considerations were the morale of staff and the impacts on services available to income 
support recipients. This survey provides qualitative anecdotal evidence that develops
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conclusions similar to the earlier large-scale studies and therefore supports these more 
general findings at a local level.
The 1996 survey is a very thorough customer satisfaction survey that is undertaken by a 
professional marketing research company with experience in commercial customer 
satisfaction research. The objective of the 1996 survey was to complete a comprehensive 
assessment of all the elements of customer service in the department and use the findings 
in a process o f continuous improvement with the soon to be introduced Centrelink. The 
1996 survey provides the only reliable instrument to compare findings against the future 
customer satisfaction results for Centrelink. However, any comparisons must be 
balanced against the organisational turmoil the regional offices must have experienced 
following the announcement of Centrelink. Details of how the agency would operate and 
the arrangements under which staff would be working were unclear and the impacts of 
this on staff morale and the flow-on effects for customer satisfaction would be 
significant.
Table 10.1 provides a comparison of the surveys outlined above. The table shows the 
characteristics o f each survey and the aspects of service delivery that respondents are 
asked about.
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Chapter Ten
Customer satisfaction surveys for the Commonwealth Employment Service
Three highly relevant and detailed surveys are available for examining job seekers’ 
satisfaction with the CES. The 1993 and 1995 surveys were available from the DEWR 
library and a 1997 survey was provided as part of the Freedom of Information request 
documents.
1993 National survey of job seekers’ CES satisfaction
The 1993 survey was undertaken to measure job seekers’ satisfaction with the services 
provided by the CES and determine whether service goals were being met following the 
introduction of service standards in 1992. The breadth and analysis of the survey results 
mark a firm beginning to the measurement of the satisfaction of job seekers. However, 
the questions seeking job seeker satisfaction ratings commonly provided a three-point 
interval response scale, comprising ‘yes’, ‘no’ and ‘don’t know’, compared to the more 
common five-point scale.
The survey involved telephone interviews of over 26,000 job seekers conducted by a 
consulting research company. The large sample size was to allow the survey to be 
representative down to the level of service centres and enable comparison between 
service centres. In relation to this, whilst the overall percentage of job seekers satisfied 
with the service they received was 75, the levels of overall satisfaction from the 300 
service centres ranged from 59 percent to 90 percent. The survey sample was derived 
from all job seekers registered with the CES, who had been in contact with a service 
centre within the previous six months and who had a telephone contact number. A total 
of 33,000 job seekers were contacted and the 26,433 completed interviews represent a 
response rate of 79.3 per cent.
The survey analysis acknowledges a range of influences, including the respondents’ 
differing levels of expectation. External influences consist of the election period that
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coincided with the collection of data and seasonal factors related to the high levels of 
unemployment. The election campaign focused on the issue of high unemployment and 
the growth in long term unemployment, possibly increasing the awareness of job seekers 
to the importance of unemployment issues.
1995 National survey of job seekers’ satisfaction with CES services 
The 1995 survey was undertaken using a similar framework to the 1993 survey. The 
same research company was used and the survey instrument was largely unchanged, 
allowing the 1995 results to be comparable to the 1993 findings. Similar to the 1993 
survey, the 1995 survey sought a sample size that would allow analysis at the service 
outlet level and enable comparisons between these outlets. As such, almost 40,000 
registered job seekers who had been in contact with the CES in the previous six months 
were interviewed.
The 1995 survey included a qualitative component that sought in-depth information about 
job seekers’ perceptions of service and their relevant service expectations. In this way, 
the methodology for the 1995 survey indicates an appreciation for the theory relating to 
the formation of customer satisfaction. In the quantitative survey, first-time users of the 
services were excluded from questions about service standards, but were asked about 
their perceptions of the CES and their first impressions. The survey also acknowledges 
the impact on satisfaction the changed policy environment may have caused. From 
May 1994, an emphasis on labour market assistance to the long-term unemployed had 
come about with the introduction of the Labor government’s Working Nation programs 
and this resulted in much greater access to training and employment programs.
1997 National quantitative survey o f job seekers’ satisfaction
The key objective of the 1997 job seeker satisfaction survey was to provide benchmark 
information about service quality under the CES. This would enable the 1997 survey to 
function as a point of comparison for subsequent evaluations of satisfaction that would be 
undertaken with the new Job Network. However, as with the 1996 Centrelink survey, the
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impact on the CES of the announcement of the new service delivery arrangements would 
have resulted in a significant impact on staff and job seeker interactions. Managing the 
high level of uncertainty among staff during this period was recognised as a challenge by 
the department (DEETYA 1998b, p. 7). As such, the extent that the 1997 survey 
provides a suitable benchmark is questioned. It is unclear whether the 1997 survey was 
commissioned from the same consulting firm that had completed the 1993 and 1995 
customer satisfaction surveys. In addition, the 1997 report does not provide a copy of the 
questionnaire for comparative purposes, although similar service elements appear to be 
considered. Also, the 1997 report, as a document from the Freedom of Information 
request, has sections of the report that have been deleted.
It is noted that at the time of the survey Centrelink had commenced operation and taken 
over a number of functions from the CES. However, the 1997 telephone survey, 
examining customers’ satisfaction from a retrospective viewpoint, gathered data from 
when these functions had been undertaken by the CES.
The 1997 survey reveals the influence of customer satisfaction theory was making greater 
inroads. For example, a secondary objective of the survey was to gather data examining 
job seekers’ needs and expectations of employment services and to better understand the 
customers’ perceptions of service quality. Together with information from a qualitative 
survey identifying aspects of service delivery that job seekers found important, the 1997 
survey provided the basis for developing a performance matrix. A performance matrix is 
able to yield information from customer research to assist agencies in determining areas 
that require high levels of priority (ICCS 2001, p. 43). The analysis uses the results from 
customers about the importance of services compared to their levels of satisfaction. As a 
result, a matrix is developed that positions aspects of service relative to their levels of 
importance and satisfaction.
239
Chapter Ten
Diagram 10.1: Performance Matrix
High
Importance
IMPROVE
Important to customers 
Expectations not met
SUSTAIN
Important to customers 
Expectations being met
MONITOR EVALUATE
Less important to customers Less important to customers
Low
If importance increases, 
performance will be an issue
May indicate misplaced priority
Low High
Satisfaction
Source: ICCS 2001, p. 43
As diagram 10.1 shows, performance matrices are designed to indicate areas of service 
that require attention by rating certain items high on importance, but low for satisfaction 
(IMPROVE quadrant). At the same time, the matrix indicates those areas where 
resources may be lowered, as with those items rated less important and where satisfaction 
ratings are high (EVALUATE quadrant) or areas of service where performance is being 
met (MONITOR and SUSTAIN).
However, in taking account of the ambiguous relationships between concepts such as 
importance, satisfaction, performance and expectations and the influence these and other 
factors have on the business of an organisation, caution should be applied in using 
performance matrices as a tool that ‘'greatly enhances your ability to set priorities for 
improvement efforts”, as recommended by the ICCS (2001, p. 43).
The logic of the framework underlying the performance matrix suggests that firms should 
set about achieving a balance between the customer ratings for importance and 
satisfaction. This would require movement towards the dotted line placed diagonally
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across the matrix in diagram 10.2 — indicating where importance equals satisfaction. 
However, in addition to improving or lowering performance, an alternative response to 
achieve this balance, using the disconfirmation paradigm, would be to maintain 
performance whilst influencing the level of customer satisfaction or the rating of 
importance through shaping expectations.
Diagram 10.2: Analysis of a performance matrix
High
IMPROVE
Importance
Low
MONITOR
SUSTAIN
/
/
/
/
*  (b)
EVALUATE
Low High
Satisfaction
Similarly, from a performance perspective, a driver analysis o f the performance matrix 
would suggest improving the service quality of point (a) in diagram 10.2 and reducing the 
service quality of point (b). However, both (a) and (b) are rated at the same level o f 
importance and a valid response may be to do nothing. Afterall, from the overall 
customer satisfaction level, these two items may operate to cancel each other out and, 
therefore, cumulatively have little impact on a customer satisfaction rating. It may also 
be the case that despite differences in the satisfaction ratings, item (b) is more central to
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the service production and scaling back performance may impact in other areas o f 
importance and therefore overall satisfaction. Likewise, item (a) may be secondary in the 
service process and improving performance would consume resources from other more 
important aspects. Accordingly, the performance matrix represents an incomplete 
framework from which to implement a performance or customer satisfaction 
improvement strategy and requires a careful analysis to be beneficial.
The performance matrix developed in the 1997 survey sought to establish those aspects 
of service that should be given priority in order to increase job seeker satisfaction. The 
following diagram presents this matrix.
Diagram 10.3: CES 1997 performance matrix
High
Importance
High priority for improvement
In form ation on best way to look for a job 
G ive access to the right kind of help 
Fix p roblem s quickly 
In form ation about the help availab le
Strengths - maintain
Staff treat you like a person 
Inform ation on job  vacanc ies  
Staff listen to job  se eke r’s' po in t of view 
Staff treat job  seeke r w ith  respect 
Privacy
Low priority for improvement Less influential - maintain
Give inform ation about rights W aiting tim e less than 15 m inutes
Low
Act qu ick ly  to m eet needs
Give inform ation on rules and regulations
Access to office
Low High
Performance
Whilst the survey report indicates that certain service activities should be targeted for 
performance improvement, and other service aspects that are performing well or are less 
important to customers be maintained, the analysis does not consider the implications of
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the types of services listed. That is, those service aspects that need to be improved and 
are important to customers are strongly linked to job seekers gaining employment. These 
services are shown in the ‘high importance’ and ‘low performance’ quadrant of diagram 
10.3 and include:
• giving information about the best way to look for a job;
• giving access to the right kind of help;
• fixing problems quickly; and
• providing information about the help available.
The underlying outcome from these activities is connected to job seekers entering 
employment. The importance of this outcome to job seekers is high and the 1997 survey 
confirms this with 78 percent of job seekers indicating they contacted the CES for the 
purpose of seeking work or training. However, guaranteeing a job is an aspect of service 
delivery that is often beyond the control of the CES and being unable to deliver the 
outcome might result in a low perception of performance for aspects of service over 
which the CES has limited influence.
Also, during the period the survey was conducted, the opportunities for employment and 
training had become restricted on two fronts. Firstly, commencing in mid-1995 and 
continuing through to 1997, the Australian labour market foundered (DEETYA 1997, 
p. 13). The weak labour market resulted in reduced rates of full-time employment, a 
slowing in the growth rate of part-time employment and increases in long-term 
unemployment. Secondly, the access for job seekers to training was curtailed as a result 
of significant budget reductions in labour market programs. The resources for labour 
market programs in 1995-96 was $2.7 billion, reducing to $2.08 billion in 1996-97 and 
falling to $1.6 billion in 1997-98 (O’Neill 1998, p. 1).
Summary
The three surveys undertaken of the CES provide detailed and useful information from 
which to form a picture of job seekers’ satisfaction with employment services. These
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customer satisfaction surveys were conducted by market research companies with 
experience in the application of these types of surveys. Evidence of an appreciation for 
customer satisfaction theory is present in the reports and the broad areas of service 
elements examined are similar to those elements that are identified in the customer 
satisfaction literature as necessary for gaining information to enable satisfaction to be 
measured. The issue of timing may be important given that all surveys were conducted 
by telephone and did not immediately follow the service encounter. However, until the 
omnibus survey commences in 2003, a six month time period from when the service 
encounter may have occurred is common to that of future surveys and therefore 
introduces an element of commonality in the survey methodologies.
Table 10.2 provides a comparison of the CES surveys outlined above. The table shows 
the characteristics of each survey and the aspects of service delivery that respondents are 
asked about.
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Chapter Ten
Customer satisfaction surveys for Centrelink prior to the Job seeker omnibus 
surveys
Centrelink provided limited data regarding the satisfaction of unemployment recipients to 
the overall quality of Centrelink services covering the period 1997 to 2004. In providing 
this data Centrelink advised their focus was on broad aspects of service applicable to all 
customers regardless of the payment they were on and the type of service they were 
receiving. Therefore, while job seekers were included in the Centrelink surveys, specific 
questions about employment services were not obtained. As a result, the Freedom of 
Information request to DEWR sought job seeker satisfaction survey results for 
Centrelink, in addition to the satisfaction results for the Job Network.
In late 2002, the department implemented a job seeker omnibus survey that combined the 
separate surveys that had been conducted for job seekers’ perceptions of Centrelink and 
job seekers’ perceptions of Job Network members. The following section describes the 
Centrelink surveys that cover the period 1998 to 2002 — prior to the commencement of 
the omnibus surveys. As with much of the data that comes from the Freedom of 
Information request, these surveys contained numerous deletions.
1998 National survey of job seekers ’  satisfaction with Centrelink service quality 
The 1998 survey stratified job seekers across eight different groupings. Quotas were 
established and a selection process followed that provided for the appropriate 
representation within each group according to age, sex and geographical location.
Table 10.3 indicates the groups, their quotas and the final number interviewed.
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Table 10.3: 1998 Centrelink survey groups and quotas
Group* Sample selection Quota for
interviews
With special needs, in receipt of income 
support and short-term unemployed
1750 350
With special needs, in receipt of income 
support and long-term unemployed
2100 350
With special needs, not in receipt of income 
support and short-term unemployed
750 150
With special needs, not in receipt of income 
support and long-term  unemployed
900 150
Without special needs, in receipt of income 
support and short-term unemployed
2100 700
Without special needs, in receipt of income 
support and long-term unemployed
2800 700
Without special needs, not in receipt of 
income support and short-term unemployed
900 300
Without special needs, not in receipt of 
income support and long-term  unemployed
1200 300
TOTAL 12,500 3000
Note: Special needs customers include Indigenous, disabled and those from a non- 
English speaking background.
The 3000 interviews were completed by a market research firm using computer-assisted 
telephone interview (CATI) technology. CATI systems use computers to administer the 
interviews and control the pace of the interview, the flow of questions, recording 
responses, including rejecting invalid answers, and establish a tracking system for each 
response. It is not surprising that this technology for conducting interviews has become 
the industry norm as complex questionnaires with skip patterns and branching can be 
easily accommodated within a cost-effective method of surveying large numbers of 
respondents. From this period, the CATI technology becomes a feature of all future 
surveys of Centrelink and the Job Network, regardless of the research companies that 
undertake the surveys.
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The results for those job seekers on income support compared to those not on income 
support show the overall satisfaction level is 88 percent and 78 percent respectively. 
This significant difference highlights the problem of gathering satisfaction data some 
time after the service experience has taken place and raises questions about why the 
difference in overall satisfaction levels between these two groups. Are the
characteristics, perceptions and backgrounds of the two groups different at the time of the 
service encounter and would different satisfaction ratings have been gathered from a 
survey undertaken immediately following the service experience? Or, do perceptions and 
memories alter when job seekers are no longer on income support compared to when they 
remain on income support? The 10 percentage points difference in overall satisfaction 
may indicate that respondents in receipt of income support are less willing to be critical 
of services given their current dependency on income support.
1999 National survey o f job seekers’ satisfaction with Centre link service quality
The 1999 survey was undertaken by a different research company than the one chosen in 
1998. As a result, the methodology is dissimilar and most likely the questionnaire, 
although this questionnare was not included with the Freedom of Information request 
documents so it is difficult to be certain. The objective of the survey also reflects the 
greater stability in the new arrangements as the survey is designed to measure job 
seekers’ satisfaction against key performance indicators forming part of the 1998-99 
service arrangements between the employment department and Centrelink. The survey 
highlights the role of Centrelink as a gateway to the Job Network, recognising that poor 
performance may impact on access to Job Network services and the overall effectiveness 
of the new employment services market.
Using a stratified random sample provided by the department of almost 7000 job seekers, 
the research company sought quotas for 18 different categories of job seekers. Basic 
demographic information such as age, sex, education and location enabled further 
categorisation. The final sample comprised 2874 interviews and although six of the 18 
categories of job seekers did not achieve their quotas, more often the quota was exceeded,
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perhaps to ensure a sufficient number of interviews. The groups included in the survey 
and the number of job seekers interviewed are shown in table 10.4.
Table 10.4: 1999 Centrelink survey groups and quotas
Group Quota Number
Interviewed
A b o r ig in a l a n d  T o r re s  S tra it Is la n d e rs  u n e m p lo y e d  fo r  le s s  
th a n  s ix  m o n th s
110 110
S o le  p a re n ts  u n e m p lo y e d  fo r  le s s  th a n  s ix  m o n th s 110 122
Y o u th  n o t o n  a llo w a n c e  u n e m p lo y e d  fo r  le s s  th a n  s ix  
m o n th s
110 110
P e o p le  w ith  a  d is a b il ity  u n e m p lo y e d  fo r  le s s  th a n  s ix  
m o n th s
110 120
N o n -E n g lis h  s p e a k in g  b a c k g ro u n d  u n e m p lo y e d  fo r  le s s  
th a n  s ix  m o n th s
110 111
* A b o r ig in a l a n d  T o r re s  S tra it Is la n d e rs  u n e m p lo y e d  fo r  
g r e a te r  th a n  s ix  m o n th s
110 78
S o le  p a re n t u n e m p lo y e d  fo r  g r e a te r  th a n  s ix  m o n th s 110 135
Y o u th  n o t o n  a llo w a n c e  u n e m p lo y e d  fo r  g re a te r  th a n  s ix  
m o n th s
110 118
* P e o p le  w ith  a  d is a b il ity  u n e m p lo y e d  fo r  g re a te r  th a n  s ix  
m o n th s
110 100
* N o n -E n g lis h  s p e a k in g  b a c k g ro u n d  u n e m p lo y e d  fo r  
g r e a te r  th a n  s ix  m o n th s
110 95
* N o r th e rn  T e r r ito ry  jo b  s e e k e rs 110 66
A u s tra l ia n  C a p ita l T e r r ito ry  jo b  s e e k e rs 110 111
T a s m a n ia  jo b  s e e k e rs 110 113
* J o b  m a tc h in g  -  n o t o n  a llo w a n c e , re g is te re d  w ith  J o b  
N e tw o rk
110 76
* J o b  m a tc h in g  -  n o t o n  a llo w a n c e , re g is te re d  w ith  
C e n tre l in k
110 83
In te n s iv e  A s s is ta n c e  jo b  s e e k e rs 300 317
J o b  S e a rc h  T ra in in g  jo b  s e e k e rs 300 308
A ll o th e r  ( jo b  m a tc h in g , on  a llo w a n c e )  jo b  s e e k e rs 700 701
T o ta l 2 9 5 0 2 8 7 4
* Quota not obtained
249
Chapter Ten
Those groups where the quotas are not reached may not provide a representative sample 
and this is particularly the case for Indigenous job seekers. In addition, Centrelink’s 
contact information for Indigenous job seekers indicates that less than 50 per cent provide 
telephone contact details. This further questions the extent that Indigenous job seekers 
who have telephones are representative of the total Indigenous job seeker population.
2000 Survey of job seekers’ satisfaction with Centrelink services
For the third consecutive year a different research company conducted the Centrelink job 
seeker satisfaction survey. The 2000 survey was processed using CATI technology and 
comprised 3127 interviews.
A comparison of the questions indicates more detail is provided in the 2000 questionnaire 
than the 1998 questionnaire. For example, in seeking responses to job seekers’ 
satisfaction with the registration process, the 2000 survey asks the following screening 
question:
We are interested in talking to people who have “registered with Centrelink as looking 
for work” in the last 6 months. Registration usually involves providing your personal 
details and details of your employment history, filling in a number of forms, attending at 
least one formal interview and, maybe attending an Information Seminar with other 
people who are looking for work. You may also get your job seeker ID card.
In comparison, the 1998 survey asks (note: the 1999 questionnaire was not provided):
Now I have some questions about the registration process. Registration is when 
Centrelink takes down your personal details and details of your employment history. In 
some cases you may have had more than one interview or attended information sessions 
to complete the registration process.
The lead-in provided in the 2000 survey provides the job seeker with more information 
about the registration process and may assist the job seeker in recalling more detail about 
the services provided, particularly as the telephone interview may take place some time
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after the service has taken place. The likelihood that the different lead-ins results in 
dissimilar responses for each of the surveys is high.
Overall, the satisfaction of job seekers to Centrelink’s employment services had risen 
since the 1999 survey, up from 75 percent to 79 percent, although the report 
acknowledges the state of the labour market during 2000 had improved with the 
unemployment rate falling and job vacancies increasing.
2001 Evaluation o f employment services delivered by Centrelink
The 2001 job seeker satisfaction survey was undertaken by the same research company 
that conducted the 2000 survey. This provides for some continuity, but the number of 
questions in the survey instrument did increase in 2001 by 24, perhaps reflecting the 
increased participation requirements being imposed on job seekers. The categories of job 
seekers for which quotas of respondents are sought also increased from 18 in 1999 to 22 
categories in 2001. As with the increased number of questions, the increase in categories 
reflects the additional activity requirements placed upon the unemployed. The additional 
categories include job seekers with experience of mutual obligation, work for the dole, 
preparing for work agreements and the community support program.
To demonstrate the subject matter and questions asked, table 10.5 compares the question 
topics covered in the 2000 to the 2001 survey, including the number of questions for each 
topic. Not all questions are asked as CATI surveys include screening questions that 
enable the interviewer to skip irrelevant questions.
251
5
H
a3
a.j2
U
CO
>
a>>
3
(0
c
O
O
(0
*85
to
CO
a>
o>
a>co
n
o
oo
CM
TJ
C
COooo
CM
0)
£
c
TJ
<D
CO
(0
a>a
E
3
C
■Oc
10
8
ao
co
Ü0
a>
3cr
a)a
co
«  - *
I I
E £  O c
O  a>
O
in
d
13
(0h-
N
um
be
r
of
qu
es
tio
ns
- ■m-
ID h- COCO - CD
o CO CO - co ■'t c^ o- 12 3 6
16
1 
+ 
nu
m
be
r 
de
le
te
d
Su
rv
ey
 y
ea
r 
20
01
Q
ue
st
io
n 
to
pi
c
S
a
tis
fa
ct
io
n
 w
ith
 e
m
p
lo
ym
e
n
t 
se
rv
ic
e
s
R
e
g
is
tr
a
tio
n
 a
t 
C
e
n
tr
e
lin
k
In
fo
rm
a
tio
n
 s
e
ss
io
n
s
R
e
g
is
tr
a
tio
n
 o
ve
ra
ll
C
o
n
ta
ct
 w
ith
 C
e
n
tr
e
lin
k
S
e
lf-
h
e
lp
 f
a
ci
lit
ie
s
W
a
iti
n
g
 t
im
e
s
Jo
b
 M
a
tc
h
in
g
 s
e
rv
ic
e
s
Jo
b
 S
e
a
rc
h
 T
ra
in
in
g
In
te
n
si
ve
 A
ss
is
ta
n
ce
G
e
n
e
ra
l 
a
sp
e
ct
s
M
u
tu
a
l 
o
b
lig
a
tio
n
W
o
rk
 f
o
r 
th
e
 d
o
le
P
re
p
a
ri
n
g
 f
o
r 
w
o
rk
 a
g
re
e
m
e
n
t
D
e
le
te
d
 f
ro
m
 F
O
I 
d
o
cu
m
e
n
t
D
e
le
te
d
 f
ro
m
 F
O
I 
d
o
cu
m
e
n
t
V2
 d
e
le
te
d
 f
ro
m
 F
O
I 
d
ou
cm
e
n
ts
 
a
cc
e
ss
 t
o
 C
e
n
tr
e
lin
k 
la
b
o
u
r 
fo
rc
e
 s
ta
tu
s
S
ec
tio
n
< m o Q LU LL CD X — —> _i z O CLO
Su
rv
ey
 y
ea
r 
20
00
N
um
be
r 
of
 
qu
es
tio
ns
CD CD COCM O- o ID o CM co o CO 13 6
13
7 
+ 
nu
m
be
r 
de
le
te
d
Q
ue
st
io
n 
to
pi
c
R
e
g
is
tr
a
tio
n
 a
t 
C
e
n
tr
e
lin
k
R
e
g
is
te
ri
n
g
 w
ith
 a
 J
o
b
 N
e
tw
o
rk
 M
e
m
b
e
r
C
o
n
ta
ct
 w
ith
 C
e
n
tr
e
lin
k
Jo
b
 N
e
tw
o
rk
 M
e
m
b
e
r 
a
cc
e
ss
 
(i
n
cl
u
d
e
s 
se
lf-
h
e
lp
 f
a
ci
lit
ie
s)
D
e
le
te
d
 f
ro
m
 F
O
I 
d
o
cu
m
e
n
t
W
a
iti
n
g
 t
im
e
s
Jo
b
 M
a
tc
h
in
g
 s
e
rv
ic
e
s
Jo
b
 S
e
a
rc
h
 T
ra
in
in
g
In
te
n
si
ve
 A
ss
is
ta
n
ce
G
e
n
e
ra
l 
a
sp
e
ct
s
M
u
tu
a
l 
o
b
lig
a
tio
n
W
o
rk
 f
o
r 
th
e
 d
o
le
Vz
 d
e
le
te
d
 f
ro
m
 F
O
I 
d
o
cu
m
e
n
ts
 
la
b
o
u
r 
fo
rc
e
 s
ta
tu
s
<0c
0
to
03
0 -
CDa
S
ec
tio
n
< CG o Q LU LL CD X - “ 5 * _i
E3c
h-
25
2
Chapter Ten
In 2001 the question relating to the overall satisfaction of job seekers to Centrelink was 
revisited. This is because during qualitative explorations the researchers found that in 
thinking about satisfaction, job seekers would often concentrate on Centrelink’s role in 
providing income support. As such, an additional question was included in the 2001 
survey that asked job seekers on income support to put aside Centrelink’s payment 
processing performance and indicate their satisfaction with the other employment 
information, facilities and services provided by Centrelink. Also, job seekers not in 
receipt of income support were asked about their satisfaction with the services, facilities 
and employment information provided by Centrelink.
The results indicate a significant difference in job seekers’ satisfaction measurements. 
While 88 per cent of job seekers receiving income support reported satisfaction with 
Centrelink’s payments process, a much lower percentage of 74 percent indicated overall 
satisfaction with employment information, facilities and services. Job seekers not in 
receipt of income support report a 64 per cent overall satisfaction with employment 
information, facilities and services. The survey report indicates that for all respondents, 
the overall satisfaction measure for employment services is 79 per cent and this is the 
figure commonly reported in publications.
However, these finding raise issues about the reliability of previous surveys and the 
comparability of satisfaction measurements. If respondents are focusing on payment 
processing issues, the previous Centrelink satisfaction ratings are not a reliable indicator 
of job seeker satisfaction with the employment services undertaken by Centrelink that 
had transferred from the CES.
2002 Job seeker evaluation of employment services (Centrelink)
The 2002 job seeker survey of satisfaction with Centrelink was undertaken by a different 
research company than in the previous two years. However, the format of the report and 
the questionnaire appear very similar to the 2000 and 2001 reports and it is possible the 
same research company was involved under another business name. As indicated in table
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10.5 the number of questions included in the surveys was increasing over time and the 
2002 survey report notes the average interview length was 20 minutes. This compares to 
an average interview length in 1998 of 12.5 minutes. The 2002 survey report comments 
on the decline in overall satisfaction among job seekers to Centrelink’s employment 
services. The recorded level of 75.5 per cent represented a decline from the previous two 
years of almost four percentage points. At the same time, the survey report advises no 
corresponding increase in dissatisfaction had taken place, but there had been an increase 
in the more ambivalent responses of ‘neither satisfied nor dissatisfied’ and ‘don’t know’. 
It may be that given the length of the interview process job seekers were becoming less 
interested in participating in the survey and less inclined to be positive.
Summary
All the surveys undertaken of Centrelink during the period 1998 to 2002 have been 
conducted by market research companies. The surveys employ CATI technology and 
respondents are chosen from a sample of job seekers that have been in contact with 
Centrelink during the previous six months, although a respondent is not necessarily 
receiving income support at the time of the questionnaire. The common elements of 
service delivery examined in the surveys provide a basis for comparison, although 
differences in the survey instruments are evident and this reduces the validity of direct 
comparisons.
Table 10.6 provides a comparison of the Centrelink surveys undertaken during the period 
1998 to 2002. The table shows the characteristics of each survey and the aspects of 
service delivery that respondents are asked about.
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Chapter Ten
Customer satisfaction surveys for the Job Network prior to the Job seeker 
omnibus survey
Prior to the commencement of the omnibus survey in 2003, the department had 
undertaken two biennial surveys of job seekers’ perceptions of, and satisfaction with, the 
Job Network. These surveys were conducted in 1999 and 2001.
1999 Survey of job seekers’ satisfaction with Job Network
Unfortunately, the Freedom of Information request documents provide very little 
information on the 1999 job seeker survey. The methodology and the questionnaire are 
not included, although the summary for the survey indicates the result have been derived 
from telephone interviews conducted between March and June 1999.
The Job Network commenced in May 1998 and the 1999 survey relates to a period when 
some design issues were causing problems. Researchers who examine the Job Network 
comment on the difficulties that took place during the first employment services contract 
and these may have been impacting on survey results (Australian Council of Social 
Services 2001; Chalmers and Davis 2001; Dockery 1999; Eardley, Abellö and 
MacDonald 2001, Productivity Commission 2002; Thompson 1998). For example, 
writers discuss the problems of:
• untested service providers being given contracts over established providers who 
had a proven record of delivering successful services;
• providers unable to deliver their services and who sub-contracted to agencies that 
had failed to win contracts on merit; and
• organisations who were providing services for free or cross-subsidising across the 
different employment services so that funds established for highly disadvantaged 
job seekers were not reaching this target population.
Some of the government responses to the early Job Network problems included up-front 
retainers of 30 per cent of expected job matching places for each contract monitoring
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period to improve the income and cash flow of Job Network members, a marketing 
package of $1000 for each Job Network member to raise awareness of Job Network 
services among employees, increased funding in regional areas, extending the pool of 
eligible unemployed people to enable Job Network members to access non-income 
support recipients and an exit package, comprising a payment of $15,000, to assist 
non-viable agencies depart the system.
The 1999 Job Network survey results are perhaps more useful as an indication of the 
immediate impact on satisfaction of changes to government policies and the delivery 
arrangements surrounding these than as a measurement of job seekers’ satisfaction with 
the substance of their employment services.
2001 Survey of job seekers ’ satisfaction with Job Network
The 2001 survey of job seekers’ satisfaction with Job Network members was conducted 
by a market research firm using CATI technology. In commenting on the fieldwork for 
the 2001 job seeker satisfaction survey, the methodology report notes the tight timeframe 
did not provide for adequate testing of the questionnaire prior to loading on the CATI 
system. As a result, changes required in the middle of the fieldwork were “quite 
disruptive”. The methodology report also comments on the difficulty of contacting job 
seekers. The response rate, that is the completed number of interviews divided by the 
number of contacts, plus those where there was no answer after six calls, minus those out 
of scope, was 67 per cent. In comparison, the hit rate, referring to the completed number 
of interviews divided by the total selection of respondents for which contact was 
attempted, was 57 per cent. The main reason for the low hit rate was the number of job 
seekers where no contact could be made, presumably because of incorrect contact details.
One of the main aims of the survey was to gather data on the service quality and job 
seekers’ satisfaction with the four main Job Network services. These services include job 
matching, job search training, intensive assistance and the New Enterprise Incentive 
Scheme. The link to service quality was achieved by stratifying the sample of
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respondents according to the star rating of their Job Network provider, highlighting the 
importance of the star ratings system to the department.
The star ratings system was developed by the department in 1999, with the assistance of 
the Flinders University, the University of Adelaide and the South Australian Centre for 
Economic Studies. The system provides a performance rating out of five stars, with 
measurements possible to Vi star increments, that focuses on the achievement of 
employment outcomes for job seekers or their placement into education and training. 
The system accounts for differences in the labour market conditions under which 
providers operate and the different characteristics of job seekers that Job Network 
members provide services. The star rating system has become important for the 
comparison it provides between different Job Network members and its use by the 
department for assessing Job Network members that are invited to continue providing 
services in subsequent employment services contracts.
Table 10.7 indicates the groups interviewed in the 2001 survey and the desired quotas.
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Table 10.7: 2001 Job Network survey groups and quotas
Group* Sample selection Quota for
interviews
G ro u p  1: J o b  s e e k e rs  w h o  le f t  in te n s iv e  
a s s is ta n c e  ( IA ) o r  jo b  s e a rc h  tra in in g  (J S T )  
w ith in  o n e  to f iv e  m o n th s  p r io r  to  in te rv ie w
n.a . 5 2 9 4
G ro u p  2 : J o b  s e e k e rs  w h o  h a d  c o n ta c t w ith  
J o b  N e tw o rk  w ith in  11 m o n th s  p r io r  to  
in te rv ie w  a n d  d e a lt  w ith :
3 0 0 0 3 1 2 9
•  IA p rov ider w ith  star ra ting of one (low est); 300 316
•  IA prov ider w ith  star ra ting of five  (h ighest); 400 354
•  JS T  p rov ide r w ith  star rating of one; 150 158
•  JS T  p rov ide r w ith  s ta r rating of five; 250 256
•  New E nterprise  Incentive  S chem e provider; 500 582
•  JST prov ide r w ith  star ra ting of two, th ree  
or four;
300 331
•  IA p rov ider w ith  sta r ra ting of two, th ree  o r 
four;
600 617
•  job  m atch ing  p rov ider 500 515
G ro u p  3: J o b  s e e k e rs  fitt in g  b o th  Groups 1 
a n d  2
n .a . 82 1
T O T A L 9 2 4 4
It is interesting to note the findings of the 2001 survey indicate job seekers from low 
rated agencies are more satisfied (89.8 per cent) with the overall services provided than 
clients from medium (84.1 percent) or high (83.6 per cent) rated agencies. More 
specifically, 44.4 per cent of job seekers from low rated agencies are ‘very satisfied’ 
compared to 36.7 per cent of job seekers from high rated agencies. Such results may 
appear counter-intuitive, but highlight the different measurements gathered by 
satisfaction surveys as compared to the star rating system. That is, Job Network members 
achieve high star ratings for delivering positive outcomes in terms of employment, 
training or education. As such, achieving these higher outcomes may involve 
concentrating effort on the easiest to place job seekers at the expense of the more
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disadvantaged and difficult to place. In comparison, low rated Job Network members, 
who do not achieve high levels of employment, training or education outcomes, may 
concentrate effort more equally on all their job seekers and consequently achieve a higher 
rate of overall job seeker satisfaction.
Many commentators on the Job Network raise concerns about the design of the 
employment services market that provides outcome payments as part of a profit-based 
system, promotes undesirable practices by Job Network members such as placing the 
greatest effort into those job seekers able to secure employment, known as creaming, 
whilst minimal effort is expended on the most highly disadvantaged job seekers who are 
unlikely to gain employment, referred to as parking (Bruttel 2004; Burgess 2003; 
Considine 2000; Cowling and Mitchell 2003; Dockery and Stromback 2001; Eardley, 
Abel 16 and MacDonald 2001; Kerr, Carson and Goddard 2002; McNally 2003; Struyven 
and Steurs 2005). Whilst the government has introduced changes to the employment 
services contract to ensure disadvantaged job seekers receive appropriate employment 
assistance, this has involved increased requirements in the contract and greater levels of 
monitoring, suggesting decreased opportunities for Job Network members to engage in 
innovative and flexible solutions (Bruttel 2004).
Summary
The 1999 and 2001 job seeker surveys of the Job Network were undertaken during the 
early stages of the Job Network and accordingly do not reflect a stable period of 
operation. Limited information is provided for the 1999 survey and the emphasis on the 
star rating system of the 2001 survey is not repeated. Table 10.8 provides information on 
the characteristics of the 1999 and 2001 Job Network surveys.
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Table 10.8: Customer satisfaction surveys for the Job Network, 1999 and 2001
Survey titie/date 1999 Survey of job 2001 Survey of job seekers’
seekers’ satisfaction with satisfaction with Job
Job Network Network
Researcher U nknow n C onsu ltan t
Survey type T e lephone  in terview CATI
Number of 
respondents
U nknow n 9244
Timing of U nknow n, but not D epend ing  on group, w ith in
interview im m ed ia te ly  fo llow ing five  to  11 m onths of con tac t
serv ice w ith  the Job N etw ork m e m b e r
Response rate U nknow n 67%
Aspects of Job m atch ing serv ices Job m atch ing se rv ices
service covered Job  Search T ra in ing Job S earch T ra in ing
In tens ive  ass is tance In tens ive  ass is tance
N ew  Enterprise  Incentive New  Enterprise  Incentive
Schem e S chem e
O the r aspects (com parison 
of JN to CES)
Job seeker om nibus surveys
In late 2002, DEWR replaced the previous survey arrangements, that sought measures of 
job seekers’ satisfaction with Centrelink and the Job Network through separate surveys, 
with an omnibus survey that combined questions about the services of these two agencies 
into a single job seeker satisfaction survey. To undertake this task, the department 
commissioned a company that had not previously been involved in conducting job seeker 
surveys. The omnibus approach resulted in the redesign of the questionnaires, including 
the order of questions and the ways they were asked. The timing of when the 
questionnaire was given became closer to when the service took place, within three 
months afterwards instead of within six months, and the data was gathered at different 
times of the year and from a wider scope of job seekers.
Comments in the 2003 methodology report acknowledge the extent of the changes and 
suggest caution in comparing the results from 2003 and later surveys to those gathered
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beforehand. But, the report also states “it is fair to say, however, that it is unlikely that 
the change in methodology alone, could explain the entire increase”. This claim is 
unwarranted as it is not possible to quantify portions of any increase in satisfaction as due 
to one particular factor over another.
2003 Job seeker omnibus survey
In the case of Centrelink, the 2003 omnibus survey incorporates a revised measurement 
of satisfaction — the Customer Satisfaction Index. Whilst mentioned as under 
development in the 2001 Centrelink survey report, the index is derived from combining 
key service delivery elements that are weighted according to each service element’s 
importance to job seekers as identified in qualitative research together with a factor 
analysis. As such, the measurement of overall satisfaction becomes a multi-level, rather 
than single-level measurement and, therefore, accords with the views of many market 
researchers where satisfaction is based on a composite calculation in which some 
dimensions of service are more important than others. Szymanski’s and Henard’s (2001) 
meta-analysis of the empirical evidence of customer satisfaction research finds in favour 
of using multi-item measures to capture customer satisfaction.
Each of the satisfaction ratings for the service elements that combine to form the 
customer satisfaction index is derived from a series of sub-elements. For example, the 
‘reputation’ element comprises aspects that relate to how fair and reasonable Centrelink 
performs its tasks and if Centrelink can be relied upon to get things right. From close 
analysis of the components of the customer satisfaction index it is possible to calculate 
the exact contribution of a particular sub-element to the overall satisfaction measurement 
and, therefore, identify those aspects that are responsible for change in the overall 
customer satisfaction index. The department uses such analysis to determine the key 
drivers of change and enable improvement initiatives to be highly targeted.
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Table 10.9 describes the eight service elements, and their associated sub-elements, 
together with the weightings of importance these are given in determining the overall 
customer satisfaction index.
Table 10.9: Service elements and weightings for the Centrelink Customer 
Satisfaction Index
Service Element and sub -elements Weight
( % )
Inform ation provision 30.0
•  c le a r ly  e x p la in  h o w  to  c o n ta c t J o b  N e tw o rk  m e m b e r 2 .3
•  g a v e  g o o d  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f J o b  N e tw o rk  s e rv ic e s 2 .3
•  e n c o u ra g e d  u se  o f J o b  N e tw o rk  fo r  jo b  m a tc h in g 2 .3
•  re g is tra t io n  in fo rm a tio n  u s e fu l in  h e lp in g  to  lo o k  fo r  w o rk 2 .3
•  re g is tra t io n  in fo rm a tio n  e a s y  to  u n d e rs ta n d 2 .3
•  re g is tra t io n  in fo rm a tio n  a c c u ra te  a n d  c o r re c t 2 .3
•  to ld  a b o u t th e  to u c h s c re e n s 2 .3
•  to ld  a b o u t s e lf-h e lp  fa c il it ie s 2 .3
•  to ld  a b o u t re s p o n s ib il it ie s  a n d  ru le s 2 .3
•  in fo rm a t io n  u p - to -d a te 2 .3
•  to ld  a b o u t r ig h ts  w h e n  u s in g  J o b  N e tw o rk 2 .3
•  in  g e n e ra l in fo rm a tio n  p ro v id e d  a c c u ra te  a n d  c o r re c t 2 .3
•  in  g e n e ra l in fo rm a tio n  p ro v id e d  e a s y  to  u n d e rs ta n d 2 .3
Staff 30.0
•  g a v e  t im e  a n d  a tte n tio n  re q u ire d 7 .5
•  m a d e  jo b  s e e k e r  fe e l lik e  th e y  w a n te d  to  h e lp 7 .5
•  tre a te d  jo b  s e e k e r  lik e  a  p e rs o n  n o t a n u m b e r 7 .5
•  a c te d  q u ic k ly  to  m e e t jo b  s e e k e rs ’ n e e d 7 .5
Self-help facilities 10.0
•  s e lf -h e lp  fa c il it ie s  w e re  w e ll p re s e n te d  a n d  t id y 2 .5
•  s e lf -h e lp  fa c il it ie s  w e re  e a s y  to  f in d 2 .5
•  e q u ip m e n t w a s  in w o rk in g  o rd e r 2 .5
•  e v e ry o n e  h a s  a  fa ir  c h a n c e  to  u s e  s e lf-h e lp  fa c il it ie s 2 .5
Waiting time 10.0
•  a p p o in tm e n t 4 .5
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•  front counter 2 .5
•  phone 3 .0
Preparing for work agreem ent 7.5
•  understood what is required 3 .8
•  satisfied with process of com pleting and signing 3 .8
Reputation 5.0
•  is fa ir and reasonable 2.5
•  can be relied on to get th ings right m ost of the tim e 2.5
Privacy 5.0
•  treats inform ation confiden tia lly 1.7
•  layout of office m akes job  seeker feel com fortable 1.7
•  staff m ade job seeker feel com fortab le 1.7
M utual Obligation 2 .5
•  c learly  explained what MO is all about 0 .8
•  c learly  explained options or choices in meeting MO requirem ents 0 .8
•  job  seeker clearly understands their requirem ents under MO 0 .8
Overall Customer Satisfaction Index 100
From 2003, the customer satisfaction index is treated as the major indication o f customer 
satisfaction, suggesting this aggregate measurement is a more accurate level o f 
satisfaction than the single-item satisfaction measurement. The department also applies a 
retrospective analysis to determine customer satisfaction indexes dating back to 2000, 
prior to when the questionnaires do not provide sufficient data to enable the appropriate 
calculations. Following the introduction o f the omnibus survey a consistent theme 
emerges — an increase in Centrelink’s satisfaction rating. However, at the same time, 
the proportion of job seekers indicating they were ‘very satisfied’ declines.
For the Job Network, the omnibus survey also involved many methodological changes 
and the capacity to compare these later surveys with the earlier surveys o f job seeker 
satisfaction with the Job Network and the CES is diminished. The omnibus survey, as 
with previous Job Network surveys, does distinguish between the different services 
provided — job matching services, job search training services and intensive assistance 
services. Unlike the Centrelink customer satisfaction index derived from the omnibus
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survey, the overall satisfaction of job seekers to their Job Network agency is not a 
composite measure. The omnibus survey asks job seekers a single-item question, ‘now, 
thinking about all aspects of the services provided by [employment agency name], 
overall, to what extent were you satisfied or dissatisfied?’.
In prior surveys, job seekers from the different Job Network services responded to 
different sections of the survey. With the introduction of the omnibus survey, although 
the type of services received by the job seekers are identified and reported on separately, 
all job seekers were asked the same questions in the same way, irrespective of the type of 
assistance they were receiving. While this approach may enable greater comparability 
between the satisfaction levels for the different services, it limits the opportunity to 
investigate aspects of quality unique to the delivery of each service.
2004 Job seeker omnibus survey
The 2004 omnibus survey was conducted by the same research company that undertook 
the omnibus survey in the previous year. The methodology is generally unchanged from 
the 2003 omnibus survey and the survey is conducted using CATI data collection 
methods from a sample of job seekers that have provided telephone contact details to the 
department.
The 2004 omnibus survey may have introduced bias in the way it configures job seekers 
among the different Job Network services provided. At the time of the survey, computer 
systems information was unable to reliably indicate the employment assistance programs 
that job seekers were engaged in with Job Network members. As such, assumptions were 
made about the programs job seekers were undertaking based on their duration of 
unemployment. That is, job seekers with an unemployment duration of less than three 
months were assumed to be taking part in job search support, those unemployed between 
three and six months were assumed to be undertaking job search training, those 
unemployed from six to 12 months were assumed to be involved in a mutual obligation 
activity and those unemployed for greater than 12 months were assumed to be in
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intensive assistance. However, the assumptions about the programs job seekers are 
engaged in, based upon their length of unemployment, can be inaccurate. For example, 
Bruttel (2004) notes that in the third employment services contract around 20 percent of 
new job seekers were assessed as suitable for immediate placement into intensive 
assistance. In addition, not all job seekers with a duration of unemployment longer than 
12 months are receiving intensive assistance. Two six-month periods of intensive 
assistance were available to the long-term unemployed — the first six months of 
intensive assistance provided after 12 months of unemployment and the second period 
provided after the job seeker had been unemployed for two years.
The 2004 omnibus survey uses factor analysis and regression analysis to determine the 
key drivers of overall satisfaction of job seekers to the services provided by Job Network 
members. The two factors that provided the greatest influence on job seekers’ overall 
satisfaction were the perceived treatment job seekers received from their Job Network 
members and the job seekers’ confidence their Job Network members would find them 
work. The primary role these two aspects of service delivery play in the formation of job 
seekers’ overall satisfaction with provider services is similar to the results of the 1997 
CES survey. The 1997 performance matrix indicated the two service aspects that were 
most important to customers were services linked to job seekers gaining employment and 
the quality of personal interaction with staff.
2005 Job seeker omnibus survey
The 2005 omnibus survey was conducted by the same research company that conducted 
the 2003 and 2004 surveys and this provides for a measure of continuity. The 2005 
omnibus survey made slight changes to the questionnaire and the collection methodology, 
but largely the omnibus survey remained the same as in 2004 and 2003.
An interesting feature of the surveys is the capacity to compare job seekers’ overall 
satisfaction with Centrelink’s employment services to the satisfaction rating as 
determined by the Centrelink customer satisfaction index.
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Table 10.10: Comparison of results from overall satisfaction question to the 
customer satisfaction index
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Overall satisfaction 
with Centrelink 
employment services
78.8 79 75.5 82 86.5 85.6
Customer satisfaction 
index
77.9 76 75.7 81.3 83.7 84.2
As indicated in table 10.10, although not the same figures, both the overall satisfaction 
rating and the customer satisfaction index follows the same trends over time. An 
explanation for this can be found in the analysis from the survey report that investigates 
the overall satisfaction rating and the drivers that provide for its foundations.
The research company delves further into the overall satisfaction rating o f Centrelink and 
uses factor analysis and regression analysis to determine the key drivers o f job seekers’ 
overall satisfaction. The model produced by the analysis indicates two primary 
contributors of overall satisfaction — the ‘treatment of job seekers’ and the ‘ general 
information and reputation of Centrelink’ . Three secondary drivers o f satisfaction are 
identified as the ‘provision of touchscreens’ , ‘waiting times’ and ‘ information at 
registration’ . Through an analysis of the performance of these primary and secondary 
drivers of overall satisfaction, the research company produces a performance matrix 
indicating the areas where Centrelink’s performance requires improvement and where 
performance may be maintained at existing levels. Accompanying this matrix, the survey 
report also provides a second performance matrix derived from the components o f the 
customer satisfaction index by comparing each component’ s relative performance against 
their weight in the index. The two performance matrices, one developed from the overall 
satisfaction question and the other developed from the index, are very similar and the 
report concludes the most important components of the index are the same as the primary 
and secondary contributors that determine job seekers’ overall satisfaction.
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This conclusion and the connection between the drivers of overall satisfaction and the 
primary weightings for the index helps explains why the overall satisfaction level of job 
seekers indicates similar figures to those determined in the customer satisfaction index as 
indicated in table 10.10. That is, the statistical tools that examine the data and identify 
groupings of questions with a high correlation to the overall satisfaction rating merely 
confirm the results of the qualitative research and associated analysis that ascertains the 
major attributes contributing to satisfaction and their weightings, thereby enabling 
construction of the index. Accordingly, the two measures have been derived from similar 
processes and merely reflect each other. Whilst the customer satisfaction index is more 
likely to produce a more exacting measurement, the overall satisfaction rating is not 
dissimilar.
Summary
The job seeker omnibus surveys represent a consolidation of the measurement of job 
seekers’ satisfaction and provide detailed information covering a broad range of aspects 
of service that relate to the assessment of satisfaction. The ANAO report into the 
employment department’s oversight of Job Network services to job seekers found the 
analytical methodology applying to the results of the omnibus surveys was broadly sound 
and concluded that “DEWR conducts high-quality, systematic client research” (2005e, 
p. 115).
Table 10.11 provides a comparison of the characteristics of the omnibus surveys 
conducted from 2003 to 2005.
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Chapter Ten
Conclusion
This chapter identified satisfaction surveys that have been undertaken of job seekers’ 
satisfaction with income support and employment services. The surveys cover the period 
1986 to 2005 and the findings are used in the following three chapters to establish trends 
in the satisfaction of job seekers over the period during which Centrelink and the Job 
Network were implemented.
This chapter has shown that different research companies, methodologies and 
questionnaires have been involved in gathering data on the satisfaction of job seekers. 
The emphasis driven by much of the customer satisfaction literature covered in 
Chapter 9, particularly that component dealing with data collection and measurement, 
would seek to determine methodologies that are more valid and reliable than others and 
accept the results of these surveys as more accurate reflections of job seekers’ 
satisfaction. The analysis would then discard invalid measurements and form
conclusions on the basis of reliable results.
However, most of the job seeker satisfaction surveys are developed, conducted and the 
results analysed by research consultants with a background in consumer satisfaction. As 
such, the methodologies are well constructed and often comprise:
• exploratory focus groups to explore issues and determine the job seekers’ 
understanding of terms and concepts;
• pilot testing of questionnaires to enable fine tuning and the flow of the questions 
to be adjusted;
• fieldwork that ensures representative samples are used and the data collected by 
trained interviewers;
• analysis and reporting that incorporates significance tests to consider the 
differences between groups or survey results from different periods;
• factor and regression analysis to identify key drivers of satisfaction; and
• open-ended discussions with job seekers to provide in-depth information.
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In addition to the sound methodologies, the job seeker satisfaction surveys also 
investigate comparable service aspects and comment upon the same programs or 
modified versions of these. In a similar vein, the customer satisfaction literature explored 
in Chapter 9 offers a broad consensus on those aspects of service that relate to 
satisfaction and that form the basis of investigation. For example, both the job seeker 
surveys and the customer satisfaction literature examine customers’ perceptions of the 
attitudes and behaviours of employees, the appearance of the service facilities, the 
dependability and responsiveness of the service and the outcomes of the service 
encounter.
Accordingly, the capacity to use the findings of job seeker surveys across time to 
examine comparable data and establish trends in satisfaction should be high. However, 
even using the same research company with the same approach to measuring job seekers’ 
satisfaction, the results show that even slight wording changes in a question from one 
survey to the next can have a significant impact on the levels of satisfaction. Therefore, 
regardless of other similarities such as sound methodologies and the satisfaction 
measurements of comparable service aspects, on the basis of the questionnaire wordings 
alone, the results of job seeker satisfaction surveys can fluctuate greatly.
In addition, concerns are raised about the impact of the censorship imposed on the results 
of the job seeker satisfaction surveys that were contained within the Freedom of 
Information request documents. The lack of complete and open information limits the 
ability to fully explore the methodologies applied, the total number of service attributes 
explored and the levels of satisfaction achieved.
There are also the impacts of other factors on the findings of job seeker satisfaction 
surveys. These factors include the wider surroundings, comprising such aspects as labour 
market shifts or changing political agendas, and variations in the immediate environment, 
for example program policy changes such as increased activity requirements and the 
impact of the changed arrangements governing service delivery. In addition, the
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subjective nature of satisfaction means that data collection methods and analysis are 
unable to provide absolute and objective measurements of satisfaction.
A reasonable conclusion is that the differences between the surveys, the number of 
environmental variables that influence the results and the subjective nature of satisfaction 
measurements introduce too many biases to provide for accurate calculations of 
satisfaction that enable precise comparisons to be made across the different job seeker 
satisfaction surveys. As such, the findings derived from the job seeker satisfaction 
surveys described in this chapter need to be approached cautiously and be seen as 
reflecting a general position, rather than as accurate accounts of job seekers’ satisfaction 
levels.
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Chapter 11: The service effectiveness of Centrelink
The surveys discussed in the previous chapter are undertaken in comprehensive and 
systematic ways and they offer the capacity to paint a broad picture of the trends in job 
seekers’ satisfaction over the period that Centrelink and the Job Network were 
established. This chapter examines the results of the survey instruments described in the 
previous chapter and combines this with additional research from independent studies and 
government reviews to expand on the survey findings. In this way a more complete 
understanding may be gained of trends in job seekers’ satisfaction and the factors that 
may be impacting on specific aspects of service.
The chapter presents numerous charts and tables that have been constructed by 
combining the figures from the various satisfaction survey instruments that have been 
described in the previous chapter. While this chapter focuses on trends in job seekers’ 
satisfaction with DSS/Centrelink, the following chapter considers the case of the CES/Job 
Network. In Chapter 13, a cross-sectional study of customer satisfaction with Centrelink 
compared to DVA is undertaken.
In comparing Centrelink’s customer satisfaction levels with the previous arrangements, 
aspects common to both of these delivery systems and for which survey data is available
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are examined. These service aspects include the accuracy of information, privacy of 
disclosed material, treatment by staff, waiting times, the process of registration, provision 
of information, the operation of self-help facilities and administration of the activity test. 
Finally, the analysis considers the overall level of job seekers’ satisfaction with 
Centrelink.
Accuracy
Identified as an essential element of good customer service, is ensuring customers are 
provided with accurate information. Demonstrating the significance of accuracy as a 
prominent service aspect, all of the satisfaction surveys measure the respondents’ 
perceptions of the accuracy of information that DSS/Centrelink provide. This section 
also examines the accuracy of payments that Centrelink provides, as payment accuracy is 
a delivery task that is of paramount importance in the delivery of income support.
Chart 11.1 plots job seekers’ responses to questions on accuracy. In the case of the 1986 
survey, the term ‘accuracy’ was not used in the questionnaire. Accordingly, the figure of 
88 per cent for the 1986 survey comes from the question, ‘were procedures explained 
properly?’. During this early period, and prior to Internet technology, DSS was not 
producing the extensive number of publications and pamphlets explaining the income 
support system that became available in later years. Chart 11.1 shows that satisfaction 
with the accuracy or correctness of information has always been reasonably high.
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Chart 11.1: Percentage of customers satisfied with the accuracy of DSS and 
Centrelink information, 1986 to 2005
Centrelinlk
Sources: Survey instruments outlined in Chapter 10.
Apart from the decline to 76 per cent in 2000, the rate of job seekers’ satisfaction to the 
accuracy of the former DSS’s and Centrelink’s information is above 80 per cent. 
Though, from the perspective of income support recipients, determining the accuracy of 
the information they receive is difficult to establish and would generally only be a 
perception.
Similarly, determining the accuracy of payment for an income support customer would 
not be straightforward and would require an understanding o f the legislative provisions 
governing programs and the accompanying policy and procedural guidelines that expand 
on these provisions. Generally, the amount of income support is determined by the 
application of income and assets tests. Whilst the allowance assets test involves an 
immediate discontinuance of payment once a specific level of assets is reached, the 
income test for allowances comprises a free area and two withdrawal rates. The amount
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paid may also involve eligibility for supplementary assistance, such as payments in 
respect of children or assistance with the payment of private rent, that also have different 
income tests. Furthermore, in the case of an unemployed person who is partnered, the 
income tests for each partner interact to determine the final rate of payments.
Another method to gain insight into the accuracy of Centrelink’s benefit assessment is to 
consider audits undertaken by the ANAO. As no recent audits are available for 
unemployment payments, the findings of audits undertaken on the assessment of new 
claims for age pension (ANAO, 2001a) and the administration of the parenting payment 
(single) (ANAO, 2003b) are examined.
For the age pension, Centrelink had claimed an accuracy rate of 97 per cent in 1998-99 
and 98 percent in 1999-00. However, the ANAO examination of a random sample of 
new age pension claims found that around a quarter of new claims had an incorrect 
payment assessment. Centrelink’s accuracy checking systems were shown to be 
incorrect, resulting in a significant underreporting of the claim assessment error rate. The 
ANAO concluded the integrity of Centrelink’s external reporting was compromised and 
the capacity to effectively evaluate internal quality controls was impeded.
The objective of the parenting payment (single) audit was to determine whether the 
measures used by FaCS, as the purchaser of the delivery of parenting payment (single) 
from Centrelink, were effective. As part of this, the ANAO looked at the FaCS 
methodology for estimating the level of risk of incorrect payment and concluded that this 
was limited and reduced the department’s ability to detect the error and non-compliance 
rate. Also, the ANAO found that in cases involving a Centrelink review of complex 
circumstances, some 18 per cent of cases contained an administrative error with an 
immediate impact on the rate of payment.
It is not unreasonable to suggest the level of incorrect payments for unemployment 
benefits is similar to the levels of error in payment amounts the ANAO found for age 
pension and parenting payment. However, customers are most likely unaware of these
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errors. That is, despite the reasonably high levels o f satisfaction that customers have w ith 
accuracy and correctness o f information, most respondents would not be in a position to 
determine such accuracy. The findings do not suggest Centrelink is any worse or better 
than the previous DSS, but indicate that customers have a high level o f faith in the 
accuracy o f information and level o f payment provided to them.
Privacy
The area of privacy is another example where job seekers express a high degree o f 
satisfaction, but are unable to gauge the extent that the information they provide is used 
appropriately and remains confidential. Chart 11.2 indicates job seekers’ responses to 
questions about the treatment o f confidential information.
Chart 11.2: Percentage of customers satisfied with the privacy aspects of DSS and 
Centrelink, 1996 to 2005
100 t
Centrelink
Sources: Survey instruments outlined in Chapter 10.
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The consistently high levels of satisfaction that job seekers have for the way the 
department and Centrelink have treated private customer information is in contrast to 
other research that indicates this is not always the case. In August 2006, Centrelink 
announced that revised internal staff monitoring systems had found numerous instances 
of staff accessing customer information inappropriately (Centrelink, 2006). As a result of 
privacy breaches, in 2005 a total of 585 staff were sanctioned, including 19 dismissals, 92 
resignations, more than 300 salary reductions or fines and five cases had been referred to 
the Federal Police or the Director of Public Prosecutions. A newspaper article that 
investigated Centrelink’s internal privacy review notes that Jeff Whalan, Centrelink’s 
chief executive officer, presents “the best possible spin” in declaring the privacy review 
to be internally driven and responsible for revised privacy protection, but that “he could 
hardly be proud of the fact that one in 50 broke the rules” (Malone 2006, p. B 1).
As with the service element of accuracy, despite the high levels of job seekers’ 
satisfaction, customers are not in a position to objectively determine the extent that the 
organisation treats information confidentially. This is the case for both Centrelink and 
the previous departmental structure.
Treatment by staff
For job seekers, their perceptions of the attitudes and behaviours of staff are consistently 
ranked as a key determinant of satisfaction. This means a job seeker who perceives they 
have been given poor service will tend to be dissatisfied overall with the service 
experience. The significance of this aspect of service is reflected in Centrelink’s 
customer satisfaction index that weights ‘staff attributes at 30 per cent of the overall 
total. Chart 11.3 shows the level of job seekers’ satisfaction with Centrelink staff.
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Chart 11.3: Percentage of customers satisfied with Centrelink staff, 2000 to 2005
2000 2004 2005
Sources: Survey instruments outlined in Chapter 10.
Chart 11.3 indicates changes in the level of job seekers’ satisfaction with Centrelink over 
much of the period that Centrelink has been operating. In the years 2003 to 2005, job 
seekers’ level of satisfaction with staff has been consistently above 80 percent. Whether 
this is due to an increase in service quality, or the new survey methodology that came 
about in 2003 and has remained since, is uncertain. However, this information is of little 
use for a comparison of job seekers’ perception of staff with the former DSS.
The DSS satisfaction surveys indicate positive responses from income support recipients 
to questions about treatment from staff, although these questions and the options for 
answers are too dissimilar from later Centrelink surveys to enable direct comparisons. 
The large-scale 1986 survey of around 5000 respondents rated very high levels of 
satisfaction to the questions about staff attitudes. These questions and the proportion of 
respondents who answered ‘yes’ are provided in table 11.1.
279
Chapter Eleven
Table 11.1: Satisfaction levels to questions about staff attitudes from the 1986 
Department of Social Security survey
Question Level of
satisfaction
Did they do all they could to help you? 93%
Did they care about you as a person? 83%  (a)
Did they show concern for your problem? 79%  (a)
Were they polite and courteous? 97%
Did they show respect for your point of view? 91%  (a)
(a) A significant number of respondents replied ‘not applicable’ (for example, they may be 
receiving a non-stimulus payment and do not visit a social security office). The percentages 
shown in the table are calculated from the respondents to whom the questions did apply.
Similar to the 1986 survey results that are reported in table 11.1, the small scale 
qualitative survey undertaken in 1990 of a regional office in DSS indicates similar high 
levels of satisfaction with the treatment received from staff. In the 1990 survey, 
93.3 per cent of respondents felt staff had adequately attended to their query and 
97.6 per cent felt staff had been polite and helpful. As with the 1986 survey, respondents 
were offered a limited range of options for their answers —’yes’, ‘no’ and ‘don’t know’.
In recognition of the variation in satisfaction levels that occur when the wording of 
questions are altered, the following table tracks the type of questions that examine staff 
attributes across the different surveys. As table 11.2 shows, the type of staff attributes 
examined in 1986, although similar, are framed differently to later surveys and the 
options for responses are different. For example, the 1986 survey asks respondents, “do 
they care about you as a person?’ and the choice of answer is ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘not 
applicable’. Later surveys did not ask this same question, but a similar sentiment is found 
in the question that asks job seekers, ‘to what extent do you agree or disagree that 
Centrelink staff treated you like a person not a number’. These later surveys offer a 
larger range of responses that comprise, ‘strongly agree’, ‘’agree’, ‘neither agree nor 
disagree’, ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’. In relation to this question, the 1986 survey 
results report that 83 per cent of respondents agreed staff had cared about them as a
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person compared to a range of between 69 per cent and 84 per cent of job seekers 
agreeing that Centrelink staff had treated them like a person and not a number. These 
results would suggest that customers’ perception of their treatment by staff is not 
noticeably improved under Centrelink. However, the variations in the questions and 
options for responses are too wide to enable reliable comparisons between the earlier and 
later surveys.
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W aitin g  times
Given the large number o f income support recipients, the extent that Centrelink is 
effective in dealing with contact from customers can be measured in customers’ 
satisfaction with waiting times. Waiting times also form a component o f those aspects o f 
service that combine to form the Centrelink customer satisfaction index. In the fo llow ing 
chart, the 1998 job seeker satisfaction survey o f Centrelink is not included as it did not 
ask a question about satisfaction with waiting times. However, this survey noted that 
long queues at offices and long waiting times on the phone was a common problem w ith 
around 27 per cent o f job  seekers mentioning waiting times as the worst aspect o f the 
services provided by Centrelink.
Chart 11.4: Percentage of customers satisfied with DSS and Centrelink 
waiting times, 1996 to 2005
Centrelink
Appointment
Phone
Counter
2003 2005
Sources: Survey instruments outlined in Chapter 10.
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Chart 11.4 shows that waiting times on the phone remain the poorest aspect of service 
delivery, although since the departmental survey of 1996 satisfaction levels have been 
increasing. The increase in phone waiting time satisfaction may be due to advances in 
teleservice centre technology. Waiting times at the counter have dropped by around 
15 percent in 2005, compared to 1996, although this feature is cyclical with high 
satisfaction levels recorded in 2000 and 2003. Satisfaction with appointments remains 
the strongest aspect of waiting times, but this may reflect the element of control that 
Centrelink are able to have in the case of pre-arranged appointments. Centrelink have 
also been able to take advantage of technological advances to streamline the appointment 
system, attach electronic documents to each booked appointment, record the type of 
services that particular staff can provide, when those staff are available, and access the 
next available appointment with the appropriate officer. These factors make comparison 
with DSS difficult as it is likely the department would have introduced similar 
technology-driven changes if it had remained intact.
Registration of job seekers
Prior to the establishment of Centrelink, an unemployed person was required to register 
as unemployed at the CES, then apply for unemployment payments at their local social 
security office. The formation of Centrelink enabled this process to be combined, so the 
assessment of an unemployed person for employment services and their eligibility for 
unemployment payments became integrated. This meant that unemployed people only 
needed to visit one location.
The one-stop shop aspect of the new arrangements was actively promoted by the 
government. In his address at the official launch of Centrelink, the Prime Minister, John 
Howard, stated that:
In the past we have encouraged people to go from one location to another and we have 
often confused them with a lot of administrative duplication. And, in one very big stroke 
Centrelink cuts through that duplication. Centrelink consolidates in an efficient, modem 
fashion the major service delivery activities of the Federal Government 
(Howard, 24 September 1997).
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However, other changes in the delivery of employment services question the one-stop 
shop nature of the arrangements. When the Job Network was introduced, many of the 
services previously undertaken by the CES such as job matching services, job search 
training and intensive assistance, became the responsibility of Job Network members. 
Job seekers were required to register with a Job Network member in order to maintain 
eligibility for unemployment payments and, in many cases, job seekers registered with 
more than one Job Network member in order to access a greater range of vacancies. In 
effect, Centrelink became a first-stop shop for the unemployed and the Job Network 
became a many-stop shop. Other research has recognised the first-stop shop nature of the 
Centrelink arrangements for job seekers (OECD 2001).
The registration process involves visiting Centrelink to claim unemployment payments 
and registering as ‘looking for work’. The process involves an interview to determine job 
seekers’ eligibility for income support and job seekers are issued with a Job Network card 
and provided with information about local employment service providers. Group 
information sessions are also conducted that provide additional information. In addition, 
Centrelink administer a classification instrument to identify job seekers who are 
disadvantaged and may require early access to specialised employment assistance. In the 
early stage of unemployment Centrelink also negotiate a Preparing for Work Agreement 
setting out the job seekers’ responsibilities and the Mutual Obligation activity to be 
undertaken following six months of unemployment. At the completion of the registration 
process a job seeker should understand their participation and obligation requirements, 
the employment services available to them and their rights of review and appeal.
To provide an indication of the quality of the registration process, all surveys, except the 
1993 CES survey, provide ratings for job seekers’ overall satisfaction with the 
registration process. The satisfaction of job seekers to the registration process, as 
indicated in chart 11.5, is reasonably stable and, for the period 1995 to 2002, is situated 
between 72 per cent and 79 per cent. However, in the period since 2002, all three surveys
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have achieved a satisfaction rating for the registration process above 80 per cent. It is 
uncertain if the satisfaction levels in later years reflect improvements in the registration 
process or are a sign of the different survey methodology.
Chart 11.5: Percentage of customers satisfied with the overall registration 
processes of CES and Centrelink, 1995 to 2005
Centrelink
1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Sources: Survey instruments outlined in Chapter 10.
The provision of employment services information
As part of the reformed employment services market, the Job Network replaced the CES 
in the provision of employment assistance. However, as the first point of contact for job 
seekers, Centrelink is responsible for providing job seekers with information about Job 
Network members and the services they provide. Accordingly, this section examines the 
extent that job seekers are satisfied they received a good understanding of the services 
and help available to them.
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The surveys from 1997 until 2005 all ask a sim ilar question o f whether job  seekers are 
satisfied they were given a good understanding o f the employment services available to 
them. However, in the earlier CES surveys o f 1993 and 1995, no such question was 
asked. For 1993, the question chosen as most closely aligning w ith having a good 
understanding o f the employment services available is respondents being asked to think 
about all the information and assistance they had received and whether the information 
was ‘all that they needed to know’ . The options for responses were, ‘yes’ , ‘no’ and 
‘don’ t know’ , w ith only three per cent nominating ‘don’ t know ’ . In the 1995 survey, 
respondents were asked how useful was the information they received, w ith four 
responses providing the choice o f ‘ very useful’ , ‘somewhat useful’ , ‘not that useful’ and 
‘no use at a ll’ .
Chart 11.6: Percentage of customers satisfied with the employment services 
information received from CES and Centrelink, 1993 to 2005
Centelink
Sources: Survey instruments outlined in Chapter 10.
Chart 11.6 shows the percentage o f job seekers who were satisfied w ith the information 
received from Centrelink about the Job Network services available to them has been
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reasonably steady over the period 1998 to 2003, hovering around 70 per cent. Significant 
increases in 2004 and 2005 reflect either the new survey methodology or a period of 
stability following the commencement of the third Employment Services Contract in 
mid-2003 and a settling down of employment policy changes. The figures relating to 
1993 and 1995 relate to different questions and do not provide suitable points for 
comparison. However, the low figure of 54 per cent in 1997 does relate to a comparable 
question that asked job seekers if they were given a good understanding of the range of 
service available to them. It is likely the result for 1997 is reflecting a period of 
uncertainty. At this time, the new employment services market had been announced, but 
not yet commenced and departmental activity was directed towards implementing the 
new arrangements. At the same time, an extensive range of employment programs were 
being abolished, to be cashed out into the employment placement market. Uncertainty 
about the types of labour market programs available to job seekers may have been high 
and partly responsible for the low level of job seekers’ satisfaction recorded in the 1997 
survey.
P rovision  o f inform ation - C hoice of Job N etw ork  Provider
A major design feature of the Job Network is the capacity for job seekers to choose their 
Job Network members. This feature, based on the idea that effective markets operate 
with fully informed consumers making choices, presumes that job seeker choice 
promotes a more effective Job Network because providers compete with one another to 
attract eligible job seekers. The reason for exploring this aspect of service delivery is that 
job seekers’ choice is facilitated by the degree that Centrelink provides appropriate 
information. The issue of job seekers’ choice was not relevant to the CES, so a 
comparative analysis cannot be undertaken. However, this aspect of the Job Network 
arrangements was central to its design, so examining job seekers’ choice of their Job 
Network members is useful.
It should be noted that job seekers’ choice was always moderated by a system able to 
allocate job seekers to specific Job Network members. For example, under the third
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Employment Services Contract, a Job Network member is allocated a specific business 
share of job seekers, although this share does not include ‘Job search support only’, that 
is, job seekers who are generally not in receipt of an unemployment payment. Centrelink 
manages the allocation of job seekers to within 20 per cent of the contracted business 
share. This means the number of job seekers available to the Job Network member is 
between 80 per cent and 120 per cent of the provider’s business share. If a job seeker 
does not nominate a Job Network member within a certain period of time, an automatic 
referral process operates that takes account of a Job Network member’s business share.
The design of a system that is based on the inconsistency between job seekers’ choice 
and contracted business share has been criticised. In a study conducted during the early 
period of the Job Network’s operation, a Job Network member had reached their 
contracted limit well before the end of the contract period and, although able to bring 
forward allocations from subsequent months, the result would be no fee-attracting job 
seekers for the last few months of their contact (Kelly, Lewis, Mulvey, Norris and 
Dockery 1999, p. 27). Despite being a successful provider, the closure of this Job 
Network business was expected to take place when new job seekers were unable to be 
referred to the business.
The job seeker satisfaction surveys do not explore the specific aspect of job seekers 
choosing their Job Network provider. However, a 2002 report from DEWR provides 
some insights (DEWR 2002d). The report indicates that 74 per cent of job search 
training and intensive assistance recipients were satisfied with the information provided 
by Centrelink to help them choose a Job Network member. In terms of the level of 
choice, this was lower than the figures reported in 2001 for job seekers undertaking job 
search training or intensive assistance, as shown in the following chart.
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Chart 11.7: Proportion of job seekers who choose their Job Search Training or 
Intensive Assistance provider, 2001 to 2002
Job Search Training 
Intensive Assistance
2002
Source: DEWR 2002d
The employment department has reported there is some confusion among job seekers 
about the referral process and their right to choose a Job Network member. This 
confusion and lack of choice may be worse for disadvantaged job seekers. Research by 
Abellö and MacDonald (2002) on disadvantaged job seekers found they exercised little 
choice in decisions about who would become their providers and expressed 
powerlessness in having any impact on the quality of service delivery. In terms of the 
quality of information about providers given by Centrelink, job seekers considered this 
very poor and that it often comprised of no more than a name and location details (Abellö 
and MacDonald 2002. p. 58). For disadvantaged job seekers who may be accessing more 
intensive forms of employment assistance, the choice of Job Network provider may be 
even more limited given the specialised assistance these job seekers require.
When job seekers exercise their choice of provider, by far the most common reason for 
choosing a Job Network member is the convenient location. Chart 11.8 shows the 
proportion of job seekers that provided specific reasons for choosing their Job Network 
members.
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Chart 11.8: Reasons for choosing a Job Network member, 2000 to 2002
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It is not surprising that convenient location would be the most common reason for 
choosing a Job Network member, given the costs of transportation and the limited access 
to funds for the unemployed. But, such a choice becomes even less surprising in the 
context that access to information about the performance of Job Network members may 
be difficult to obtain. Jobs Australia (2002), the national peak body representing and 
providing services to not-for-profit Job Network members, is concerned about evidence 
that shows job seekers lack information about provider performance and do not exercise 
choice of provider based on performance information. Similarly, Bruttel (2004) indicates 
that, whilst information in the form of the Job Network Star Ratings system is provided, 
locating this information by welfare recipients may be difficult.
Overall, the research and survey data suggests that job seekers exercising choice in their 
provider is not operating as intended. A more extreme view is that the Job Network
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constitutes a network for governing citizens where the idea of choice is used for its 
fashionable appeal (McDonald, Marston and Buckley 2003, p. 502).
In what could be viewed as a limitation on job seekers’ choice of provider, the third 
Employment Services Contract introduced arrangements that require job seekers to 
remain attached to a single Job Network member for the entire duration of their 
unemployment. Furthermore, if a job seeker exits the system and then returns within 12 
months from the date of payment cancellation, they return to this same Job Network 
member. A job seeker is only able to change providers in limited circumstances, for 
example, in the case of an irretrievable breakdown in the relationship or where the job 
seeker changes location. Such rules make the choice of Job Network member more 
critical for job seekers.
The Productivity Commission’s final report into the Job Network (2002) notes the 
absence of publicly available data on job seekers’ choice is symptomatic of a lack of 
transparency. Additionally, the Commission notes conflict in the figures surrounding the 
choice of job seekers. DEWR has indicated that 56 percent of job seekers choose their 
provider (lower than the 71 per cent in 2002 indicated in the departmental publication 
that provided the data in chart 11.7), whereas Centrelink informed the Commission that 
only 20 per cent of job seekers choose their providers. Along similar lines, a number of 
providers suggested to the Commission the employment department’s data on job 
seekers’ choice was at variance with their experiences. Organisations such as Jobs 
Australia, Job Futures, Salvation Army Employment Plus and Un(der)employed People’s 
Movement Against Poverty, all considered that job seekers rarely exercise choice in their 
Job Network provider. Ultimately, the Commission estimated that around 30 per cent of 
job seekers choose their providers.
Finally, findings from an ANAO performance audit (2005e) cast doubt on the 
information provided by Centrelink to assist job seekers in making an informed choice 
about their provider. The ANAO undertook an indicative assessment of the quality of 
such information from four Centrelink customer service centres and found that
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information provided in seminars and in display areas was “variable, often poor, and did 
not meet minimum requirements speeified in the Business Partnership Agreement’’ 
(ANAO 2005e, p. 21). Furthermore, the information sessions for job seekers were often 
conducted after job seekers had decided on their Job Network provider.
While the absence of recent data on job seekers’ choice of their Job Network member is 
disappointing, it also raises concerns that aspects of the employment services reform that 
are not operating as intended are not fully disclosed.
Self-help facilities
Another means for measuring the effectiveness of Centrelink in providing employment 
assistance to job seekers is examining satisfaction with self-help facilities. While the Job 
Network replaced most of the employment services provided by the CES, Centrelink 
formed the basis of the first tier of job search support with the availability of self-help 
services. These services include information about Job Network members to facilitate 
job seekers’ choice, general information about other relevant services, such as migrant 
services, and additional job search assistance including the use of free resources such as 
telephones, fax machines, photocopiers, newspapers and computers for preparing and 
printing job applications.
The key element of the self-help facilities is a national vacancy database available via 
touchscreens. The database contains a range of open vacancies providing full details of 
jobs including the contact information for employers and closed vacancies requiring 
applicants to be screened before referral. Comparing the self-help facilities of Centrelink 
with the assistance available from the CES would be inappropriate. The availability of 
touchscreen technology was in its early stages of development when the CES was being 
abolished and the previous system involving job cards placed on job boards is too 
dissimilar. As such, it would be incorrect to attribute the Job Network with the 
introduction of the touchscreen technology and the national vacancy database. The
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introduction of these systems would have taken place regardless of whether the reformed 
employment services were introduced. For example, by mid-1996, shortly following the 
change of government, more than 2200 touchscreens had been installed in CES offices.
Nevertheless, as this aspect of Centrelink’s service has replaced the initial level of 
assistance provided by the CES and as self-help facilities remain a component of the 
customer satisfaction index used by the department to assess overall customer 
satisfaction, it is appropriate to consider. Paradoxically, while the job seeker satisfaction 
surveys pose questions relating to the self-help facilities, qualitative research for the 1997 
CES survey found that customers perceive self-service as ‘no service’. However, these 
perceptions fail to recognise the organisations must provide the facilities, maintain them 
and assist job seekers with using the facilities when required.
Touchscreen technology was an aspect of self-help service that was being developed in 
the 1990s. The 1995 CES survey of job seekers notes how several job seekers expressed 
frustration with the inaccuracies on job cards that were placed on job boards. Job cards 
were often out of date and contained insufficient information to enable job seekers to 
determine their eligibility for a particular job. It was hoped the introduction of 
touchscreen technology would solve some of these problems, with access to a far wider 
pool of vacancies and additional information about the positions. Responses from a 1995 
qualitative study of job seekers from an office where the touchscreens were being trialed, 
were all positive.
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Chart 11.9: Percentage of customers satisfied with Centrelines self-help facilities, 
1999 to 2005
100 t
2004 20052002 2003
Sources: Survey instruments outlined in Chapter 10.
Chart 11.9 indicates that satisfaction with the self-help facilities at Centrelink has been at 
consistently high levels throughout the period 1999 to 2005. However, these figures are 
not straightforward. A 2002 DEWR (2002e) survey of self-help facilities indicates that 
while the majority of job seekers had used touch screens (76 per cent), there had been an 
increase over the previous year of job seekers who had never used the facilities. This 
trend continues and despite the high level of satisfaction in 2005, only 44.5 per cent of 
job seekers were using the touchscreens, compared with 83.2 percent in 2001. One of 
the reasons for the decreased usage would be the increase in access to the Internet both in 
the home and public places such as libraries. However, another reason may have to do 
with the reliability of information available on the jobs database. In 2002, of the job 
seekers who had used touchscreens, 25 per cent indicated the job was no longer available, 
19 percent said the information about job vacancies was not up to date and 18 percent 
were not satisfied that enough information was available to decide if the job was suitable.
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Studies of the Job Network have been critical of the quality of information on the 
national vacancy database. Perhaps as a result of the difficulty in making profits under 
job matching services, and the incentives that outcome payments provide, Job Network 
members have been found to engage in improper practices with the technology. For 
example, Kelly, Lewis, Dockery and Mulvey (2001, p. 25) found that vacancies may be 
listed more than once and it is not apparent to job seekers that a multiple listing is 
occurring. Also, phantom jobs may be listed when jobs are already occupied, but the 
listings are required in order to attract outcome payments. Finally, Job Network 
members may hoard vacancies until a job seeker is registered with them that suits the job 
description (McNally 2003, 16). It would appear that whether a jobs vacancy system 
operates manually or electronically, the benefits are only as good as the processes 
established to maintain, update and monitor the quality of the information provided.
In due course, the job search facilities provided in Centrelink offices have been scaled 
down. In 2003, under the third Employment Services Contract, the facilities enabling job 
seekers to undertake job searching were to be established by all Job Network members. 
These facilities include touchscreen kiosks for job seekers to search for employment, 
maintain resumes on-line and check the outcome of automatic job matches. Telephones 
are also required to be available as well as the capacity to print professional resumes. In 
recognition of this, the 2004 and 2005 surveys, limit the self-help facilities questions 
specifically to touchscreens.
Administration of the activity test
In announcing the proposed reforms to employment assistance, the government 
considered some key results from international research. This research discussed the role 
of income support eligibility and its influence on the effectiveness of active labour 
market policies. The main feature of these policies was the application of benefit 
sanctions to compel job seekers to actively engage in job searching and any other 
additional requirements (Vanstone 1996, p. 7).
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At the commencement of the Job Network, the social security legislation contained 
provisions that required job seekers to enter into activity agreements. Job seekers risked 
financial penalties such as reduced or complete loss of payment, if they did not comply 
with the terms of their activity agreements. However, activity agreements did not apply 
to all job seekers. For example, Return to Work Plans operated under these provisions of 
the legislation, but only applied to long-term unemployed job seekers who were being 
case managed.
Given the emphasis under the Job Network of active participation, the Coalition 
government introduced a range of measures designed to require job seekers’ 
participation. For example, Preparing for Work Agreements were introduced using the 
same legislative provisions that supported the Return to Work Plans. However, Preparing 
for Work Agreements are required of all unemployed job seekers from commencement 
on the unemployment payment, unless the job seeker is exempt for reasons such as being 
temporarily incapacitated. The government also introduced a ‘Job Seeker Diary’ for the 
first three months duration of unemployment that is checked each fortnight and has 
increased the number of jobs that job seekers need to apply for. Another example is the 
Mutual Obligation Initiative that requires a person, who has been receiving 
unemployment payments for six months, to undertake an activity for a specified number 
of hours and period. The standard involvement is 30 hours per fortnight over a period of 
around six months.
As a result of the emphasis on active participation and the increased requirements placed 
upon job seekers, Centrelink’s role in oversighting a job seeker’s obligations and 
imposing financial sanctions for non-compliance has become more involved than when 
services were delivered by DSS and the CES. Job Network members are also able to 
monitor a job seeker’s participation and inform Centrelink if a job seeker is not compliant 
with their obligations. As a result, dramatic increases in the number of sanctions took 
place and, in the first four years of the operation of Centrelink, financial penalties
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imposed on job  seekers rose by 220 per cent. Table 11.3 outlines the number o f breaches 
that were applied in this period.
Table 11.3: Breach numbers, 1997-98 to 2000-01
Year 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01
No. of 
breaches
120,718 165,492 223,350 386,946
Sources: FaCS Annual reports
The different emphasis placed upon job  seekers’ participation and obligation 
requirements under the Job Network make comparisons o f the framework operating 
before and after the Job Network d ifficu lt. However, the role o f Centrelink in ensuring 
that job seekers understand their obligations, the consequences o f non-compliance and 
their rights o f appeal are sim ilar to the former role o f the CES. The fo llow ing chart 
indicates that job  seekers’ knowledge o f their rights and obligations has generally been 
high. The decline in 1997 may reflect the introduction o f active labour market policies 
and the period when obligations were less certain.
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Chart 11.10: Percentage of job seekers satisfied with the information provided by 
CES and Centrelink about rules and responsibilities, 1993 to 2005
Centrelink
q. 70
2003 2004
Sources: Survey instruments outlined in Chapter 10.
With apparently high levels of job seekers understanding their participation requirements 
and the possible consequence of a sanction for non-compliance, it is interesting to reflect 
on the substantial increase in the number of breaches being imposed following the 
commencement of active labour market policies.
Whilst the expansion of requirements placed upon job seekers increased during the early 
period of the Howard government, the figures relating to job seekers’ knowledge of the 
rules and their responsibilities, as shown in chart 11.10, indicate a high degree of 
awareness. This would suggest the reasons for the increase in breach numbers is not a 
result of job seekers’ lack of knowledge about the requirements placed upon them, but 
may be due to other factors. For example, breaching may be used by some providers to 
re-engage job seekers. In this process, marginalised job seekers are compelled through 
the breaching regime to re-engage with their Job Network providers and this may result
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in job placements and consequent outcome payments for Job Network members. 
Moreover, the breach recommendations of Job Network members are downplayed as 
Centrelink make the final breach decisions and, from the job seekers’ perspective, 
Centrelink is held responsible for any hardships these breaches impose.
A number of internal and external investigations into the high levels of breaching took 
place in 2001 and 2002. However, prior to the conclusions of these investigations, and 
the consequent modifications to the breaching policies that were recommended and 
adopted, the level of breaches began dropping dramatically. Following the peak of 
breach number in 2000-01 of around 387,000, the numbers dropped to around 260,000 in 
2001-02 and declined further to around 100,000 in 2002-03. These breach reductions 
were unusual given they occurred without substantial changes taking place to 
participation requirements and prior to the recommendations of the breaching reviews 
being fully implemented. It appears that when welfare groups, the media and 
government expressed concerns about the high levels of breaching, the levels began to 
decline.
One suggestion for the fluctuation in the number of breaches is that Centrelink staff 
applied a strict interpretation of the active employment policies promoted by the 
government during the early period of these changes, then responded to the strong 
criticisms of the impact of these policies on highly disadvantaged job seekers by reducing 
the number of breaches applied. This suggestion indicates the high level of discretion 
available to Centrelink staff in the decision to apply a breach and, therefore, the 
possibility that inconsistent breaching decisions are applied to unemployed people. Other 
research supports the inconsistent application of breaching decisions and the implications 
this has for the overall fairness and equity of the process (Bigby and Files 2003).
Overall satisfaction
To conclude this chapter, the survey findings that measure the overall satisfaction of job 
seekers to Centrelink’s employment services are examined. The following chart provides
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a number of alternative satisfaction measurements for job seekers. These measurements 
have been taken from the following sources:
• C E S - 1993 to 1995;
• D SS-1996;
• DEWR -  overall satisfaction measures from 1997 to 2005;
• DEWR -  customer satisfaction index from 2000 to 2005; and
• Centrelink -  overall satisfaction measures (‘all’ customers and ‘employment 
payments only’ customers) from 1997 to 2004.
The Centrelink data is derived from national customer satisfaction surveys that 
Centrelink undertake in November each year of around 1600 customers. Centrelink 
commissions a market research company to undertake these surveys via telephone calls to 
customers. Although recent contact with Centrelink is not a requirement of the surveys, 
the interviews are done with ‘current’ Centrelink customers and, as unemployment 
payments are based on the stimulus of lodging a continuation claim form, these 
customers would have been in recent contact with Centrelink. The Centrelink survey 
data was obtained through a Freedom of Information request.
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Chart 11.11: Percentage of job seekers satisfied with the overall employment 
services of CES/DSS and Centrelink, 1993 to 2005
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Chart 11.11 shows the overall ratings o f job seekers’ satisfaction with Centrelink services 
obtained from the numerous surveys the different organisations have undertaken. The 
results from the DEWR surveys that measure satisfaction are not that dissimilar from the 
results o f the DEWR customer satisfaction index. A reason for this has been suggested 
earlier and this proposed that the two methods for measuring satisfaction reflect similar 
perceptions about the same service attributes. However, data from the Centrelink surveys 
shows a lower level of satisfaction, with ‘employment payment’ customers generally less 
satisfied than ‘a ll’ Centrelink customers.
The difference in the levels of overall satisfaction between Centrelink data and data from 
DEWR is the most interesting feature to emerge from chart 11.11. The overall 
satisfaction levels are generally much lower in the Centrelink data. For example, in the
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years 1998 and 2000, the Centrelink surveys record levels of overall satisfaction almost 
20 percentage points lower than the levels of overall satisfaction determined by the 
DEWR surveys.
Also, it is often the case that the Centrelink and DEWR sets of satisfaction data move in 
the opposite direction. For instance, from 1997 to 1998, the overall satisfaction of 
Centrelink’s unemployment customers declines from 71 per cent to 63 per cent, while the 
level of satisfaction from DEWR’s survey of job seekers increases from 77 percent to 
84 per cent. In the following year, overall satisfaction from Centrelink’s data increases 
from 63 per cent to 70 per cent, while the satisfaction level from the employment 
department’s data declines from 84 per cent to 75 per cent. In every year when the 
survey data on overall satisfaction is available from the two organisations, the levels 
move in opposite directions, except for the period between 2000 and 2001, when the 
employment department’s data on level of overall satisfaction remains stable at 
79 per cent while Centrelink’s data shows an increase from 62 per cent to 70 per cent.
To make sense of the variations in the different measurements of overall satisfaction, the 
questions asked in each of the surveys are compared. Where possible, table 11.4 
illustrates the overall satisfaction questions asked in the different surveys.
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Table 11.4: Overall satisfaction questions asked in the surveys, 1993 to 2005
Year DSS survey CES surveys
1993 Now thinking of the service that you 
have been given by the CES, overall 
have you been satisfied or 
dissatisfied with that service?
1995 Now thinking of the service that you 
have been given by the CES, overall 
how satisfied are you with that 
service?
1996 Thinking about all your experiences 
dealing with DSS, how would you rate 
the overall quality of the ir people, 
services and information?
Centrelink surveys DEWR surveys
1997 Thinking about all your experiences 
dealing with Centrelink, how would 
you rate the overall quality of their 
people, services and information?
Questionnaire not provided
1998 as above Overall, how satisfied are you with 
the standard of service you get at 
Centrelink?
1999 as above Q uestionnaire not provided
2000 as above Thinking now about all aspects of 
the em ploym ent services provided 
by Centrelink, would you say that 
overall you were satisfied or 
dissatisfied?
2001 as above as above
2002 as above as above
2003 as above Now thinking about the em ploym ent 
services provided by Centrelink, 
overall, to what extent were you 
satisfied or dissatisfied?
2004 as above Thinking about the services 
provided by Centrelink, overall, to 
what extent were you satisfied or 
dissatisfied?
2005 as above
The questions are reasonably similar, although the Centrelink surveys direct respondents 
to consider the overall quality o f the ‘people, services and information o f Centrelink’ , 
whereas the DEWR surveys question respondents more generally about either the 
‘employment services provided by Centrelink’ or the ‘services provided by Centrelink’ .
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In this regard, the Audit Office comments on the questionnaire quality of Centrelink’s 
surveys and suggests the overall satisfaction question is too long, comprising several 
parts, and is difficult for customers to respond effectively (ANAO 2005b). However, it is 
not apparent the differences between Centrelink’s results and the employment 
department’s results and the movements of satisfaction levels in sometimes opposing 
directions are due to variations in the questions that are being asked.
An alternative explanation may be found in the methodologies by which the surveys are 
conducted. The ANAO (2005e) investigation into the job seeker omnibus surveys 
conducted by DEWR found the surveys to be of high-quality and involving systematic 
client research. A more detailed examination by the Audit Office into Centrelink’s 
customer satisfaction surveys was more critical of the methodologies (ANAO 2005b). 
However, some of the criticisms applying to Centrelink’s surveys seem equally 
applicable to the employment department’s surveys. For example, the Audit Office raises 
concerns with the sample validity of the Centrelink surveys commenting on the non­
response issues that are a feature of telephone interviewing, such as not being able to 
contact homeless people, those with a drug or alcohol dependency problem, or those 
customers that have no phone or a silent number. Such sample validity concerns are 
equally applicable to the job seeker omnibus surveys undertaken by DEWR, which also 
use telephone interviews to obtain data.
Turning to the customer satisfaction literature to make sense of the variations within and 
between the different organisations’ job seeker surveys, a clear message emerges about 
the impacts that multiple factors bring to these measurements. The program policies, 
methods of delivery and the economic and political environments, are not constants, but 
shift and change particularly during a period following large-scale reform such as with 
the establishment of Centrelink and the Job Network. In a similar manner, the customer 
satisfaction literature cautions researchers that customer satisfaction measurements are 
not an accurate reflection of an objective truth. Rather, numerous and intangible
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elements function in complex interactions to form perceptions of service quality for 
which customer satisfaction measurements offer broad insights.
Given the nature of services delivered and the customer groups these services are 
provided to (income support and employment programs to jobless people) the levels of 
satisfaction are perhaps surprisingly high and generally within the “rule of thumb” range 
of 65 per cent to 85 per cent of customers satisfied regardless of the service surveyed 
(DEETYA, 1996b). Overall, throughout the evaluation period, while the different 
surveys indicate variable levels of satisfaction for the same periods, this reflects the 
difficulty of devising methods for measuring customer satisfaction that can objectively 
indicate a highly subjective attribute.
Merging the results
In drawing together the results of the job seeker satisfaction surveys and providing a 
broad longitudinal picture, chart 11.12 combines the data that has been displayed in the 
preceding charts. That is, each of the service attributes plotted in the previous charts of 
this chapter are incorporated into a single chart. As such, each data series in chart 11.12 
is not intended for separate scrutiny as this information has already been provided in 
detail, together with commentary. The consolidated chart 11.12 is provided to enable the 
observation of any patterns that may emerge from the different attributes of satisfaction 
that have been measured.
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Chart 11.12: Consolidation of DSS/CES and Centrelink satisfaction ratings
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Note: Legend not repeated as Chart provides a consolidated picture.
The data provided in chart 11.12 identifies a number of features. Generally, the 
satisfaction levels are grouped between the standard 65 per cent to 85 per cent of 
customers satisfied, supporting the literature that notes satisfaction surveys tend to be 
skewed, with results biased towards the upper end of the satisfaction scale and few scores 
occurring towards the lower end (Brown and Swartz 1989; Elam and Ritchie 1996; 
Fomell 1992). In chart 11.12, the very low levels of job seekers’ satisfaction relate to 
waiting times on the phone and improvements for this item would require significant 
outlays and staff resources to ensure prompt responses.
The most notable feature of chart 11.12 is that up until 2002, the satisfaction levels of job 
seekers commonly varies within a range, with no general trend observed. During this 
time, the percentage of job seekers satisfied with specific service aspects may increase or 
decrease up to 10 percentage points from one survey to the next. However, in the final 
three years for when the survey data is gathered, 2003 to 2005, a distinct upward trend in 
satisfaction for most items occurs. This suggests either a trend of more satisfied job
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seekers or the impact of the different survey methodology that commenced with the job 
seeker omnibus survey in 2003 and continued through to the 2005 survey.
An upward trend in job seekers’ satisfaction would be the most desirable outcome for 
Centrelink and endorse improvements in service effectiveness arising out of the new 
public management approach that recommends separating policy from delivery. 
However, attributing this upward trend in satisfaction to the structural reform that came 
from the establishment of Centrelink would encounter difficulties. For example, other 
influences, such as the stronger economic growth that has lowered unemployment, would 
also need to be considered for its impact on job seekers’ levels of satisfaction.
A different view is that job seekers’ levels of satisfaction have not undergone a recent 
upward trend, but that different survey methodologies are responsible. In this context, 
the variations between the satisfaction surveys’ Findings that predate the 2003 survey 
reflect the involvement of different market research companies and the associated 
differences in questionnaire designs, methodologies and analyses that are involved. In 
the same vein, from the 2003 survey and onwards, the similarities in the surveys’ findings 
reflect the involvement of the same research company and the application of the same 
survey instruments. Indeed, for the later surveys, the research company often explains 
variations in the findings from the earlier surveys as reflecting changes to the questions 
asked in the survey instruments. An argument that supports the survey methodologies of 
the 2003 to 2005 surveys being responsible for the upward and maintained trend in job 
seekers’ satisfaction is because the increases occur in almost all of the service attributes 
measured. A more reasonable outcome for the omnibus surveys would be for increases 
in satisfaction to take place in specific areas of service delivery where improvements may 
have been implemented. The earlier and unrelated job seeker surveys reduce the chance 
of survey bias distorting the results and suggest the findings from numerous robust 
surveys may present a more realistic picture of the range of customer satisfaction that is 
possible. In this way, the disconnection between the survey methodologies prior to 2003 
becomes a positive element, with the variations between the satisfaction findings of
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various surveys that employ valid and reliable methods as indicating a general range of 
possible satisfaction outcomes.
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to examine data relating to the satisfaction of job seekers 
to the services that deliver income support and employment assistance over a period 
when the delivery of these services underwent significant change. The chapter sought to 
determine if improvements in effectiveness, as measured by end-user satisfaction, 
improve with the introduction of a new delivery structure.
In focusing specifically on Centrelink, this chapter examined the results of survey 
instruments dating from 1986 through to 2005. Prior to 2003, no trend either upward or 
downward in customer satisfaction across a range of service elements, and in terms of 
overall satisfaction, is apparent. However, in the 2003 survey, an upward trend in 
satisfaction for most items occurs and the following two surveys maintain these high 
levels of customer satisfaction. Whilst these later results imply more satisfied job 
seekers, and this may reflect positively on the reformed delivery arrangements, the 
weight of other possibilities, such as biases in the survey methodologies and contrary 
findings from other surveys, undertaken during the same period, suggest the increase in 
job seekers’ satisfaction ratings is subject to some degree of question.
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Chapter Twelve
Chapter 12: The service effectiveness of the 
Job Network
As with the previous chapter, this chapter draws together the findings of the survey 
instruments described in Chapter 10 and develops numerous charts and tables that seek to 
determine possible trends in job seekers’ satisfaction levels with employment services 
over the period when the government delivery of these services was replaced with private 
sector providers.
A common feature with the surveys is the use of regression and factor analysis to 
determine the key drivers of satisfaction. Throughout the 12-year period the surveys 
span, these drivers of satisfaction remain constant. For example, the 1993 CES survey 
found the most important aspect in determining job seekers’ overall satisfaction levels 
was an improvement in the chances of gaining employment. Other important aspects 
related to staff attributes, such as promptness of service, courteousness of staff and the 
quality of information, including accuracy and timeliness. Similarly, at the other end of 
the evaluation period, the 2005 survey identifies the two primary contributors to job 
seekers’ satisfaction levels as comprising job seekers’ confidence their Job Network 
member will assist them in finding work and the perceived treatment provided by staff. 
Four secondary contributors of job seekers’ satisfaction levels in 2005 also correspond 
closely to the important drivers of satisfaction determined in 1993 survey. These
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secondary contributors relate to information handling and provision, knowledge about 
rights and responsibilities, job seekers feeling comfortable about discussing personal 
information and satisfaction with touchscreens. Given the importance of these service 
delivery aspects to job seekers, this chapter will examine the survey results for job 
seekers’ confidence their Job Network members have improved their employability, the 
level of their treatment by staff, information quality and overall satisfaction 
measurements.
In addition, a number of the survey instruments differentiate respondents according to 
whether the employment service they are receiving involves job matching, job search 
training or intensive assistance. These surveys recognise the perceptions of job seekers 
are based on their experiences of very different types of services and that these services 
also relate to their length of unemployment or their assessed level of disadvantage. 
Where possible, the analysis in this chapter classifies job seekers’ satisfaction levels 
according to the employment service that is received.
C onfidence in Job N etw ork  m em ber
To gain insight into the confidence that job seekers have with their Job Network 
members, this section examines the confidence that job seekers have in their providers 
being able to improve their chances of gaining employment and increase job seekers’ 
levels of motivation.
The provision of employment services presupposes that forms of assistance will be 
offered that improve overall employability and reduce dependency on income support. 
An important component of such services relates to the way in which providers are able 
to maintain job seekers’ confidence in themselves, improve their levels of motivation and 
use this to secure tangible employment outcomes.
Research commissioned by DEWR (2001c) into job seeker attitudinal segmentation 
identifies job seekers on the basis of their motivational characteristics. The links between
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the segments and the type of job search activities engaged in are outlined and conclusions 
are established that position job seekers into a behavioural change model. The role of Job 
Network members in targeting the appropriate assistance to guide job seekers into a 
segment that is highly job motivated and open to all employment opportunities links 
strongly into service aspects that improve job seekers’ self-confidence and belief in their 
Job Network members’ ability, and the job seekers’ own capacity, to find paid 
employment.
Motivation
A number of attributes are gathered that seek to measure satisfaction related to the 
encouragement shown by employment service providers. The following chart 
demonstrates three attributes related to job seekers’ satisfaction with their Job Network 
member:
• having familiarity with the local labour market;
• helping job seekers stay motivated to find work; and
• improving job seekers’ self confidence.
Chart 12.1 is able to track these service aspects back to the 1997 CES survey, but only for 
intensive assistance services. Although this data is also gathered in later surveys for job 
matching and job search training services, there are no survey results that enable 
comparisons with delivery by the CES.
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Chart 12.1: Aspects related to job seekers’ confidence in and motivation from their 
employment service providers (intensive assistance services),
1997 to 2005
Job Network
cl 70
-■— Familiar with local market 
-♦— Providing motivation 
-A— Improving self-confidence
55
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Sources: Survey instruments outlined in Chapter 10.
Chart 12.1 shows that over the period 1997 to 2005, for intensive assistance services the 
satisfaction of job seekers with their Job Network members’ ability to maintain or 
improve their motivation has undergone cycles of decline and improvement, by 
sometimes significant amounts. The lower satisfaction level recorded by job seekers is 
for their Job Network members’ efforts in improving their self-confidence. In 1999, a 
year following the commencement of the Job Network, job seekers’ satisfaction level 
with their employment service providers improving their self-confidence was only 
57 percent. While this level of satisfaction climbed to 74 percent in 2003, a decline to 
64 per cent in 2004 was followed by a satisfaction level of 67 per cent in 2005. The 
results for Job Network members providing job seekers with motivation varies between a 
low of 72 per cent of job seekers’ satisfied in 1999 to a high of 85 per cent in 2003. By 
2005, 78 per cent of job seekers were satisfied with their Job Network members’ ability 
to provide them with motivation. Across all surveys there are high levels of job seekers’ 
satisfaction in the familiarity of their employment services providers with the local labour 
market.
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In terms of improving self-confidence, the results in chart 12.1 suggest that intensive 
assistance might be struggling to assist the most disadvantaged of job seekers who have 
the most to gain from behavioural and motivational interventions. These interventions, 
that do not initially lead to gaining employment, but are on the pathway to eventual 
independence from income support, go largely unrewarded in an outcomes-based system, 
such as the Job Network, that is predominantly rewarded by sustained employment as an 
outcome. The issue of tangible outcomes is examined by Kerr, Carson and Goddard 
(2002) in a study that explores the impact of the Job Network on mature-age job seekers. 
These authors describe the case of an employment assistance agency offering specialised 
services since 1984 to the older unemployed. However, as a result of being unable to 
satisfy the employment outcome requirements of the Job Network, this agency ceased 
operating and the valuable counselling services it provided to mature aged jobless people 
ended.
Interestingly, those job seekers receiving intensive assistance services tend to rate higher 
levels of satisfaction with their Job Network members than job seekers receiving job 
matching or job search training. This seems paradoxical given that intensive assistance 
job seekers are the more disadvantaged of job seekers and would be expected to have 
lower levels of confidence in the system. However, these results fit neatly with the 
customer satisfaction literature that suggests customers with lower levels of expectations, 
as would be expected from job seekers in intensive assistance, are more satisfied with 
lower levels of service quality. Combined with the increased levels of assistance 
available within intensive assistance services, the additional attention may serve to 
increase overall levels of satisfaction with service providers.
Gaining employment
From the earliest job seeker satisfaction surveys in 1993, the question has been asked 
whether job seekers agree the services provided have improved their chances of gaining 
employment. Chart 12.2 shows significant increases have occurred in the overall levels
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of job seekers’ satisfaction that their employment service provider will improve their 
chances of gaining employment. The dotted line, signifying overall satisfaction, 
increases from 49 per cent in 1993 to 70 per cent in 2005 (note: the figure for 2001 was 
not provided). Where possible, the chart includes the satisfaction levels for the different 
employment services, although case management (CES)/intensive assistance (Job 
Network) is the only service for which satisfaction levels are provided for the entire 
period.
Chart 12.2: Job seekers’ satisfaction with employment service providers 
improving their chance of employment, 1993 - 2005
Job Netw ork
—  —  Overall
-■— Job Matching
- h -----Job Search Training
-♦-----Intensive Support
2004
Sources: Survey instruments outlined in Chapter 10.
Before judging the results as a success for the Job Network, the questions underlying the 
measurements across the different surveys are considered. In 1993 and 1995, the surveys 
asked job seekers if they thought the services provided had improved their chances of 
getting a job and ‘yes’ ‘no’ or ‘can’t say’ were possible responses. For 1997 and 1999, 
the survey questionnaires were not provided. However, the survey analysis in 1997 
reports a response of 38 per cent of job seekers ‘agreeing’ or ‘strongly agreeing’ to the
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statement that ‘the services provided by the CES would not improve their chances o f 
finding a job ’ . This figure was subtracted from 100 to provide the 62 per cent that is used 
in chart 12.2 for the overall satisfaction rating in 1997.
In 2001, the overall satisfaction rate was not provided, perhaps because the survey 
questionnaire only asked job seekers in intensive assistance or job search training, ‘to 
what extent do you agree or disagree that overall the help you received from [Job 
Network agency] improved your chances of getting a job?’ . For those job seekers in job 
matching services, the 2001 survey examined the relationship between satisfaction and 
specific actions of Job Network members and concluded that job seekers were more 
likely to be satisfied the more proactive their provider was. For example, 96 per cent of 
job seekers in job matching services were satisfied with their providers when they had 
received help preparing for a job interview. In contrast, the least satisfied job seekers 
(36 per cent) had registered with their providers because of an interest in an advertised 
job, but had received no reply to their resumes.
From 2003, when the job seeker omnibus survey commences, all respondents are asked 
the same questions in the same way and this enables a comparison of the three major 
services of the Job Network and an overall rating of the degree to which job seekers agree 
their providers improved their chances of getting a job. The following table shows the 
questions asked in the 1993 and 1995 surveys and compares this to the 2003 to 2005 
surveys.
Table 12.1: Question comparison -  Improving chances of gaining employment
1993 and 1995 surveys 2003 to 2005 surveys
Do you th ink tha t the  se rv ices  provided by 
the CES have im proved you r chances of 
ge tting  a job?
(yes /no /can ’t say)
To w hat ex ten t do you agree o r d isag ree  
tha t overa ll the  help you rece ived  from  [Job 
N etw ork agency] im proved you r ch ances  
of getting  a job?
(s trong ly  a g re e /ag ree /ne ithe r a g re e  nor 
d isag ree /d isag ree /s tong ly  d is a g re e /d o n ’t 
know  o r ca n ’t rem em ber)
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The differences in these questions is apparent —the 2003 to 2005 surveys are 
presupposing that help has been received and this suggestion may prompt more job 
seekers to express satisfaction. Also, the greater range of responses in the later surveys 
provides the opportunity for job seekers to agree with the statement, but not strongly 
agree. These differences make it difficult for the results to be directly compared and 
conclusions developed about whether job seekers are more satisfied with Job Network 
members improving their chances of gaining employment.
Treatment by staff
Consistent with the customer satisfaction literature, job seekers’ perceptions of the 
attitudes and behaviours of staff are continuously ranked as a key determinant of 
satisfaction. While treatment by staff has always been an aspect of service examined in 
the satisfaction surveys, the questions asked over time are too dissimilar to enable direct 
comparison. Table 12.2 provides an indication of the types of questions that examine 
staff attributes across the different surveys and compares the responses in these surveys.
318
Ta
bl
e 
12
.2
: 
Jo
b 
se
ek
er
s’
 p
er
ce
pt
io
ns
 o
f s
ta
ff 
se
rv
ic
e 
as
pe
ct
s 
of
 th
e 
C
ES
 a
nd
 t
he
 J
ob
 N
et
w
or
k
20
05
CO00 CD00 CD CDN-
y
20
04
CM00 CD00 CD r^ -Is-
O 0a
0  '43
Z  co 
oO 5^
20
03
O00 0000 oCD 0000 00Is-
20
01
00CD CMCD CMCD CD00 CMCD
19
99
N-
CD
or-. Is-00 LDCD CDCD
C
om
m
on
w
ea
lth
 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
Se
rv
ic
e 
(%
 s
at
is
fie
d)
19
97
CDCD CO00 CDCD
19
95
CD CDh- or- oCD
CD00 h-00
19
93
CO CDCD IDCD 00 CO00 O00
Q
ue
st
io
n/
S
ta
te
m
en
t
St
af
f a
re
 
kn
ow
le
dg
ea
bl
e
St
af
f a
re
 p
ro
m
pt
St
af
f a
re
 c
on
si
de
ra
te
 o
f 
cl
ie
nt
 n
ee
ds
St
af
f a
re
 c
ou
rte
ou
s
St
af
f a
re
 fr
ie
nd
ly
St
af
f t
ak
e 
yo
ur
 n
ee
ds
 
in
to
 a
cc
ou
nt
St
af
f k
no
w
 w
ha
t t
he
y 
ar
e 
do
in
g
St
af
f a
re
 h
el
pf
ul
Is 
a 
fa
ir 
an
d 
re
as
on
ab
le
 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n
Is 
re
lia
bl
e 
an
d 
co
ns
is
te
nt
Tr
ea
te
d 
fa
irl
y
Tr
ea
te
d 
w
ith
 r
es
pe
ct
Tr
ea
te
d 
lik
e 
a 
pe
rs
on
 
no
t a
 n
um
be
r
Ac
te
d 
qu
ic
kl
y 
to
 m
ee
t 
ne
ed
s
R
es
po
ns
e 
sc
al
e
19
93
 to
 1
99
5 
= 
4 
po
in
t s
ca
le
19
97
 =
 4
 p
oi
nt
 
sc
al
e
(1
99
9 
no
 s
ca
le
 
pr
ov
id
ed
)
20
01
 (
JS
T 
an
d 
IA
 
se
rv
ic
es
 o
nl
y)
= 
4 
po
in
t s
ca
le
20
03
 to
 2
00
5 
= 
5 
po
in
t s
ca
le
31
9
Chapter Twelve
Reflecting on the type of questions asked about staff attitudes and behaviours, it is 
interesting to consider the changes over time that are demonstrated in table 12.2. The 
questions in the earlier surveys are more direct, relate to a single staff quality and deal 
with only six aspects — courteousy, friendliness, promptness, consideration of needs, 
knowledge and helpfulness. In the job seeker omnibus surveys commencing in 2003, the 
number of questions relating to staff dealings have expanded to 14 aspects and the 
questions are less straightforward. For example, in the earlier surveys, the question about 
prompt service simply states whether staff were prompt. In comparison, the later surveys 
ask a double barreled question that seeks to determine whether staff acted quickly to meet 
the job seekers’ needs. This latter question deals with both speed of service delivery and 
achievement of outcomes. Respondents may be confused about their responses if staff 
acted quickly, but didn’t fulfil their needs, or when staff performed slowly, but the job 
seekers’ needs were met.
Also, the qualities of staff being friendly and courteous are not covered in the later 
surveys. Rather, the later surveys ask job seekers about being treated with respect and 
being treated as a person and not a number. Perhaps the respectful treatment of job 
seekers is analogous to friendly and courteous treatment, but a service experience can be 
provided respectfully, without a friendly attitude.
Often, the questions relating to staff service aspects appear similar, but the questions may 
incorporate subtle changes that place different meanings and interpretations on the 
responses provided and diminish the capacity to use the data for comparative purposes. 
Taken individually, the surveys overall indicate reasonable levels of job seekers’ 
satisfaction with the attitudes and behaviours of staff. The poorest satisfaction results 
relate to the 1997 survey, but this may be explained by the announcement and 
implementation of the new service delivery arrangements and the disruption to staff and 
the subsequent flow-on effect for service performance this is likely to have caused.
The only staff attribute that is common throughout all the surveys relates to the 
helpfulness of staff, although the wordings of the relevant questions differ throughout the
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surveys. For example, the following table compares the helpfulness of staff questions 
from the 1993 and 1995 CES surveys to the 2003 to 2005 job seeker omnibus surveys.
Table 12.3: Question comparison -  Helpfulness of staff
1993 and 1995 surveys 2003 to 2005 surveys
H ow  often w ou ld  you say that CES staff 
a re  helpfu l?
(a lw ays/m ost of the  tim e /som etim es/ha rd ly  
ever, neve r/can ’t say)
T h ink ing  abou t all your dea ling s  w ith  [Job 
N e tw ork agency] to w ha t ex ten t do you 
agree  or d isagree  tha t they  m ade you fee l 
like they  w an ted  to  help you?
(s trong ly  ag re e /a g re e /n e ith e r a g ree  nor 
d isag ree /d isag ree /s tong ly  d isa g re e /d o n ’t 
know  o r ca n ’t rem em ber)
The question about the helpfulness of staff in the later surveys enables job seekers to 
express satisfaction with their Job Network members because the staff made the job 
seekers feel like they wanted to help, regardless o f whether such help was provided. 
Although the opportunity for higher levels of satisfaction seem more likely with the 
question asked in the later surveys, job seekers rate high levels o f satisfaction for staff 
being helpful in the 1993 and 1995 CES surveys. Similar to other staff attributes, the 
lowest level of satisfaction with staff helpfulness occurs in the 1997 CES survey when 
wide-ranging disruptions were taking place as a result of the implementation o f the 
employment services reform.
Overall, despite the different questions and possible responses, job seekers’ satisfaction 
with the treatment they receive from staff as shown in table 12.2 are reasonably positive 
across all the surveys.
Information quality
The provision o f quality information is one o f the key aspects o f service delivery that 
links into the formation of overall job seekers’ satisfaction with services. Chart 12.3 
outlines job seekers’ satisfaction levels with the ‘accuracy’ and ‘ease o f understanding’ 
information, although data for the 1999 survey was not provided. The chart also shows
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the satisfaction levels of job seekers to the ‘usefulness’ o f information and whether 
information was ‘provided at the right time’ , although this data is only available for the 
period 1993 to 1997 when the CES provided the bulk of employment services.
Chart 12.3: Percentage of customers satisfied with aspects of CES’s and Job 
Network’s information, 1993 to 2005
Job Network
90 -
85 z z  -
75 -
65
Ease of understanding 
Accuracy 
Usefulness 
Available at right time
60
1997 2003 2004 2005
Sources: Survey instruments outlined in Chapter 10.
Chart 12.3 shows that satisfaction with accuracy and ease o f understanding information 
has been consistently high and steady throughout the period from 1993 to 2005. 
However, the usefulness of the information and whether the information was provided at 
the right time is significantly lower. No reason is provided for why the satisfaction level 
for information being available at the right time drops from 84 per cent in 1993 to 
58 per cent in 1995. This period coincides with a changing policy environment with 
increased labour market programs available under the Working Nation initiative and 
structural changes to the employment department brought about by an internal Services 
and Structure Review. Perhaps the decline in information being available at the right 
time is because job seekers expected a greater range o f program options, but did not 
receive timely advice or clear information about the services available.
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Whilst data on the usefulness and timeliness of information was not collected in the Job 
Network surveys, and therefore no comparisons are possible, these attributes have been 
included in chart 12.3 to highlight the differences in the information collected across the 
different surveys. The more recent Job Network surveys may indicate high levels of job 
seekers’ satisfaction to the provision of information, but the data collected is biased 
towards questions that returned high levels of satisfaction in the earlier surveys. Asking 
questions in the later surveys about the usefulness and timeliness of information may 
have revealed a different picture of job seekers’ satisfaction with the provision of 
information.
Measures of satisfaction
Measures of the overall satisfaction of job seekers with employment service providers are 
available for the three different types of assistance -  job matching, job search training 
and intensive assistance -  and as a combined overall satisfaction measurement.
Satisfaction with job matching services
Job seekers’ satisfaction with job matching services can be tracked from 1997 to 2005. 
The figure was not collected in 1995 because this survey placed emphasis on job seekers’ 
satisfaction with case management services, recognising the increasing emphasis that 
Working Nation placed upon this form of labour market assistance. In the 1993 survey, 
no question was asked directly about overall satisfaction with job brokerage services, but 
a series of questions about the help received from specific aspects of this service that are 
similar in nature to the assistance involved in job brokerage services are covered. For 
example, questions were asked that enquired about job seekers’ satisfaction with:
help looking for a job; 
information on training courses; 
advice on job suitability;
323
Chapter Twelve
• advice on job prospects;
• careers information; and
• advice on how to look for a job.
In chart 12.4, the figure of 93 percent for the 1993 survey has been constructed from 
averaging the responses to these specific aspects related to job brokerage services. 
However, the 93 per cent should not be treated as equivalent to an overall satisfaction 
measurement because it lacks input about job seekers’ satisfaction of general service 
aspects and carries no weightings between the different aspects of service.
Chart 12.4: Percentage of job seekers satisfied with Job Matching 
services, 1993 to 2005
100 r~
Job Network
2003 2004 2005
Sources: Survey instruments outlined in Chapter 10. Note: specific job matching services data is 
not provided in the 1995 CES survey.
The most notable feature of chart 12.4 is the decline in 2001 of job seekers’ overall 
satisfaction level with job matching services from 79 per cent to 56 per cent. The 2001 
survey report explains this low level of satisfaction by reference to the other services 
provided, noting that job search training and intensive assistance delivers additional
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value, or increased services, and this attracts higher levels of satisfaction. However, this 
explanation does not account for the higher levels of satisfaction with job matching 
services in the other surveys. An alternative suggestion is the initial impact of the Job 
Network on job matching services.
Under the first Employment Services Contract, the government’s approach to contracts 
for job matching services was built on a price-competitive basis for an agreed number of 
placements. Agencies were uncertain about the costs of their job matching services and 
the price competitive approach led to employment agencies bidding downwards. Many 
Job Network members that were engaged only in job matching services found their 
businesses financially unviable (Eardley, Abellö and MacDonald 2001). Writers have 
also commented that, even with the benefit of hindsight, Job Network members would 
not have increased their fees for job matching services as the department had made the 
acceptable fee range common knowledge. Furthermore, in some cases the fee finally set 
was below that tendered by the employment agency (Kelly, Lewis, Dockery and Mulvey 
2001, p. 23).
By 2001, the second Employment Services Contract had commenced and adjustments in 
some areas surrounding job matching services had been resolved, but the legacy of a 
period from a year earlier may have remained and been impacting on job seekers’ levels 
of satisfaction. The second contract also altered the make-up Job Network providers. 
For example, the largest private provider in the first contract, Drake Jobseek, did not have 
its contract renewed. Also, the public provider, Employment National, lost most of its 
intensive assistance services and was offered the largest share of job matching services. 
Eardley, Abellö and MacDonald (2001, p. 43) raise concerns about the under funding of 
job matching services and the implications this had for Employment National. From the 
early days of operation, the public provider reported financial losses and eventually, in 
2003, Employment National was disbanded.
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Adjustments to job  matching services were continuing as the third contract period 
commenced in 2003. In acknowledgment o f the problems with job matching services, a 
key feature o f the third Employment Services Contract was extending the service to the 
non-Job Network recruitment industry. In 2003-04, 450 recruitment organisations were 
given ‘Job Placement organisation’ licences, thereby enabling job seekers to have access 
to recruitment agencies and a pool o f vacancies not previously available through the Job 
Network.
Satisfaction with job search training
Job search training services are provided to job  seekers who have been in receipt o f 
income support for three months. These job  seekers are provided with access to services 
aimed at improving job  search skills and increasing job  seeker motivation. The figures in 
chart 12.5 indicate that a high proportion o f job  seekers are satisfied w ith jo b  search 
training services.
Chart 12.5: Percentage of job seekers satisfied with Job Search Training 
services, 1997 to 2005
90 t-----
Job Netw ork
2004
Sources: Survey instruments outlined in Chapter 10.
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The level of satisfaction is not surprising as these job seekers have spent a period 
engaged in job search without success and are now provided with training aimed at 
improving their employment prospects. Perhaps, unintentionally, the design of the Job 
Network pathway for a ‘non-disadvantaged’ unemployed person begins with very low 
levels of intervention that may operate to lower expectations. The increased levels of 
assistance that follow may result in more satisfied customers given the shaping of low 
expectations that has taken place in the previous non-interventionist period. Such 
strategies are discussed in the customer satisfaction literature and were raised in 
Chapter 9. For example, Sheth and Mittal (1996) suggested that firms should concentrate 
on approaches directed towards shaping customer expectations to avoid expectations that 
could lead to dissatisfied customers and lowered profitability.
Satisfaction with intensive assistance services
As with other aspects of the Job Network, intensive assistance services have altered over 
time. Struyven and Steurs (2005) suggest changes introduced as part of the third 
Employment Services Contract were aimed at reducing the parking of hard-to-place job 
seekers. These changes included Job Seeker Accounts and Service Guarantees. The Job 
Seeker Accounts provide Job Network members with access to a pool of funds 
quarantined to specific job seekers for the purchase of certain services or products, such 
as training, clothing and equipment or employer incentives. Although able to be accessed 
after three months of unemployment, the Job Seeker Accounts provide the greatest 
amounts of assistance when job seekers commence their first and second periods in the 
intensive assistance program. The Service Guarantee establishes a set of standards for 
the services that Job Network members must deliver to job seekers, including minimum 
levels of contact. Some commentators view these changes as an admission by the 
government that intensive assistance services have not achieved the employment 
outcomes intended and that a greater prescription of services is required because the 
system lacks incentives for Job Network members to invest in the most disadvantaged of 
job seekers. (Bruttel 2004; Cowling and Mitchell 2003: Eardley 2002a).
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Chart 12.6 indicates the percentage of job seekers that are satisfied with intensive 
assistance services over the period 1995 to 2005.
Chart 12.6: Percentage of job seekers satisfied with Intensive Assistance 
services, 1995 to 2005
90 T-—
Job Network
2004 20051999
Sources: Survey instruments outlined in Chapter 10.
Chart 12.6 indicates sustained high levels o f job seekers’ satisfaction with intensive 
assistance services. The level o f satisfaction during the period when the Job Network 
provides delivery is higher than for the CES, but only by a few percentage points.
The overall high levels of satisfaction reported by job seekers engaged in intensive 
assistance are not surprising. The results confirm the analysis of Marston and McDonald 
(2003), who conducted semi-structured interviews with job seekers undergoing intensive 
assistance and case managers to understand the nature of the social relations involved. 
These authors found that job seekers had an overwhelmingly positive regard for their 
case managers (Marston and McDonald 2003, p. 306). The higher satisfaction levels for 
intensive assistance compared to overall Job Network services are most likely a reflection
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o f the personal relationships that develop and the perception by job seekers their specific 
needs are receiving individualised attention.
Overall satisfaction
The overall satisfaction o f job  seekers with employment services generally, and fo r the 
three major types o f employment services, is plotted in chart 12.7. For 2001, the survey 
results do not provide a figure for the overall levels o f job  seekers’ satisfaction. Grouped 
together the chart shows the more interventionist services rate higher levels o f 
satisfaction.
Chart 12.7: Percentage of job seekers satisfied overall with employment services, 
1993 to 2005
Job Network
------ Overall sat
—• —Job Matching 
—• —Job Search Training 
—♦— Intensive Assistance
Sources: Survey instruments outlined in Chapter 10.
The d ifficu lty  w ith overall satisfaction ratings fo r services delivered by a wide range o f 
providers is that variations between individual providers are not acknowledged. The 
1993 and 1995 surveys indicate that the overall levels o f satisfaction are 75 percent and
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76 per cent, respectively. However, in the 1993 CES survey, levels of overall satisfaction 
varied across CES outlets from 59 per cent to 90 per cent and in 1995, from 62 per cent to 
91 percent. Global satisfaction measures that do not identify the satisfaction ratings of 
individual service providers lose the opportunity to enable poor performing agencies to 
consider the practices of more successful providers and improve their satisfaction ratings 
by adopting such practices.
The department calculates the employment outcome performance of providers according 
to the Star Ratings system and provides access to this information. Expanding the 
reporting arrangements to include measurements of job seekers’ satisfaction levels across 
different Job Network members may facilitate continuous improvement and further assist 
job seekers in their choice of service provider.
Merging the results
As with the previous chapter on job seekers’ satisfaction with Centrelink, each of the 
satisfaction levels for the individual charts that track job seekers’ satisfaction with the 
CES and the Job Network are incorporated into a single chart. Chart 12.8 draws together 
these results and provides a broad longitudinal picture of the satisfaction of job seekers 
for the various attributes of service delivered by employment service providers.
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Chart 12.8: Consolidation of CES and Job Network satisfaction ratings
Job Network
1997 2004
Note: Legend not repeated as Chart provides a consolidated picture.
Unlike the equivalent chart for Centrelink (refer chart 11.12), the results do not show 
increases in the rates of job seekers’ satisfaction over the period coinciding with the job 
seeker omnibus surveys in 2003 to 2005. Although a similar feature to the Centrelink 
results is the general flattening out of satisfaction levels over this later period. Prior to 
2003, chart 12.8 indicates a greater range in satisfaction levels between the different 
surveys.
Overall, the results are not supportive of the Job Network achieving higher levels o f job 
seekers’ satisfaction compared to the satisfaction levels achieved when the CES delivered 
employment services. This result is particularly relevant to the outcomes expected under 
contractualised new public management reforms. This is because the Job Network 
represents a private sector network of providers and yet the resulting satisfaction ratings 
over the successive survey periods are less indicative o f positive changes in satisfaction 
than Centrelink’s results. Although Centrelink is an organisation that is designed around
331
Chapter Twelve
purchaser-provider arrangements it has remained firmly within the public sector and 
theoretically constrained by the associated bureaucratic processes that operate.
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to examine data relating to the satisfaction of job seekers 
to employment assistance over a period when the delivery of these services underwent 
significant restructure. The chapter sought to determine if improvements in 
effectiveness, as measured by end-user satisfaction, improves with the introduction of a 
new delivery system.
The chapter compared similar service attributes across different survey instruments that 
cover the period 1993 to 2005. The longitudinal analysis showed that no observed 
increases in the level of job seekers’ satisfaction have taken place, but that continual 
variation over a range of satisfaction levels for the various service elements is achieved.
New public management calls for reform to the public sector and the whole-scale change 
that contractualised arrangements require are commonly rationalised through the 
improvements that are generated for service effectiveness. This chapter examined end- 
user satisfaction as an indicator of service effectiveness and the findings show 
satisfaction levels have not increased following a change in delivery from a public system 
to private providers, but that job seekers’ satisfaction levels have remained stable within a 
broad range of satisfaction measures.
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Chapter 13: Cross-sectional analysis -  the service 
effectiveness of Centrelink and the 
Department of Veterans’ Affairs
This chapter compares levels of customer satisfaction between the externalised public 
sector delivery arrangements, as represented by Centrelink, to a public sector department 
that did not undergo a structural separation of its delivery services from its policy 
functions, as represented by the Department of Veteran’s Affairs (DVA).
While many customer satisfaction researchers are wary of the difficulties in comparing 
results across different firms and industries, it is not seen as an impossible task. The idea 
is not to “lose sight of the generic aspects of the situation and the generic aspects of the 
goal” (Nicholls, Gilbert and Roslow 1998, p. 246). In this context, Nicholls, Gilbert and 
Roslow, provide as an example, the substantial difference between the timely service of 
piloting a cruise ship out of port compared to setting up pins in a bowling alley, but note 
the service commonality of consumers expecting prompt service in these two divergent 
areas remains the same. In contrast to this example, exploring the customer satisfaction 
of job seekers to Centrelink and comparing this to the satisfaction of veterans to DVA 
appears a feasible and more reasonable undertaking.
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For Centrelink, developing a customer service orientation was paramount and much was 
made of the changed structural arrangements in facilitating this. For example, in 
celebrating the Fifth birthday of the organisation, the Centrelink magazine, Scope, noted 
that, “one of the biggest challenges was to instill a customer service culture into an 
organisation that had traditionally operated along more bureaucratic lines” (Centrelink 
2002b, p. 6). The suggestion in the Centrelink magazine is that the traditional approach 
of the bureaucracy does not emphasise a customer service culture. However, exploring 
the material of the veterans’ affairs portfolio indicates that delivering high quality 
customer service and instilling a customer service focus in staff, is a priority area for this 
traditionally structured bureaucratic department. For instance, the DVA service charter 
states that, “[i]t (the Service Charter) also reminds staff of the importance of high quality 
service delivery and the department’s commitment to honouring those who have served 
in our defence forces.”(DVA, 2003, p. 121).
An encouraging sign is that DVA has been committed to collecting regular customer 
satisfaction data since 1995. Initially, general data on satisfaction was gathered, but from 
1998 the department changed its approach to specific cyclical surveys of the different 
areas of service delivery. These areas include health care cardholders, income support 
recipients and Military Compensation Rehabilitation Services users. As job seekers are 
recipients of unemployment payment, they most closely align to veterans’ affairs’ income 
support recipients and, therefore, it is this sector of the veterans’ affairs customer base 
that will be used for comparison.
It is interesting to note the same marketing research company that undertakes the DEWR 
job seeker omnibus surveys also conducts the veterans’ satisfaction surveys. This 
provides further confidence in comparing the two customer groups as many of the 
questions asked of veterans about general service aspects of the department are similar in 
word construction to the questions asked of job seekers about Centrelink.
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It might also be suggested that as the same research company has been commissioned by 
DEWR and DVA to conduct the customer satisfaction research, similar collection 
methods, analysis of data and presentation of results has taken place.
Chart 13.1 compares the overall satisfaction levels of job seekers with Centrelink 
services, as obtained from DEWR data and Centrelink data, to DVA customers in receipt 
of a D VA pension. The chart does not provide data for 2005 because D V A  did not 
conduct a general veterans satisfaction survey in this year.
Chart 13.1: Percentage of customers satisfied with overall service (veterans, job 
seekers and all Centrelink customers), 1998 to 2005
Veterans
DEWR data - job seekers 
-a -  Centrelink data - all customers 
Centrelink data - job seekers
Chart 13.1 shows the overall satisfaction levels of veterans receiving a D V A  payment is 
very high and is always at or above 90 per cent. Compared to job seekers, veterans 
exceed the satisfaction levels by, a minimum of 10 percentage points in 2002, and by a 
maximum margin of 29 percentage points in 2000. Overall, during the seven year period
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displayed in chart 13.1, the average percentage that veterans’ satisfaction levels exceeds 
job seekers’ satisfaction levels is around 17 per cent.
From the results in chart 13.1 a reasonable conclusion is that DVA is providing higher 
quality services than Centrelink, as reflected in the significantly higher rates of customer 
satisfaction. However, these results need to be interpreted with a great deal of caution as 
a number of factors impact on the very high levels of satisfaction shown by veterans. 
Most veterans have been successful in their most recent income support claim, review or 
appeal (91 percent) and, common to most satisfaction surveys, a positive outcome 
translates into high levels of satisfaction. For job seekers, the outcomes are more 
complex and relate to finding a job or successfully completing an education or training 
course, in addition to receiving income support. At the same time, income support for 
job seekers is reliant on many forms of assessment and participation requirements, 
including the possible loss of payment for not complying with such requirements. Job 
seekers might prefer having minimal contact with Centrelink and may respond with 
higher levels of satisfaction if not compelled to undertake activities and maintain regular 
contact to ensure unemployment payments are continued.
Also, veterans are generally older than those on unemployment payments and the older 
age groups tend to rate the quality of services higher, including with Centrelink’s age 
pension population. This might occur because, unlike younger job seekers, older 
customers have no participation requirements and view their income support as an 
entitlement rather than a handout requiring a reciprocal obligation. In addition, staff may 
treat the elderly with greater respect than younger unemployed job seekers who may be 
blamed for their unemployment status. This show of respect may be particularly 
applicable to veterans, where staff may acknowledge and express admiration for the war 
service their customers gave. Survey findings support this conclusion as the satisfaction 
level of veteran income support customers for the ‘courtesy’ aspect of service delivery 
was rated at 97 per cent in 2004, whereas for job seekers in 2004 one of the main reason 
for dissatisfaction was the negative attitudes shown by Centrelink staff.
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Having regard to the research on customer satisfaction, recognition of the way that 
satisfaction levels are affected by a person’s role in the service delivery process may also 
be a factor. For example, a claimant of unemployment payments may have feelings of 
shame or guilt and be struggling with thoughts of personal inadequacies and frustration at 
their predicament. Such feelings may detract from the service experience for an 
unemployed person. In comparison, a war veteran might approach the service encounter 
with feelings of pride and accomplishment, with the payment defined as a reward for 
services rendered.
Veteran income support customers also tend to rate the services received from veterans’ 
affairs as better compared to other government organisations. For example, in the 2004 
veterans satisfaction survey, 78 per cent of the survey’s respondents rated DVA as better 
than other government organisations they have had dealings with. This finding suggests 
that other government organisations, perhaps unaware of the veteran-status of their 
clients, do not approach aspects of their service delivery in the same way as DVA.
Whilst using DVA as a comparison against the Centrelink arrangements is not an ideal 
benchmark, it does provide some indication of the quality of services that can be 
delivered by an established public bureaucracy. That is, the findings demonstrate that a 
publicly-owned and operated organisation structured on a bureaucratic model that 
combines policy and service delivery can deliver high quality services as defined by 
end-user customer satisfaction.
Conclusion
The validity of comparing Centrelink customers with veterans is questioned because of 
the different ways that the organisations may treat their customers and the recipients’ 
different participation in the service process. It is suggested the results of the customer 
satisfaction surveys reflect the higher degree of respect that may be shown towards 
veterans compared to Centrelink customers. Also, the customer base for each
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organisation may approach the service encounter differently, thereby influencing the 
satisfaction outcomes. The results support this view and show the satisfaction levels of 
veterans are much higher than the satisfaction levels of job seekers and Centrelink 
customers generally. In conclusion, the findings demonstrate that an organisation which 
remains structured along bureaucratic lines whereby service delivery is retained within 
the department is able to achieve high levels of customer satisfaction.
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Chapter 14: Conclusion
Centrelink and the Job Network are high-profile and large-scale examples of the 
application of new public management reform in Australia where service delivery is 
separated from the development and implementation of policy. When announced, the 
government was confident that greater efficiency and effectiveness compared to the 
existing systems of delivery would take place as these outcomes are commonly 
associated with the application of such reform. However, there is continual debate within 
the public sector literature about whether the contractualist form of new public 
management is successful. Taking its cue from government material at the time 
Centrelink and the Job Network were announced, this thesis defined efficiency as cost 
savings and effectiveness as improved customer satisfaction. The thesis then set about 
evaluating whether improvements in these aspects of delivery have taken place.
The evaluation was not seeking to determine whether the structural reforms represented 
by Centrelink and the Job Network are responsible for improving cost efficiency and 
customer satisfaction, as such research requires cause and effect modelling. For example, 
the reasons for improvements might have more to do with the wider environment and 
under the same conditions the previous delivery structures may have produced similar 
cost efficiency and customer satisfaction results. Rather, this thesis undertook the first 
step in the process, by examining whether improvements in cost efficiency and customer
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satisfaction appear to have taken place since the establishment of Centrelink and the Job 
Network.
By way of background, the thesis explored general issues involved in an evaluation 
process, including specific issues relating to the measurement of efficiency and customer 
satisfaction. The background chapters highlighted the wide variation in evaluation 
approaches, but also emphasised the need to ensure that carefully planned and robust 
methods are applied. The various difficulties in forming accurate conclusions about 
directions in cost efficiency and customer satisfaction were also discussed.
The data analysis chapters applied a predominantly longitudinal approach, which 
considered measurements of costs and customer satisfaction ratings over a period of time 
that included a number of years before, during and after the reform. A cross-sectional 
analysis, comparing Centrelink to DVA, provided an opportunity to consider the 
efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery in a structure that separates its delivery 
components as against one that does not.
The longitudinal cost efficiency analysis recognised that while the delivery mechanisms 
may have changed, the programs, at their core, were tasked with providing similar 
services involving the provision of income support and employment services. Initially, a 
broad view was taken and income support and employment programs were grouped 
together to form a broad picture of the total costs of the provision of these services. To 
ensure the comparability of the costs over time, all figures were converted to real terms 
using 2004 dollar values. The focus of the analysis was then narrowed down to a 
program level and the costs separated into the amounts required to fund programs and the 
operational costs of delivering them.
For Centrelink, the findings showed the operational costs of delivering income support 
payments on a per customer basis, compared to the previous delivery arrangement, had 
declined for some payments, but had increased for others. Generally, these costs had 
risen in the case of payment types that involved substantial customer numbers, therefore
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explaining the increased level of overall expenses during the evaluation period. The 
conclusion was that cost efficiency had not improved with Centrelink delivering income 
support payments compared to the previous departmental structure. In relation to 
Centrelink delivering specific efficiency indicators, the analysis showed that Centrelink 
generally functions with net operating losses in meeting the efficiency dividends required 
by government and that the key performance indicator of price per customer is at a 
similar level in 2004 as when Centrelink commenced in 1997.
The situation for the Job Network was more difficult than Centrelink to assess, with more 
assumptions required to match employment programs over time. A broad picture of the 
costs was developed as figures from the annual reports were modified to retain continuity 
in whether expenses related to program costs or operational costs for similar categories of 
employment programs. An analysis of these administered and departmental expenses 
was unable to support cost efficiency improvements, with the Job Network shown to cost 
no less in delivering employment services on a per customer basis than the CES.
In terms of customer satisfaction, specific conclusions are not straightforward given the 
number of companies commissioned to undertake the research, and the various data 
collection techniques, numerous questionnaires and assorted methods of analysis this 
involves, as well as the influences of the wider environment over the course of the 
evaluation period. However, in using the survey results as a general indication of 
customer satisfaction, rather than as accurate portrayals, the analysis showed that job 
seekers maintain a range of satisfaction levels that are consistent with the range reported 
in the satisfaction literature of between 65 per cent and 85 per cent of customers 
generally being satisfied. In the final years of the evaluation period, Centrelink’s 
customer satisfaction ratings from the DEWR job seeker omnibus surveys showed 
increases in satisfaction across all attributes. But, reasons were put forward to suggest 
this may have more to do with the methodology surrounding the surveys, than with actual 
increases in customer satisfaction levels. Another compelling reason for this conclusion 
was that the overall satisfaction levels of unemployment payment recipients from surveys 
conducted by Centrelink over the same period did not indicate similar increases in
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satisfaction levels as shown in the DEWR omnibus surveys. As with the Centrelink job 
seeker satisfaction findings, the satisfaction levels of job seekers to the services provided 
by the Job Network vary over a range, but do not provide a strong indication that levels 
of satisfaction have either increased or declined.
In the cross-sectional evaluation of Centrelink and DVA, the analysis did not provide 
convincing evidence the separated delivery arrangements are performing with greater 
cost efficiency or higher levels of customer satisfaction than a department retaining a 
combined approach to policy and service delivery. In relation to costs, DVA was shown 
to deliver its service and disability pensions at no greater departmental costs per customer 
than Centrelink’s delivery of the age pension and disability support pension. For 
customer satisfaction, the results indicated the satisfaction ratings of DVA’s customers 
far exceeded the satisfaction ratings for Centrelink’s. However, doubt was placed on the 
comparability of the satisfaction ratings for DVA’s veteran customers compared to 
Centrelink’s unemployment payment recipients. Rather than accept the results as an 
indication that the quality of DVA’s services exceeded that of Centrelink’s, the analysis 
concluded that a departmental structure based on the bureaucratic model that combines 
the policy and service delivery functions is able to deliver services that provides their 
customers with very high levels of satisfaction.
Implications for new public management theories
The empirical evidence in this case study questions whether the theories associated with 
new public management, where service provision is separated from policy departments, 
can deliver the expected outcomes. Cost efficiencies do not appear to have improved 
with the establishment of Centrelink and the Job Network and customer satisfaction is 
shown to be highly variable with the results not providing a clear indication that 
improvements in customer satisfaction have taken place.
It may be the case that the introduction of managerialist techniques during the 1980s for 
DSS and the CES, as part of the earlier phase of new public management, led to
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improvements in efficiency and an increased focus on customer satisfaction. As such, 
comparing Centrelink and the Job Network with the structures operating beforehand is a 
comparison of new public management when delivery is externalised to an earlier form 
where modem management techniques were adopted within the bureaucracy.
If improvements in cost efficiency and customer satisfaction since the establishment of 
Centrelink and the Job Network are questionable, it does not mean the theories upon 
which the contractualist form of new public management are built are ill-conceived. 
Rather, the results may reflect the difficulties of translating these theories into practice or 
the lack of clear direction for the most appropriate new public management solution to 
engage in specific situations. In being unable to specify suitable solutions, new public 
management is described as lacking a “sub-model of implementation” (Boyne, Farrell, 
Law, Powell and Walker 2003, p. 155). A sub-model of implementation would indicate 
the specific new public management interventions to apply in certain types of 
organisational situations to be assured of successful outcomes. However, given the 
number of years that new public management has been discussed, applied and evaluated, 
it may be the new public management set of ideas are incapable of constructing an 
implementation sub-model. Under this scenario, research is unable to prove or disprove 
the merits of the theories that underlie new public management. This feature is not 
unique to this set of organisational theories. Numerous other theories of organisational 
design are proposed, but none of these theories, or the practices related to them, offer 
universal solutions for producing the most efficient and effective outcomes.
In some instances a contingency view is put forward that seeks to provide an 
organisational solution to suit specific contexts. Such is the case with public choice 
theory that outlines situations for when a hierarchy is superior to a market. These 
situations relate to the capacity for assets to be put to alternate uses, the level of 
uncertainty generated by information imbalances and the number of suppliers. In this 
way, public choice theory recognises that private sector firms are not inherently designed 
to deliver services more efficiently and effectively than the bureaucracy. In light of this, 
Niskanen (1971, p. 218) suggested that experiments to determine whether the supply of
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public services should be undertaken by bureaucracy or private firms would lead to a 
large part of the bureaucracy surviving “this challenge by improving its own performance 
to equal or exceed that of other forms of organisation”.
An extreme contingency view questions the search for appropriate structures or practices 
to apply in certain situations, suggesting the influence of internal and external variables is 
so substantial the appropriate choice of design is indefinable and the results never certain. 
In any case, the contingency view is at variance with the way new public management 
has been adopted and the emphasis placed by reformers on private sector management 
practices and market-based mechanism as the optimal solution for delivering services in 
the most efficient and effective ways. That is, a contingency approach would consider 
each situation on its merits, with private sector structures and practices neither more nor 
less superior than those of the public sector. Ultimately, if the outcomes of new public 
management are uncertain and the theories that support their introduction are unable to 
provide sound direction on issues involving their implementation, then the wide-ranging 
adoption of reform based upon them is questioned.
Future research
The Howard government sought public consultation on their proposed employment 
services reforms, but these consultations involved peripheral matters, particularly related 
to the obligations of job seekers or the structure of incentives in contracts for employment 
service providers. In terms of the substantive structural direction, involving a reduced 
delivery role for the bureaucracy, the establishment of a specialised delivery agency and 
the development of a competitive employment services market, the government was 
firmly committed to introducing a reformed services delivery framework. The extent to 
which the basic framework for the reform or the final detailed structure of operations 
relied upon a knowledge and understanding of new institutional economics is uncertain, 
but is unlikely to have been a dominant factor.
344
Chapter Fourteen
The government did consider a departmental review of the Working Nation employment 
programs and although subsequently found to be methodologically lacking22, the results 
were part of the justification for introducing the employment services reform. However, 
a failure of programs does not necessarily equate with a failure in the programs’ delivery 
mechanisms or of the organisational structures surrounding these. Blame could equally 
be placed upon the theories underlying the interventions supported by the programs. One 
argument is the Working Nation programs were not in operation long enough to allow for 
a meaningful evaluation of their impacts to take place. Notwithstanding, the programs 
were abolished prior to the commencement of the Job Network, revealing that ending 
significant and large-scale programs do not require structural reform to take place and 
that reduced program costs should not be wholly attributed to the Job Network.
It is more plausible to assume the employment services reform in Australia reflect a 
certain way of looking at perceived problems and how these might be resolved. This 
perception relates to the fundamental purpose of the bureaucracy, its role in the success 
or failure of programs and the operation of incentives in competitive markets. Such 
views are not certainties, but are beliefs that should be openly questioned and discussed.
Accordingly, with structures such as Centrelink and the Job Network reflecting such 
beliefs, research on their impacts and performances should be ongoing. Following on 
from this thesis, research may consider the implications for cost efficiency and customer 
satisfaction of the October 2004 administrative changes. Alternatively, other evaluative 
methods might be applied or different aspects of performance evaluated and compared to 
the previous delivery structures. For example, Chapter 2 explored operational issues that 
are commonly discussed in the literature as negatively impacted in the process of public 
sector reform. These issues included accountability, policy capacity, performance 
management and citizen responsiveness. The impact of Centrelink and the Job Network 
on these areas are possibilities for future research. Overall, despite the number of years
22 Refer to research by P. Junankar and C. Kapuscinski (1997)
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since Centrelink and the Job Network were established, many issues remain uncertain 
and the area is disposed to a great deal of further research.
Conclusion
During the course of the twentieth century the size and influence of public bureaucracies 
expanded greatly and concerns associated with the level of bureaucratic power in shaping 
and directing government policies were raised. It is not surprising the adoption of 
approaches, such as new public management, questioning the role of the bureaucracy 
would achieve popularity. However, despite the valid questioning of bureaucracy’s role, 
the platform upon which reform progressed was the wastage and inefficiencies that arise 
out of inappropriate incentive systems that operate in the public sector.
Evaluative research, such as that undertaken in this thesis, questions whether 
bureaucracies that combine service delivery and policy within single organisations are as 
inefficient and ineffective as the theories behind the contractualist form of new public 
management would suggest. Furthermore, the widespread and swift adoption of these 
types of new public management reform has raised genuine issues about possible 
negative consequences and issues such as policy coherence, strategic capacity and 
accountability are commonly discussed. In the case of developing nations, numerous 
writers have cautioned against the widespread adoption of new public management 
reforms that seek market-based delivery solutions given the lack of formal control 
systems in these countries and the opportunities for fraud and corruption that operate 
(Borins 1998; Schick 1998).
In practice, the examples of Centrelink and the Job Network suggest that new public 
management reforms may become less desirable over time. In the case of Centrelink, the 
agency remained within the public sector, but its design sought to incorporate private 
sector practices and a degree of autonomy. For example, service agreements with 
purchasing departments specified respective roles within a quasi-contractual framework 
and a Board of Management, that included representatives of the private sector, was
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responsible for setting overall strategic directions and assisted in establishing a 
management structure that was at arm’s length from government. However, the location 
of Centrelink within the social security portfolio blurred the distinctions between policy 
and delivery, with political imperatives taking precedence over the autonomous design 
structure (Halligan 2004). The administrative rearrangements of October 2004, that 
removed Centrelink from the social security portfolio and placed the agency within the 
new Department of Human Services, also dissolved Centrelink’s Board and re­
established a more traditional public sector structure of accountability. In speaking about 
the role of the department, the human services Minister noted that “the Government is 
keen to have a more direct ministerial role in the running of these Agencies” and that 
“these Agencies will now report directly to me through the Secretary of the Department 
of Human Services” (Hockey 2005, p. 3).
Similarly, the Job Network, designed to become a fully competitive market with the 
business of the CES being outsourced to private firms, has over time been placed under 
increased restriction from the government with the degree of specification escalating in 
each successive employment services contract (Thompson and Marston 2006). This 
feature exposes the new public management dilemma of enabling providers to be 
innovative and flexible, while at the same time preventing undesirable behaviours23. This 
tendency for increasing government control has also been recognised in the British 
experience of new public management where denationalisation has led to “the 
introduction of massive regulation” (Lane 2001, p. 44).
As is often the case with reform, the swinging pendulum may be slowing as the 
shortcomings and risks of restructured service delivery reveal themselves. In the case of 
Centrelink and the Job Network the current arrangement may be less progressed than its
23 For example, in the Senate Estimate Committee Hearings of June 2001, Opposition members 
raised the issue of a Job Network member securing, through their subsidiary company, 15-hour 
employment contracts that paid job seekers less than the job matching placement fee for such an 
outcome (Senate Employment, Workplace Relations, Small Business and Education Committee 
2001, pp. 98 -  104). The subsequent investigations of this specific case resulted in revised 
departmental guidelines and the recovery of payments from the Job Network member that 
exceeded $500,000.
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designers envisaged. For example, despite the initial thoughts of Centrelines chief 
executive officer and the Secretary of the social security portfolio that Centrelink could 
be operating within a competitive environment, this has not eventuated. Likewise, 
commentators on the Job Network note the reduced opportunities that new providers have 
to enter the market and indicate that it is less meaningful to describe the structure as 
competitive, with the government opting for stability rather than greater competition 
(Eardley 2002a). Overall, this thorough examination of government annual reports, 
financial statements and customer satisfaction surveys, provides no clear evidence that 
efficiency and effectiveness have improved since Centrelink and the Job Network were 
established. Perhaps as the body of evidence increases that casts doubts upon the 
assumptions held by some that public sector delivery is wasteful and inefficient and that 
private sector organisations are inherently competent and efficient, governments may turn 
their attention towards successful organisations that demonstrate efficient and effective 
service delivery and focus on understanding how this success is achieved.
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C r o s s ta b u la t io n  A n a ly s is  S ta te  B r e a k d o w n  o f  R e s u l ts
O r im a
R e s e a r c h
135
A u g u s t  2 0 0 4  -  
M a y  2 0 0 5
J o b  S e e k e r  O m n ib u s  S u rv e y  - A p p e n d ix  M : 
C r o s s t a b u la t io n  A n a ly s is  T y p e  o f  A s s is ta n c e
O r i m a
R e s e a r c h
6 2
A u g u s t  2 0 0 4  -  
M a y  2 0 0 5
J o b  S e e k e r  O m n ib u s  S u rv e y  - A p p e n d ix  O : O m n ib u s  
Q u e s t io n n a i r e
O r im a
R e s e a r c h
3 6
2 0 0 5 E m p lo y e r  s u r v e y  -  R e c r u i tm e n t  in  th e  2 1 SI C e n tu r y  
( B a c k g r o u n d )
W a l l i s 1
2 0 0 5 P e r c e p t io n s  o f  C e n t r e l in k  -  S u m m a r y  r e p o r t  f o r  2 0 0 5 O r im a
R e s e a r c h
5
J u n e  2 0 0 5 C e n t r e l i n k  S e r v ic e  Q u a l i ty O r i m a
R e s e a r c h
2 3
J u n e  2 0 0 5 R e g is t r a t io n  a n d  M u tu a l  O b l ig a t io n O r i m a
R e s e a r c h
13
J u n e  2 0 0 5 C o n ta c t  w ith  C e n tr e l in k O r im a
R e s e a r c h
6
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